JUDGMENT : Muralee Krishna, J. The common issue in this writ appeal and the writ petition is the entitlement of the writ petitioners for maternity leave, which was denied by the University, stating the reason that the writ petitioners, who are contract employees, did not work for 80 days immediately preceding the date of delivery/leave. 2. The 1st respondent in W.A. No.1430 of 2023/writ petitioner in W.P.(C)No.19230 of 2023 was initially appointed as a guest faculty in DDU Kaushal Kendra (Centre of Knowledge Aquisition and Upgradation of Skilled Human Abilities and Livelihood) under Cochin University of Science and Technology (‘CUSAT’ in short) during the period 03.08.2020 to 29.09.2020. Thereafter, from 30.09.2020 to 29.02.2021, she worked as an Assistant Professor on contract basis in DDU Kaushal Kendra under CUSAT. She was again engaged by the University as a Guest Lecturer during the period 05.11.2021 to 22.02.2022. After this period, she was selected for appointment as Assistant Professor in the Department of Statistics in CUSAT on contract basis for one year and she joined duty on 07.03.2022. This period of contract was extended from 08.03.2023 to 07.03.2024. During this period, the 1 st respondent applied for maternity leave from 10.04.2023 as per letter dated 18.04.2023. However, her claim for maternity leave was denied on the ground that her present term of contract commenced only on 08.03.2023, and therefore, she had not worked for 80 days immediately preceding the date of delivery. This fact was informed to the 1 st respondent by Ext.P8 communication dated 06.05.2023 issued by the Registrar of CUSAT. Though the 1 st respondent again made a request to the Registrar for reconsideration of her application, she was intimated by Ext.P10 communication dated 29.05.2023 that her request was rejected for the reason that the current contract alone can be considered for granting maternity leave. Though the 1 st respondent again made a request to the Registrar for reconsideration of her application, she was intimated by Ext.P10 communication dated 29.05.2023 that her request was rejected for the reason that the current contract alone can be considered for granting maternity leave. Being aggrieved, the 1 st respondent approached this Court by filing W.P.(C)No.19230 of 2023 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following reliefs: “(A) To quash Ext P8 and P10 communications of the 2 nd respondent, denying the legitimate claim of the maternity leave of the petitioner; (B) To issue a writ of certiorari to the extent of quashing the stipulation in Ext P11 GO(P) No. 2/21 finance dated 04.01.2021 to the extent in Clause No.4 no officer shall be entitled to the above benefits unless she has actually worked under the employer for a period of not less than 80 days immediately preceding her expected date of delivery or date of miscarriage; (C) Issue a Writ of Mandamus or such other Writ, Order or Direction directing the 2 nd respondent to grant 26 weeks of maternity leave as provided in Maternity Benefits Act, 1961 or 180 days as provided in the Kerala Service Rules forthwith; (D)To declare that the petitioner is entitled to maternity leave with allowance for 180 days” 3. Respondents 2 to 4 in W.P.(C)No.19230 of 2023 filed a counter-affidavit dated 05.07.2023 opposing the reliefs sought in the writ petition. Paragraph 3 of that counter affidavit reads thus: “3. With respect to the various averments and allegations contained in the above Writ Petition, it is submitted that the term of contract of the petitioner was renewed for one year with effect from 8.3.2023, with break during vacation month, after one-day break on 7.3.2023 under the usual terms and conditions of contract teachers in the University. For each such contract renewal the appointee has to enter into a fresh contract with the University and considered to be a fresh employee. Therefore, the petitioner has notfulfilled the condition to work not less than 80 days immediately preceding the date of delivery. In the said circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to get the maternity benefits.” 4. For each such contract renewal the appointee has to enter into a fresh contract with the University and considered to be a fresh employee. Therefore, the petitioner has notfulfilled the condition to work not less than 80 days immediately preceding the date of delivery. In the said circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to get the maternity benefits.” 4. The learned Single Judge, after hearing the learned counsel on both sides, by relying on the judgment of this Court in Naziya B. and others v. State of Kerala and another [2022 (3) KHC 434] allowed the writ petition. Paragraph 4 and the operative portion of the said judgment read thus: “4. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent University, I am of the opinion that the question raised in the writ petition is quitely covered in favour of the petitioner by the judgment of this Court in Naziya’s case (supra). This Court has, in the aforesaid judgment, clearly held that the artificial break of one day just prior to the renewal of contract has to be ignored for the purposes of determining whether the person concerned is entitled to the benefit of maternity leave. There is no rhyme or reason for this Court to take a different view from the view taken by this Court in the aforesaid judgment. In the result, this writ petition is allowed and Exts.P8 and P10 orders are quashed. The competent among the respondents is directed to consider afresh the claim made by the petitioner for maternity leave taking note of the observations contained in this judgment. The order shall be passed forthwith and at any rate within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. If the petitioner is being allowed any other kind of leave, the petitioner will be permitted to continue on such leave till fresh orders are passed as directed above.” 5. Contending that the judgment in Naziya [2022 (3) KHC 434] relied by the learned Single Judge is under challenge in W.A. No.1527 of 2022 filed by the State of Kerala, the appellants filed the above writ appeal. 6. Contending that the judgment in Naziya [2022 (3) KHC 434] relied by the learned Single Judge is under challenge in W.A. No.1527 of 2022 filed by the State of Kerala, the appellants filed the above writ appeal. 6. The petitioner in W.P.(C)No.27076 of 2024 was initially appointed on 01.07.2019 as Assistant Professor on contract basis in the Division of Computer Science and Engineering at CUSAT for a period of one year with effect from 01.07.2019. Later, the contract was renewed for another one year by the order dated 27.07.2020. During the second term of contract employment, the petitioner took 90 days unpaid maternity leave without allowance from 11.09.2020 to 09.12.2020. However, her request for allowances for the period of leave was rejected by the University by Ext.P5 order dated 03.03.2021, stating the reason that she does not have 80 days of service prior to the maternity leave. The period of contract of the petitioner was renewed for one more year with effect from 05.07.2021 as per the order dated 23.04.2021. Contending that a similarly situated employee was given the benefit of maternity leave in the judgment dated 06.07.2023 in W.P.(C)No.19230 of 2023, the petitioner filed the instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following reliefs: “1. Call for the records relating to Ext.P5 and P9 and quash the same by issuing a writ of Certiorari. 2. To issue a Writ of mandamus directing the respondents to disburse forthwith the maternity benefits due to the petitioners during the maternity leave granted by the respondents. 2A. Declare that the stipulation in Ext.P3 that the petitioner can avail leave without allowance for 90 days is inoperative and stands suspended by G.O.(P) No.2/2021/Fin dated 04.01.2021.” 7. The 2 nd respondent filed a counter affidavit dated12.08.2024 in the writ petition opposing the prayers therein and maintaining the stand taken in W.P.(C)No.19230 of 2023. 8. On 26.05.2025, when W.P.(C)No.27076 of 2024 came up for consideration before the learned Single Judge, noting the pendency of W.A. No.1430 of 2023 before this Bench, the matter was directed to be placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice to tag the writ petition with the writ appeal for a common decision. Accordingly, by the order dated 24.06.2025, the Hon’ble the Chief Justice directed the Registry to tag W.P.(C)No.27076 of 2024 with W.A No.1430 of 2023 pending before this Bench. 9. Accordingly, by the order dated 24.06.2025, the Hon’ble the Chief Justice directed the Registry to tag W.P.(C)No.27076 of 2024 with W.A No.1430 of 2023 pending before this Bench. 9. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants in W.A.No.1430 of 2023, the learned counsel for the 1 st respondent in the appeal, the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(C)No. 27076 of 2024, the learned Standing Counsel for CUSAT and the learned Senior Government Pleader. 10. During the course of arguments, the learned Standing Counsel for CUSAT fairly submitted that W.A. No.1527 of 2022 filed against the judgment in Naziya [ 2022 (3) KHC 434 ] was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court as per judgment dated 24.11.2023. 11. In Naziya [ 2022 (3) KHC 434 ] , a learned Single Judge of this Court held thus: “14. I am of the view that the word "actually" has been consciously used in Exhibit P4 order. From Ext.P1 and P2 appointment orders itself, it is evident that the KUHS is working with minimum number of staff and it was when the same had adversely affected the workflow of the University that recommendations were obtained from the system manager and after reckoning the qualifications and the prior experience of the petitioners in the University that the Vice - Chancellor chose to accord sanction to appoint the petitioners as programmers. It is undisputed that the 1 st and 3 rd petitioners have been working under the 2 nd respondent for the past 9 years and the 2 nd petitioner for the past 5 years. What is stated by the Government in Ext.P4 is that in order to be eligible for the benefits, the employee should have "actually" worked for a period of not less than 80 days immediately preceding her expected date of delivery or date of miscarriage. By employing the word "actually", the Government wanted to include persons such as the petitioners who have been working for years together. Furthermore, I have no doubt in my mind that the artificial break - in of two days inserted between successive contracts cannot be used as a device to deny the benefits to which the petitioners, as female officers, were entitled by way of maternity benefits. Furthermore, I have no doubt in my mind that the artificial break - in of two days inserted between successive contracts cannot be used as a device to deny the benefits to which the petitioners, as female officers, were entitled by way of maternity benefits. This was the view taken by this Court in the judgment dated 08/10/2018 in W.P.(C) No. 19296/2018 wherein this Court had held that the petitioners therein were allowed renewal based on their satisfactory service, the artificial break of one day is only to be ignored.” 12. It was relying on the above finding in Naziya [2022 (3) KHC 434], the learned Single Judge passed the impugned judgment in W.P.(C)No.19230 of 2023. The appeal filed by the State of Kerala against the judgment in Naziya as W.A. No.1527 of 2022 is dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court by the judgment dated 24.11.2023. Paragraph 5 of that judgment reads thus: “5. The maternity leave cannot be treated as a mere statutory right flowing out of statutory provisions. It is an acknowledgement of motherhood and any action depriving maternity leave would be an affront to motherhood. Therefore, maternity leave has a constitutional safeguard and protection. If an employee is engaged continuously for more than one year with an artificial break after the term of 179 days, that artificial break will have to be ignored. The learned Single Judge relied on various precedents deprecating the practice of rejecting the maternity claim to the contractual employees who are engaged for 179 days on a contract basis. We find no reason to interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The writ appeal is dismissed.” 13. From the judgment in Naziya [ 2022 (3) KHC 434 ] which was confirmed by the judgment dated 24.11.2023 in W.A. No. 1527 of 2022, it is clear that the issue in W.P.(C)No.19230 of 2023 as well as in W.P.(C)No.27076 of 2024 are squarely covered in favour of the 1 st respondent in W.A. No.1430 of 2023 and the petitioner in W.P.(C)No.27076 of 2024. In Naziya [2022 (3) KHC 434] , it is clearly held that the artificial break of one day just prior to the renewal of the contract has to be ignored for the purpose of determining whether the person concerned is entitled to the benefit of maternity leave. In Naziya [2022 (3) KHC 434] , it is clearly held that the artificial break of one day just prior to the renewal of the contract has to be ignored for the purpose of determining whether the person concerned is entitled to the benefit of maternity leave. This finding was affirmed in the judgment dated 24.11.2023 in W.A. No.1527 of 2022. In such circumstances, we have no hesitation to hold that W.A. No.1430 of 2023 is liable to be dismissed and W.P.(C)No.27076 of 2024 is to be allowed. In the result, WA 1430 of 2023 stands dismissed. W.P.(C)No.27076 of 2024 is allowed and Exts. P5 order dated 03.03.2021 and P9 order dated 15.05.2024 of the 2 nd respondent in that writ petition are quashed. The 2 nd respondent is directed to consider afresh the claim made by the petitioner for maternity leave, taking note of the observations contained in this judgment. The order shall be passed as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.