JUDGMENT : Moushumi Bhattacharya, J. 1. The Writ Appeals arise out of a Common Order passed by a learned Single Judge on 12.09.2025 in W.P. Nos.27715 and 27718 of 2025. The said impugned Common Order was passed in two Writ Petitions filed by the respondents herein seeking a Writ of Mandamus against the action of the appellants/State Authorities in dispossessing the respondents from a part of the premises bearing No.3-6-292, admeasuring 5641 square yards, situated at Hyderguda, Himayathnagar, Hyderabad (‘subject property’), without following due process of law. 2. Both the Writ Petitions were disposed of by way of the impugned Common Order dated 12.09.2025 by granting liberty to the Lessor of the writ petitioners therein to file a fresh Suit as per the liberty granted by the Supreme Court within ten days from the date of the order and directed the respondent Nos.2 to 4 therein not to dispossess the respondents/writ petitioners from the subject property. The respondent No.4/Mandal Revenue Officer, Himayathnagar Mandal, Hyderabad, was also directed to unlock the M.A. Garden Function Hall running in the subject premises with immediate effect. 3. The appellants were the respondents/State Authorities in the Writ Petitions. The appellants assail the impugned Common Order on the ground that the impugned Common Order was passed in contravention of the settled law on the subject and contrary to the provisions of The Telangana Land Encroachment Act, 1905 (‘1905 Act’). 4. The learned Advocate General and the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents/State Authorities challenge the impugned Common Order on the ground that the Writ Petitions were disposed of at the admission stage by directing the Mandal Revenue Officer to unlock the Function Hall which was being run in the subject premises by the writ petitioner Nso.2 and 3 in W.P.No.27718 of 2025 without considering relevant facts. According to the appellants, the Writ Petitions were filed by the Lessees of the subject premises whereas the Lessor i.e., Kishan Chand Foundation Trust, was involved in an earlier round of litigation with the appellants/State which culminated in SLP (C) No.16769 of 2022 filed by the Lessor being withdrawn by the Lessor. According to the appellants, the Writ Petitions were filed by the Lessees of the subject premises whereas the Lessor i.e., Kishan Chand Foundation Trust, was involved in an earlier round of litigation with the appellants/State which culminated in SLP (C) No.16769 of 2022 filed by the Lessor being withdrawn by the Lessor. According to the learned Advocate General and the learned Special Government Pleader, the Writ Petitions are not maintainable either in law or on the facts since the petitioners therein sought to adjudicate disputed questions of title and possession and the Lessor had also failed to obtain any interim protection from the Supreme Court. 5. According to the appellants, the learned Single Judge usurped the powers of the Civil Court which is not permissible in law. It is also submitted that the eviction proceedings initiated by the appellants under section 6 of the 1905 Act on 20.11.2004 and the consequent Panchanama dated 23.11.2004 to take over possession of the subject property was upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.1243 of 2005 and hence the writ petitioners are not entitled to a fresh notice under the said Act. It is also argued that the writ petitioners do not have locus standi to approach the Writ Court after the SLP filed by the Lessor was disposed of as withdrawn and that the relief granted to the writ petitioners was misconceived and is liable to be rejected. 6. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ petitioners/respondents herein relies on the background facts of the case to urge that the Trust created by the purchasers of the subject property and the Lessor of the writ petitioners was in peaceful possession of the subject property from 1945 till 1997 i.e., for more than 52 years, without any claim by the Government. Senior Counsel places various records including Trade Licenses for running the Function Hall, Electricity Bills, Payment Receipts and Labour Department permissions, etc., to show continued settled possession of the Trust over the subject property. It is further argued that the appellants are bound to wait for a reasonable period of time to take possession of the subject property after the Supreme Court gave liberty to the Lessor to file a substantive Suit vide order dated 09.09.2025. It is further argued that the appellants are bound to wait for a reasonable period of time to take possession of the subject property after the Supreme Court gave liberty to the Lessor to file a substantive Suit vide order dated 09.09.2025. Senior Counsel submits that the Trust and the Lessees are well within their rights to seek removal of the lock over the Function Hall in view of the sudden action taken by the appellant without following due process of law and in violation of the constitutional rights of the respondents/writ petitioners. 7. We have considered the submissions made by the Learned Advocate General and the Learned Special Government Pleader on behalf of the appellants/State and learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents/writ petitioners. 8. The dates which are relevant to the adjudication of the present Appeals are as follows: (i) The subject property, a part of which is being used as a Function Hall, was purchased under two registered Sale Deeds, dated 22.07.1968 by Mr. Mahesh Chand, Mrs. R.D. Chand, Mr. Naresh Chand and Mr. Ramesh Chand (buyers) from one Mohammad Ayub under document Nos.2183/1968 and 2184/1968. (ii) The purchasers created a registered Trust on 10.03.1969 which thereafter underwent amendments with regard to appointment of the new Trustees under registered amendment documents on 08.12.2021 and 09.12.2022. Sale Deeds were executed in favour of the Trustees pursuant to proceedings in O.S.No.14 of 1962 and C.C.C.A. No.101 of 1967 and EP No.59 of 1968. (iii) The M.A. Garden Function Hall was being run in the subject property from 2011. Trade Licenses and Registration Certificates for the same were obtained from 2016 onwards. A Notice was received from the Government under section 7 of the 1905 Act on 26.06.1997 while the Trust was in occupation. The Trust, apprehending dispossession, filed W.P.No.23001 of 2004 pursuant to receipt of the said Notice and obtained interim orders. W.P.M.P. No.9726 of 2005 was filed for amendment of the main prayer in W.P. No.23001 of 2004. (iv) W.P.No.23001 of 2004 and W.P.M.P. No.8726 of 2005 were allowed by order dated 26.04.2005, whereby the Government was directed to put the writ petitioner therein (Trust) back in possession of the subject property with a specific finding that the invocation of the provisions of the 1905 Act was erroneous in the factual matrix of the matter. (iv) W.P.No.23001 of 2004 and W.P.M.P. No.8726 of 2005 were allowed by order dated 26.04.2005, whereby the Government was directed to put the writ petitioner therein (Trust) back in possession of the subject property with a specific finding that the invocation of the provisions of the 1905 Act was erroneous in the factual matrix of the matter. The Government challenged this order in W.A.No.1243 of 2005 and sought suspension of the said order vide W.A.M.P.No.2277 of 2005 filed therein. The Division Bench passed an order in W.A.M.P.No.2277 of 2005 on 29.08.2005 directing status quo as on 29.08.2005. The Division Bench allowed the Writ Appeal on 07.09.2022 by setting aside the order passed by the Single Judge in Writ Petition No.23001 of 2004. (v) The Lessor of the writ petitioners filed SLP(C) No.16769 of 2022 in the Supreme Court against the judgment in Writ Appeal No.1243 of 2005 which was disposed of on 09.09.2025 granting liberty to avail of the remedy of filing a fresh Suit. (vi) On 11.09.2025, the Government locked the Function Hall as recorded in the Panchanama pertaining to September, 2025 (date not mentioned). The Lessees (writ petitioners) approached the Writ Court on 12.09.2025 by way of the two Writ Petitions (W.P.Nos.27715 and 27718 of 2025) challenging the action of the Government. (vii) The learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petitions by way of the impugned common order on 12.09.2025 granting liberty to the Lessor of the writ petitioners to file a fresh Suit within a period of 10 days from the date of the order. The appellant No.4/Mandal Revenue Officer, Himayathnagar Mandal, was also directed to unlock the M.A. Garden Function Hall and the appellant Nos.2 to 4 were directed not to interfere with the subject property for the aforesaid period of ten days. (viii) The Government preferred the present Writ Appeals on 15.09.2025. (ix) On 16.09.2025, the Lessor (Trust), Trustees and the writ petitioners filed O.S. No.438 of 2025 on the file of the learned II Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for declaration of title, recovery of possession and permanent injunction. 9. The first issue which commands our attention is with regard to the action taken by the Government on 11.09.2025 under a Panchanama pertaining to September, 2025 (the Panchanama does not carry a date) locking the Function Hall was amenable to judicial review. 9. The first issue which commands our attention is with regard to the action taken by the Government on 11.09.2025 under a Panchanama pertaining to September, 2025 (the Panchanama does not carry a date) locking the Function Hall was amenable to judicial review. The legality of this action needs to be tested from the facts culminating in the impugned action of the Government on 11.09.2025. 10. We do not deem it necessary to repeat the factual narration already given in the paragraphs above. It is sufficient to reiterate that on 09.09.2025, the Supreme Court granted liberty to the writ petitioners/Lessor to file a Suit. Pursuant to the liberty granted by the Supreme Court, the Lessor filed the Suit i.e., O.S.No.438 of 2025 on 16.09.2025 before the learned II Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court at Hyderabad for Declaration of Title, Permanent Injunction and Recovery of Possession. The Function Hall consisting of a part of the subject property was locked by the appellants on 11.09.2025. The writ petitioners were hence constrained to approach the Writ Court with the two Writ Petitions on 12.09.2025. 11. Thus, the question which arises is whether the State was justified in precipitating matters by dispossessing the writ petitioners from the subject property within two days of the Lessor being granted liberty to file a fresh Suit. 12. In our view, the answer must be an emphatic ‘No’. The reasons for the view are stated below. 13. Both the parties were represented before the Supreme Court on 09.09.2025. Hence, the State was very much aware that the Lessor of the writ petitioners was granted liberty to file a Suit for addressing their grievance relating to the threat of or actual dispossession from the subject property. It can hence be assumed that the writ petitioners would require a reasonable length of time to approach a Civil Court pursuant to such leave being granted. It is nobody’s case that the writ petitioners took an inordinately long time to file the Suit. The Suit was filed on 16.09.2025. 14. The State however refused to wait for a reasonable period or give sufficient opportunity to the writ petitioners to file the Suit. Instead, the State showed unexplained haste in seeking to dispossess the writ petitioners by locking a part of the premises within 48 hours of the Supreme Court granting liberty to the writ petitioners to file a fresh Suit. The State however refused to wait for a reasonable period or give sufficient opportunity to the writ petitioners to file the Suit. Instead, the State showed unexplained haste in seeking to dispossess the writ petitioners by locking a part of the premises within 48 hours of the Supreme Court granting liberty to the writ petitioners to file a fresh Suit. The refusal on the part of the State to give due regard to the leave granted to the writ petitioners and frustrating that leave certainly amounts to arbitrary and unreasonable action, if not strong-arm tactics by using the State machinery. The least that can be expected of a litigant who is a party to a proceeding before a Court of law is to uphold the Rule of Law. Any action which is taken in scant regard of the principles of fair play would call for interference. Viewed from any angle, 48 hours is too less a time for a party to file a Suit before a Court of Law involving substantive reliefs. 15. Thus, even without going into the rival contentions with regard to the parties’ claims over the subject property or the question whether the subject property can be categorized as Government land, the very action of the State in locking the Function Hall without permitting the writ petitioners to make good the leave granted by the Supreme Court, fully justifies filing of the Writ Petitions before the learned Single Judge. 16. It is important to bear in mind that any arbitrary exercise of power by the Officers of the State carries with it an express obligation to issue notice to the affected parties before such action is taken. In other words, the affected party needs to be given sufficient time to challenge the action before an appropriate forum and more importantly, to vacate the property and arrange their affairs to minimize the potential damage from such State action: In Re: Directions in the matter of demolition of Structures, (2025) 5 SCC 1 . Moreover, a rightful owner who has wrongfully been dispossessed of land may retain possession peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. Moreover, a rightful owner who has wrongfully been dispossessed of land may retain possession peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. It is settled law that even a trespasser who claims to be in possession of the property can only be evicted by the rightful owner through due process and not by taking the law in one’s own hands: Rame Gowda v. M.Varadappa Naidu , (2004) 1 SCC 769 17. In essence, even if the concept of ‘reasonable time’ cannot be quantified in terms of days for a party to seek recourse to law, an action taken by the State in curtailing the right of the affected party to challenge the action would call for Judicial Review. The situation would be aggravated if the affected party obtained leave from a Court of Law (the Supreme Court in this case) to file a Suit. Using brute force to dispossess another reflects a callous disregard of the Rule of Law apart from what might legitimately and reasonably be expected from the Government: Bishan Das v. The State of Punjab , AIR 1961 SC 1570 . In the present case, the act of locking the Function Hall without giving an opportunity to the writ petitioners to establish their right over the subject property is a colourable exercise of State power. 18. The other point which merits consideration is the issue of the writ petitioners’ peaceful possession over the subject property. The writ petitioners/Lessor claim to be in peaceful and continuous possession of the subject property since 2011. The documents filed in the Writ Appeals would show that the Function Hall is being run from 2011 upon obtaining valid trade license and other permissions. Electricity Bills, Event Permits and GHMC documents are part of records. Even before the notice was issued under section 7 of the 1905 Act on 26.06.1997, the Trust and their vendors had been in peaceful possession of the subject property from 1945 till 1997 i.e., for more than 52 years without any claim from the State Authorities. 19. The Division Bench in W.A.No.1243 of 2005 granted status quo to be maintained as on 29.08.2005. The order of status quo continued till 09.09.2025, i.e., till the Supreme Court granted leave to the writ petitioners to file a fresh Suit. 19. The Division Bench in W.A.No.1243 of 2005 granted status quo to be maintained as on 29.08.2005. The order of status quo continued till 09.09.2025, i.e., till the Supreme Court granted leave to the writ petitioners to file a fresh Suit. It is indeed curious as to why the appellants/Government would seek to reclaim possession of a part of the subject property on 11.09.2025 if the appellants were already in possession of the subject property as claimed by the appellants. The State has also not argued that the order of status quo dated 29.05.2005 was violated by the writ petitioners or that the writ petitioners forcibly occupied the subject property after 23.11.2004 (the first Panchanama issued by the Government which was the subject- matter of W.P.No.23001 of 2004). 20. Therefore, the facts brought to the notice of this Court would indicate that the Lessor of the writ petitioners had been in possession of the subject property from 2011 onwards till the order of status quo was granted by the Division Bench on 29.08.2005 and continued to be in possession of the subject property even thereafter i.e., till 09.09.2025. 21. The import of the 1905 Act was considered by the Supreme Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao, (1982) 2 SCC 134 whereby the Supreme Court held that the Government cannot take a unilateral decision in its own favour that the property belongs to it and take recourse to the summary remedy provided by section 6 of the 1905 Act for evicting the person who is in possession of the property under a bona fide claim or title. The Government cannot appropriate its extra-judicial right of re-entry and possession of the property can be resumed by the Government only in a manner known to or recognized by law: S.R. Ejaz v. T.N. Handloom Weavers’ Cooperative Society Ltd. , (2002) 3 SCC 137 . The State seeks to bolster its case on an entry in the Town Survey Land Register (‘TSLR’) as its document of title. However, an entry in the revenue record alone may not be conclusive proof of title nor can it be relied upon as proof for establishing title: State of Andhra Pradesh v. Hyderabad Potteries (P) Ltd. , (2010) 5 SCC 382 22. However, an entry in the revenue record alone may not be conclusive proof of title nor can it be relied upon as proof for establishing title: State of Andhra Pradesh v. Hyderabad Potteries (P) Ltd. , (2010) 5 SCC 382 22. We thus hold that the State was under a duty and obligation, at all material times, to take recourse to due process of law before dispossessing the writ petitioners. The locking of the Function Hall amounts to prohibiting the writ petitioners from access to, enjoying or using the part of the subject property. Any act of eviction or dispossession must be accompanied by a recourse known to and recognized in law. Hence, the contentions advanced on behalf of the State resisting the claim of the writ petitioners are not tenable. 23. The argument that the Writ Petitions or the prayers sought therein are not maintainable since the Writ Petitions involve disputed questions of facts in relation to title and possession of the parties cannot be used as a broad shield to keep the writ petitioners out from a Writ Court. A cause of action in a Writ Petition, as in a Suit, would always be the bundle of facts and the assertions made in the Writ Petition which would justify a petitioner coming to a Court of law. It is settled that a cause of action would include proving every fact, if traversed, in order to succeed in the Suit. The writ petitioners did not seek adjudication of their right or title to the subject property, but knocked the doors of the Writ Court against the arbitrary action of the State in forcefully dispossessing the petitioners from subject property on 11.09.2025. 24. The appellants’ argument that the statutory requirement under the 1905 Act was duly complied with as far back as in 2004 thus extinguishing the need for a further notice to the writ petitioners before the impugned act, lacks substance. The Lessor challenged the notice under section 7 of the 1905 Act by filing W.P.No.23001 of 2004 and obtained interim orders therein which was allowed by the learned Single Judge on 26.04.2005 holding, inter alia, that the Panchanama was a paper Panchanama. This order was challenged by the State in W.A.No.1243 of 2005 wherein a Division Bench granted an order of status quo on 29.08.2005. This order was challenged by the State in W.A.No.1243 of 2005 wherein a Division Bench granted an order of status quo on 29.08.2005. This order of status quo continued till 09.09.2025 when the Supreme Court allowed the Lessor to file a Civil Suit. However, the contention that the Writ Petitioners/Lessees did not have a cause of action to approach the Writ Court is also unacceptable in view of the Lessor and their predecessor in title being in possession over the subject property. The Lessees/Writ Petitioners were also directly affected by the impugned action taken by the State on 11.09.2025 and thus had every right to approach the Writ Court for appropriate relief. 25. BSNL v. Telephone Cables Ltd. , (2010) 5 SCC 213 dealt with misuse of liberty and an observation made by the High Court while disposing of the first Writ Petition with regard to BSNL being liable for compensation/damages. In the present case, there is no complaint by the respondents/writ petitioners misusing any liberty. In fact, the respondents filed the Civil Suit before the appropriate Court on 16.09.2025 soon after the liberty granted by the Supreme Court on 09.09.2025. 26. Satyabrata Biswas v. Kalyan Kumar Kisku , (1994) 2 SCC 266 held that an order of status quo granted by a Court cannot be circumvented by a party with impunity. As stated above, the State has not argued that the writ petitioners or their Lessor violated the order of status quo granted by the Division Bench on 29.08.2025. 27. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Gunasekaran v. The State of Tamil Nadu , WP No.3002 of 2023, dated 23.11.2023 considered a challenge to section 6 of The Tamil Nadu Land Encroachment Act, 1905 and found that the petitioner therein was in unauthorized occupation of the Government property and hence would not be entitled to the protection under Article 21 of the Constitution. Hence, none of the cases cited on behalf of the appellants/State come to its assistance. The admitted facts before this Court are substantially different from the cases relied upon. 28. The limited scope of the Writ Appeals must also be borne in mind. Hence, none of the cases cited on behalf of the appellants/State come to its assistance. The admitted facts before this Court are substantially different from the cases relied upon. 28. The limited scope of the Writ Appeals must also be borne in mind. The only question is whether the impugned Common Order passed by the learned Single Judge was justified in allowing the Writ Petitions by restraining the District Collector, Hyderabad, from dispossessing the writ petitioners from the subject property and directing the Mandal Revenue Officer, Hayathnagar to immediately unlock the Function Hall. 29. We also wish to clarify that any issue with regard to the writ petitioners/Lessor being in possession of the subject property or having any rights thereto has been referred to only for the purpose of highlighting the arbitrary action taken by the appellants/State. We have not expressed any opinion as to the title of the writ petitioners/Lessor to the subject property. The aforesaid question is presently pending before the Civil Court. 30. In view of the facts discussed above and the State’s violation of the fundamental obligation to respect and adhere to the Rule of Law in all circumstances, we are of the view that the writ petitioners were justified in filing the Writ Petitions and the learned Single Judge did not commit any error in passing the impugned directions against the State Authorities. The anxiety of the appellants/State to divest the Writ Court of its jurisdiction from passing necessary directions is not acceptable in view of the petitioners’ clear cause of action to seek redressal of their grievance against the impugned State action. 31. Therefore, we do not find any reason to interfere with or set aside the impugned Common Order passed by the learned Single Judge on 12.09.2025 in W.P.Nos.27715 and 27718 of 2025. 32. W.A.Nos.1031 and 1032 of 2025, along with all connected applications, are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.