JUDGMENT : NBK, J. This appeal is filed against the Order and Decree dated 08.08.2023 passed by the Principal District and Sessions Judge-cum-Family Court, Medchal-Malkajgiri District, at Malkajgiri, in F.C.O.P. No. 150 of 2019. By the impugned order, the Family Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner (i.e., the husband) is not entitled to the grant of divorce on the ground of cruelty, as the allegations were not proved.The appellant herein is the husband, and the respondent is the wife. 2. Brief facts of the case are as follows: The marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was solemnized on 18.05.2015 at L.B. Nagar, Hyderabad, in accordance with Hindu rites and customs. After the marriage, the parties cohabited at the matrimonial home and lived together for a period of time, though disputes arose subsequently. The respondent is employed in the private sector, and the petitioner is also employed, with both parties maintaining independent work schedules. In August 2017, the respondent conceived, and unfortunately, the pregnancy ended in miscarriage/abortion after medical intervention at Rainbow Hospital, L.B. Nagar. Thereafter, the parties continued to live separately for extended periods, and ultimately, from 17.10.2018 onwards, they have been living apart. Mediation and reconciliation efforts were undertaken on more than one occasion but did not result in reunion. The petitioner instituted F.C.O.P.No.150 of 2019 seeking dissolution of marriage on the grounds of cruelty by respondent- wife. The petition was contested by the respondent. During the trial, both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence, wherein the petitioner examined himself as PW-1 along with three other witnesses as PWs.2 to 4 and marked documents Exs. A-1 to A-13. The respondent examined herself as RW-1 and marked Exs. R-1 and R-2. The Family Court, vide the impugned Order and Decree, dismissed the F.C.O.P. No.150 of 2019, leading to the present appeal. 3. Heard Mr. T. Sharath, learned counsel for the appellant-husband; and Mr. Sadiq Hussain, learned counsel for the respondent-wife. Perused the record. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the Court below failed to appreciate the oral and documentary evidence in a proper perspective and overlooked the fact that the respondent not only committed acts of cruelty prior to the filing of the O.P. but also continued such acts thereafter, culminating in the petitioner’s arrest by initiating criminal proceedings. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the Court below failed to appreciate the oral and documentary evidence in a proper perspective and overlooked the fact that the respondent not only committed acts of cruelty prior to the filing of the O.P. but also continued such acts thereafter, culminating in the petitioner’s arrest by initiating criminal proceedings. The Family Court further failed to take note of the material fact that the respondent’s family members were present for the identification of the petitioner at the time of his arrest and also failed to consider the respondent’s own admission that she left the matrimonial home on 17.10.2018 and never returned thereafter. The court below lost sight of the fact that, at the behest of the respondent’s father, the petitioner was arrested, and that in W.P. No. 7554 of 2019 filed by the petitioner challenging the said arrest, the High Court severely criticized the police action and imposed costs of Rs.1,00,000/-, thereby lending credence to the petitioner’s case of harassment. The Family Court also failed to consider that although the respondent was a party to the said writ petition, she did not file any counter affidavit denying the allegations made therein. The court below further erred in misapplying the rationale of the judgments relied upon by the petitioner and failed to take note of the respondent’s conditional willingness to resume marital life only if the petitioner agreed to live separately from his parents, which condition, by itself, amounts to mental cruelty. 4.1. Adverting to the specific query by this Court as to how a complaint lodged by the father of the respondent can be attributed to the respondent herself, it was submitted that in matrimonial offences, particularly under Section 498-A IPC, the law consciously permits complaints to be lodged not only by the wife but also by her close relatives, as acts of cruelty ordinarily occur within the privacy of the matrimonial home. The very object of the provision is to safeguard the interests of the married woman who may be unable, unwilling, or restrained from directly approaching the police. Therefore, the identity of the informant is immaterial once the victim wife adopts and supports the allegations. 4.2. Secondly, it was pointed out that the present case does not rest merely on a complaint by the respondent’s father. Therefore, the identity of the informant is immaterial once the victim wife adopts and supports the allegations. 4.2. Secondly, it was pointed out that the present case does not rest merely on a complaint by the respondent’s father. On the very same day, the respondent herself recorded her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. (Ex.A11), fully supporting the allegations of harassment and dowry cruelty made by her father. By doing so, she clearly associated herself with the criminal prosecution and demonstrated her intention to proceed against the appellant. Consequently, the trial court’s reasoning that the father’s acts cannot be attributed to the respondent is legally unsustainable and contrary to the record. 4.3. Thirdly, regarding cruelty, it was submitted that the appellant was illegally arrested from his workplace without compliance with Section 41-A Cr.P.C., was remanded to judicial custody, suffered public humiliation, mental trauma, and ultimately lost his employment. These consequences were directly traceable to the criminal proceedings initiated and supported by the respondent-wife. The illegality of the arrest was conclusively established in W.P. No. 7554 of 2019, wherein compensation was awarded to the appellant, and significantly, both the respondent and her father were parties to the writ petition but chose not to file any counter denying their role. Such conduct, it was submitted, squarely falls within the ambit of mental cruelty. 4.4. Fourthly, the learned counsel submitted that if the respondent had any bona fide intention to preserve the matrimonial relationship, she could have withdrawn the criminal proceedings or at least taken steps for restitution of conjugal rights. Instead, she persistently pursued criminal and domestic violence proceedings without substantiating evidence, thereby prolonging harassment of the appellant. This conduct, coupled with the admitted conditional offer to resume cohabitation only if the appellant lived separately from his aged parents, reinforces the appellant’s case of cruelty. 4.5. Finally, answering the query on the overall marital relationship, it was submitted that the parties have been living separately for over seven years, the respondent has effectively deserted the appellant, and the marriage has irretrievably broken down. When the entire conduct of the respondent is viewed cumulatively—constant pressure for separate residence, active participation in false criminal proceedings, illegal arrest and remand of the appellant, continued litigation, and absence of genuine reconciliation efforts—the only reasonable conclusion is that the appellant has been subjected to sustained mental cruelty warranting dissolution of marriage. 4.6. When the entire conduct of the respondent is viewed cumulatively—constant pressure for separate residence, active participation in false criminal proceedings, illegal arrest and remand of the appellant, continued litigation, and absence of genuine reconciliation efforts—the only reasonable conclusion is that the appellant has been subjected to sustained mental cruelty warranting dissolution of marriage. 4.6. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the appellant relies on Jaspal Kour Cheema vs Industrial Trade Links , (2017) 8 SCC 592 ; V. Bhagat vs D. Bhagat , (1994) 1 SCC 337 ; Sivasankaran vs Santhimeenal , (2022) 15 SCC 742 ; Joydeep Majumdar vs Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar , (2021) 3 SCC 742 ; Rakesh Raman vs Kavitha , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 497 ; Dr. Eathakota Ramesh Kumar vs KuragantiEathakota Sapna , 2019 SCC OnLine TS 455 (Telangana High Court) ; Rajan Vasant Revankar vs Mrs.Shobha Rajan Revankar , 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 116 (Bombay High Court) ; C. Siva Kumar vs A. Srividhya , 2022 SCC OnLine Mad 3672 (Madras High Court) ; Bhaskar Das vs Renu Das , 2020 SCC OnLine Gau 2954 (Gauhati High Court) ; Sarang Diwakar Amle vs State of Maharashtra , 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 4125 (Bombay High Court) ; Pruthviraj Sinh Nodhubha vs Jayesh Kumar Chhakadas Shah , (2019) 9 SCC 533 ; Shashiraj K Ram vs Sangeetha S Bangera , W.P.No.61463 of 2016 (Karnataka High Court) ; and Bandhu Mahto (Died) by LRs vs BhukhilMahatain , (2007) 10 SCC 564 to contend that the acts of the respondent tantamount to cruelty towards appellant- husband. Learned counsel further relies on Sri Subhash Chandra Das Chowdhury vs. Smt. Sandhya Das Chowdhury , 2009 SCC OnLine Cal 1699 , Malathi Ravi, M.D. vs. B.V. Ravi, M.D. , (2014) 7 SCC 640 ; Narendra vs. K. Meena , (2016) 9 SCC 455 , and also the Order of this Court in CMA No. 68 of 2022, dated 21.06.2024, wherein living separately by the wife for a long period of seven years or more is termed as “cruelty”, entitling the husband to a decree of divorce. 5. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent-wife essentially contends that the allegations of cruelty levelled by the appellant–husband are false, exaggerated, and self-serving, and that the appellant has failed to establish any conduct on the part of the respondent which would constitute mental cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act. It is contended that the respondent is a working woman who sincerely attempted to balance her professional obligations and matrimonial responsibilities, and that her inability to devote herself exclusively to household chores cannot be construed as cruelty. The incident allegedly said to have occurred at the time of the marriage reception is denied, and it is asserted that the appellant’s family is deliberately attempting to malign the respondent and her parents. 5.1 Learned counsel further submits that the respondent’s pregnancy complications and subsequent abortion were unfortunate medical events, and the attempt of the appellant to attribute blame to the respondent or her family is both insensitive and baseless. The respondent’s stay at her parental home during pregnancy and thereafter was on medical advice and with the knowledge of the appellant, and cannot amount to desertion or cruelty. It is also contended that the respondent never demanded separation without justification, but only sought a peaceful matrimonial life free from constant interference, harassment, and domination by the appellant’s parents. 5.2 . It is argued that the appellant himself neglected the respondent emotionally, failed to support her during critical phases of her life, and made no sincere efforts to address her grievances. The respondent’s visits to her parental home and her reluctance to disclose salary particulars are stated to be consequences of the appellant’s lack of trust and understanding, rather than acts of cruelty. Learned counsel maintains that the respondent was always willing to resume cohabitation provided she was treated with dignity and respect, and that it is the appellant who, by his conduct, pushed the marriage into discord. Learned counsel therefore submits that the appellant has not approached the Court with clean hands, that no legally sustainable ground of cruelty is made out, and that the petition for dissolution of marriage is liable to be dismissed. 5.3 . Learned counsel therefore submits that the appellant has not approached the Court with clean hands, that no legally sustainable ground of cruelty is made out, and that the petition for dissolution of marriage is liable to be dismissed. 5.3 . In support of his case, learned counsel for the respondent relies on Smt. Asha Gupta @ Anju Gupta vs Rajiv Kumar Gupta , 2004 SCC OnLine P&H 900 (Punjab & Haryana High Court); Murarilal vs Saraswathi , 2003 SCC OnLine MP 83 (Madhya Pradesh High Court) ; and Rajendra vs Meena , 2004 SCC OnLine MP 245 (Madhya Pradesh High Court) and further submits that the respondent is ready and willing to join the company of the appellant and she undertakes that she will provide all the necessities to her husband and hence the OP is to be dismissed. 6. Having considered the respective contentions and perused the record, it is to be noted that before the Family Court, PWs 1 and 2, though contended that the respondent-wife never cooperated in household work, PW1 (the husband), in his cross-examination, admitted that the respondent used to assist his mother (PW2) in household chores. He also admitted in cross-examination that the respondent stayed in his house for a period of two weeks and, during that time, she mingled with all the family members and assisted his mother in the kitchen. He further stated that she used to bring food from the kitchen and place it on the dining table. 6.1. The entire case of PW1 was that on 17.10.2019, the respondent picked a quarrel with him and his mother and left the house. He further stated that she used to bring food from the kitchen and place it on the dining table. 6.1. The entire case of PW1 was that on 17.10.2019, the respondent picked a quarrel with him and his mother and left the house. In cross-examination, PW1 deposed that though the respondent was ready to come and join him if they lived separately from his parents, he was not prepared to take her back as he had been remanded to judicial custody.Though PW1 stated that within a span of one year and nine months the respondent had stayed with him for a period of only five months and for the rest of the time she stayed at her parents’ house, in cross-examination he deposed that they both lived together for a period of only three months.The Court below held that the appellant had not made out a case for grant of divorce on the ground of cruelty and that the evidence led by him was not sufficient to conclude that the respondent had behaved cruelly towards him and, therefore, dismissed the FCOP No. 150 of 2019, by the impugned Order. 7. In this backdrop, it is to be noted that since the appellant-husband is seeking dissolution of the marriage on the ground of cruelty by the respondent-wife, the onus is on the appellant to prove that his wife behaved cruelly, it would be expedient if the appellant could prove cruelty by his wife, based on the facts and evidence. 7.1 . A careful perusal of the facts and evidence would reveal that neither the appellant nor any of the witnesses examined on his behalf has directly deposed that the respondent behaved cruelly by beating, abusing, harassing etc. What they deposed is that the respondent is not cooperating with her mother-in-law in household duties; not preparing food to the appellant; frequently visiting her parents' house and staying there for long periods. Additionally, the appellant contended that at the behest of the respondent he was arrested. He also pleaded that the respondent was insisting on him for separation from his parents and she stated that then only she will join his company. 7.2. In the normal perception, the complaint by mother-in-law that her daughter-in-law is not cooperating her in household duties cannot be termed as “cruelty” towards the mother-in-law. He also pleaded that the respondent was insisting on him for separation from his parents and she stated that then only she will join his company. 7.2. In the normal perception, the complaint by mother-in-law that her daughter-in-law is not cooperating her in household duties cannot be termed as “cruelty” towards the mother-in-law. Admittedly, the office timings of the petitioner are from 1:00 PM to 10:00 PM and he used to come home from office at 11:00 PM. Whereas, the office timings of the respondent are 9:00 am to 6:00 pm. When the petitioner used to come home by 11:00 pmand go to office by 1:00 pm, and the respondent wakes up by 6 am and goes to office by 9 am, not preparing food by her for her husband cannot be seen seriously and it cannot be termed as cruelty. Even otherwise, the appellant as PW1 in his cross-examination has categorically admitted that the respondent used to assist his mother (PW2) in household chores. 7.3 . Regarding staying by her at her parents' house, the appellant at one breath said that they lived together for 5 months and at another breath he said it is 3 months that they lived together. This contradiction is not explained by the appellant. Further, admittedly she suffered miscarriage.Therefore, her stay at her parents' house also cannot be said as cruelty or desertion. 7.4 . Regarding the arrest of the appellant, admittedly, it is not the respondent who lodged the complaint against the petitioner, but it is her father. So, it cannot be said that the respondent harassed the appellant by sending her to judicial custody.No doubt, in some cases, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that insisting and forcing the husband by the wife for separation from his parents/family, and for separate living, is a cruelty by wife towards her husband considering the totality of facts of each case; however, in the instant case the respondent-wife nowhere in her evidence deposed that she insisted the appellant for separate living. The respondent deposed in cross-examination: "It is true that in the cross-examination of PW-1 it was suggested by my counsel that I am ready to join the respondent if we both live separately from the parents of the petitioner." To this suggestion in cross-examination the appellant replied: "Though the respondent is ready to come and join if we live separately from our parents as she has filed a false case for the offence u/Sec. 498-A IPC wherein I was remanded to judicial custody as such I am not prepared to take back the Respondent." 7.5 . From the above, it is clear that the proposal to live with the appellant if he agrees to live separately, did not come from the mouth of the respondent-wife. It is only a suggestion by the counsel for the respondent in the cross-examination of PW-1 (husband).So also, the appellant was arrested because of the complaint in Crime No. 243 of 2019 of LB Nagar PS dt. 02.03.2019 lodged by the respondent's father. This cannot be attributed to the respondent to show that she harassed the appellant. 7.6 . With regard to the contentions based on Sri Subhash Chandra Das Chowdhury (supra) , Malathi Ravi, M.D. (supra), and Narendra (supra), and also CMA No.68 of 2022, dated 21.06.2024, wherein living separately by the wife for a long period of seven years or more is termed as cruelty, entitling the husband to a decree of divorce, it is to be noted that in the instant case, the entire period of wedlock is one year and nine months, of which, according to the appellant, the respondent stayed with him for about five months, became pregnant, which pregnancy was aborted, and thereafter stayed at her parents’ house. Hence, her stay as such cannot be construed as cruelty. 8. At this juncture, this Court is inclined to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh , 20 (2007) 4 SCC 511 , wherein some instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of 'mental cruelty', have been enumerated, which are as follows: "(ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day-to-daylife would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill- conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty. " 9. From the above discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the appellant failed to prove cruelty on the part of the respondent towards him, and none of the ingredients carved out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various judgments relied on by the learned counsel in support of his contentions on cruelty, attract to the case at hand. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the view that there is no illegality in the dismissal of the FCOP No.150 of 2019, by the impugned Order and Decree dated 08.08.2023, and hence this appeal is liable to be dismissed. 10. Accordingly, the Appeal is dismissed. No costs. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.