JUDGMENT : Easwaran S., J. The plaintiffs in a suit for partition have come up with these appeals, aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Sub Court, Kannur in A.S.Nos.448 of 2012 and 1 of 2013. 2. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these appeals are as follows:- The property described as item No.2 in the plaint was held by one Matha as per Marupattam document No.2554/1943. The property described as item No.1 was in the possession of Kunhi Thundiyil Ambutty as per document No.139/1931. The plaintiffs and the defendants are the legal heirs of Matha and Ambutty and after the death of Matha and Ambutty, the right in the plaint schedule property was devolved upon the plaintiffs and defendants. As per a registered Nishchaya Rekha No.1323/1941 dated 01.08.1941 and Marupattam document No.2554/1943 of the S.R.O, Kadachira, the properties were in joint possession of the plaintiffs and the defendants. Since the plaintiffs did not want to continue in the joint possession of the property, they sought for partition on 15.04.2008 and the same was denied. Hence, the suit. The defendants appeared and contested the suit and contended that the property is not a joint family property and is in a exclusive possession of the 1 st defendant. It is further pointed out that, in the year 1984, the properties were partitioned among the members of the thavazhi and plaintiffs 1, 2, 4 to 9 and 11 to 14 or their predecessors were parties to the partition deed. The entire thavazhy properties were partitioned as per the partition deed and that the plaint schedule property was left out meaning thereby that the same is no longer available for partition. On behalf of the plaintiffs, PW1 was examined and Exts.A1 to A8 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, DW1 was examined and Exts.B1 to B15 were marked. One of the contentions raised by the plaintiffs was as regards a joint statement executed by the members of the thavazhi before the Sub Court, Thalassery in LAR No.187/1983. Hence, the proceedings of the LAR were called for and were marked as Ext.X1 series. The Trial Court, on an appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence of the plaintiffs, came to the conclusion that the plaint schedule property is partible and decreed the suit and allowing the plaintiffs to recover 13 shares out of 14 equal shares. Hence, the proceedings of the LAR were called for and were marked as Ext.X1 series. The Trial Court, on an appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence of the plaintiffs, came to the conclusion that the plaint schedule property is partible and decreed the suit and allowing the plaintiffs to recover 13 shares out of 14 equal shares. The supplemental 6 th defendant, who is the subsequent assignee, aggrieved by the judgment and decree, preferred A.S.No.1/2013. In the meantime, the property was alienated by the defendants. The original defendants 1 to 5 preferred A.S.No.448/2012. The first appellate court, on an appreciation of evidence, found that the purchase certificate issued in the name of the defendants by the Land Tribunal would enure to the exclusive benefit of the defendants. It was further found that the subsequent assignments of the property were not questioned by the plaintiffs and therefore, it reversed the findings of the Trial Court and dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the judgment, these present appeals are preferred. 3. When these appeals were admitted to file, this Court framed the following questions of law:- 1. Once the predecessor in interest of defendants 1 to 5 admitted that the property is a Thavazhi property, are not the defendants 1 to 5 estopped from denying the right of partition? 2. Whether the findings in L.A.R.No.187/1983 is binding on the defendants in view of the admission in the written statement by their predecessor, admitting that the property is a Thavazhy property? 3. Whether the lower appellate court justified in not drawing adverse inference when the defendants 1 to 5 in the suit abstained themselves from adducing evidence to substantiate their contention?” 4. Heard Sri.C.P.Peethambaran, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Sri.K.P.Sujesh Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents 2 to 6 in R.S.A.No.606/2015 and respondents 1 to 5 in R.S.A.No.601/2015 and Sri.K.C.Santhoshkumar, the learned counsel appearing for the 1 st respondent in R.S.A.No.606/ 2015 and additional 6 th respondent in R.S.A.No.601/2015. 5. Sri.C.P.Peethambaran, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants contended that Ext.X1, a joint statement, executed before the Sub Court, Thalassery as L.A.R.No.187/1983 will bind the parties in as much as there was a clear admission regarding the existence of a joint family property and the issuance of the purchase certificate for the benefit of the thavazhi. 5. Sri.C.P.Peethambaran, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants contended that Ext.X1, a joint statement, executed before the Sub Court, Thalassery as L.A.R.No.187/1983 will bind the parties in as much as there was a clear admission regarding the existence of a joint family property and the issuance of the purchase certificate for the benefit of the thavazhi. That be so, the defendants 1 to 5 cannot treat the plaint schedule property as an exclusive property. The first appellate court erred egregiously reversing the findings of the Trial Court by holding that the subsequent assignments by the defendants are not questioned by the plaintiffs. He would point out that since the transaction itself is void, no relief to set aside the same is required. In support of his contention, he would rely on the decision of this Court in Vannathi Valappil Janaki and others vs. Puthiya Purayil Paru and others (AIR 1986 Kerala 110) , Dhurandar Prasad Singh vs. Jai Prakash University and others ( AIR 2001 SC 2552 ) and Vidhyadhar vs. Manikrao and others (AIR 1999 SCC 1441). 6. Per contra, the Sri.K.P.Sujesh Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for respondents 2 to 6 in R.S.A.No.606/2015 would contend that, the fact that the plaint schedule property was not included in the partition deed executed in the year 1984 would go to show that the property was not treated as a joint family property. As regards Ext.X1, a joint statement preferred before the Land Tribunal as L.A.R.No.187/1983 the learned counsel would contend that there is no estoppel against law. It is further pointed out that the purchase certificate issued by the Land Tribunal would enure to the benefit of the holder of the certificate and therefore, in terms of Section 72 (k) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act , the purchase certificate is conclusively proved as regards the title. 7. Sri.K.C.Santhoshkumar, the learned counsel appearing for the subsequent assignee would contend that when the members of the joint family entered into a partition in the year 1984, it was the intention of the family, not to include this plaint schedule property, as a joint family property throwing the same into the common hotchpotch. Therefore, the defendants were perfectly entitled to treat the same as their own property. Therefore, the defendants were perfectly entitled to treat the same as their own property. The purchase certificates obtained by the vendors, as evident from Exts.B5 and B8, would show that the vendors had an absolute title over the property and therefore, the plaintiffs cannot seek partition of the plaint schedule property. 8. I have considered the rival submissions raised across the bar and perused the judgment and decree of the courts below and also the records of the case. 9. The question that falls for consideration before this Court is whether the inference drawn by the first appellate court regarding the nature of the property is sustainable or not. It is pertinent to mention that, in the years 1976 and 1977, two purchase certificates were issued in the name of the Senior member of the thavazhi. These facts are not disputed. However, the dispute in the present case stems out of the execution of the partition deed in the year 1984 wherein the plaint schedule property is excluded. The defendants contended that the exclusion of the plaint schedule property will enure to their benefit, since there is no allocation of the plaint schedule property to the members of the thavazhi. The plaintiffs on the other hand would contend that, after the execution of the partition deed, the parties filed a compromise statement before the Sub Court, Thalassery in L.A.R.No.187/1983 making their intention clear as regards the status of the plaint schedule property. The learned counsel for the defendants would however point out that there is no estoppel against the law. This Court is not impressed with the aforesaid argument. When the parities consciously chose to enter into a compromise and the description of the plaint schedule property is mentioned as thavazhi property and the reference is made to the purchase certificate issued by the jurisdictional Land Tribunal and further the nature of the purchase certificate is also described as one enuring to the benefit of the thavazhi, the defendants cannot be heard to contend that the exclusion of the plaint schedule property in the partition deed will amount to the benefit of the defendants. 10. 10. It is pertinent to mention that the exclusion of the plaint schedule property in the partition deed would clearly show that the properties were intended to be kept in common and if the parties intended to confer any benefit to the defendants as regards the plaint schedule property, there would have been a clear indication in the partition deed. It is in this contest that the decision cited by Sri.C.P.Peethambaran, the learned counsel for the appellants has significance. 11. In Vannathi Valappil Janaki and others vs. Puthiya Purayil Paru and others (AIR 1986 Kerala 110) , a learned Single Judge of this Court considered the impact of the purchase certificate obtained by one of the co- owners of the property. It was held that under Section 72 (k) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act , the purchase certificate will enure to the benefit of other co-owners also. This was reiterated by this Court in Thayukutty vs. Manikandan (2023 KHC 886). Therefore, this Court has no doubt in its mind to hold that the purchase certificate issued by the Land Tribunal cannot confer any exclusive right title and interest on the defendants enabling them to treat the property as their own. The contrary finding rendered by the first appellate court is, thus, erroneous and liable to be interfered by this Court. 12. It is next contended that the subsequent alienation made by the defendants and also the issuance of Exts.B5 and B6 purchase certificates are not questioned by the plaintiffs. In Dhurandar Prasad Singh vs. Jai Prakash University and others ( AIR 2001 SC 2552 ) , the Supreme Court considered the true purported scope of the expression “void and voidable”. It was held that if the document obtained is void, the same has no legal effect and the same need not be set aside. Paragraph 22 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder:- “22. Thus the expressions “void and voidable” have been subject matter of consideration on innumerable occasions by courts. The expression “void” has several facets. One type of void acts, transactions, decrees are those which are wholly without jurisdiction, ab initio void and for avoiding the same no declaration is necessary, law does not take any notice of the same and it can be disregarded in collateral proceeding or otherwise. The expression “void” has several facets. One type of void acts, transactions, decrees are those which are wholly without jurisdiction, ab initio void and for avoiding the same no declaration is necessary, law does not take any notice of the same and it can be disregarded in collateral proceeding or otherwise. The other type of void act, e.g., may be transaction against a minor without being represented by a next friend. Such a transaction is good transaction against the whole world. So far the minor is concerned, if he decides to avoid the same and succeeds in avoiding it by taking recourse to appropriate proceeding the transaction becomes void from the very beginning. Another type of void act may be which is not a nullity but for avoiding the same a declaration has to be made. Voidable act is that which is a good act unless avoided, e.g., if a suit is filed for a declaration that a document is fraudulent and/or forged and fabricated, it is voidable as apparent state of affairs is real state of affairs and a party who alleges otherwise is obliged to prove it. If it is proved that the document is forged and fabricated and a declaration to that effect is given a transaction becomes void from the very beginning. There may be a voidable transaction which is required to be set aside and the same is avoided from the day it is so set aside and not any day prior to it. In cases, where legal effect of a document cannot be taken away without setting aside the same, it cannot be treated to be void but would be obviously voidable.” 13. It is also pertinent to mention that defendants 1 to 5 for the best reasons known to them abstained from tendering any evidence. The failure of the defendants 1 to 5 to mount the box has to be viewed in detriment to their cause. In Vidhyadhar vs. Manikrao and others (AIR 1999 SC 1441), the Supreme Court held that when a party to the suit does not appear into the witness box, a presumption would arise that a case set up by him is not correct. Therefore, the Trial Court was perfectly justified in drawing an adverse inference against the defendants. 14. In Vidhyadhar vs. Manikrao and others (AIR 1999 SC 1441), the Supreme Court held that when a party to the suit does not appear into the witness box, a presumption would arise that a case set up by him is not correct. Therefore, the Trial Court was perfectly justified in drawing an adverse inference against the defendants. 14. Lastly, it is contended by Sri.K.P.Sujesh Kumar, the learned counsel for the defendants 1 to 5 that the devolution of shares in favour of the plaintiffs is not seen explained in the plaint. It is true that the genealogy chart or the devolution of title is not seen explained in the plaint. However, for the said purpose, the plaintiffs preferred I.A.No.705/2012 producing the genealogy chart in order to substantiate the allotment of the shares. The said application was filed on 15.03.2012 and was adjourned to 19.03.2012 for counter. On 19.03.2012, the same was again adjourned to 21.03.2012 for counter. Ultimately, on 21.03.2012, the said application stood allowed on the failure of the defendants to file objections to the same. Therefore, this Court is not impressed by the aforesaid argument that the genealogy chart is not produced in the plaint and therefore, the Trial Court was not justified in allotting the 13 shares out of 14 equal shares to the plaintiffs. 15. As an upshot of these discussions, this Court finds that the questions of law raised by the appellants are to be answered in their favour. Resultantly, the appellants are entitled to succeed and these appeals are allowed reversing the judgment of the first appellate court in A.S.Nos.448/2012 and 1 of 2013 and restoring the judgment and decree of the Munsiff Court, Thalassery in O.S.No.315/2008. The appellants will also be entitled to cost through out the proceedings. At this time, the learned counsel appearing for the subsequent assignee has requested this court to reserve her liberty to claim damages on compensation from the defendants 1 to 5. Since, in these proceedings, the claim for any damages on account of the subsequent transaction is not a question raised, hence this Court deems it appropriate to leave open the said question to be raised in appropriate proceedings. Ordered accordingly.