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2025 DIGILAW 1904 (KAR)

Project Director, National Highways Authority Of India v. Jyoti, W/o. Srinivas Reddy

2025-12-16

D.K.SINGH, TARA VITASTA GANJU

body2025
JUDGMENT : D.K. SINGH, J. 1. The present intra Court appeal has been filed by the appellants-National Highways Authority of India (NHAI), who were the respondents in W.P.No.12631/2022, wherein the impugned judgment and order dated 24.01.2025 came to be passed by the learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition filed by the petitioner-Smt. Jyoti. 2. The parties are referred to as per their ranking in the writ petition, for the sake of convenience. 3. The petitioner has filed the said writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for a writ of mandamus to the respondent No.4-Special Land Acquisition Officer, NHAI, to pay compensation towards acquisition of the land of the petitioner admeasuring 606 sq.mts. in Survey No.92/7A (Khata No.804) as per the award proceedings dated 06.09.2018. 4. The petitioner claims to be the owner of the land admeasuring 1 acre and 7 guntas in Survey No.92/7A (Khata No.804) situated at Guddadarangavvanahalli Village of Chitradurga Taluk on National Highway No.50. Out of the total extent of land admeasuring 1 acre and 7 guntas, 606 sq.mts. of land is said to have been acquired by the NHAI for the purpose of extension of the National Highway in terms of the Preliminary Notification dated 17.11.2016 and the Final Notification dated 02.12.2017 published under Section 3D of the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the NH Act'). The case of the petitioner before the learned Single Judge was that the said extent of 606 sq.mts. of land had been converted for non-agricultural/commercial purposes. An award was passed under Section 3G of the NH Act on 06.09.2018 determining the compensation payable in a sum of Rs.45,19,351/- for the total extent of land measuring 2272 sq.mts. in Survey No.92/7A and the said compensation amount was ordered to be paid to the other land owners. However, no compensation was assessed for the petitioner's land admeasuring 606 sq.mts in Survey No.92/7A. 5. In the said award proceedings at Column No.8, it is mentioned that the total extent of land acquired under Section 3D notification is 35567 sq.mts. However, the award in respect of the land belonging to the petitioner to an extent of 606 sq.mts. has not been passed on the premise that the Land Acquisition Officer required some more information in respect of the land in question. 6. However, the award in respect of the land belonging to the petitioner to an extent of 606 sq.mts. has not been passed on the premise that the Land Acquisition Officer required some more information in respect of the land in question. 6. The petitioner, under such circumstances, issued a notice on 15.11.2021 to the respondent No.4-Special Land Acquisition Officer requesting either to remove the illegal encroachment or to grant the compensation. A reply dated 22.02.2022 was issued stating that the land measuring 606 sq.mts. belonging to the petitioner had not been utilized and as such, the compensation would not be payable. 7. The learned Single Judge, having placed reliance on the judgment of the High Court of Chhattisgarh in WPC No.2285/2018 and taking note of the provisions contained under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as well as Section 93 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, has allowed the writ petition and directed the respondent-authorities to pay compensation to the petitioner in respect of the land measuring 606 sq.mts forming part of the land in Survey No.92/7A as per the award dated 06.09.2018 along with all statutory benefits payable in accordance with law within a period of 12 weeks. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants-NHAI submitted that no compensation was assessed in respect of the petitioner-owner's land as it was not required for the purpose of widening of National Highway No.50 for which the preliminary and final notifications were issued. It is submitted that the possession of the petitioner's land was never taken and her land was mistakenly notified for acquisition. It is the petitioner who has been conveniently utilising the notified land for her personal and commercial use. It is submitted that the power to issue notification for acquiring a land would also include the power to add to, amend, vary or rescind the notification. The petitioner is not prejudiced in any manner inasmuch as she has been in possession of the land all through which is not disputed and she has been utilising the land even after the final notification was issued. He submitted that the Courts have held that where possession has not been taken, then mere notification issued would not amount to vesting of the land in favour of the NHAI. He submitted that the Courts have held that where possession has not been taken, then mere notification issued would not amount to vesting of the land in favour of the NHAI. He has further submitted that a land owner cannot force the authority to acquire a land when such land is not required. The petitioner would not be entitled to seek a direction from the Court for payment of compensation in respect of the land. He, therefore, submitted that the learned Single Judge has erred in allowing the writ petition. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent- owner has submitted that under Section 3D(2) of the NH Act, on publication of the declaration under Section 3D(1) of the Act, the land vests absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. In the present case, the final notification was published under Section 3D on 02.12.2017 and therefore, on the said date, the land vested absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of High Court of Himachal Pradesh in CWP No.6660/2021 dated 25.11.2022 and a Division Bench judgment of the High Court of Chhattisgarh dated 04.04.2023 passed in Writ Appeal No.140/2023. 10. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties. It would be appropriate to take note of Section 3D of the NH Act. Section 3D reads as under: "3D. Declaration of acquisition.—(1) Where no objection under sub-section (1) of section 3C has been made to the competent authority within the period specified therein or where the competent authority has disallowed the objection under sub-section (2) of that section, the competent authority shall, as soon as may be, submit a report accordingly to the Central Government and on receipt of such report, the Central Government shall declare, by notification in the Official Gazette, that the land should be acquired for the purpose or purposes mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 3A. (2) On the publication of the declaration under sub-section (1), the land shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. (2) On the publication of the declaration under sub-section (1), the land shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. (3) Where in respect of any land, a notification has been published under sub-section (1) of section 3A for its acquisition but no declaration under sub- section (1) has been published within a period of one year from the date of publication of that notification, the said notification shall cease to have any effect: Provided that in computing the said period of one year, the period or periods during which any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under sub-section (1) of section 3A is stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded. (4) A declaration made by the Central Government under sub-section (1) shall not be called in question in any court or by any other authority." 11. No doubt, sub-section (2) of Section 3D provides that on publication of the declaration under sub-section (1), the land shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. Sub-section (3) of Section 3D provides that where in respect of any land, a notification has been published under sub-section (1) of Section 3A for its acquisition, but no declaration under sub-section (1) has been published within a period of one year from the date of publication of that notification, the said notification under sub-section (1) of Section 3A shall cease to have any effect. 12. All the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent-owner are distinguishable on facts inasmuch as in those cases, the possession was taken and the award was passed. However, in the present case, the possession has been with the respondent throughout and no compensation was determined to pass an award. In such circumstances, Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 would come into play which provides that the power to issue the notification would include the power to add to, amend, vary or rescind the notification. 13. The Supreme Court, in the case of NAL LAYOUT RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION vs. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND OTHERS ([2018]12 SCC 400) , has held that the applicability of Section 21 cannot be denied to any "Central Act" as defined under Section 3(7) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The NH Act clearly falls within the definition of the Central Act. 13. The Supreme Court, in the case of NAL LAYOUT RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION vs. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND OTHERS ([2018]12 SCC 400) , has held that the applicability of Section 21 cannot be denied to any "Central Act" as defined under Section 3(7) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The NH Act clearly falls within the definition of the Central Act. The applicability of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH vs VISHNU PRASAD SHARMA ( AIR 1966 SC 1593 ) . The applicability of Section 21 in exercise of particular power granted by the Central Act can be negated only when the statute in question itself expressly or implicitly indicates so. Paragraphs 34 to 38 of the judgment in NAL LAYOUT RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION (supra are relevant, which are extracted hereunder: "34. According to Section 21 power to issue notification conferred by any Central Act includes the power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to like sanctions and conditions, if any, to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notification so issued. Although, Section 48 does not refer to the issuance of any notification, however, this Court has laid down in Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat that withdrawal from acquisition has to be notified. Following was stated in paras 30 and 31: (SCC pp. 407-408) “30. It was submitted by Mr Salve that Section 48 of the Act did not contemplate issue of any notification and withdrawal from the acquisition could be by order simpliciter. He said that Sections 4 and 6 talked of notifications being issued under those provisions but there was no such mandate in Section 48. It was thus contended that when the statute did not require to issue any notification for withdrawal from the acquisition, reference to Section 21 of the General Clauses Act was not correct. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is as under: ‘21. Power to issue, to include power to add to, amend, vary or rescind, notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is as under: ‘21. Power to issue, to include power to add to, amend, vary or rescind, notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws. —Where, by any Central Act, or Regulation, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules, or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any) to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued.’ Mr Salve said that Section 21 expressly referred to the powers being given to issue notifications, etc. under an Act or Regulation and under this that power included power to withdraw or rescind any notification in a similar fashion. It was therefore submitted that when Section 48 did not empower the State Government to issue any notification and it could not be read into that provision that withdrawal had to be issued by a notification. His argument, therefore, appeared to be that on correct interpretation of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act before reaching the stage of Section 48, the State Government could withdraw notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act by issuing notifications withdrawing or rescinding earlier notifications and that would be the end to the acquisition proceedings. We do not think that Mr Salve is quite right in his submissions. When Sections 4 and 6 notifications are issued, much has been done towards the acquisition process and that process cannot be reversed merely by rescinding those notifications. Rather it is Section 48 under which, after withdrawal from acquisition is made, compensation due for any damage suffered by the owner during the course of acquisition proceedings is determined and given to him. It is, therefore, implicit that withdrawal from acquisition has to be notified. 31. Principles of law are, therefore, well settled. A notification in the Official Gazette is required to be issued if the State Government decides to withdraw from the acquisition under Section 48 of the Act of any land of which possession has not been taken. An owner need not be given any notice of the intention of the State Government to withdraw from the acquisition and the State Government is at liberty to do so. An owner need not be given any notice of the intention of the State Government to withdraw from the acquisition and the State Government is at liberty to do so. Rights of the owner are well protected by sub-section (2) of Section 48 of the Act and if he suffered any damage in consequence of the acquisition proceedings, he is to be compensated and sub-section (3) of Section 48 provides as to how such compensation is to be determined…” 35. Applicability of Section 21 cannot be denied to any Central Act as defined in Section 3(7) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 3(7) is as follows: “ 3. Definitions .—In this Act, and in all Central Acts and Regulations made after the commencement of this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context— *** (7) “Central Act” shall mean an Act of Parliament, and shall include— (a) an Act of the Dominion Legislature or of the Indian Legislature passed before the commencement of the Constitution, and (b) an Act made before such commencement by the Governor General-in-Council or the Governor General, acting in a legislative capacity;” 36. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 clearly falls within the definition of the Central Act. The applicability of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act was considered by this Court in State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma, AIR 1966 SC 1593 , where it is held that in a case where under Section 9 notification has not been issued the Government can cancel the notification under Section 4 and Section 6 by virtue of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. It is useful to extract following observations made in para 19: (AIR pp. 1601-602) “19. Then reliance is placed on Section 48 which provides for withdrawal from acquisition. The argument is that Section 48 is the only provision in the Act which deals with withdrawal from acquisition and that is the only way in which the Government can withdraw from the acquisition and unless action is taken under Section 48(1) the notification under Section 4(1) would remain (presumably for ever). It is urged that the only way in which the notification under Section 4(1) can come to an end is by withdrawal under Section 48(1). We are not impressed by this argument. It is urged that the only way in which the notification under Section 4(1) can come to an end is by withdrawal under Section 48(1). We are not impressed by this argument. In the first place, under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act (10 of 1897), the power to issue a notification includes the power to rescind it. Therefore it is always open to the Government to rescind a notification under Section 4 or under Section 6, and withdrawal under Section 48(1) is not the only way in which a notification under Section 4 or Section 6 can be brought to an end. Section 48(1) confers a special power on the Government of withdrawal from acquisition without cancelling the notifications under Sections 4 and 6, provided it has not taken possession of the land covered by the notification under Section 6. In such circumstances the Government has to give compensation under Section 48(2) …” 37. The applicability of Section 21 in exercise of particular power granted by the Central Act can be negated only when the statute in question itself expressly or implicitly indicates so. As noted above, this Court in Larsen & Toubro has rejected the submission of the learned counsel that the notification under Sections 4 and 6 with aid of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act can be cancelled at any time. This Court held that when notifications under Sections 4 and 6 are issued and much has been done towards the acquisition process and that process cannot be reversed merely by rescinding this notification. 38. However, when the State has exercised its power under Section 48(1) by withdrawing from acquisition there is nothing in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to indicate that such notification cannot be amended, varied or rescinded by issuing a notification in like manner. In the event, it is accepted that after issuance of notification under Section 48, there is no power to amend, vary or rescind any such notifications, it may cause undue hardship. Take an example of simple mistake whereby notification under Section 48 has been issued where acquisition has been completed in all respects and acquired land had already been utilised. We are thus of the opinion that there may be several circumstances where notifications under Section 48 may be required to be amended, modified or rescinded. Take an example of simple mistake whereby notification under Section 48 has been issued where acquisition has been completed in all respects and acquired land had already been utilised. We are thus of the opinion that there may be several circumstances where notifications under Section 48 may be required to be amended, modified or rescinded. As observed above, there is nothing in the Act, which indicates that after exercising power under Section 48, the State Government exhaust its jurisdiction to vary, amend, modify or rescind the notification. Thus, the applicability of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act in exercise of power under Section 48 of the 1894 Act by a notification cannot be denied." 14. In the present case, the stand of the NHAI is that by mistake, the notification under Section 3D was issued including the land of the petitioner and therefore, when this mistake was noticed, no compensation was determined and no award was passed or possession was taken. We, respectfully relying on the said judgment of the Supreme Court, are of the view that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is applicable to the NH Act, 1956, which is a Central Act and in the peculiarity of the facts and circumstances of the case where neither possession was taken nor the compensation was determined and award was passed in respect of the petitioner's land and her land was included by mistake in the notification issued under Section 3D, the Central Government will have the power to de-notify or amend the notification itself. We, therefore, allow the writ appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge. In view of disposal of the writ petition, pending IAs, if any, do not survive for consideration and accordingly, they stand disposed of.