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2025 DIGILAW 1894 (KER)

Abhiram Namboothiri S/o Narayanan Namboothiri v. State of Kerala

2025-07-08

DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN, M.B.SNEHALATHA

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JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. 1. The appellants contend that the judgment in WP(C)No.6617/2025 is flawed because it did not direct the Maintenance Tribunal – constituted under the provisions of Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 – to consider the question of maintainability of Ext.P10, before it took cognizance of the same. 2. Sri.E.Narayanan – learned counsel for the appellants, argued that, as per the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’ for short), notice to his clients could have been issued by the Tribunal on Ext.P10 only after it had satisfied itself that it was maintainable. He argued that since such satisfaction is not forthcoming from any record maintained by the Tribunal, the cognizance taken is illegal and unlawful. As an alternative plea, Sri.Narayanan requested that, if this Court is not inclined to accept his clients’ afore plea, then liberty may be reserved to them to raise the question of maintainability before the Tribunal as a preliminary issue and rued that the learned Single Judge did not agree even to this. 3. We have considered the afore submissions on the touchstone of the various materials available on record. 4. It is perspicuous that Rule 6 of the ‘Rules’, provides that, once the Tribunal is satisfied by the points mentioned in Rule 5 (1), it shall cause issue each person, against whom an application for maintenance has been filed, a notice in Form C, directing them to show cause why the application should not be granted; and that it shall accompany with it a copy of the application and its enclosures. As per Rule 5(1), the mandate on the Statutory Tribunal, on receipt of an application, is to satisfy itself that it is complete and that the opposite party has, prima facie, an obligation to maintain the applicant. The second Sub Rule to the said Rule provides that if there is any lacunae in the application, the Tribunal can ask the applicant to rectify the same. 5. It is thus luculent that it is only after preliminary satisfaction on feasibility of the plea in the application is arrived at by the Tribunal, will it issue notice to the respondent. However, the Rules do not mandate that this has to be recorded in the form of a formal order. 5. It is thus luculent that it is only after preliminary satisfaction on feasibility of the plea in the application is arrived at by the Tribunal, will it issue notice to the respondent. However, the Rules do not mandate that this has to be recorded in the form of a formal order. In fact, the factum of the Tribunal having issued notice to the respondent ipso facto would render it limpid that it has found that the criteria under Rule 5(1) has been satisfied. 6. Of course, this does not mean that once the respondent/s appears in person, pursuant to the notice issued, he/she/they cannot raise the question of maintainability; and this liberty has been expressly reserved in favour of the appellants herein by the learned Single Judge also. 7. The only surviving question, as impelled by Sri.Narayanan, is whether the parties should be reserved the liberty of raising the question of maintainability as a preliminary issue and whether the Tribunal ought to be directed to consider it as such. 8. We are afraid that we cannot find favour with such course because, the proceedings before the Statutory Tribunal is quasi judicial in nature and it is for it to decide in which manner the issue/s raised before it is/are to be decided. There is no warrant for us to believe that the Statutory Tribunal would not advert to or assess all the relevant aspects projected before it; and hence it would be unnecessary for this Court to direct it to consider a particular one as the preliminary issue, especially when the final order certainly would be edificed on consideration of such. Since the learned Single Bench has already allowed all applicable liberties to the appellants, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment. This Appeal is, therefore, dismissed; however, without making any order as to costs.