JUDGMENT : SUSMITA PHUKAN KHAUND, J. Heard learned counsel M. Kato for the petitioner and learned Senior Government Advocate Mr. S. Tapin for the respondent. 2. The petitioner Shri Bulang Marik has filed this petition to set aside and quash the impugned suspension order No. HOME-11011/11/2024/865 dated 02.06.2024 issued by the respondent No. 1 and to direct the respondent authorities to reinstate the service of the petitioner, from the date when he was suspended, and to direct the respondents to allow the consequential service benefits. 3. It is contended that the suspension order of the petitioner was not reviewed within 90 (Ninety) days as the petitioner was in custody. Thereafter, the petitioner was granted interim bail which was made absolute on 18.01.2025. An RTI application was filed to find out why the suspension order was not reviewed even after 90 (Ninety) days. It is submitted that this writ petition was filed on 01.05.2025 and thereafter, the suspension order was reviewed when notice was issued in connection with this petition. 4. It is contended that the suspension order was not reviewed for more than 270 (Two Hundred and Seventy) days from the date of suspension of the petitioner. However, it is contended that review was pending from the initial date of suspension, for a total period of 366 (Three Hundred and Sixty Six) days. Thus, the initial order is required to be interfered with, and the petitioner is to be reinstated as per Rule 10 Sub-Rule 6 and 7 of the proviso to Rule 10 of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules {CCS (CCA) Rules for short}. 5. The petitioner has relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhury-Versus-Union of India through its Secretary and Another reported in (2015) 7 SCC 291 and the decision of this Court in Santosh Kumar- versus-Union of India & ors. reported in 2025 (3) GLT 485. 6. It is further averred that no memorandum of charge has been served to the petitioner and the petitioner is still under suspension. 7. Per contra, learned Government Advocate laid stress in his argument, that the pertinent point is whence 90 (Ninety) days starts running, from the date of suspension. Learned Government Advocate has again reiterated the proviso to Rule 10(7) of the CCS Rules and has highlighted the word ‘deemed suspension’. 7. Per contra, learned Government Advocate laid stress in his argument, that the pertinent point is whence 90 (Ninety) days starts running, from the date of suspension. Learned Government Advocate has again reiterated the proviso to Rule 10(7) of the CCS Rules and has highlighted the word ‘deemed suspension’. Rule 10 (7) and the proviso to Rule 10(7) reads :- [(7) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under sub- rule (1) or (2) of this rule shall not be valid after a period of ninety days unless it is extended after review, for a further period before the expiry of ninety days. Provided that no such review of suspension shall be necessary in the case of deemed suspension under sub-rule (2), if the Government servant continues to be under suspension at the time of completion of ninety days of suspension and the ninety days' period in such case will count from the date of Govern- ment servant detained in custody is released from detention or the date on which the fact of his release from detention is intimated to his appointing authority, whichever is later.” 8. Stressing on the word whichever is later, it is submitted that it has been clearly mentioned in paragraph 5 of the affidavit-in-opposition of respondents No. 1, 2, 3 and 4 that the petitioner was released on bail vide order dated 18.01.2025 and this fact was communicated to the authority vide letter No. PHQ/PB/DP-46/2024 dated 03.03.2025 from the Police Headquarters that the petitioner was released on bail vide order dated 18.01.2025. A copy of the communication is marked as Annexure-1 of the counter-affidavit. 9. As the suspension of the petitioner was reviewed on 29.05.2025, evidently, the window of 90 (Ninety) days was not exhausted if the days are calculated from 03.03.2025 as 90 (Ninety) days expires only on 01.06.2025. 10. It is further submitted that paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit clearly reflects that an intimation was received that the petitioner was released from custody and a review committee was constituted vide HOME-11011/12/2024 dated 28.05.2025 under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary, Government of Arunachal Pradesh. Immediately, a review committee on 29.05.2025, after consideration of the material facts and gravity of the offence, recommended extension of suspension to 180 (One Hundred and Eighty) days, w.e.f. 02.06.2025 and the order was issued on 03.06.2025. Immediately, a review committee on 29.05.2025, after consideration of the material facts and gravity of the offence, recommended extension of suspension to 180 (One Hundred and Eighty) days, w.e.f. 02.06.2025 and the order was issued on 03.06.2025. As the intimation relating to the petitioner being released from custody was received on 04.03.2025, the review was well within 3 (Three) months. 11. Thereby, it is submitted that the argument of the petitioner that the suspension was extended on 03.06.2025 after a lapse of 366 (Three Hundred and Sixty Six) days, beyond 270 (Two Hundred and Seventy) days of limitation cannot be accepted and thereby, the petition is liable to be dismissed. 12. I have considered the submissions at the bar with circumspection. 13. It would be apt to reiterate that - the suspension order was passed on 02.06.2024; the respondents were intimated of the bail order on 03.03.2025 which was received by them on 04.03.2025; the petitioner was released on bail on 18.01.2025; the review committee was constituted on 28.05.2025; After review meeting on 29.05.2025, the suspension order was extended w.e.f. 02.06.2025; and the order of extension was issued on 03.06.2025. 14. Now, the question that falls for consideration is that whether the review was dehors the period as mandated by law. 15. It is also apt to mention at this juncture that the petitioner was suspended immediately after he was arrested in connection with Itanagar WPS Case No. 20/2024 under Section 373 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Sections 6, 8, 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and read with Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Immoral Trafficking (Prevention) Act, 1956. 16. As this is not a case of suspension on departmental proceeding initiated by the department, but suspension pursuant to a criminal offence allegedly committed by the petitioner, it is submitted that no memorandum of charge has been drawn against the petitioner. So, the contention that the petitioner is still under suspension without memorandum of charges being served, does not arise at all. 17. The petitioner has relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajay Choudhury (supra) wherein it has been held that :- “21. So, the contention that the petitioner is still under suspension without memorandum of charges being served, does not arise at all. 17. The petitioner has relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajay Choudhury (supra) wherein it has been held that :- “21. We, therefore, direct that the currency of a suspension order should not extend beyond three months if within this period the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is not served on the delinquent officer/employee; if the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is served, a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the suspension. As in the case in hand, the Government is free to transfer the person concerned to any department in any of its offices within or outside the State so as to sever any local or personal contact that he may have and which he may misuse for obstructing the investigation against him. The Government may also prohibit him from contacting any person, or handling records and documents till the stage of his having to prepare his defence. We think this will adequately safeguard the universally recognised principle of human dignity and the right to a speedy trial and shall also preserve the interest of the Government in the prosecution. We recognise that the previous Constitution Benches have been reluctant to quash proceedings on the grounds of delay, and to set time-limits to their duration. However, the imposition of a limit on the period of suspension has not been discussed in prior case law, and would not be contrary to the interests of justice. Furthermore, the direction of the Central Vigilance Commission that pending a criminal investigation, departmental proceedings are to be held in abeyance stands superseded in view of the stand adopted by us.” 18. Reverting back to this case, it is held that it is true that the suspension order of the petitioner is not pursuant to any departmental proceeding initiated by the Office, but pursuant to his arrest in criminal offence registered against him as per Rule 10 (2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules. 19. Although this is not a case of continuous extension, yet the respondents’ submission that as the petitioner is booked in a criminal offence, the Department may have delayed in formulating the memorandum of charge, holds no water. 20. 19. Although this is not a case of continuous extension, yet the respondents’ submission that as the petitioner is booked in a criminal offence, the Department may have delayed in formulating the memorandum of charge, holds no water. 20. The petitioner is a Government servant and he was serving as an st Assistant Commandant under 1 APP Bn, Chimpu, Itanagar when he was arrested in connection with the aforementioned criminal case. He is being under suspension continuously since 02.06.2004. 21. The petitioner has also relied on the decision of this Court in Santosh Kumar (supra) wherein it has been held that :- “10. The disputed issues in the present case are whether the suspension gets revoked unless the review of the suspension is made before expiry of the period of 90 days from the date of the order of suspension and also whether the suspension is required to be extended prior to expiry of 90 days.” ***** ***** ***** “12. A careful perusal of the Rules reveal that the Rule 10 mandates categorically that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made shall not be valid after a period of 90 days unless it is extended after review, for a period beyond the expiry of 90 days. The Rule therefore prescribes that any order of extension must be reviewed and also be extended before the expiry of 90 days of the order of suspension issued by the authority. This Rule came to be interpreted in a Judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Dipal Mali (Supra) where the Apex Court upheld the Judgment of High Court of Madhya Pradesh which had interfered with the extension of the suspension order and which order of the High Court came to be assailed before the Apex Court. The Apex Court upon examining the entire matter as well as the CCS (CCA) Rules categorically held that the review and modification or revocation of the order of suspension was required to be done before the expiry of 90 days from the date of the order of suspension and as had been categorically provided under Sub Rule 7. The Apex Court held that the order of suspension made or deemed to be made would not be valid after a further period unless it was ex- tended after review before expiry of the period of 90 days.” ***** ***** ***** “14. The Apex Court held that the order of suspension made or deemed to be made would not be valid after a further period unless it was ex- tended after review before expiry of the period of 90 days.” ***** ***** ***** “14. From the pleadings available on record, it is clear that there is no dispute that the suspension order was issued on 19.7.2019 putting the petitioner under deemed suspension until further orders. There is also no dispute on facts that the petitioner was taken into custody on 19.09.2019 and therefore under the provisions of Rule 10(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, the petitioner was deemed to be under suspension by order dt. 27.09.2019 until further orders. 15. The question of review of such a suspension order or the necessity of continuance of such a suspension order is prescribed under Sub-Rule 7 of Rule 10. Proviso to Sub- Rule 7 of Rule 10 however, makes it clear that the review of such a suspension order shall be required only after the Government Servant detained in custody is released from detention or from the date on which the fact of his release was intimated to appointing authority. 16. In the facts of the present case, it is clear that after his release from detention on 18.04.2020, he had intimated to the respondent authorities by way of an E-mail on 20.04.2020 about his release from detention. There is no denial by the respondents regarding those emails by the petitioner. Therefore, in terms of Rule 10(7) of CCS (CCA) Rules, it is clear that the period of 90 days for review and extension of the order of suspension by the respondent authority was required to have been completed by 19.07.2020. But the same was issued only on 22.07.2020. Even if the argument of the counsel for the respondent is to be accepted that decision for review was taken on 25.06.2020 even then the order of extension of the review, as mandated under Rule 10(7) was required to be issued prior to the expiry of 90 days from the date of suspension of the petitioner and which date expired on 20.07.2020. 17. 17. Under such circumstances, this Court is of the view that the impugned suspension order dated 22.07.2020 which was issued lost its force or validity w.e.f. 20.07.2020 and therefore an order which has lost its validity could not have been extended by subsequent order as have been done in the present case. 18. Accordingly, the writ petition stands allowed. The impugned order of suspension dated 22.07.2020 is hereby interfered with, set aside and quashed. 19. In view of the discussions and directions above, the subsequent orders of review passed by the departmental authority are also set aside and interfered with.” 22. Relying on this judgment, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the respondent Department reviewed the suspension order dated 03.06.2025, after expiry of 366 (Three Hundred and Sixty Six) days during the extant currency of the petitioner’s suspension. 23. It is contended that the review was initiated when notices were issued to the respondents after this writ petition was filed on 01.09.2025. 24. In view of the foregoing submissions and the documents annexed along with the petition, it has surfaced that the department was intimated about the petitioner’s bail order on 03.03.2025 and the communication was received by the department on 04.03.2025. Annexure-1 to 4 of the counter affidavit of respondents No. 1 to 4, is the communication. Thus, the extension order was issued after expiry of 90 (Ninety) days on 03.06.2025, although it was to be effected from 02.06.2025. 25. The argument of the learned Government Advocate that the extension of suspension of the petitioner was reviewed on 29.05.2025, well within the window of 90 (Ninety) days, cannot be accepted as the extension order was issued after expiry of 90 (Ninety) days i.e. on 03.06.2025. Although as per the order, the extension of suspension was to be effected from 02.06.2025, yet, the order was issued on 03.06.2025. 26. On calculation of time, running from 04.03.2025, when the communication was received by the department reveals that after expiry of 91 (Ninety One) days, the suspension of the petitioner was extended for a period of 180 (One Hundred and Eighty) days. 27. It is true that the petitioner is booked under a heinous offence. The petitioner is facing trial and the consequence of trial shall follow. 27. It is true that the petitioner is booked under a heinous offence. The petitioner is facing trial and the consequence of trial shall follow. However, despite the fact that the petitioner was placed under suspension pursuant to the allegations of a heinous offence, but in view of the fact that the suspension order was extended in violation to provisions of CCS (CCA) Rules, the impugned order dated 03.06.2025 has to be set aside. 28. This Court relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. Vs. Dipak Mali, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 222 has held in Santosh Kumar (supra) that the Apex Court upheld the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh which had interfered with the extension of the suspension order and which order of the High Court came to be assailed before the Apex Court. The Apex Court upon examining the entire matter as well as the CCS (CCA) Rules categorically held that the review and modification or revocation of the order of suspension was required to be done before the expiry of 90 days from the date of the order of suspension. 29. In the instant case as the order of suspension of the petitioner was deemed to have been made under Sub-Rule 2 of Rule 10 of CCS (CCA) Rules, the proviso to Sub-Rule 7 of Rule 10 comes into play and as per the proviso, the period of 90 (Ninety) days will start running and will be factored in, from the date of Government servant detained in custody is released from detention or the date on which the fact of his release from detention is intimated to his appointing authority, whichever is later. 30. Thus, there is not even an iota of doubt that in violation of the provisions of the CCS (CCA) Rules, the extension order was passed after expiry of 91 (Ninety One) days. 31. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that Circular No. F/No.AR-33/3/2025-SECT-1-AR/125 Dated Itanagar, the 23rd January, 2025 and has highlighted that :- “1…….. 30. Thus, there is not even an iota of doubt that in violation of the provisions of the CCS (CCA) Rules, the extension order was passed after expiry of 91 (Ninety One) days. 31. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that Circular No. F/No.AR-33/3/2025-SECT-1-AR/125 Dated Itanagar, the 23rd January, 2025 and has highlighted that :- “1…….. Provided that no such review of suspension shall be necessary in the case of deemed suspension, if the Government servant continues to be under detention and in such case the ninety days' period shall be computed from the date the Government servant detained in custody is released from detention or the date on which the fact of his release from detention is intimated to his appointing authority, whichever is later: Provided further that in a case where no charge sheet is issued under these rules, the total period under suspension or deemed suspension, as the case may be, including any extended period in terms of sub-rule (6) shall not exceed, - (a) …………. 2. In view of (1) above, an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made shall be reviewed by the authority competent to modify or revoke the suspension, before expiry of 90 days from the effective date of suspension, on the recommendation of the Review Committee constituted for the purpose and pass orders either extending or revoking the suspension. Subsequent reviews shall be made before expiry of the extended period of suspension. Extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding 180 days at a time.” 32. In view of the foregoing discussions, this Court is constrained to set aside the order of extension of Shri Bulang Marik for a further period of 180 days w.e.f. 02.06.2025 as the order was issued on 03.06.2025 vide Order No. HOME- rd 11011/11/2024/765 Dated Itanagar, the 3 June, 2024. Thereby, the Extension rd Order No. HOME-11011/11/2024/765 Dated Itanagar, the 3 June, 2024 is set aside. 33. In view of the above observation, this writ petition stands disposed of. 34. No order as to costs.