Research › Search › Judgment

Telangana High Court · body

2025 DIGILAW 1895 (TS)

S. Jagadeeshwar Reddy v. M. Rufas

2025-12-22

NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA

body2025
ORDER : This Civil Revision Petition is filed aggrieved by the order dated 18.10.2021 in I.A.No.561/2021 in O.S.No.108/2015 passed by the learned III Additional District Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the revision petitioner/plaintiff herein is the plaintiff before the trial Court, who filed a suit against the defendant seeking the following relief: (i) direct the defendant to execute registered sale deed in respect of suit property i.e., Sy.No.213/E and 214/E total admeasuring Ac.2:00 guntas situated in the limits of Chowdarguda Village, Shamshabad Mandal, Rangareddy District by receiving balance sale consideration. (ii) alternatively direct defendant to refund Rs.2,14,000/- (advance amount + interest) with future interest @ 24% per annum from the date of suit till realization. (iii) Costs of suit. (iv) Pass such other order or orders as the Court deems fit in the interest of justice. 3. Pending the suit, during the course of evidence, the learned Judge of the trial Court impounded the subject document, collected the requisite stamp duty along with penalty, and marked the same as Ex.A1, treating it as an agreement of sale. 4. Being aggrieved by the marking of the said document, the defendant filed an application under Order XIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure in I.A. No.561 of 2021 in O.S. No.108 of 2015, praying the trial Court to reject the document marked as Ex.A1 and to de-exhibit the same on the ground that the plaintiff had the agreement of sale impounded by invoking Article 6-A of Schedule I-A of the Indian Stamp Act instead of Article 6-B, and that the document, having been insufficiently stamped, is liable to be impounded. 5. On the other hand, the plaintiff filed a counter denying the averments made in the petition and contended that the agreement of sale marked as Ex.A1 was properly stamped and impounded in accordance with Articles 6-A and 6-C of Schedule I-A of the Indian Stamp Act, that Article 6-B has no application to the said document, and accordingly prayed the trial Court for dismissal of the petition. 6. 6. Upon hearing both sides, the trial Court opined that the subject document falls under Article 6-B of Schedule I-A of the Indian Stamp Act and accordingly allowed the petition, granting liberty to the respondent/plaintiff to make good the deficit stamp duty and penalty as per Article 6-B within fourteen days from the date of the impugned order, failing which the agreement of sale marked as Ex.A1 was directed to be de-marked. 7. Assailing the impugned order, the present Revision is filed by the plaintiff contending that the order passed by the trial Court is illegal, arbitrary, and contrary to the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act and settled principles of law, inasmuch as the learned trial Judge, having once exercised jurisdiction under Section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act by impounding the document, collecting the requisite stamp duty and penalty, and marking the same as Ex.A1, became functus officio and had no jurisdiction to subsequently revisit the nature of the document or direct payment of additional stamp duty under a different Article. 8. It is further contended that the agreement of sale in question does not attract Article 6-B of Schedule I-A, as it is an agreement of sale simpliciter relating to agricultural and open land, without delivery of possession either expressly or impliedly, and therefore is properly chargeable under Article 6-A. Once the document was admitted in evidence, its admissibility could not have been questioned at a later stage in view of the statutory bar under Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act, and consequently, the application filed by the defendant under Order XIII Rule 3 CPC was not maintainable and could not be used to indirectly override the said bar. The finding of the trial Court that Ex.A1 falls under Article 6-B is perverse and unsustainable, and the direction granting liberty to pay further stamp duty and penalty, failing which the document would be de-exhibited, amounts to exercising a power not vested in law. 9. The finding of the trial Court that Ex.A1 falls under Article 6-B is perverse and unsustainable, and the direction granting liberty to pay further stamp duty and penalty, failing which the document would be de-exhibited, amounts to exercising a power not vested in law. 9. It is further contended that the Court below further erred in placing reliance on a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court reported in 2020 (6) ALD 491 while ignoring the binding judgments of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court reported in 2004 (1) ALD 557 and 2004 (5) ALD 653 , which authoritatively held that the expression “sale of any other immovable property” in Article 6-B must be read in conjunction with the rest of the provision and does not include agreements relating to agricultural lands, and it is a settled principle of judicial discipline that a Single Judge decision cannot override binding Division Bench precedents; therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and the application under Order XIII Rule 3 CPC deserves to be dismissed, confirming the marking of Ex.A1 as valid in law. 10. Heard Mr.Y.Rishikesh Reddy, learned counsel representing Mr.M.Saroj Reddy, learned counsel for the revision petitioner. Notice sent to the sole respondent was returned with the postal endorsement ‘unclaimed’; hence, it is treated as deemed service in terms of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. Perused the record. 11. Now the only point that arises for consideration is whether the document which is exhibited under Ex.A1 falls within the Article 6A of Schedule 1 or 6B? 12. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/plaintiff has argued that in case of immovable property Article 6A of Schedule-I-A applies but not Article 6B and in support of the said contention he relied upon the decision rendered by this Court in Saranam Peda Appaiah vs S.Narasimha Reddy , MANU/AP/0607/2004 wherein it was observed as follows: 11. The Supreme Court in M/s VIKRANT TYRES LTD. Vs. The Supreme Court in M/s VIKRANT TYRES LTD. Vs. THE FIRST INCOME TAX OFFICER, MYSORE, , observed thus: "It is a settled principle in law that the Courts while construing Revenue Acts have to give a fair and reasonable construction to the language of a Statute without leaning to one side or the other, meaning thereby that no tax or levy can be imposed on a subject by an Act of Parliament without the words of the Statute clearly showing an intention to lay the burden on the subject. In this process, the Courts must adhere to the words of the Statute and the so-called equitable construction of those words of the Statute is not permissible. The task of the Court is to construe the provisions of the taxing enactments according to the ordinary and natural meaning of the language used and then to apply that meaning to the facts of the case and in that process if the taxpayer is brought within the net he is caught, otherwise he has to go free. This principle in law is settled by this Court in India Carbon Ltd. v. State of Assam , wherein this Court held "Interest can be levied and charged on delayed payment of tax only if the statute that levies and charges the tax makes a substantive provision in this behalf." A Constitution Bench of this Court speaking through one of us (Hon. Bharucha, J.) in the Case of V.V.S. Sugars v. Government of A.P. reiterated the proposition laid down in the India Carbon Ltd.'s case (supra) in the following words: "The Act in question is a taxing statute and, therefore, must be interpreted as it reads, with no additions and no subtractions, on the ground of legislative intendment or otherwise." 14. The Supreme Court in GURSHAI SAIGAL Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, PUNJAB, , stated thus: "IT is well recognised that the rule of construction that if a case is not covered within the four corners of the provisions of taxing statute, no tax can be imposed by inference or by analogy or by trying to probe into the intentions of the legislature and by considering what was the substance of the matter applies only to a taxing provision and has no application to all provisions in a taxing statute. It does not apply to a provision not creating a charge for the tax but laying down the machinery for its calculation or procedure for its collection. The provisions in a taxing statute dealing with machinery for assessment have to be construed by the ordinary rules of construction, that is to say, in accordance with the clear intention of the legislature, which is to make a charge levied effective." 18. Even if the words used are ambiguous and reasonably open to two interpretations, benefit of interpretation should be given to the subject. 19. Article 6(B) is very clear in its expression that in case of any transactions relating to construction of a house etc. as mentioned in descriptive column of the instrument, the stamp duty required is Rs. 5/- for every hundred or part thereof, of the market value or the estimated cost of proposed construction or development of such property as the case may be. Therefore, the question that calls for consideration is whether the said Article covers the agricultural land also. It is a cardinal principle of the interpretation that the provision interpreted with reference to the words contained in the provisions and by interpretative process, it is neither to be expanded nor constricted. When the Legislature has specifically referred to the document relating to construction of house, apartment, flat, portion of multi-storied building etc and the stamp duty is payable on the market value or the estimated cost of the said property, it has to be confined only to houses, multi unit houses or apartment etc. Even the valuation was sought to be arrived at on the basis of the rates prescribed by the Public Works Department authorities. Further it is noticed that the transactions left over by Article 6(B) are covered by Article 6(C). Therefore, it cannot also be said that there was vacuum in the Article. In the instant case, the agreement is after 1.4.1995, but it relates to the agricultural land. Taking the clue from the last expression in the document namely "sale of any other immovable property" it was contended that it would embrace in its fold other immovable property including the agricultural property and therefore, the stamp duty has to be paid on that basis. Taking the clue from the last expression in the document namely "sale of any other immovable property" it was contended that it would embrace in its fold other immovable property including the agricultural property and therefore, the stamp duty has to be paid on that basis. But, that contention cannot be accepted, in as much as the expression the sale of any other immovable property has to be interpreted keeping in view the principles of ejusdam generis namely where general words fallow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or classes as specifically mentioned. Otherwise, the other provisions become otiose. An identical issue came up before the ld. Brother P.S. Narayana J in PECHITTI RAMAKRISHNA Vs. NEKKANTI VENKATA MANOHARA RAO , and after referring to the amendments has observed as follows: "A careful reading of Article 6(B) of Schedule 1-A of the Act goes to show that it is applicable if the agreement relates to construction of a house or building including a multi-unit house or building or unit of apartment/flat/portion of a multi-storied building or for development/sale of any other immovable property. A further reading of the stamp duty payable specified in column No.2 also makes it clear that this provision was introduced in relation to the construction agreements or agreements of the like nature. No doubt, emphasis was laid on the language "sale of any other immovable property". These words "sale of any other immovable property" in Article 6(B) of Schedule I-A of the Act may have to be read along with the rest of the provision and also with column No.2. As far as any other case specified in Article 6(C) of Schedule I-A of the Act is concerned, it should be construed to be a case not falling under either A or B of Schedule I-A of the Act. It is needless to say that Article 6(A) of Schedule I-A of the Act is a general provision. It is no doubt true that in the present case, the sale consideration recited in the agreement of sale is Rs. 42,500/- and it is in relation to the sale of a vacant site. It is needless to say that Article 6(A) of Schedule I-A of the Act is a general provision. It is no doubt true that in the present case, the sale consideration recited in the agreement of sale is Rs. 42,500/- and it is in relation to the sale of a vacant site. On a careful reading of the language employed in Article 6(A, B & C) of Schedule I-A of the Act and also the stamp duty payable specified in column No.2 and taking into consideration the object of introducing B by A.P. Act 21 of 1995, I am of the considered opinion that Article 6(B) of Schedule I-A of the Act would be applicable only in such specified cases and the same cannot override the general provision of Article 6(A) of Schedule I-A of the Act and agreement in question would definitely fall under the general provision of Article 6(A)(iii) of Schedule I-A of the Act and hence, the stamp duty already paid is sufficient. It is also clarified that in the light of the nature of the document Article 6(B) of Schedule I-A of the Act is not applicable to the present case. Hence, the impugned Order holding that the stamp duty and penalty relating to the document in question is liable to be paid under Article 6(B) of Schedule I-A of the Act cannot be sustained." Therefore, we are in agreement with the principle laid down in the aforesaid decision. The provision has to be interpreted harmoniously keeping in view the objects of the amendment. Moreover, the present amendment is fiscal in nature and it has to be construed strictly in accordance with law. In as much as the agricultural lands are not covered and it covered only specific items of property, it cannot have universal application of all transactions covering immovable properties. Under those circumstances, the suit Agreement of Sale cannot be said to be covered by Article 6(B) of the Schedule I-A of the Act and hence we are of the considered view that the Order of the lower Court is in consonance with the Article 6(B) of the Stamp Act as amended by A.P. Act 21 of 1995. 13. Under those circumstances, the suit Agreement of Sale cannot be said to be covered by Article 6(B) of the Schedule I-A of the Act and hence we are of the considered view that the Order of the lower Court is in consonance with the Article 6(B) of the Stamp Act as amended by A.P. Act 21 of 1995. 13. The Court below failed to appreciate that Ex.A1 pertains to agricultural and open land and does not relate to any building, multi- storied structure, apartment, or development/sale of immovable property as contemplated under Article 6-B, and therefore squarely falls under Article 6-A, under which the stamp duty paid is sufficient. The Court further committed a grave error in relying upon a decision of a learned Single Judge reported in 2020 (6) ALD 491, while completely ignoring the binding precedent of the Hon’ble Division Bench reported in 2004 (1) ALD 557 and 2004 (5) ALD 653 , which clearly held that the expression “sale of any other immovable property” in Article 6-B must be read in conjunction with the rest of the provision, and that agreements relating to agricultural land do not fall within its ambit. It is a settled principle of judicial discipline that a Single Judge’s decision cannot override or dilute the binding precedents of a Division Bench, and by ignoring this settled position, the Court below acted illegally and with material irregularity in allowing the petition and directing the de-exhibition of Ex.A1. 14. In view of the above decisions and considering the factual aspects, this Court is of the opinion that the suit agreement Ex.A1 relates to agricultural land and not to any building or multi-storied structure, and therefore squarely falls under Article 6-A of Schedule I-A of the Indian Stamp Act, and not under Article 6-B. The impugned order passed by the trial Court does not withstand scrutiny, as the trial Court ignored binding Division Bench decisions. Accordingly, the orders of the trial Court are hereby set aside. 15. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is disposed of. The Order dated 18.10.2021 in I.A.No.561/2021 in O.S.No.108/2015 passed by the learned III Additional District Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar is hereby set-aside. The trial Court is directed to collect the stamp duty and penalty, if any, under Article 6-A of Schedule I-A of the Indian Stamp Act, and thereafter proceed further by marking the document as an exhibit. The Order dated 18.10.2021 in I.A.No.561/2021 in O.S.No.108/2015 passed by the learned III Additional District Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar is hereby set-aside. The trial Court is directed to collect the stamp duty and penalty, if any, under Article 6-A of Schedule I-A of the Indian Stamp Act, and thereafter proceed further by marking the document as an exhibit. If the stamp duty and penalty are found to be sufficient, the document shall be treated as validly exhibited, and the trial Court shall proceed further in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, pending shall stand closed.