JUDGMENT : RAJESH SHANKAR , J. 1. I.A. No. 7280 of 2025 has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 870 days in filing the Letters Patent Appeal challenging the judgment dated 12.04.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 2835 of 2014. 2. In the application filed seeking condonation of delay, it is stated that the delay was caused due to procedural formalities. According to the applicants, they had received information about the judgement of the learned Single Judge and put up the same before the Managing Director of the first applicant. It was then examined by the Managing Director and he decided to seek legal opinion in the matter. The file was then sent to the office of the Advocate General seeking opinion and the Advocate General rendered opinion on 16.05.2024. Thereafter further steps were taken and the appeal was filed on 02.07.2024. 3. It appears that between the date of judgment on 12.04.2022 and the date when the file was sent to the office of the Advocate General, there is a gap of more than 2 years and no steps were taken to secure the opinion of the Advocate General in order to ensure that the appeal is filed within the period of limitation of 30 days. There appears to be gross negligence on the part of the applicants in taking steps expeditiously for filing the L.P.A. 4. In Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and another , (2012) 3 SCC 563 , the Supreme Court held: “25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8- 1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person-incharge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.” (Emphasis supplied) 5. The said judgment has been followed by the Supreme Court in several cases such as Commissioner of Customs Chennai v. M/s Volex Interconnect (India) Pvt. Ltd. , (2022) 3 SCC 159 , Pr. Commissioner Central Excise Delhi-1 v. Design Dialogues India Pvt. Ltd. , (2022) 2 SCC 327 , Union of India v. Central Tibetan Schools Administration & Others , (2021) 11 SCC 557 , Union of India & Others v. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Private Limited and another , (2022) 9 SCC 263 , and State of Uttar Pradesh & Others v. Sabha Narain & others , (2022) 9 SCC 266 6. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir , 2024 INSC 262 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489 the Supreme Court held that it is not permissible to look into the merits of the matter as long as it is not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of long and inordinate delay; that it hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning gross delay of more than 12 years; length of delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not; from the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation; once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his long inaction, it cannot be presumed to be non- deliberate delay and in such circumstances, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. It was reiterated while considering plea for condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main case and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It was reiterated while considering plea for condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main case and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It declared that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. 7. This was also reiterated in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary , Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 48636 of 2024 dt.29.11.2024 8. In the case of Shiv Amma (Dead) by LRS Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Others in Civil Appeal No. 11794 of 2025 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court decided on 12.09.2025 has held as under: “261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State- machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude. 262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law. 263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. 264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.” 9. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the above decisions of the Supreme Court, we are satisfied that sufficient cause has not been shown by the applicants for condonation of delay of 870 days in filing the appeal. 10. Therefore, the application for condonation of delay (I.A. No. 7280 of 2025) is dismissed. Consequently, the Letters Patent Appeal is also dismissed.