JUDGMENT : Easwaran S., J. These appeals raise a common question and being considered and disposed together. 2. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal are as follows:- O.S.No.282/2010 on the files of the Sub Court, Manjeri seeking a declaration that a lease executed by the mother of the plaintiff in favour of the 1 st defendant company is invalid and not binding on the plaintiff directing the defendants to vacate and hand over the possession of the plaint schedule property. According to the plaintiff, the property originally belonged to his maternal grand uncle one William Nicholas, who executed a registered Will bearing No.9/1941 of S.R.O, Manjeri, as per which, the right title and interest over the property, came into the plaintiff's hands. In the said Will, the mother of the plaintiff, Mrs.Ruth Kamala Grace also known as Kamala Santwan was given a limited life interest over the property. The mother of the plaintiff filed O.P.No.3/1960 before the District Court, Kozhikode for a letter of administration and by order dated 09.07.1960, the same was granted. Later, the mother of the plaintiff executed an agreement of renewal indenture dated 08.08.2002 for a period of 20 years in favour of the 1 st defendant, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. According to the the plaintiff, the mother had only limited 'life interest' over the property and therefore, was incompetent to renew the lease deed. The defendants entered appearance and contended that, by lease agreement dated 10.09.1951, M/s.Caltex (India) Ltd was granted a lease for 5 years. Thereafter, the period of lease was extended by another agreement dated 15.03.1954 revising the rent. Later, the testator died on 05.01.1959 and thereafter, the agreement was renewed by the mother of the plaintiff. The renewal agreement also mentions about the renewal of the lease in the year 1974 and therefore, since M/s.Caltex (India) Ltd was continuing in the plaint schedule property on the basis of a commercial lease, the successors in interest, namely the 1 st defendant, was entitled to protection under Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 . On behalf of the plaintiff, PW1 was examined and Exts.A1 to A5 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, DW1 was examined and Exts.B1 and B2 were marked. The Trial Court, on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence, framed the following issues:- 1. On behalf of the plaintiff, PW1 was examined and Exts.A1 to A5 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, DW1 was examined and Exts.B1 and B2 were marked. The Trial Court, on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence, framed the following issues:- 1. Whether, the lease of plaint schedule property to the defendants was created in the year 1951 by the father of the plaintiff viz.,William Nicholas as contended by the defendants or whether it was made by the mother of the plaintiff viz., Ruth Kamala Grace as contended by the plaintiff? 2. Whether, the plaintiff's mother got any right to lease out the plaint schedule property or to renew the lease to the defendants? 3. Whether, the lease of the plaint schedule property is invalid and not binding on the plaintiff? 4. Whether, the plaintiff is entitled to get vacant possession of plaint schedule property as prayed for? 5. Whether, the plaintiff is entitled to get the profit of income as prayed for? 6. Reliefs and Costs?” 3. On an appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the Trial Court came into the conclusion that the mother of the plaintiff could not have executed a renewal lease for 2 cents. Therefore, the Trial Court held that since the original lease was in respect of 6.89 cents, the plaintiff is not entitled to seek recovery of eviction of the defendants from the entire plaint schedule property and the defendant entitled for the protection under Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 for recovery of possession. Accordingly, the suit was decreed in part by granting a decree in respect of 2 cents. The aforesaid finding was arrived on the basis of the fact that the plaintiff's mother had only limited life interest over the property and she could not execute the renewal agreement in the year 2002. The plaintiff as well as the defendants preferred A.S.Nos.28 of 2013 and 82 of 2013 before the Additional District Court-II, Manjeri. By a common judgment dated 23.12.2015, both the appeals were dismissed and thus, the judgment and decree of the Trial Court was confirmed. Thus, the plaintiff as well as the defendants have filed these appeals before this Court. 4. The plaintiff as well as the defendants preferred A.S.Nos.28 of 2013 and 82 of 2013 before the Additional District Court-II, Manjeri. By a common judgment dated 23.12.2015, both the appeals were dismissed and thus, the judgment and decree of the Trial Court was confirmed. Thus, the plaintiff as well as the defendants have filed these appeals before this Court. 4. When appeal was admitted, the following questions of law are framed by this Court in R.S.A.No.315 of 2016; “a) Whether the Courts below had gone perversely wrong in applying the correct principles of law based on the facts and circumstances of the case? b) Whether the courts below are justified in not holding that the legacy devised in favour of the plaintiff is a residuary legacy? c) Whether the decree granted by the Courts below for surrendering 2 cents of additional land leased by the mother on the finding that the she enjoyed only restricted life interest over the property is not opposed to the real intention of the testator as discernable from the construction of Ext.A1 Will ? d) Whether the premature termination of the lease created by a legally competent person without valid reason and notice is sustainable in law?” In R.S.A.No.785 of 2016, the following questions of law are framed by this Court; (i) Was not the court below and the lower appellate court completely wrong in its appreciation of facts and evidences, which is evident from the reasoning provided? (ii) Is it not a case of the lower appellate court deciding the case with material illegality and irregularity, thus constituting a substantial question of law? (iii) Is not the approach of the lower appellate court wrong and illegal, in not appreciating the evidence where even the basic facts are not correctly appreciated?” 5. Heard Sri.R.Sudhish, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants in R.S.A.No.315/2016, Sri.G.Sreekumar Chelur, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff and the appellant in R.S.A.No.785/ 2016. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the lessee Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd contended that the appellants are entitled for a protection under Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act since the lease in their favour is of a commercial nature and was executed prior to coming into force of the provision. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the lessee Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd contended that the appellants are entitled for a protection under Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act since the lease in their favour is of a commercial nature and was executed prior to coming into force of the provision. It is further submitted that, during the life time of William Nicholas, a lease agreement was executed in the year 1954 and thereby, the predecessor in interest of the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation, namely M/s.Caltex (India) Ltd continued to occupy the plaint schedule property. He further contended that the finding of the Trial Court that the mother of the plaintiff had no right to execute the renewal agreement is absolutely incorrect in as much as the mother had a life interest over the property and she was in possession and enjoyment of the property. The fact that she had received rent would go to show that the plaintiff as well as his mother accepted the lease agreement. Even otherwise, it is further pointed out that the plaint schedule property is not properly identified and even the plaintiff failed to take out an Advocate Commissioner to demarcate 2 cents, which according to the Trial Court, the plaintiff's mother had no right to execute the lease deed. 7. Per contra, Sri.G.Sreekumar Chelur, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/ plaintiff would contend that the agreement of lease executed by his mother in favour of the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd is void inasmuch as his mother had no right title and interest over the property. The mere fact that, his mother accepted the rent is of no consequence. It is further pointed out that, it is the duty of the defendants to prove the existence of a lease as on the date of coming into the force of Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The initial burden having not being discharged by the defendants, the plaintiff was entitled to succeed and therefore, the courts below erroneously dismissed the suit as regards the claim for eviction of 6.89 cents. It is further submitted that, though in Ext.A4, the renewal of a lease in the year 1974 is mentioned, no document was produced. The initial burden having not being discharged by the defendants, the plaintiff was entitled to succeed and therefore, the courts below erroneously dismissed the suit as regards the claim for eviction of 6.89 cents. It is further submitted that, though in Ext.A4, the renewal of a lease in the year 1974 is mentioned, no document was produced. Even if the document of renewal had been produced, the defendants are not entitled to get claim for a protection under Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act since after 01.01.1970, a lease is prohibited under the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. Therefore, after 01.01.1970, the same can only be a commercial lease subject to terminate under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 8. I have considered the rival submissions raised across the bar and perused the judgment and decree of the courts below and also the records of the case. 9. The question that requires consideration of this Court in these appeals is as regards the entitlement of the mother of the plaintiff to execute Ext.A4. Admittedly, William Nicholas died in the year 1959. The defendants were not able to establish that during the life time of William Nicholas, he had executed any lease agreement, which would entitle them to claim the protection under Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. What is claimed before this Court is the entitlement of the defendants for a protection under Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act based on Ext.A4. Ext.A4 is dated 08.08.2002. The right of the mother of the plaintiff to execute an agreement of lease or a renewal stems out of the contents of the Will and an order obtained probate. When we look into the contents of the Will, it becomes evident that, no absolute right title and interest is vested on the mother of the plaintiff. On contrary, what is conferred on her is only a limited interest of life in the property. It is beyond ones comprehension to hold that a person holding limited life interest over a property will be entitled to act as a true owner of the property and divest the title of the true owner of the property without his juncture. Therefore, viewed in the above perspective, the defendants cannot claim any right under Ext.A4. It is beyond ones comprehension to hold that a person holding limited life interest over a property will be entitled to act as a true owner of the property and divest the title of the true owner of the property without his juncture. Therefore, viewed in the above perspective, the defendants cannot claim any right under Ext.A4. Therefore, to that extent, the findings of the Trial Court does not require any interference. 10. As regards the claim of the lessee, for the protection under Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, which has been upheld by the Trial Court while dismissing the suit for eviction as regards 6.89 cents of land, it must be noticed that the defendants did not produce any agreement that would entitle them to claim the protection under Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. Pertinently, Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act was inserted with effect from 17.12.1969. The averments in the written statement would show that, initially in the year 1951, a lease was executed for five years. At the same breath, the defendants would contend that, in the year 1954, William Nicholas had executed a fresh agreement for lease. The said agreement has not seen the light of the day. Therefore, this Court is of the view that when a claim for protection under Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act is pleaded, it was the bounden duty of the defendants to establish the same. Moreover, the reliance of Ext.A4 and also the renewal agreement in the year 1974 cannot be sustained especially in the light of the dictum laid down by this Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Mumbai and others vs. T.S.Kalyanaraman and others ( 2014 (1) KHC 263 ) , wherein this Court interpreted the expression “renewal of tenancy” and held that the same has been understood as an agreement for a fresh tenancy following on the termination of the earlier tenancy. Therefore, even if Ext.A4 is taken as such, the irresistible conclusion is that, after coming into force of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, a fresh tenancy came into existence in the year 1974, which is impermissible under law. Therefore, even if Ext.A4 is taken as such, the irresistible conclusion is that, after coming into force of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, a fresh tenancy came into existence in the year 1974, which is impermissible under law. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the mother of the plaintiff had no right title and interest over the property to execute the lease agreement, even if it is assumed that she obtained interest to execute the lease by virtue of her possession, the claim for a protection under Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act has to fail because admittedly the lease agreement is executed after coming into the force of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. Even assuming for argument sake the lease by a limited owner is permissible, the lease will come to an end on the death of the life holder. This is in tune with Section 111 (c) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 . Therefore, viewed in the above perspective, this Court cannot find favour with the views expressed by the Trial Court as confirmed by the first appellate court that the 1 st defendant, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd is entitled for a protection under Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act in respect of 6.89 cents of land. Resultantly, by answering the questions of law raised in R.S.A No.315/2016 against the appellants and answering the questions of law in R.S.A.No.785/2016 in favour of the plaintiff, the judgment in A.S.No.82/2013 as confirmed in the judgment in O.S.No.282/2010 is reversed and O.S.No.282/2010 is decreed as prayed for. Resultantly, the judgment in A.S.No.28/2013 is confirmed and R.S.A.No.315/2016 is dismissed. The plaintiff will be entitled full cost through out the proceedings.