JUDGMENT : H.P. SANDESH, J. 1. This matter is listed for admission. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and also the learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This second appeal is filed against the concurrent finding. The factual matrix of case of plaintiffs before the Trial Court in O.S.No.64/2009 while seeking the relief of declaration to declare that the Mulageni right of the defendant in respect of the scheduled plot has been duly terminated and they have entitled to get joint vacant possession of the suit schedule property plot after dismantling the building therein and to direct the division of schedule plot into two equal shares by metes and bounds. It is urged that the grandfather of the 2 nd plaintiff i.e., father’s father, late Brahmayya Shetty was the owner of the plaint ‘A’ schedule property bearing Sy.No.127/5A measuring 0.05 acres situated at Puttur kasaba Village, Puttur Taluk. The late Brahmayya Shetty had created a Mulageni lease in respect of 0.14 acres of land in Sy.No.127/5A in favour of one Gunapala Shetty as per registered document No.l-27/1951 dated 10.01.1951 of Sub-Registrar, Puttur that is marked as document Ex.P.1, the said Gunapala Shetty died in the year 1958, his leasehold rights in the above land was inherited by his Aunt Smt.Chinnamma since he was not having any issues. The Mulageni rights so inherited by her was purchased by the wife of one Varisena Shetty, namely Bharathi Kumari in the year 1960. The said Varisena Shetty is the younger brother of the 1 st plaintiff’s husband and 2 nd plaintiff’s father late Yuvaraj. The husband of the defendant started running a shop in the building situated in the plot on payment of rent in the year 1970. Thereafter, in the year 1975, the defendant purchased Mulageni right in respect of the above plot from the wife of Varisena Shetty, namely Bharathi Kumari, while purchasing the Mulageni right, the defendant deliberately changed the boundary description of the plot and mentioned the wrong boundaries quite contrary to the earlier Mulageni deed, at any rate, the terms of the earlier Mulageni deed dated 10.01.1951 is binding on the defendant as the defendant is claiming Mulageni right under the said document. The defendant is estopped from disputing the terms of the said document. The defendant is estopped from disputing the terms of the said document. The Mulageni right in respect of the above plot in Sy.No.127/5A remained with late Brahmayya Shetty till his death in the year 1968. He died intestate leaving behind his sons Yuvaraj and Varisena Shetty as his legal heirs, therefore, late Yuvaraj and Varisena shetty had acquired the entire Mulageni right over the plot. Thereafter, the defendant purchased the half Mulageni right held by aforesaid Varisena Shetty in the year 1984. However, in the aforesaid sale deed, it is fraudulently stated that the said Varisena Shetty sold the entire Mulageni right over the plot. In fact half Mulageni right remained with late Yuvaraj who never sold his share of half Mulageni right to anybody. Subsequently, the mutation was wrongly made showing as if the defendant has acquired the entire Mulageni right in respect of the plot based upon the aforesaid sale deed. The father of the 2 nd plaintiff, late Yuvaraj, being aggrieved by the said mutation order, preferred an appeal before the Assistant Commissioner of Puttur as per RRT.SR.39/2006-07 which is now pending for enquiry. As per terms of the Mulageni deed dated 10.01.1951, the original Mulageni tenant namely Gunapala Shetty could not alienate his Mulageni right or any portion thereof. Further, it was also stipulated that in case of such alienation, the Mulagar/landlord is entitled to take possession of the property if the Mulageni holder fails to pay the annual rent at Rs.120/-. The Mulageni right in respect of the portion of the plot is purported to be obtained by the defendant and as such, she is able to pay the Mulageni right in respect of the scheduled part. The defendant was paying the annual Mulageni till the year 2000 to the father of the 2 nd plaintiff, late Yuvaraj. Thereafter, the defendant has failed to make payment of Mulageni to the father of the 2 nd plaintiff, late Yuvaraj or after his death, to the plaintiff. The plaintiff being the only legal representative of the late Yuvaraj, entitled to half Mulageni right of late Yuvaraj in the above plot. As per the terms of the Mulageni dated 10.01.1951, the plaintiffs are also entitled to cancel the Mulageni of the defendant and seek possession of the above plot. The plaintiff being the only legal representative of the late Yuvaraj, entitled to half Mulageni right of late Yuvaraj in the above plot. As per the terms of the Mulageni dated 10.01.1951, the plaintiffs are also entitled to cancel the Mulageni of the defendant and seek possession of the above plot. The plaintiff got issued legal notice on 14.10.2008 to the defendant to make payment of arrears of Mulageni from 31.12.2000 to 21.12.2007. The defendant instead of making payment of the arrears of Mulageni, by admitting the Mulageni right (Landlordship) of the plaintiffs, the defendant has denied the right of the plaintiffs to collect the Mulageni in a reply notice dated 31.10.2008 and also sent a demand draft of Rs.420/-, the plaintiffs have not accepted the same amount as the defendant has denied the Mulagar right of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs have returned the said D.D vide rejoinder notice dated 12.01.2008, as such the plaintiffs are also entitled for joint possession of the above plot apart from seeking division and partition of their Mulagar right. The plaintiffs are now deemed to be in joint constructive possession of the plaintiffs’ property and hence, sought for the relief by invoking Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, since the plaintiff has terminated the Mulageni of the defendant and hence, entitled for the relief of the relief as claimed in the plaint. In pursuance of the suit summons, defendant has appeared through her counsel and filed written statement contending that plaintiffs claimed contradictory reliefs. At one place, relief of declaration of joint vacant possession is claimed and at in another place, there is a prayer for direction to quit and surrender vacant joint possession. There is an alternative claim of partition of the property. These reliefs are untenable and confusing and trying to assert right which does not exist both on facts and in law. She admitted to the extent of 0.14 acre of land in Sy.No.127/5A of Puttur Kasaba Village had been leased on 10.01.1951 to Gunapala Shetty. She has given correct boundaries and she purchased only 0.05 acre out of 0.14 acre. Hence, there cannot be same boundary for larger area as well as smaller area. The sale deed dated 03.01.1975 executed by Smt.Bharathi Kumari in her favour is not for the whole 0.14 acre which Smt.Bharathi Kumari had acquired. She has given correct boundaries and she purchased only 0.05 acre out of 0.14 acre. Hence, there cannot be same boundary for larger area as well as smaller area. The sale deed dated 03.01.1975 executed by Smt.Bharathi Kumari in her favour is not for the whole 0.14 acre which Smt.Bharathi Kumari had acquired. She purchased the Mooli right under sale deed dated 17.10.1984 from Varisena Shetty relating to portion of 0.5 acre only and not for entire 0.14 acre. Therefore, when the entire 0.14 acre has been alienated to different parties without the presence of all the parties and without keeping in mind the distinction regarding extent of property, the plaintiffs have made reckless and false allegations and put forward untenable claim in the plaint. There cannot be a partition out of the 5 cents plot. The proper boundaries of the property purchased by her has already been decided in past. The Yuvaraj and Varisena Shetty in O.S.No.20/1961 on the file of Civil Judge at Mangalore, a final decree for partition took place on 31.03.1971. At that time, the portion of the property measuring 0.4 acre in Sy.No.1 had been set apart without bringing it for partition in view of the pendency of R.F.A.No.38/1986 before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore as specifically mentioned in paragraph No.VI(iii) of the final decree. Further, in paragraph No. VII(ii) it has been stated that the extent of the said property and its income was subject to the result of the appeal mentioned above and hence, it was left open. 3. It is further contention that Yuvaraj got the land in ‘A’ schedule only to the extent of 0.89 acre in Sy.No.127/5A. On 20.07.1960, Bharati Kumari wife of Varisena Shetty purchased Mulageni right from Chinnamma just at a time when the late Brahmayya Shetty had obtained decree for arrears of rent and was about to auction the Mulageni property. The property was purchased by Bharati Kumari giving boundaries in two portions of 9 cents plus 5 cents, totally 14 cents in conformity with the description of the property given in the deed dated 10.01.1951 entered into between Brahmayya Shetty and Gunapala Shetty. The property was purchased by Bharati Kumari giving boundaries in two portions of 9 cents plus 5 cents, totally 14 cents in conformity with the description of the property given in the deed dated 10.01.1951 entered into between Brahmayya Shetty and Gunapala Shetty. In the original lease deed dated 10.01.1951, there was no unconditional and clear absolute forfeiture clause, contingency and alienation of Mulageni right by the tenant would lead to payment of higher annual rent of Rs.120/- per year, instead of Rs.80/- per year at the auction of Mulagar. This auction had been exercised long back by Yuvaraj by filing proceedings in the Court. Therefore, the present plaint proceeds on a wrong foundation regarding termination of the Mulageni tenancy. The Mulageni became absolute with no forfeiture clause, particularly after option had been exercised to claim higher rent, Yuvaraj was therefore stopped from exercising any right of forfeiture of Mulageni. The plaintiffs as representatives of Yuvaraj are equally estopped accordingly. The appeal in R.F.A.No.38/1996 mentioned in paragraph No.4 supra had been compromised along with R.F.A.No.49/1966 on 07.07.1971. As per this compromise, R.F.A.No.38/1966 filed by Bharathi Kumari wife of Varisena Shetty was allowed. She was declared as absolute owner of the Mulageni interest purchased by her as per sale deed dated 22.07.1960. Further, it was declared that the Mulageni interest does not belongs to the family. In the same decree, the property purchased by Yuvaraj on 07.09.1946 was held to be his absolute property, it was compromise decree. All the persons interested were parties to it. Smt.Vasantha, 1 st plaintiff herein being wife of Yuvaraj was also party to that proceedings. Thus, the dispute has been settled, the compromise partition decree mentioned in paragraph No.4 supra, insofar it related to Sy.No.127/5 is concerned, declared it as the property belongs to Bharathi Kumari, the Mooli right if at all remained with her husband Varisena Shetty only because the family gave up the rights even by modifying the preliminary decree, so, Yuvaraj did not retain any right in the said property. The defendant in the written statement in total denied the title of the plaintiffs. The defendant in the written statement also denied that not paid the payment to late Yuvaraj till the year 2000. The defendant in the written statement in total denied the title of the plaintiffs. The defendant in the written statement also denied that not paid the payment to late Yuvaraj till the year 2000. The entire Mulageni for the whole plot is Rs.120/-, for the portion of the 0.5 acres assuming that Yuvaraj had half share, amount of annual rent payable would be a title more than Rs.20/- per year. She also contributed Rs.20/- per year, though from the year 1984 onwards, she was not liable to pay rent to anybody. When the plaintiffs have come out with allegation that Yuvaraj collected rent from her, it is a very clear case where alleged forfeiture has been waived and assignee of tenancy is recognized as direct tenant. Therefore, Yuvaraj himself could not have sought eviction of her in view of Section 112 of TP Act. He had not sought eviction, alienation by Chinnamma in favour of Bharathi Kumari and from Bharati Kumari to her (this defendant) and all these assignments have been accepted by Yuvaraj as per the plaint averments and hence, there is complete waiver of the alleged forfeiture. The notice dated 20.12.1974 issued by Yuvaraj to Nagaraja Shetty another tenant, he had mentioned that Mulageni property was kept undivided and Bharathi Kumari was the Mulageni tenant of the property of 0.14 acre. In the reply dated 31.10.2008, she (defendant) has pointed out the correct fact. After pointing out that she has become owner of the property, she has clarified that she being in occupation of 0.5 acre only, claimed putforth by the plaintiffs for Rs.60/- as Mulageni is without any basis. She has not really denied the title as such, of the plaintiffs, she has also pointed out that she is not required to pay rent. To avoid litigation, she has tendered the amount of Rs.420/- claimed by the plaintiffs, which has been refused and returned by the plaintiffs. Therefore, plaintiffs cannot rely upon the tendering of money to support their untenable case. She has not denied the title of the plaintiffs, Section 106 of T.P Act does not apply because there is no monthly tenancy in this case. Hence, the very claim made by the plaintiffs that plaintiffs are entitled for the relief cannot be accepted. The entire concept of plaintiffs having half Mulagar right is not correct. She has not denied the title of the plaintiffs, Section 106 of T.P Act does not apply because there is no monthly tenancy in this case. Hence, the very claim made by the plaintiffs that plaintiffs are entitled for the relief cannot be accepted. The entire concept of plaintiffs having half Mulagar right is not correct. The plaintiffs seeking for a partition or eviction of the defendant is illegal and untenable. If it is held that Varisena Shetty had half right as urged by the plaintiffs, then also her Mulageni right remains intact without merger and such Mulageni being non-terminable. The relief of eviction of what is mentioned half portion of Mulageni holding is not tenable. 4. It is also contended that on account of advent of Karnataka conferment of ownership on Mulageni or Vola Mulageni Tenant Act, 2011, Mulageni and Vola Mulageni having been abolished, the suit of the plaintiffs is not maintained before a Civil Court in view of the specific bar on jurisdiction contained under Section 10 of the Act, she has effected valuable improvements in the property. The property of 0.57 cents is not physically divisible into two portion of half share each. For any reason the Court comes to the conclusion that partition has to takes place, this defendant is entitled to exercise the option under the Act to purchase the alleged half Mulagar right of the plaintiffs and in equity. 5. That Trial Court having considered the pleadings of the parties framed the following issues and also additional issues: 1) Whether the plaintiffs prove that the Mulageni of the defendant in respect of schedule plot has been duly terminated? 2) Whether the plaintiffs prove that they are entitled for ½ Muli right in the suit schedule property? 3) Whether the plaintiff prove that the defendant changed the boundary description of the plot? 4) Whether the plaintiff proves that she is entitled for joint possession of suit schedule property? 5) Whether plaintiffs prove that the defendant is not entitled for any protection under section 106 of T.P.Act? 6) Whether the defendant proves that Moolageni became absolute with no forfeiture clause and as such plaintiffs are estopped? 7) Whether the defendant proves that there is a compromise partition decree in relation to survey No.127/5A and in view of the said decree late Yuvaraj did not retain any right over the plaint schedule property? 6) Whether the defendant proves that Moolageni became absolute with no forfeiture clause and as such plaintiffs are estopped? 7) Whether the defendant proves that there is a compromise partition decree in relation to survey No.127/5A and in view of the said decree late Yuvaraj did not retain any right over the plaint schedule property? 8) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to mesne profits? 9) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief as claimed in the suit? 10) What order or decree? Additional Issue on 11-04-2011 1) Whether the plaintiff proves that she is entitled for ½ share in the suit schedule property by metes and bounds after removing the super structures therein? Additional Issue on 19-11-2013 1) Whether the court has jurisdiction to try this suit? 6. The Trial Court allowed the parties to lead evidence before the Trial Court. Additional Issue on 11-04-2011 1) Whether the plaintiff proves that she is entitled for ½ share in the suit schedule property by metes and bounds after removing the super structures therein? Additional Issue on 19-11-2013 1) Whether the court has jurisdiction to try this suit? 6. The Trial Court allowed the parties to lead evidence before the Trial Court. The Trial Court having considered both oral and documentary evidence available on record, particularly relying upon the evidence of P.W.1 and D.W.1 and document Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.16 and Ex.D.1 to Ex.D.6, answered Issue No.1 as affirmative in coming to the conclusion that plaintiffs prove that Mulageni of the defendant in respect of schedule plot has been duly terminated considering the issuance of notice and reply and so also in respect of Issue No.2 and 3, answered that they are entitled for half Mulgar right in the suit schedule property and also the defendant changed the boundary description of the plot and answered Issue No.4 does not survive for consideration in view of amendment and also with regard to the Issue No.5 is concerned held that defendant is not entitled for any protection under Section 106 of T.P Act and also comes to the conclusion that Mulageni became absolute with no forfeiture clause and as such plaintiffs are estopped and such defence of the defendant was not accepted and so also with regard to the contention that there is a compromise petition decree in relation to Sy.No.127/5A and in view of the said decree, late Yuvaraj did not retain any right over the plaint schedule property and the said defence of the defendant was also not accepted and both the Issue No.6 and 7 are answered as negative and also answered the Issue No.9 in the affirmative in coming to the conclusion that plaintiffs are entitled for the relief as claimed and with regard to the Additional Issue Nos.1 and 2 are answered as affirmative in coming to the conclusion that plaintiffs are entitled for half share in the suit schedule property by metes and bounds after removing the superstructure therein. 7. 7. Being aggrieved by this judgment and decree, an appeal is filed before the Appellate Court in R.A.No.9/2020 and Appellate Court having considered the grounds which have been urged in the appeal memo, formulated the point whether the grounds are made out to allow the IAs’ filed for reopening the case and to frame an additional Issue as prayed in I.A.No.7 and whether grounds are made out to allow the I.A.No.8 and permit the appellant/defendant to amend the written statement as prayed in the application and also whether the Trial Court has appreciated the evidence placed on record and the reasons assigned for dismissal of the suit are not proper and also whether the grounds are made out to dismiss the suit. The Appellate Court having re-assessed both oral and documentary evidence, answered all the issues as negative and confirmed the judgment of the Trial Court particularly considering the material on record in paragraph No.39 considering the Muageni document Ex.P.1 dated 10.01.1951 and also transfer of the Mulageni right in favour of Bharathi Kumari under a registered transfer deed dated 22.07.1960 by Smt.Chinnamma and also considering the document Ex.D.1 and Ex.D.2 which are the compromise decrees passed in R.F.A.No.38/1966 and R.F.A.No.45/1966 would also confirm the Mulageni right of the defendant and detail discussion was made with regard to the subsequent document and so also with regard to the notice was issued demanding rent in terms of Ex.P.3 and also reply in terms of Ex.P.5 and comes to the conclusion that admittedly the defendant has purchased the Mooli right and her so called purchase is the Mulageni right only and not accepted the case of defendant with regard to the purchase of the right and particularly considering the document Ex.P.8 and provision of under 111(g) of Transfer of Property Act is to be looked into and the same is discussed in paragraph No.41 and considering both oral and documentary evidence available on record, comes to the conclusion that the Trial Court has not committed any error in granting the relief and the same is only a Mooli right which was given. In paragraph No.46 comes to the conclusion that under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act is restricted to the denial of the title at the commencement of the tenancy and also taken note of Judgment of Apex Court reported in 1999 AIR SC 3584 (S.Thangappan V/s P.Pandmavathi) and the same is discussed in paragraph number 46 and comes to the conclusion that judgments which have been relied upon are not applicable to the facts of the case on hand and an observation is made that in fact the Trial Court rightly appreciated the material placed on record and observed the fact that Mulageni of the defendant is duly terminated by the provisions of law and also about the title of the plaintiffs over the property in question was considered and hence, the Trial Court has not committed any error in granting the relief as sought and hence, confirmed the judgment of the Trial Court. 8. Being aggrieved by the concurrent finding, the present second appeal is filed before this Court. The main contention of the counsel appearing for the appellant before this Court is that the Trial court and also the First Appellate Court committed an error in considering the material on record, whether the alternative relief of partition and separate possession granted by the Trial court is arbitrary and illegal inasmuch as suit for partition and separate possession of only the property alienated without including the entire joint family property is not maintainable. The counsel would vehemently contend that both the Courts have committed an error in holding that the judgment and decree in R.F.A.No.38/1966 and R.F.A.No.45/1996 as per Ex.D.1 and Ex.D.2, the compromise decree passed therein does not confer absolute right to Bharati Kumari wife of Varisena Shetty and consequently to the purchaser, defendant and the very said approach of the both the Courts is erroneous. 9. The counsel also would vehemently contend that both the Courts erred in ruling that there is no merger of Mulageni right and the ownership rights inspite of registered sale deed dated 22.07.1960, Ex.D.3, Mulageni sale deed dated 30.01.1975, Ex.D.5 and the registered sale deed dated 17.10.1984, Ex.D.6 and the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court is arbitrary and fails to consider the merger of Mulageni right and ownership rights inspite of these sale deeds. The counsel also vehemently contend that when the joint family lost their absolute rights over the possession by virtue of acknowledging and confirming the Mulageni in favour of Bharathi Kumari as her absolute property and as not belonging to the joint family, such a suit for partition and separate possession is not maintainable and fails to take note of all these factors into consideration. Both the Courts have also erred in holding that defendant had suffered forfeiture under Section 111(g) of Transfer of Property Act. Though the denial is not at the inception of tenancy, but by virtue of subsequent event, that is sale deed dated 17.10.1984 as per Ex.D.6 and compromise decree in R.F.A.No.37/1996 dated 07.07.1991 and the said denial is bonafide, but the Trial Court and Appellate Court committed an error and hence, this Court has to admit and frame substantive question of law. 10. The counsel in support of his argument also relies upon the judgment reported in (1999) 7 Supreme Court Cases 474 in case of S.Tangappan V/s P.Padmavathy and brought to notice of this Court paragraph No.14 wherein discussion was made with regard to denial of title is concerned and also brought to notice of this Court paragraph No.15 and contend that approach of both the Courts is erroneous. 11. The counsel also relies upon the judgment reported in LAWS(SC)-1987-9-22 in case of D.Satyajnarayana V/s P.Jagadish and brought to notice of this court paragraph No.4 denial of title and with regard to the derivative of title. 12. The counsel also relied upon the judgment reported in LAWS(SC)-2002-3-27 in case of Sheela V/s Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash and also brought to notice of this Court paragraph No.18 with regard to the plea which is not malicious with denial of title compelling landlord to prove his rights of ownership to protect tenancy are held to be beyond the scope of Section 116 of T.P Act. 13. Learned counsel for respondents would submit that this second appeal is filed against concurrent finding and both the Courts considered question of fact and question of law. Learned counsel for respondents in support of his argument relies upon the synopsis and contend that Late Brahmayya Shetty (grandfather of plaintiff) had leased Sy.No.127/5A measuring 0.14 acres situated in Puttur, Kasaba Village, Puttur to one late Gunapala Shetty through a Mulageni deed dated 10.01.1951 i.e., as per Ex.P1. Learned counsel for respondents in support of his argument relies upon the synopsis and contend that Late Brahmayya Shetty (grandfather of plaintiff) had leased Sy.No.127/5A measuring 0.14 acres situated in Puttur, Kasaba Village, Puttur to one late Gunapala Shetty through a Mulageni deed dated 10.01.1951 i.e., as per Ex.P1. The Mulageni tenant Gunapala Shetty expired and Mulagini tenancy was inherited by Chinnamma, since she was not having any legal heirs and on the death of Gunapala Shetty in the year 1958, she had executed a Mulageni tenancy right in favour of Smt. Bharathi Kumari on 22.07.1960 and only Mulageni tenancy right was purchased and not the ownership. The counsel also would submit that original owner i.e., Mulagar Brahmayya Shetty expired leaving his two sons named Yuvraj and Varisena Shetty in the year 1968. It is also contented that defendant purchased suit schedule property to an extent of 0.5 acres from Bharathi Kumari and thereby, she became the Mulageni tenant of schedule property on 03.01.1975. The defendant had purchased only Mulagar's right from Varisena Shetty and therefore, the Mulagar's right of Yuvraj remained with him on 17.10.1984. Consequent upon the same, when the revenue entries were made, RRTSR No.39/2006-07 is filed by Yuvraj challenging the Mutation before the Assistant Commissioner in favour of the defendant. Subsequently, the plaintiffs issued a legal notice demanding arrears of rent on 14.10.2008 and the same is served and reply was given on 31.10.2008 in terms of Ex.P5 denying the right and title of the plaintiffs and right to collect the rent and also paying sum of Rs.420/- as rent. Hence, the rejoinder was sent back by the plaintiffs returning the rent of Rs.420/- on 12.01.2008. Subsequently, notice of termination of tenancy was issued on 20.02.2009. The suit was filed claiming half share on 28.03.2009 in the schedule property and possession of it. 14. The Trial Court having considered both oral and documentary evidence granted the relief on 01.02.2020 which is challenged on 11.03.2024 in R.A.No.9/2020 and the same was confirmed by the First Appellate Court. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents would vehemently contend that admittedly, Brahmayya Shetty was the owner of Sy.No.127/5A measuring 0.14 acres situated at Puttur, Kasaba Village, Puttur is not in dispute. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents would vehemently contend that admittedly, Brahmayya Shetty was the owner of Sy.No.127/5A measuring 0.14 acres situated at Puttur, Kasaba Village, Puttur is not in dispute. The grandfather, Brahmayya Shetty had leased the above land through a registered Mulageni deed in favour of Gunapala Shetty and Brahmayya Shetty became the Mulagar and Gunapala Shetty became the Mulageni tenant and under the registered Mulageni deed, the tenant was prohibited from alienating the property. The tenant was also liable to be evicted for non-payment of rental. The counsel also would vehemently contend that when the Mulageni tenant Gunapala Shetty had expired in the yehar 1958, the same was succeeded by Smt.Chinnamma and in turn, she had executed a document to the extent of 0.05 acres. In the meanwhile, Mulagar passed away in the year 1968 and the same was succeeded by Yuvraj and Varisena Shetty. But the interest of Yuvraj was not transferred to anybody else. Hence, he is entitled to receive the rent and also to evict the tenants. Though, the defendant had purchased Mulagar's right only from Varisena Shetty, therefore, the other co-owner Yuvraj continued to be the co- owner/Mulagar of the schedule property. Hence, the Trial Court rightly taken note of the said material on record and only after full-fledged trial, passed an order and suit has been decreed. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents, in support of his argument relied upon the judgment in M/S. INDIA UMBRELLA MANUFACTURING CO. AND OTHERS V. BHAGABANDEI AGARWALLA (DEAD) BY L.R.’S AND OTHERS reported in AIR 2004 SC 1321 and brought to notice of this Court principles laid down in this judgment that one co- owner can file eviction suit and suit filed jointly by two co- owners, one co-owner cannot withdraw his consent midway to prejudice of other co-owner. The counsel also brought to notice of this Court discussion made in paragraph No.6 and so also paragraph No.7 and contend that by merger, entire interest of landlord must get merged in tenant’s and in order to bring the tenancy to an end the merger should be complete, i.e., the interest of the landlord in its entirety must come to vest and merge into the interest of tenant in its entirety. When part of the interest of the landlord or the interest of one out of many co-landlords-cum-co-owners comes to vest in the tenant, there is no merger and the tenancy is not extinguished. The counsel relying upon this judgment would vehemently contend that the very contention of learned counsel for the appellant that plea of merger taken by the defendant cannot be accepted. 16. The counsel also would vehemently contend that the Trial Court has taken note of Section 111(g)(2) of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 while considering the material on record. Hence, there is no substantial question of law to be framed and both the Courts have taken note of question of fact and question of law and it is not a case for framing any substantial question of law. 17. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for respondents and also the principles laid down in the judgments referred supra by learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondents, no dispute with regard to the principles laid down in the judgments of the Apex Court which have been relied upon by the appellant as well as respondents. Before considering the principles laid down in the said judgments, the Court has to look into the facts of the case on hand. It is not in dispute that property originally belongs to Brahmayya Shetty, who is the grandfather of the plaintiffs and also it is not in dispute that grandfather of the plaintiff was having two sons i.e., Yuvraj and Varisena Shetty. It is also not in dispute that original owner late Brahmayya Shetty, grandfather of the plaintiffs was the owner of land in Sy.No.127/5A to an extent of 0.14 acres and he had also executed a Mulageni deed on 10.01.1951 in terms of Ex.P1 in favour of Gunapala Shetty. It is also not in dispute that he died intestate and was not having any legal heirs and hence, Chinnamma succeeded to Mulageni tenancy in respect of the property. The plaintiffs also not dispute the fact that Bharathi Kumari had purchased Mulageni tenancy from Chinnamma in the year 1960. It is also not in dispute that he died intestate and was not having any legal heirs and hence, Chinnamma succeeded to Mulageni tenancy in respect of the property. The plaintiffs also not dispute the fact that Bharathi Kumari had purchased Mulageni tenancy from Chinnamma in the year 1960. But, when Mulagar died in the year 1968, the defendant purchased Mulagar’s right only from Varisena Shetty, one of the sons of Mulagar and not from Yuvraj on 17.10.1984 and purchased the suit schedule property to an extent of 0.5 acres from Bharathi Kumari and thereby, became the Mulageni tenant of schedule property is not in dispute in terms of the document of the year 1975. 18. It is also contented by the plaintiffs before the Trial Court that this defendant continued to pay rent till 2000 and there is a specific pleading. But, in order to substantiate the same that the rent was paid till 2000, there is no documentary proof produced before the Court. However, when the legal notice was issued in terms of Ex.P3 to the defendant, wherein arrears from 2000 to 2007 was claimed, the defendant gave reply in terms of Ex.P5, wherein paid the rent of Rs.420/-. However, learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant would vehemently contend that the same was paid only in order to avoid the dispute between the parties and not denied the title. But, the contention of the respondents is that while giving such reply, title is also denied. Hence, it is not in dispute that an amount which was paid to the tune of Rs.420/- was sent back to the plaintiffs and thereafter, notice of termination was given. 19. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant would vehemently contend that plaintiffs ought not to have relied upon Section 111(g) of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and brought to notice of this Court with regard to forfeiture is concerned and contend that both the Courts have committed an error with regard to forfeiture is concerned. The counsel appearing for respondents also brought to notice of this Court that in the written statement, specifically denied the right of plaintiffs with regard to title as well as other claim made by the plaintiffs. 20. The counsel appearing for respondents also brought to notice of this Court that in the written statement, specifically denied the right of plaintiffs with regard to title as well as other claim made by the plaintiffs. 20. Having perused the proviso under Section 111(g) of Transfer of Property Act with regard to ‘Determination of lease’ is concerned, the proviso is very clear that, (g) by forfeiture; that is to say, (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that, on breach thereof, the lessor may re-enter; or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself; or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event; and in [any of these cases] the lessor or his transferee [gives notice in writing to the lessee of] his intention to determine the lease. 21. Having perused the proviso, Section 111(g)(2) is very clear that in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself, the merger comes into play. Having perused the written statement, it is very clear that the defendant has denied the very title. Apart from that the defendant claimed right in respect of remaining half share through Varisena Shetty. When such being the case, I do not find any error on the part of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court in invoking Section 111 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, since there is a categorical denial of title of the plaintiffs by the defendant in the written statement. 22. The other contention of learned counsel for the respondents is with regard to merger is concerned in view of Mulageni deed and sale deed executed by Bharathi Kumari in the year 1975 as well as in the year 1984 respectively as per Exs.D5 and D6. I have also pointed out that no dispute with regard to the document dated 03.01.1975 and 17.10.1984 as per Exs.D5 and D6 and the same is with regard to purchase of Mulageni right. I have also pointed out that no dispute with regard to the document dated 03.01.1975 and 17.10.1984 as per Exs.D5 and D6 and the same is with regard to purchase of Mulageni right. When such being the case, in view of the judgment relied upon by learned counsel appearing for respondents with regard to merger is concerned, the same comes to the aid of the respondents with regard to determination of tenancy is concerned, wherein the merger would be complete when the interest of the landlord in its entirety vests into the interest of tenant in its entirety and the same is not found and the purchase is made only from Varisena Shetty and not from plaintiffs’ interest. Hence, I do not find any force in the very contention of appellant with regard to merger is concerned. 23. No doubt, learned counsel appearing for the appellant also relied upon the judgment in S. THANGAPPAN’s case, paragraph No.14 is in respect of denying of title is concerned, an elaborate discussion is made that tenant once inducted as a tenant by a landlord, later he cannot deny his landlord's title. Thus, this principle of estoppel debars a tenant from denying the title of his landlord from the beginning of his tenancy. But, counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that from the beginning, the tenancy is disputed by the appellant. But, having considered the reply given by the appellant in terms of Ex.P5, he had sent the rent to the tune of Rs.420/-. When such being the case, the appellant cannot blow hot and cold and the very contention is that, only in order to avoid the dispute between the parties, the same was sent. But, admittedly, the rent was sent is not in dispute. When such being the case, I do not find any error on the part of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court and both the Courts have taken note of issue between the parties and also factual aspects and also question of law while considering the material on record, particularly Section 111(g)(2) of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was invoked by both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. When such being the case, having considered the material on record, I do not find any error on the part of both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court in considering the material on record. When such being the case, having considered the material on record, I do not find any error on the part of both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court in considering the material on record. Hence, it is not a case to invoke Section 100 of CPC and not made out any ground to admit the second appeal and frame any substantial question of law. 24. In view of the discussion made above, I pass the following: ORDER The regular second appeal is dismissed.