JUDGMENT : RAJESH RAI K., J. 1. This is defendants' second appeal. 2. The plaintiff has filed a suit for declaration to declare that she is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property which is delivered in her favour by the original defendant (Kanthappa Gowda) in view of bilateral agreement dated 31.03.1993 as permanent alimony and consequently, for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant, his men, servants, or any other persons claiming through him from trespassing into the possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property by the plaintiff. 3. It is the case of the plaintiff that the defendant entered into second marriage with the plaintiff since he had no male issues from his first wife and at the time of marriage, the defendant was aged about 60 years. After marriage, they both lived together for a period of 10 months along with the first wife. Later, the defendant at the instance of first wife started to harass the plaintiff. As such, the plaintiff demanded him to provide permanent alimony for her livelihood. Hence, vide agreement dated 31.03.1993 (EX.P2), the defendant agreed to settle the suit schedule property in favour of the plaintiff as there was a residential house in it, to keep up his earlier promise made at the time of marriage. 4. It is the further case of the plaintiff that the suit schedule properties were originally granted in favour of defendant under darkasth proceedings. The plaintiff was put in possession of the suit schedule property and the defendant assured that he would execute registered Conveyance Deed in her favour. Later, he turned hostile by instigation of his first wife and children and failed to act upon the agreement. Thereafter, the defendant filed a suit in O.S.No.91/1993 for declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction, which was decreed. However the First Appellate Court reversed the said judgment in R.A.No.15/1997, against which a regular second appeal was preferred before this court in RSA No.103/2009. This court has allowed the appeal in part by declaring the plaintiff as the owner of the suit schedule property by rejecting his prayer for permanent injunction since he is not in possession of the suit schedule property. This court has allowed the appeal in part by declaring the plaintiff as the owner of the suit schedule property by rejecting his prayer for permanent injunction since he is not in possession of the suit schedule property. Further this Court reserved liberty to the plaintiff to file a duly constituted suit for the appropriate relief, and upon filing of such suit, the Trial Court was directed to consider the same independently and uninfluenced by the reasons given in the said judgment. Thus, in view of the liberty granted by this Court in R.S.A No.103/2009, the plaintiff has filed the present suit. 5. The defendant, after entering appearance filed written statement and denied the plaint averments. The execution of the agreement dated 31.03.1993 in respect of suit schedule property as maintenance was also denied and contended that he never delivered possession of the suit schedule property. He also contended that the suit is clearly barred by the principles of res judicata. Accordingly, he prays to dismiss the suit. 6. The Trial Court, after considering the rival pleadings, framed relevant issues and after examining the evidence in detail, decreed the suit by declaring the plaintiff as the absolute owner of the suit schedule property delivered in her favour by way of bilateral agreement dated31.03.1993. 7. On appeal by the defendant, the First Appellate Court, upon re-appreciation of evidence, has held that this court in RSA.No.103/2009 made an observation that the defendant is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property and therefore, the plaintiff is entitled for her right in respect of suit schedule property by virtue of EX.P2. Accordingly, the First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal by confirming the judgment and decree dated 14.10.2015 passed in O.S.No.205/2010. 8. Aggrieved by the same, the defendants are before this Court. 9. I have heard Sri Sachin B.S., learned counsel for the appellants/defendants and Sri Prasad K.S., learned counsel for Smt.Archanamurthy P., learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff. 10. The primary contention of the appellants is that both the Courts have committed an error in holding that the suit of the plaintiff is not barred by principles of res judicata in view of declaration of ownership of the suit schedule property in the name of the defendant by this court in RSA No.103/2009. 10. The primary contention of the appellants is that both the Courts have committed an error in holding that the suit of the plaintiff is not barred by principles of res judicata in view of declaration of ownership of the suit schedule property in the name of the defendant by this court in RSA No.103/2009. According to the learned counsel the Trial Court ought not have entertained and adjudicated the suit on the strength of EX.P2 i.e., agreement dated 31.03.1993. By enunciating his contention, he submits that this court in RSA No.103/2009 had given liberty to the plaintiff to file a duly constituted suit for the appropriate relief. However, the plaintiff is not entitled to file second suit for the similar cause of action and for the same relief of declaration and injunction. 11. He also contended that the Trial Court has failed to examine the crucial aspect of the matter, whether the plaintiff can claim to be a legally wedded wife of the defendant when the first marriage of defendant is subsisting. According to the learned counsel, once the plaintiff was unable to prove that she is the legally wedded wife of the defendant, then she is not entitled for any alimony under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act. He further contended that, when the plaintiff claims to be the second wife, she cannot take shelter under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act and she cannot be conferred any right under Section 14(1) in respect of suit schedule property by relying on Ex.P2 - agreement, that too when the same is unregistered and disputed one. 12. In order to buttress his agreement, he relied on the following judgments: 1. Lilly Thomas & Another Vs. Union of India and Others- (2006) 6 SCC 224. 2. Sunder Lal Saini Vs. Meena Saini - 2021 SCC Online Del 4930. With these submissions, he prays to allow the appeal. 13. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff submits that the defendant has not seriously disputed the marriage with the plaintiff and also the fact, they lived together for a period of 10 months in his cross-examination. Further, he also admitted the execution of the agreement Ex.P2 and that except the plaint schedule property, there is no other property for maintenance of the plaintiff. Further, he also admitted the execution of the agreement Ex.P2 and that except the plaint schedule property, there is no other property for maintenance of the plaintiff. According to the learned counsel, the standard of proof of marriage in Section 125 of Cr.P.C is not strict as is required in other proceedings, since Section 125 of Cr.P.C provides a summary remedy to neglected wives to obtain maintenance. By relying on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of SHAILESH BOPCHE Vs. ANITHA BOPCHE IN Misc. Crl. Case No.30262/2023 , he submitted that, when the parties live together as husband and wife, there is a presumption that they are legally married couple for claim of maintenance under Section 125 of Cr.P.C and presumption of marriage may be raised when a man and woman have cohabited continuously as husband and wife. As such, he submits that the plaintiff has proved her second marriage with the defendant and she is entitled for maintenance. 14. He also contended that, as per Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the permanent alimony and maintenance has to be ordered having regard to the respondent's own income and other property, if any, the income and other property of the applicant. As such, in the case on hand, the defendant has handed over the suit schedule property to the plaintiff for her maintenance. Therefore, the same is her absolute property as per Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. 15. He also contends that, the suit is not barred by res judicata in view of the judgment passed by the Co- ordinate bench of this Court in RSA.No.103/2009 by declaring the defendant as owner in respect of the suit schedule property by rejecting his prayer for injunction on the ground that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit schedule property. Further, in view of the liberty granted by this Court to file a suit for the appropriate relief, the plaintiff is entitled to file the present suit for the relief of declaration in view of Section 34 of Specific Relief Act, 1963. With these submissions he prays to dismiss the appeal. 16. Further, in view of the liberty granted by this Court to file a suit for the appropriate relief, the plaintiff is entitled to file the present suit for the relief of declaration in view of Section 34 of Specific Relief Act, 1963. With these submissions he prays to dismiss the appeal. 16. Having given my anxious consideration to the contentions of learned counsel for both the parties and having perused the documents on record, the substantial questions of law that would arise for consideration are: i. Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff is barred by principles of res judicata in view of the judgment passed in RSA No.103/2009? ii. Whether the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court are justified in holding that, the plaintiff is entitled to claim permanent alimony and maintenance under Section 25 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1956? iii. Whether the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court are justified in holding that the plaintiff is the full owner in respect of the suit schedule property by virtue Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 based on the agreement – Ex.P2? 17. As could be gathered from records, before filling the instant suit, the defendant has filed a suit in O.S.No.91/1993 for declaration of title and consequential relief of injunction in respect of the suit schedule property against the plaintiff. Though the said suit was decreed, on appeal, the First Appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree in R.A.No.15/1997. Against the same, the defendant had approached this Court by filing RSA No.103/2009 and this Court has partly allowed the appeal and declared the defendant as the owner in respect of suit schedule property and his prayer for permanent prohibitory injunction was rejected, by reserving liberty to both the parties to file a duly constituted suit for the appropriate relief. 18. It is pertinent to note at this juncture, the Co- ordinate Bench of this Court in the above RSA has categorically held that the defendant i.e. the appellant in the said appeal was not in possession of the suit schedule property, as such, he is not entitled to the relief permanent prohibitory injunction. It is open to him to seek the relief of recovery of possession. Hence, it is quite clear that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit schedule property. It is open to him to seek the relief of recovery of possession. Hence, it is quite clear that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit schedule property. Nonetheless, the daughter of the defendant had filed a suit for partition against the defendant and other family members in O.S.No.3/2017. In the said suit, the suit schedule property in the present suit is excluded.Further, the plaintiff has also filed a suit in O.S No.39/2018 against the first wife of the defendant and their children for permanent injunction in respect of suit schedule property in the present suit and the said suit has been decreed. In such circumstance, it is clear that the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. 19. Further, this Court in RSA.No.103/2009 held that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit schedule property and she is at liberty to file a suit for appropriate relief and that the execution of Ex.P2 – Agreement has been admitted by the defendant in his cross-examination that except the suit schedule property, no other properties were given to the plaintiff for her maintenance by him. 20. In such circumstance, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondent, the remedy available for her is to file a suit for declaration of title in respect of the suit schedule property as provided under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, since she has no other remedy to seek any other relief. Accordingly, the first substantial question of law is answered in the "negative". 21. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that, the plaintiff cannot claim to be a legally wedded second wife of the defendant, that too when the first marriage of the defendant is subsisting and as per the ratio laid down in the case of Sunder Lal Saini cited supra and as such the plaintiff cannot seek maintenance from the defendant. However, on careful examination of the ratio laid down in Sunder Lal Saini , the same is not apposite to the facts and circumstance of this case. 22. In the instant case, the defendant has admitted in his cross-examination that he married the plaintiff at the age of 60 years for the reason that his first wife has not begotten a male child. 22. In the instant case, the defendant has admitted in his cross-examination that he married the plaintiff at the age of 60 years for the reason that his first wife has not begotten a male child. After the marriage, the plaintiff and defendant stayed together for a period of 10 months and thereafter, at the instance of first wife, the defendant started to harass the plaintiff. As such, for the maintenance/permanent alimony to the plaintiff, the suit schedule property was given to her by executing an agreement – Ex.P2 and ever since, the plaintiff is in possession of the suit schedule property. No doubt, the marriage of the plaintiff is the second marriage with the defendant. However, as per the settled position of law in catena of judgments, the law presumes in favour of marriage and against concubinage, when a man and woman have cohabitated continuously and where a man and woman proved to have lived together as man and wife, the law presumes, unless the contrary is clearly proved, that they were living together in consequence of a valid marriage and not in the state of concubinage. As such, when the parties live together as husband and wife, there is a presumption that they are legally married couple for claim of maintenance of wife under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. This view is also fortified by the Co-ordinate Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in the case of Shailesh Bopche cited supra. 23. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CHANMUNIYA Vs. VIRENDRA KUMAR SINGH KUSHWAHA - (2011) 1 SCC 141 has held that, where a man and woman have cohabited for a long period of time, in the absence of legal necessities of a valid marriage, such a woman would be entitled for maintenance. A man should not be allowed to benefit from legal loopholes by enjoying the advantages of a de facto marriage without undertaking the duties and obligations. 24. Applying the above legal position to the facts and circumstances of this case, in view of clear admission by the defendant about the marriage of the plaintiff with him and they lived together for ten months, I am of the considered view that the plaintiff is entitled for maintenance/permanent alimony under Section 25 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Accordingly, I answer the second substantial question of law in the "affirmative". 25. Accordingly, I answer the second substantial question of law in the "affirmative". 25. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 reads as under: 14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property.?(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation.?In this sub-section, “property” includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. 26. On careful reading of Ex.P2 – Agreement, the recitals clearly reveals that the defendant agreed to give the suit schedule property to the plaintiff and also agreed to construct house in the said property for her residence and livelihood. As such, it is clear that the same was given to her as maintenance/permanent alimony under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of MUKAT LAL Vs. KAILASH CHAND - 2024 SCC Online SC 964 held that under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the hindu female for establishing full ownership on the undivided joint family estate, must not only be possessed of the property, but she must have acquired the property. Such acquisition must be either by way of inheritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription. In the case on hand, as discussed supra, the suit schedule property was given by the defendant for the maintenance of the plaintiff. Thus, she acquired the absolute right over the same. Accordingly, I answer the third substantial question of law raised above in the "affirmative". 28. In the case on hand, as discussed supra, the suit schedule property was given by the defendant for the maintenance of the plaintiff. Thus, she acquired the absolute right over the same. Accordingly, I answer the third substantial question of law raised above in the "affirmative". 28. For the foregoing discussion, I am of the considered view that the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have rightly decreed the suit and interference with the impugned judgments do not call for at the hands of this Court. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.