ORDER : 1. The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India with the following prayers:- "1. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the impugned order dated 24.03.2022 (Annexure P/19) passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Rent Tribunal, Sri Ganganagar in Rent Petition No. 62/2019 titled as Seth Sarnamal Aggarwal Trust & Ors. Vs. Nirmla Wadhwa & Anr. may kindly be quashed and set aside. 2. By an appropriate Writ, Order or Direction, the Application Dated 22.01.2020 (Annexure P/17) under section 10 CPC preferred by the Petitioners may kindly be allowed." 2. The facts, insofar as necessary for determination of the present controversy, are that the petitioners claim to have purchased the property in question through two duly executed agreement to sell, executed by the respondents. The first agreement to sell was dated 24.04.2004 (Annexure P/1) and the second agreement to sell was dated 22.09.2010 (Annexure P/8), pertaining to two separate portions of premises commonly known as “Hariyana Bhawan” situated at Plot No. 3 (Flour Mill), Industrial Area, Block, Sri Ganganagar. As per the agreement to sell dated 24.04.2004, the petitioners claim to have paid the total amount of Rs. 21,00,000 in parts, and their possession of the property, which began as tenancy on 14.01.2004, was acknowledged in the agreement itself. With respect to the subsequent agreement dated 22.09.2010, the petitioners claim to have paid the full consideration amount of Rs. 15,00,000/– in cash, upon which possession of the relevant portion was delivered to them, with an understanding interse that the formal sale deed would be executed within eight years. When the respondents, notwithstanding the petitioners’ presence before the Sub-Registrar on 30.04.2019, failed to execute the requisite sale deeds, the petitioners instituted two Civil Suits bearing suit No. 18/2019 and 19/2019 before the Additional District Judge No.02, Sri Ganganagar, seeking specific performance of the aforesaid agreements, wherein interim orders of status quo came to be passed. During pendency of the said suits, the respondents filed the Rent Petition No. 62/2019 under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 (for short “the Act”) before the Rent Tribunal, Sri Ganganagar (hereinafter referred as "learned Tribunal"), seeking eviction of the petitioners from the property in question. During pendency of the said suits, the respondents filed the Rent Petition No. 62/2019 under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 (for short “the Act”) before the Rent Tribunal, Sri Ganganagar (hereinafter referred as "learned Tribunal"), seeking eviction of the petitioners from the property in question. Upon which, the petitioners filed an application under Section 10 read with Section 151 Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short “CPC”) seeking stay of the rent proceedings on the ground that the issues involved were directly and substantially in issue in the pending civil suits. However, the learned Tribunal, by order impugned dated 24.03.2022, rejected the said application. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the learned Tribunal, the petitioners have approached this Court, invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 & 277 of the Constitution of India. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order dated 24.03.2022, rejecting the application of the petitioners filed under Section 10 read with Section 151 CPC, is perverse and unsustainable on the premise that two previously instituted civil suits for specific performance concerning the very same property and between the same parties are already pending adjudication before the competent Civil Court, wherein interim protection has also been granted. It was further urged that despite being aware of the said pendency, the respondents have deliberately filed a subsequent rent petition by suppressing material facts and taking entirely contradictory stands regarding title, tenancy, and sale agreements. Learned Counsel further submitted that the issues relating to title, validity of sale agreements, and their possession as purchasers are directly and substantially in issue before the Civil Court, and continuation of parallel rent proceedings would result in conflicting findings and abuse of process of law. It was further contended that the learned Tribunal failed to consider the mandate of Section 10 CPC and the inherent powers under Section 151 CPC, and passed the impugned order in a cursory manner without recording any finding on the specific pleas raised by the petitioners. Thus, it was prayed that the impugned order may be quashed and set aside, and the rent proceedings pending before the learned Tribunal may be stayed. 4. Thus, it was prayed that the impugned order may be quashed and set aside, and the rent proceedings pending before the learned Tribunal may be stayed. 4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, vehemently opposing the arguments advanced at bar by learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the learned Tribunal has rightly dismissed the application filed by petitioners under Section 10 read with Section 151 of the CPC. It was submitted that the respondents have invoked the jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal strictly in accordance with law, and the civil suits filed by the petitioners have no nexus whatsoever with the Rent Petition filed by the respondents. It was further contended that the respondents-Trust has neither transferred the property in question nor is legally competent to do so, and the petitioners are in possession of the property in question in the capacity of tenants only and not as purchasers. It was further averred that the parties involved in the suit for specific performance and those before the learned Tribunal are different, and the nature, basis, and reliefs sought in these two proceedings are wholly distinct. As such, no element of similarity, overlap, or uniformity exists between these civil suits and the petition filed before the learned Tribunal. It was also urged that the learned Tribunal has rightly dismissed the application, as the civil court, in any event, lacks jurisdiction to grant the reliefs contemplated under the Act, and therefore, the principles underlying Section 10 CPC have no application to the facts of the present case. Therefore, it was prayed that the writ petition, being devoid of merit and not maintainable in the eye of law, deserves to be dismissed. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the following judgments:- 1. National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences vs. C. Parameshwara, (2005) AIR(SC) 242 2. H.K. Sharma vs. Ram Lal, (2019) 4 Supreme Court Cases 153 3. Madhav Das vs. Rajkumar Vyas, Civil Writ Petition No. 15831 of 2019 4. Shyam Sundar Malpani vs. Shyam Lal Sharma, 2022 (2) CJ(Civ.) (Raj.) 897 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the material available on record and the judgments cited at the bar. 6. H.K. Sharma vs. Ram Lal, (2019) 4 Supreme Court Cases 153 3. Madhav Das vs. Rajkumar Vyas, Civil Writ Petition No. 15831 of 2019 4. Shyam Sundar Malpani vs. Shyam Lal Sharma, 2022 (2) CJ(Civ.) (Raj.) 897 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the material available on record and the judgments cited at the bar. 6. In order to examine the applicability of the statutory bar invoked by the petitioners, it becomes necessary to advert to Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is reproduced for ready reference: “10. Stay of suit.— No Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title where such suit is pending in the same or any other Court in India have jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed, or in any Court beyond the limits of India established or continued by the Central Government and having like jurisdiction, or before the Supreme Court. Explanation.—The pendency of a suit in a foreign Court does not preclude the Courts in India from trying a suit founded on the same cause of action.” 7. A bare perusal of Section 10 CPC indicates that its object is to prevent courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously proceeding with parallel suits involving issues that are directly and substantially the same. The provision operates as a procedural safeguard and comes into play only where the entire subject matter of both suits is identical. The statutory expression “the matter in issue is directly and substantially in issue” signifies an issue that forms the core of the dispute, as distinguished from questions that arise merely incidentally or collaterally. A common property forming the subject matter of litigation does not, by itself, attract bars of Section 10. 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while deciding Usha and Another v. Shahjad Bi @ Sejad and Others , (2024) 3 CivCC 138 , made a congruent observation to that in the case of National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences (supra) and has categorically held as under: “10. The object of this Section is to prevent courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits in respect of the same matter in issue. The object of this Section is to prevent courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits in respect of the same matter in issue. This Section deals with a rule of procedure. Section 10 applies only in cases where the whole of the subject matter in both the suits is identical. The crucial 3 words in Section 10 are “the matter in issue is directly and substantially in issue” in the previously instituted suit. The aforesaid words are different from “incidentally or collaterally in issue.” Therefore, there must be identity of the matter in issue in both the suits inasmuch as the subject matter in both the proceedings is identical. But even on a consideration of the two suits, even if the property in respect of two suits is one and the same but the issues are separate and there is no identity at all with regard to the cause of action and also the reliefs that are sought in both the suits, the subsequent suit between the same parties, is not liable to be stayed under Section 10. Not only the matter in issue in the second suit should also be directly and substantially in issue in the first suit, but that the second suit must be for the same relief as that claimed in the first suit. Therefore, it is not only the identical subject matter but also the relief claimed in both suits that determine the applicability of Section 10. Thus, for instance, if the first suit is for partition and separate possession of the suit scheduled property and the second suit is for ejectment of a tenant from the same, then Section 10 would not apply.” 9. A coordinate bench of this Court while deciding Civil Writ Petition No. 15831/2019, Madhavdas v. Rajkumar Vyas , decided on 06.11.2019, observed that mere execution of an agreement to sell between the parties does not result in the determination of tenancy, and held that the issues in a suit for specific performance and a petition for eviction under the Rajasthan Rent Control Act 2001 cannot be regarded as substantially the same. 10. Further the applicability of Section 10 of the CPC has been clearly elucidated in Aspi Jal And Another v. Khushroo Rustom Dadyburjor , AIR 2013 SC 1712 wherein the Apex Court observed as under: “11. 10. Further the applicability of Section 10 of the CPC has been clearly elucidated in Aspi Jal And Another v. Khushroo Rustom Dadyburjor , AIR 2013 SC 1712 wherein the Apex Court observed as under: “11. In the present case, the parties in all the three suits are one and the same and the court in which the first two suits have been instituted is competent to grant the relief claimed in the third suit. The only question which invites our adjudication is as to whether “the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in previously instituted suits.” The key words in Section 10 are “the matter in issue is directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit.” The test for applicability of Section 10 of the Code is whether on a final decision being reached in the previously instituted suit, such decision would operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit. To put it differently one may ask, can the plaintiff get the same relief in the subsequent suit, if the earlier suit has been dismissed? In our opinion, if the answer is in the affirmative, the subsequent suit is not fit to be stayed…” 11. In the present matter, the central issue concerns the applicability of Section 10 of CPC. The provision can be invoked only where the issues requiring adjudication in the later proceeding correspond directly and substantially with those arising in the previously instituted suit. The determinative test lies in whether the essential legal questions are the same, and not simply whether the same property or parties are involved. The law does not contemplate a stay where the nature of the rights asserted, the causes of action invoked, or the reliefs sought are fundamentally distinct. 12. It is also pertinent to note that the Rent Tribunal, functioning under the special and self-contained act, exercises a circumscribed statutory jurisdiction exclusively over landlord–tenant matters and eviction. By virtue of Section 21 of the Act, the provisions of the CPC apply to the Rent Tribunal only to the extent expressly permitted, and the Rent Tribunal, not being a civil court, cannot have its proceedings mechanically equated with a civil suit. A petition before the Rent Tribunal, invoked under a special statutory jurisdiction, is fundamentally differs, both in form and in scope, from a civil suit instituted before a civil court. A petition before the Rent Tribunal, invoked under a special statutory jurisdiction, is fundamentally differs, both in form and in scope, from a civil suit instituted before a civil court. Proceedings of such character do not automatically become subordinate to a civil action merely because a separate dispute concerning the same property is pending before a civil court. Further, the Rent Tribunal is first required to determine the existence of a landlord– tenant relationship, which constitutes a threshold and independent enquiry under the statute. This determination is entirely separate from the issues canvassed in a civil action concerning contractual or proprietary rights. 13. In the case at hand, the petitioners have instituted two civil suits seeking specific performance of distinct agreement to sell pertaining to two separate portions of the property in question, whereas the respondents, during the pendency of those suits, seeking possession of the same premises, filed eviction petition before the learned Tribunal. The threshold questions before the learned tribunal, namely the existence and nature of the landlord tenant relationship and the grounds for eviction, are entirely independent of the contractual disputes regarding specific performance of contract, with the causes of action, statutory foundations, and reliefs in the two forums being fundamentally distinct. Thus, the key issues in the two proceedings are distinct in law and in substances, and the proceedings before the learned Tribunal need not be stayed on account of the pending civil suits. 14. In the light of the aforesaid observations and looking into the factual matrix of the present case, this Court, exercising its limited supervisory jurisdiction, finds no illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional infirmity in the impugned order dated 24.03.2022 passed by the Rent Tribunal, Sri Ganganagar in Rent Petition No.62/2019 while rejecting the application of the petitioners filed under Section 10 read with Section 151 CPC. 15. Consequently, the present writ petition stands dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stands disposed of.