J UDGMENT : KAUSHIK GOSWAMI, J. Heard Mr. M. K. Mishra, learned Amicus Curiae, and Ms. S. B. Choudhury, learned counsel, appearing for the appellant. Also heard Mr. M. P. Goswami, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, appearing for the State respondent. Pertinently on 29.10.2025, noticing that there was no representation on behalf of the appellant, this court appointed Mr. M. K. Mishra to represent the appellant in the instant criminal appeal. However, on 10.11.2025, Ms. S. B. Choudhury, learned counsel, appeared before this court and submitted that she has been engaged to appear on behalf of the appellant after the earlier engaged counsel for the appellant shifted his practice from Guwahati. This court accordingly on the same date gave liberty to both the counsels to present arguments for the accused/appellant. 2] The present appeal is directed against the judgment & order dated 06.01.2014, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nagaon (hereinafter referred to as the “trial court”), in Sessions Case No. 319 (N)/2005, whereby the accused/appellant was convicted under Section 304 Part-II of the INDIAN PENAL CODE , 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”) and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 7 (seven) years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- only, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for another period of 3 (three) months. 3] The case of the prosecution is that on 30.05.2005 one Billal Uddin, i.e., PW-1 lodged a written ejahar alleging, inter alia, that on 29.05.2005 at about 12.30 pm a quarrel took place between his wife/deceased, i.e., Ayesha Khatun and his brother Najrul’s wife, Mustt. Manjila Khatun, i.e., the accused/appellant. At that time suddenly the accused/appellant inflicted injury on the head of his wife with a piece of bamboo. He then immediately took his wife to the Civil Hospital at Samaguri, and after treatment, he took his wife to his house, and on 30.05.2005 at about 3.30 pm his wife died at his house. Accordingly, a case was registered under Sections 325 /302 of the IPC. After completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer laid the charge-sheet under Sections 325 /302/34 of the IPC against the accused/appellant and her husband Md. Najrul Islam. However, the trial court framed charges under Section 302 /34 of the IPC against the accused persons. 4] During the trial, the prosecution examined as many as 7 (seven) witnesses, including PW-1 (informant/husband), PW-2 Musst. Najrul Islam. However, the trial court framed charges under Section 302 /34 of the IPC against the accused persons. 4] During the trial, the prosecution examined as many as 7 (seven) witnesses, including PW-1 (informant/husband), PW-2 Musst. Noorjahan Begum (mother-in-law of both the accused and the deceased/claimed sole eye witness), PW-3 Musstt. Sharifa Begum (reported witness/sister-in-law of both the accused and the deceased), and PW-4 Md. Ahmod Ali (reported witness/brother of the deceased), PW-5 Md. Mainuddin (brother of PW-1), PW-6 Dr. Keshabananda Goswami (Medical Officer) and PW-7 Satya Nath Das (Investigating Officer). After closure of the prosecution evidence, the statement of defence of the accused/appellant under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. was recorded, where she denied all the allegations leveled against her and stated that the deceased pulled her hair & during the scuffle the deceased fell down on a pucca slab, for which she sustained injury. 5] After the conclusion of the argument, the trial court, on the perusal of the case record, did not find any evidence against Md. Najrul Islam, and as such, he was acquitted of the charge under Section 302 /34 of the IPC, and was set at liberty forthwith. However, the trial court found the accused/appellant guilty and convicted & sentenced her thereof for the offence under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. Situated thus, the present appeal has been preferred. 6] Mr. M. K. Mishra, learned Amicus Curiae, appearing for the appellant, submits that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused/appellant assaulted the deceased with a bamboo stick, causing her death. He further submits that the sole eyewitness, i.e., PW- 2, being the mother-in-law of the accused/appellant and the deceased, in view of the fact that she herself admits that she has lost her vision, her testimony as regards witnessing the manner of the assault is highly doubtful. He further submits that the benefit of doubt accordingly ought to have been given to the accused/appellant. 7] Ms. S. B. Choudhury, learned counsel, appearing for the appellant, further adds that there is no legal and cogent evidence against the accused/appellant in this case, and the so-called eyewitness, i.e., PW-2, is totally belied for her contradictory evidence, and also the prosecution witnesses are self-contradictory in their evidence. 7] Ms. S. B. Choudhury, learned counsel, appearing for the appellant, further adds that there is no legal and cogent evidence against the accused/appellant in this case, and the so-called eyewitness, i.e., PW-2, is totally belied for her contradictory evidence, and also the prosecution witnesses are self-contradictory in their evidence. She further submits that the so called eyewitness, i.e., PW-2, totally failed to prove the case in all important and vital facts in law; however, the trial court ignored all these contradictions and sentenced the accused/appellant on an erroneous finding. 8] Per contra, Mr. M. P. Goswami, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, appearing for the State respondent, submits that the trial court has properly assessed the evidence on record and, upon proper reasoning, convicted and sentenced the accused/appellant. He further submits that the evidence clearly shows the scuffle between the accused/appellant and the deceased, and the Medical Officer’s evidence corroborates the head injury, which has been caused by the accused/appellant, resulting in the death of the deceased. He accordingly submits that the impugned judgment and conviction warrant no interference from this appellate court. In support of his aforesaid submission, he relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh – vs- Kalicharan and Ors ., reported in (2019) 6 SCC 809 . 9] I have given my prudent consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsels for both the parties and have also perused the material available on record. I have also duly considered the case law cited at the bar. 10] The accused/appellant has questioned the legality of the conviction primarily on the grounds that (i) the sole eyewitness is unreliable and physically incapable of witnessing the incident, (ii) the medical evidence does not support the ocular version, (iii) death occurred almost a day later due to lack of timely treatment, and (iv) the prosecution failed to establish the causal nexus between the alleged injury and death. 11] The issue arising for determination in the present appeal is whether the prosecution has established through cogent and reliable evidence that the accused/appellant assaulted the deceased with a bamboo stick; and/or whether the alleged assault was the cause of death; and/or whether the ingredients under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC are made out; and/or whether the conviction can be sustained or the accused/appellant is entitled to benefit of doubt. 12] Before adverting to the evidence of the sole eyewitness, PW-2, let me first examine the evidence of PW-1, who is the husband of the deceased and the informant in the present case. He deposed that he was working as a helper to a carpenter at a distance of about half a kilometer at the time the incident took place. He further deposed that his elder daughter Mamtaj rushed and informed him that the accused/appellant had given a blow on the head of his wife/deceased with a piece of bamboo. He further deposed that when he came home he found his wife/deceased injured and saw a bleeding injury on her head. He further deposed that on his query, his wife told him that the accused/appellant had a scuffle with her and injured her by giving her a blow on her head with a piece of bamboo. He then came to the Khatowal Police Station and informed them about the incident, and they took the injured to the Samaguri Hospital. He further deposed that after being treated by a doctor, he brought his wife home, and on the next day at about 2.30 P.M., his wife had died. He further deposed that the police then came on information given by the villagers and took the dead body to the Police Station, and seized the piece of bamboo. During cross-examination he clarified that police had interrogated him. The house of his and his brother Nazrul is nearby; his house is on the north side of the road, and the house of his brother Moinuddin is on the west side of his house, where he lives with his family. He further clarified that the incident took place on 30.5.2005 at 9.30 am. He further clarified that on the day of the incident he was working at a distance of about half a furlong away, and he did not see the incident of scuffle. He denied the suggestion that his daughter Mamtaj had told the police that Nazrul Islam had broken the head of her mother by beating her. He further clarified that after coming home, he found his wife/deceased inside the house injured. He denied the suggestion that he had not said that the accused/appellant had given a blow from behind with a bamboo stick. He further clarified that there were concrete slabs lying in between his and the accused/appellant’s house. He further clarified that after coming home, he found his wife/deceased inside the house injured. He denied the suggestion that he had not said that the accused/appellant had given a blow from behind with a bamboo stick. He further clarified that there were concrete slabs lying in between his and the accused/appellant’s house. He further clarified that he cannot say if his wife/deceased fell down on the slab and got injured. He further clarified that at first he took his wife to the Khatowal Police Station and informed them about the incident at the police station, and police then sent them to the Samaguri Hospital. He further clarified that the deceased was not admitted to the hospital and was sent back after doing a bandage, and on the next day his wife died. After the death of the deceased, he had lodged a written Ejahar. He denied the suggestion that he had lodged a false case. He clarified that he did not see the piece of bamboo in the court that day. 13] PW-2 deposed that PW-1, and Nazrul Islam are her sons and the accused/appellant is her daughter-in-law. She further deposed that about two years back from the date of deposition, one day at about 9.00 am her two daughters-in- law the deceased and the accused/appellant, got involved in a scuffle regarding a jackfruit tree. She further deposed that her three sons were staying in separate houses constructed on one katha of land, which are adjacent to each other. She further deposed that when the incident took place, she was staying with her second son. She further deposed that on Sunday when the deceased came back from the field after leaving the goats for grazing, the accused/appellant had given her a blow on the head with the end of a piece of bamboo about one and a half hands long in front of the house of the deceased. She further deposed that while the deceased was lying, Nazrul came. She further deposed that the strips of bamboo went inside the head of the deceased and the head was broken, and there was continuous bleeding. She further deposed that on Monday in the evening at about 4 P.M. after returning from Samaguri, the deceased had died. She further deposed that while the deceased was lying, Nazrul came. She further deposed that the strips of bamboo went inside the head of the deceased and the head was broken, and there was continuous bleeding. She further deposed that on Monday in the evening at about 4 P.M. after returning from Samaguri, the deceased had died. She further deposed that police had interrogated her twice, once at the home and again on Tuesday in the daytime at the Khatowal police station. She further deposed that at the time of the incident none of her sons were present in the house. During cross-examination she clarified that her age is about 80 years, the powers of the eyes have been lost, it is difficult to identify people, and that she has been brought by PW-1. She further clarified that PW-1 has not brought her after tutoring to adduce evidence. She further clarified that there was a jackfruit tree at the boundary of Nazrul and PW- 1’s house and there was a scuffle between the accused/appellant and the deceased regarding the jackfruit tree. She further clarified that at the time of the scuffle between them, she was in the house of her brother. The house of her brother is at a distance of 3 furlongs, and after returning from the house of her brother, she found that they were fighting, and though she tried to stop them, they did not listen. She clarified that the deceased did not fall on the stones. 14] PW-3 deposed that at the time of the occurrence she was at home, but she did not see the occurrence. She was declared hostile by the prosecution but the prosecution, failed to divulge anything from her in support of the prosecution case. 15] PW-4 deposed that he did not see the occurrence, but on being asked, the deceased reported to him that the accused/appellant assaulted her; however, during cross- examination, he clarified that he had never told before the police in his statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. that the deceased reported him for the alleged occurrence. 16] PW-5 the youngest brother of the PW-1 deposed that when he came home in the evening, his mother PW-2 and PW-3 told him that the deceased was assaulted by the accused/appellant. 16] PW-5 the youngest brother of the PW-1 deposed that when he came home in the evening, his mother PW-2 and PW-3 told him that the deceased was assaulted by the accused/appellant. During cross-examination the defence confronted his said evidence and brought out the fact that he had never told the said fact before the I.O/PW-7 during his examination under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. 17] PW-6 the Medical Officer, who conducted the post- mortem over the deceased on 31.05.2025 deposed that on examination he found the following: - “A. Physical examination: Oblique stitched wound over right frontal region of the scalp 1" x 1" B. Injury One transverse fracture on the frontal bone. C. Rest of the scalp are healthy D. On opening the scalp, membrane and brain matter found congested and there was subdural (clotted blood was present) E. Rest of the viscera of chest, thorax, abdomen are found congested. F. Uterus was five months size. On section of the uterus a dead male foetus of 20 weeks was found. G. Ante-mortem clotted blood present in the injury over the scalp.” He further opined that death was due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of head injury and accordingly exhibited the post-mortem report as exhibit-4. During cross-examination he clarified that if the proper treatment had been provided to the deceased at proper time, there was chance of survival of the deceased. 18] PW-7, who is the Investigating Officer of the case, deposed that he investigated the case, and during the investigation he went to the place of occurrence on 29.12.2005 and came to know that there was a scuffle between the accused/appellant and Nazrul Islam with the deceased. Subsequently, on the following day, i.e., on 30.5.2005, the deceased died. Thereafter an inquest was conducted on the dead-body of the deceased. He further deposed that he sent the dead body for post-mortem examination. He further deposed that during the investigation he arrested Nazrul Islam and the accused/appellant and sent them to judicial custody. He recorded the statement of the witnesses, and after completion of the investigation the charge-sheet against Nazrul Islam and the accused/appellant was submitted. He further deposed that P.W.3 stated before him that she witnessed the incident from her house and saw accused/appellant assaulting on the head of Ayesha Khatun by a piece of bamboo. He recorded the statement of the witnesses, and after completion of the investigation the charge-sheet against Nazrul Islam and the accused/appellant was submitted. He further deposed that P.W.3 stated before him that she witnessed the incident from her house and saw accused/appellant assaulting on the head of Ayesha Khatun by a piece of bamboo. In his cross-examination he clarified that he seized one piece of bamboo stick but he has not sent the same for FSL examination and denied that he has not investigated the case properly. 19] What transpires from the above is that the deceased died after about 29 hours, but her statement was not recorded by the police, although her husband, i.e., PW-1, took her to the police station on 29.05.2005, and police sent her to Civil Hospital, Samaguri, for treatment, and on 30.05.2005 at about 2.30 pm she expired. The evidence of PW-1 that the deceased reported him is not supported by any reliable evidence; rather, the statement of PW-1 before the police was that his daughter Mumtaz reported to him that the accused/appellant assaulted the deceased, totally belying his evidence. 20] Upon careful examination and analysis of the evidence of the sole eyewitness, i.e., PW-2, it appears that PW-2 had lost eyesight or suffered from severe visual impairment. Her ability to witness the event as narrated is therefore unhesitatingly doubtful. It further appears that she has categorically stated in her cross-examination that she was half a kilometer away at her brother’s house at the time of the quarrel and that she later claimed that she lifted the injured from the spot. It further appears that she deposed that she was not present at home when the quarrel took place. It further appears that she vacillates regarding whether there was a pucca slab near the tube well. It further appears that her version is contradicted by her statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., which is confirmed by the Investigating Officer/PW-7. It further appears that though she narrated a clear assault with a bamboo stick on the head of the deceased, PW-6 the Medical Officer, found only a 1? × 1? injury. On the contrary, neither external marks consistent with the force of a bamboo blow nor fractures consistent with a forceful hit appear to be discernible from the medical evidence. It further appears that though she narrated a clear assault with a bamboo stick on the head of the deceased, PW-6 the Medical Officer, found only a 1? × 1? injury. On the contrary, neither external marks consistent with the force of a bamboo blow nor fractures consistent with a forceful hit appear to be discernible from the medical evidence. 21] It is well-settled law that when ocular testimony is inconsistent with medical evidence in particulars, the benefit must go to the accused ( Refer :- Kamaljit Singh – v- State of Punjab , reported in (2003) 12 SCC 155 ). Thus, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are unsafe for sustaining the conviction. It is clearly established from the record that the death occurred nearly after 29 hours later; the deceased did not die immediately and died on the next day at around 2.30 pm; no timely medical treatment was provided. PW-6 has categorically clarified during cross-examination that “If timely treatment had been given, the deceased could have survived.” This statement itself breaks the chain of causation and weakens the prosecution case that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In such a situation when death admittedly occurred due to lack of proper treatment, the accused/appellant cannot be held liable for culpable homicide unless the injury is shown to be inherently sufficient to cause death. It appears that the only injury found was simple. To attract Section 304 Part-II of the IPC, the act must be done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death. [ Refer :- State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya , reported in (1976) 4 SCC 382 ], and Kalicharan (supra)]. 22] In the humble understanding of this court, a 1? × 1? injury that the Medical Officer/PW-6 says was survival with timely care cannot satisfy this requirement. Hence, the essential ingredients of Section 304 Part-II are not established. That apart, it is clearly evident that there are serious lapses in the investigation. The bamboo stick alleged to have been used for assaulting the deceased was not sent to the FSL. It further appears that, it was not exhibited in the trial court. In fact, the sketch map of the place of occurrence appears to be missing. It further appears that the original case diary was not available and the PW-7/Investigating Officer deposed from copies. It further appears that, it was not exhibited in the trial court. In fact, the sketch map of the place of occurrence appears to be missing. It further appears that the original case diary was not available and the PW-7/Investigating Officer deposed from copies. It further appears that the F.I.R. was lodged after 29 hours without explanation despite the police station being 3 kilometers away. Most pertinently, Mamtaz, the daughter of the deceased, was not examined. 23] In Kali Ram – vs- State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (1973) 2 SCC 808 , the Apex Court has reiterated that a defective investigation combined with weak evidence entitles the accused to acquittal. That apart, the suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. Apt to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh – vs- Wasif Haider and Others , reported in (2019) 2 SCC 303 . Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid decision reads as under: - “22. In the instant appeals before us, the prosecution has failed to link the chain of circumstances so as to dispel the cloud of doubt about the culpability of the respondent-accused. It is a well-settled principle that a suspicion, however grave it may be cannot take place of proof i.e. there is a long distance between „may be? and „must be?, which must be traversed by the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt [see Narendra Singh v. State of M.P.5]. 23. This Court in Kailash Gour v. State of Assam, has held that: (SCC pp. 50-51, para 44) ‘44. The prosecution, it is axiomatic, must establish its case against the accused by leading evidence that is accepted by the standards that are known to criminal jurisprudence regardless of whether the crime is committed in the course of communal disturbances or otherwise. In short, there can only be one set of rules and standards when it comes to trials and judgment in criminal cases unless the statute provides for anything specially applicable to a particular case or class of cases.’ (emphasis supplied)” 24] It is well settled that in criminal jurisprudence, where two versions are possible, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other pointing to the guilt of the accused, the one favourable to the accused must be adopted. Apt in this regard to extract two paragraphs of the decision of the Apex Court in the aforesaid case of Kali Ram (supra) , which read as under: - “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. Rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by report to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures. 26. It needs all the same to be re-emphasised that if a reasonable doubt arises regarding the guilt of the accused, the benefit of that cannot be withheld from the accused. The Courts would not be justified in withholding that benefit because the acquittal might have an impact upon the law and order situation or create adverse reaction in society or amongst those members of the society who believe the accused to be guilty. The guilt of the accused has to be adjudged not by the fact that a vast number of people believe him to be guilty but whether his guilt has been established by the evidence brought on record. Indeed, the Courts have hardly any other yardstick or material to adjudge the guilt of the person arraigned as accused. Reference is sometimes made to the clash of public interest and that of the individual accused. The conflict in this respect, in our opinion, is more apparent than real. As observed on page 3 of the book entitled „The Accused? by J. A. Coutts 1966 Edition, „When once it is realised, however, that the public interest is limited to the conviction, not of the guilty, but of those proved guilty, so that the function of the prosecutor is limited to securing the conviction only of those who can legitimately be proved guilty, the clash of interest is seen to operate only within a very narrow limit, namely, where the evidence is such that the guilt of the accused should be established. In the case of an accused who is innocent, or whose guilt cannot be proved, the public interest and the interest of the accused alike require an acquittal?” 25] In the present case the prosecution version is shaky and contradicted; the defence version of falling during a scuffle is probable and consistent with medical evidence. In the case of an accused who is innocent, or whose guilt cannot be proved, the public interest and the interest of the accused alike require an acquittal?” 25] In the present case the prosecution version is shaky and contradicted; the defence version of falling during a scuffle is probable and consistent with medical evidence. The purpose of Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. is to provide the accused with a reasonable opportunity to explain the adverse circumstances that have emerged against him during the course of the trial. A reasonable opportunity entails putting all the adverse evidence in the form of questions so as to give an opportunity to the accused to articulate his defence and give his explanation. In the case of Naresh Kumar – vs- State of Delhi , reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 1641 , the Apex Court has held as under: “16. In this context, the maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit-"the act of court shall prejudice no one", has also to be looked into. In the decision in Oil and Natural Gas Company Limited v. Modern Construction and Company, this Court held that the court has to correct the mistake it has done, rather than to ask the affected party to seek his remedy elsewhere. In the context of the decisions referred above, there can be no doubt that in a charge for commission of a serious offence where extreme penalty alone is imposable in case the accused is found guilty, procedural safeguards ensuring protection of right(s) of accused must be followed and at any rate, in such cases when non-compliance of the mandatory procedure capable of vitiating trial qua the convict concerned is raised and revealed from records, irrespective of the fact it was not raised appropriately, it must be considered lest the byproduct of consideration of the case would result in miscarriage of justice. Being the Court existing for dispensation of Justice, this Court is bound to consider and correct the mistake committed by the Court by looking into the question whether non- examination or inadequate examination of accused concerned caused material prejudice or miscarriage of justice. We may hasten to add here, that we shall not be understood to have held that always such a mistake has to be corrected by this Court by examining the question whether material prejudice or miscarriage of justice had been caused. We may hasten to add here, that we shall not be understood to have held that always such a mistake has to be corrected by this Court by examining the question whether material prejudice or miscarriage of justice had been caused. In this context, the summarization of law on the subject of on consequence of omission to make questioning incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution evidence and the ways of curing the same, if it is called for, by this Court in the decision in Raj Kumar Suman v. State (NCT of Delhi), assumes relevance. Paragraph 16 of the said decision reads thus:- "17. The law consistently laid down by this Court can be summarized as under: (i) It is the duty of the Trial Court to put each material circumstance appearing in the evidence against the accused and separately. The specifically, distinctively material circumstance means the circumstance or the material on the basis of which the prosecution is seeking his conviction;" (ii) The object of examination of the accused under Section 313 is to enable the accused to explain any circumstance appearing against him in the evidence; (iii) The Court must ordinarily eschew material circumstances not put to the accused from consideration while dealing with the case of the particular accused; (iv) The failure to put material circumstances to the accused amounts to a serious irregularity. It will vitiate the trial if it is shown to have prejudiced the accused, (v) If any irregularity in putting the material circumstance to the accused does not result in failure of justice, it becomes a curable defect. However, while deciding whether the defect can be cured, one of the considerations will be the passage of time from the date of the incident; (vi) In case such irregularity is curable, even the appellate court can question the accused on the material circumstance which is not put to him; and (vii) In a given case, the case can be remanded to the Trial Court from the stage of recording the supplementary statement of the concerned accused under Section 313 of CrPC. (viii) While deciding the question whether prejudice has been caused to the accused because of the omission, the delay in raising the contention is only one of the several factors to be considered. 17. (viii) While deciding the question whether prejudice has been caused to the accused because of the omission, the delay in raising the contention is only one of the several factors to be considered. 17. In view of the circumstances obtained in this case, factually and legally, it is also relevant to refer to paragraph 20 of the decision in Raj Kumar's case (supra) and it reads thus:- "21. Even assuming that the defect or irregularity was curable, the question is whether today, the appellant- accused can be called upon to explain the said circumstance. More than 27 years have passed since the date of the incident. Considering the passage of time, we are of the view that it will be unjust now at this stage to remit the case to the Trial Court for recording further statement of the appellant under Section 313 of CrPC. In the facts of the case, the appellant cannot be called upon to answer something which has transpired 27 years back. There is one more aspect of the matter which persuaded us not to pass an order of remand. The said factor is that the appellant has already undergone incarceration for a period of 10 years and 4 months.? 21. We have already held that whether non- questioning or inadequate questioning on incriminating circumstances to an accused by itself would not vitiate the trial qua the accused concerned and to hold the trial qua him is vitiated it is to be established further that it resulted in material prejudice to the accused. True that the onus to establish the prejudice or miscarriage on account of non-questioning or inadequate questioning on any incriminating circumstance(s), during the examination under Section 313 , Cr. P.C., is on the convict concerned. We say so, because if an accused is ultimately acquitted, he could not have a case that he was prejudiced or miscarriage of justice had occurred owing to such non-questioning or inadequate questioning.” 26] Undoubtedly, the standard of proof is not the same when it comes to the accused proving the explanation given under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. The accused merely has to probabilize his defence (Refer: - Reena Hazarkia vs State of Assam , reported in 2019 13 SCC 289 ). In the instant case it is clear that right from the initial opportunity, i.e., cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, the defence has tried to probabilize the fact that the deceased had fallen on a pucca slab, apart from taking the said plea in his defence under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. 27] That apart, PW-1 has categorically clarified during cross-examination that there is a pucca slab at the place of occurrence, and he cannot say as to whether his wife had fallen on the said slab and had injured her head. 28] In the facts of the foregoing, it is abundantly clear that the prosecution could not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused/appellant had assaulted the deceased, for which she sustained injury on her head, resulting ultimately in her death. Merely because there was a quarrel between the accused/appellant and the deceased, however strong the suspicion may be, the same is nonetheless not sufficient to convict the accused/appellant. Therefore, a reasonable doubt having arisen in the mind of this court as regards the innocence of the accused/appellant, the benefit must go to the accused/appellant. As such, the accused/appellant deserves to be acquitted. 29] That being so, the judgment & order dated 06.01.2014, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nagaon, in Sessions Case No. 319 (N)/2005, is hereby set aside. 30] Accordingly, the appellant is acquitted of all the charges. The bail bond furnished by the appellant accordingly, stands discharged. 31] Resultantly, the criminal appeal stands allowed. 32] Before closing the matter, this court expresses its appreciation and satisfaction for the assistance rendered by Mr. M. K. Mishra, learned Amicus Curiae, who was appointed by this court vide order dated 29.10.2025 to assist this court on the legal issue involved in the case at hand, and his requisite fees shall be paid by the Assam State Legal Services Authority. 33] Return the trial court record (TCR).