ORDER : This Criminal Petition is filed with the following prayer: “…to quash the proceedings in CC No.9437 of 2024 on the file of XIII Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Nampally, Hyderabad against the Petitioners/Accused Nos.6 and 7 herein and pass such other order or orders...” 2. Heard Mr. V Seetharama Avadhani, learned counsel for petitioners, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1 and Ms. Palai Subhashree Priyadarshani, learned counsel for respondent No.2. 3. This Criminal Petition is filed by petitioners–accused Nos.6 and 7 in C.C.No.9437 of 2024. Grievance/complaint/allegation against petitioners–accused Nos.6 and 7 is that petitioner No.2, respondent No.2’s father-in-law’s first brother, and petitioner No.1, wife of father-in-law’s first brother, had tortured respondent No.2 by keeping wrong relationship between her and her father. Except this allegation, there is no other allegation in the entire complaint, complaint runs into six pages. 4. It is contended by learned counsel for petitioners that petitioners are Singapore citizens and are residents of Singapore. That there are no specific instances of any overt acts nor any specific allegations in the entire complaint to attract the offence(s) under Sections 498A and 506 of Indian Penal Code, 1861 (for short ‘IPC’) and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 5. On the other hand, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor contended that it is only in the rarest of rare cases that the Court should exercise its power under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘Cr.P.C’) to quash the proceedings. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya) & others, 2025 INSC 1287 to buttress the contention that the present set of facts demonstrates that the case is a fit case for trial. Issues are triable in nature, hence, no indulgence be shown. 6. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 reiterated the contentions advanced by learned Assistant Public Prosecutor and submitted that petitioners–accused Nos.6 and 7 have kept respondent No.2 and her father in a wrong relationship and threatened not to have kids and further did not allow her to participate in the pooja and other function along with her husband are suffice to attract the offences. That this Court cannot exercise its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C to grant any relief in the wake of the allegations in the complaint. 7. Before venturing any further, it is trite to extract the relevant sections. That this Court cannot exercise its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C to grant any relief in the wake of the allegations in the complaint. 7. Before venturing any further, it is trite to extract the relevant sections. Section 498A of I.P.C is as follows: “ Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty -Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.- For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means- (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”. 8. Section 506 of I.P.C is as follows: “ Punishment for criminal intimidation - Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.- And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or [imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment o either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.” 9. Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act is as follows: “ 4. Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act is as follows: “ 4. Penalty for demanding dowry - If any person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees: Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.” 10. To make out the alleged offences, the ingredients of Sections have to be spelled out in the complaint, though, not necessarily in detail. On a perusal of the contents of Sections, it is apparent that the ingredients of the Sections have not been spelled out in the complaint, even remotely. On a plain reading, the contents do not reflect any ingredients to draw a prima facie case against petitioners–accused Nos.6 and 7. In the absence of ingredients spelled out in the complaint, even remotely, no offences can be said to have been made out in the present case. Various allegations have been levelled in complaint; but, none of the allegations are directed or pointed towards petitioners, no specific allegation of any overt act being committed by petitioners or meting out of any physical harassment or any other harassment is complained of. 11. The relevant portion of the complaint against the petitioners as reflected in the complaint is as follows: “My father-in-law’s first own brother and his wife tortured me by keeping wrong relationship between me and my father. My father-in-law’s second own brother and his wife would threaten me not to have kids till they have kids and Emani Padma threatened me not to have kids and would always separate me from husband in any pooja or family function.” 12. A statement that petitioners have kept a wrong relation between the complainant and her father cannot be said to attract the offences. The statements that petitioners separated her husband in pooja and family function also do not invite the wrath of the Sections. No details of any threatening made are spelled out, there are no specific allegations. 13. A statement that petitioners have kept a wrong relation between the complainant and her father cannot be said to attract the offences. The statements that petitioners separated her husband in pooja and family function also do not invite the wrath of the Sections. No details of any threatening made are spelled out, there are no specific allegations. 13. It is trite to extract the relevant portion of the Hon’ble Apex Court’s judgment in Dara Lakshmi Narayana and others v. State of Telangana and another , (2025) 3 Supreme Court Cases 735 , which is as follows:- “27. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well- recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband’s family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalized and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularized allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, Appellants 2 to 6, who are the members of the family of Appellant 1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of Appellant 1 and Respondent 2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.” 14. On a perusal of contents of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is apparent that generalized allegations cannot form the basis for proceedings. Specific allegations pointing towards the involvement of the accused are not forthcoming in the complaint nor in the charge sheet making out a prima facie case. The complaint should spell out briefly the details attracting the ingredients of Sections alleged. In the absence of such specific allegations, on the basis of generalized statements, the Courts cannot mulch the petitioners to undergo the rigmarole of criminal proceedings. 15. In the present case, no specific allegations are forthcoming to at least prima facie attract the ingredients of sections. The complaint should spell out briefly the details attracting the ingredients of Sections alleged. In the absence of such specific allegations, on the basis of generalized statements, the Courts cannot mulch the petitioners to undergo the rigmarole of criminal proceedings. 15. In the present case, no specific allegations are forthcoming to at least prima facie attract the ingredients of sections. In the absence of any such allegations made out on the face of it as read from the complaint, the criminal proceedings in C.C.No.9437 of 2024, if allowed to remain, would be an abuse of process of law. 16. Learned counsels appearing on behalf of respondent No.2 and petitioners–accused Nos.6 and 7 have expressed that they intend to compromise and settle the entire issue. The golden lining of Section 482 Cr.P.C is embedded in the words “interest of justice.” This aspect of interest of justice has to be given primacy in the present facts of the case, as respondent No.2 is young, aged 27 years, that if all the parties to the proceedings intend to come to a table and settle the issues amicably, it would be appreciated by this Court and would set free respondent No.2 to walk her own life. With a fond hope, this Court requests all the parties to settle the issue amicably. 17. This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the Hon’ble Apex Court, in a number of judgments, has held that if the parties are willing to compromise in a matrimonial issue, the Court should permit such compromise in the larger interest of all the parties and in the interest of justice. The Hon’ble Apex Court in K.Bharathi Devi and another v. State of Telangana and another , (2024) 10 SCC 384 , considering the judgment of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another , (2012) 10 SCC 303 and other catena of judgments, held that if parties are willing to compromise in matrimonial matters, where offences under Section 498A and Dowry Prohibition Act are alleged, the Courts can quash proceedings taking note of the compromise/ settlement arrived at between the offender and the victim. 18. Both the counsels expressed their willingness on instructions from their clients that they would like to compromise the entire issue amicably. With a fond hope, this Court permits all the parties to arrive at a settlement. 18. Both the counsels expressed their willingness on instructions from their clients that they would like to compromise the entire issue amicably. With a fond hope, this Court permits all the parties to arrive at a settlement. The parties are at liberty to place the compromise deed before the trial Court and the trial Court shall consider the same and pass orders in accordance with law. 19. As held supra, the alleged offences are not made out against the petitioners-accused Nos.6 and 7. Proceedings in C.C.No.9437 of 2024 on the file of XIII Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Nampally, Hyderabad, qua the petitioners are liable to be quashed and are accordingly quashed. To the extent of petitioners, the criminal petition is allowed. 20. In respect of the request made for settlement, the same is permitted. 21. With the above observations, this Criminal Petition is allowed. Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.