ORDER : 1. The present Civil First Appeal, instituted under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter to be referred as “CPC”), has been preferred by the appellant assailing the judgment and decree dated 07.10.2024, passed by the learned Additional District Judge No.1, Jodhpur Metropolitan, in Civil Suit No. 34/2024. By the said judgment, the learned Court below has allowed the application filed by the defendant–respondent under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff’s suit has been rejected at the threshold. 1.1 During the pendency of the instant appeal, the appellant, Kanaram unfortunately expired, so the legal representatives of the appellant has been taken on record. 2. Briefly stating the facts of the case are that the appellants claim longstanding khatedari rights and settled possession over their land in Village Anganwa, separated from Khasra No. 78 by a 60-year-old boundary wall. They allege that respondent No. 2, relying on a torn and unreliable revenue map, wrongly treated their land as part of Khasra No. 78 and initiated coercive eviction proceedings without granting them any hearing. According to the appellants, this action arose after they repeatedly complained about encroachments on nearby Khasra No. 73, causing hostility among interested parties. Despite reports that proper demarcation was impossible, a demarcation report dated 21.06.2024 was prepared and used to label their land as encroached Aabadi land. To protect their civil rights, they filed a suit for declaration and injunction, which the Trial Court rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on jurisdictional objections, leading to the present appeal. 3. Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and perused the material available on record. 4. The plaintiffs have made a prayer in the plaint that the plaintiffs and defendant No. 3 are the lawful owners and possessors of the land in question, and that the demarcation dated 21.06.2024, the superimposed map dated 12.07.2024, and the factual report are illegal, incorrect, and void as they were prepared on a wrong base point. Secondly, the allegation of encroachment on Khasra No. 78 is unfounded. Lastly, to permanent restrain defendant Nos. 1 and 2 from disturbing the plaintiff’s peaceful possession from acting upon the impugned demarcation documents, and from causing any obstruction or interference. 5. Secondly, the allegation of encroachment on Khasra No. 78 is unfounded. Lastly, to permanent restrain defendant Nos. 1 and 2 from disturbing the plaintiff’s peaceful possession from acting upon the impugned demarcation documents, and from causing any obstruction or interference. 5. After perusing the material available on record, it is evident that the appellants have categorically pleaded their long, settled, and continuous possession over agricultural lands. The lands of the plaintiffs are situated in Village Anganwa and comprises the following parcels namely, Khasra No. 80, admeasuring 13 Bigha 11 Biswa, Chahi Pratham; Khasra No. 80/1, admeasuring 13 Biswa, Gair Mumkin Bera; Khasra No. 135/1, admeasuring 11 Bigha 13 Biswa; Khasra No. 141, admeasuring 16 Bigha 7 Biswa; and Khasra No. 161, admeasuring 17 Bigha 5 Biswa. A boundary wall exists between Khasra Nos. 80 and 78, which, as pleaded, was constructed prior to the last settlement, approximately six decades ago. The present suit pertains exclusively to the dispute concerning land falling in Khasra No. 78. recorded as aabadi/government land. 5.1 It is a well-nigh settled principle of law that for the purpose of deciding an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC seeking rejection of the suit on any of the grounds mentioned in Rule 11 of Order 7 CPC, only the averments taken in the plaint should be seen and can be considered for the desired purpose. The plea taken by the defendant or documents submitted by him are not required to be considered. A plaint filed citing infringement of civil rights and seeking redressal of the breached action of the defendant should not be thrown away, and the suit proceeding should not be stifled at the very inception solely on the simple assertion of the defendant made by him or through pleading and during submissions. All those things are required to be weighed and measured during the proceedings of the suit. The dismissal of the application by the learned Trial Court, therefore, appears to be justified on that count. 5.2 Their case is that a substantial portion of Khasra No. 78 is also under their peaceful, continuous and settled possession since time immemorial, giving rise to a claim of possessory title. In respect of the other Khasra numbers, they have already pursued the appropriate remedies before the Revenue Court, where they have also been granted interim protection. 5.2 Their case is that a substantial portion of Khasra No. 78 is also under their peaceful, continuous and settled possession since time immemorial, giving rise to a claim of possessory title. In respect of the other Khasra numbers, they have already pursued the appropriate remedies before the Revenue Court, where they have also been granted interim protection. The suit before the Civil Court is, therefore, consciously confined to grievances pertaining exclusively to Khasra No. 78. The nature of this land being aabadi land and the plea of settled possession unmistakably bring the issue within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. It is trite that where a party asserts possessory rights, even to an inch of land, such a claim cannot be foreclosed at the threshold; the merits must be adjudicated after evidence is led. Whether such possession is legal, illegal, established, or otherwise defective is a matter for trial and not for summary rejection under the narrow contours of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 6. It is not in dispute that proceedings with respect to other Khasra Nos. are the subject-matter of the Revenue Court, which alone is competent to adjudicate disputes relating to agricultural land and rights emanating therefrom. The jurisdiction of the Revenue Court cannot be stretched beyond that narrow statutory sphere. The plaintiffs have specifically averred that, as per the demarcation report concerning Khasra No. 78, a portion of the said land though shown as government/aabadi land is under their physical possession, which the authorities have branded as “unauthorised”. Whether such possession is lawful or unlawful; whether it ripens into a possessory title; whether the decades-old wall delineates longstanding occupation; whether the demarcation (seemankan) is erroneous; and whether the authorities were justified in treating the plaintiff’s private land as falling within Khasra No. 78, all these are disputed questions of fact requiring full-fledged trial. They cannot be summarily discarded at the gateway of Order VII Rule 11. A mere assertion that a declaratory plea for possessory rights is untenable cannot be pre- supposed at this preliminary stage. The plaint itself reproduces that the plaintiffs claim rights over Khasra No. 78, an aabadi land on the strength of their possession. If such a grievance cannot be adjudicated by the Civil Court, then the pertinent question arises is before which forum would they go. The plaint itself reproduces that the plaintiffs claim rights over Khasra No. 78, an aabadi land on the strength of their possession. If such a grievance cannot be adjudicated by the Civil Court, then the pertinent question arises is before which forum would they go. As far as the Revenue Court is concerned, it is incompetent to entertain disputes pertaining to aabadi land or civil rights arising out of possession thereof. The plaintiff’s assertion that the demarcation is erroneous and that, on its basis, their private land has been wrongly shown as aabadi government land, squarely invites civil jurisdiction. If the plaintiffs assert even one inch, one foot, or any part of Khasra No. 78 to be under their possession and claim rights flowing therefrom, the suit for declaration and injunction is maintainable before the Civil Court alone. Whether they ultimately succeed or fail is a different matter altogether, but they cannot be denied an opportunity to prove their case or lead evidence and foreclosing such a claim under Order VII Rule 11 CPC would amount to denying them access to justice. The reasoning adopted by the Court below appears premature, mechanical, and absurd, it pre-supposes the failure of the plaintiff’s claim without permitting it to undergo the judicial trial. 6.1 Reference must be made to the principle crystallised in the judgment Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. vs. Mahaveer Lunia and Ors. , AIR 2025 SC 2933 , whereby it was held that a plaint cannot be rejected in its entirety merely because one of the prayers or reliefs sought is legally untenable, even one of the relief in the prayer maintainable and based on independent causes of action, then the suit must proceed in Civil Court: 8. The position of law is that rejection of a plaint Under Order VII Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure is permissible only when the plaint, on its face and without considering the defence, fails to disclose a cause of action, is barred by any law, is undervalued, or is insufficiently stamped. At this preliminary stage, the court is required to confine its examination strictly to the averments made in the plaint and not venture into the merits or veracity of the claims. If any triable issues arise from the pleadings, the suit cannot be summarily rejected. At this preliminary stage, the court is required to confine its examination strictly to the averments made in the plaint and not venture into the merits or veracity of the claims. If any triable issues arise from the pleadings, the suit cannot be summarily rejected. Keeping in mind this settled principle of law, we proceed to examine whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the plaint Under Order VII Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure. 9.5. However, the High Court erred in treating the second cause of action pertaining to the sale deeds registered on 19.07.2022 as merely "academic", and proceeded to reject the plaint in its entirety without undertaking a judicial examination of this distinct issue. This approach is contrary to the well settled legal principle that a plaint may be rejected Under Order VII Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure only if, on a plain reading of the plaint, it discloses no cause of action or falls within the other narrowly defined grounds under the said provision, such as under-valuation, insufficient court fees, or bar by any law. In this context, we may place reliance on the judgment in Central Bank of India (supra), wherein, this Court while examining the jurisdiction of civil courts in disputes involving immovable property and proceedings under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, held that a plaint cannot be rejected in its entirety merely because one of the prayers or reliefs sought is legally untenable, so long as other reliefs are maintainable and based on independent causes of action. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below: 15. The plaintiff in her suit has prayed for 3 reliefs: a) The first relief is in relation to a sale deed executed by Sumer Chand Jain in favour of Parmeshwar Das Prajapati. b) The second relief is in relation to a mortgage deed executed by Parmeshwar Das Prajapati in favour of the bank. c) The third relief is for being handed over the possession of the suit property. 24. Even if we would have been persuaded to take the view that the third relief is barred by Section 17(3) of the SARFAESI Act, still the plaint must survive because there cannot be a partial rejection of the plaint Under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 24. Even if we would have been persuaded to take the view that the third relief is barred by Section 17(3) of the SARFAESI Act, still the plaint must survive because there cannot be a partial rejection of the plaint Under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Hence, even if one relief survives, the plaint cannot be rejected Under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the case on hand, the first and second reliefs as prayed for are clearly not barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI ACT and are within the civil court's jurisdiction. Hence, the plaint cannot be rejected Under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 25. If the civil court is of the view that one relief (say relief A) is not barred by law but is of the view that Relief B is barred by law, the civil court must not make any observations to the effect that relief B is barred by law and must leave that issue undecided in an Order VII, Rule 11 application. This is because if the civil court cannot reject a plaint partially, then by the same logic, it ought not to make any adverse observations against relief B. Therefore, the High Court's wholesale rejection of the plaint, without appreciating that the reliefs claimed flowed from multiple and distinct causes of action particularly one arising after the revocation of the power of attorney amounts to an improper application of Order VII Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure. Selective severance of reliefs is impermissible where different causes of action are independently pleaded and supported by distinct facts. 6.2 From bare perusal of the judgment, it is evident that even if one relief survives, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Here, in the case at hand, the prayer itself states that for other Khasra Nos., they have already pursued the appropriate remedy from revenue Court but for the disputes concerning aabadi land, possession, civil title or injunctions, revenue Court cannot intervene, once the plaintiffs claim possessory rights over Khasra No. 78, admittedly aabadi, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction is clearly and unmistakably attracted. The impugned order thus suffers from a manifest misapplication of law and an unwarranted pre-determination of merits under the guise of Order VII Rule 11, and cannot be sustained. 7. The impugned order thus suffers from a manifest misapplication of law and an unwarranted pre-determination of merits under the guise of Order VII Rule 11, and cannot be sustained. 7. The court below has also erred in observing that the suit is barred under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The plaint discloses a clear cause of action, raises contentious questions of fact, and seeks adjudication regarding the nature, extent, and legality of possession over Khasra No. 78. Such issues cannot be brushed aside at the entry gate. The principle of law is well settled where complex and contentious matters arise, the plaintiff must be afforded an opportunity to prove his case rather than being shut out at the very threshold. The impugned order is thus unsustainable in law. It reflects a misapplication of the statutory provision and an unwarranted pre-determination of merits under the guise of a procedural objection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 7.1 The Hon’ble Supreme Court has, on numerous occasions, sounded a note of caution that suits raising contestable issues, particularly those resting upon disputed factual substrata, ought not to be throttled at the nascent stage by resort to Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The sanctity of the trial process obliges the Court to permit such matters to traverse the regular course of evidence rather than foreclosing them prematurely. In its recent pronouncement in Babasaheb Ramdas Shirole & Ors. v. Rohit Enterprises & Ors., (Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 16809/2025) decided on 17.11.2025, the Hon’ble Apex Court has once again reiterated the well-settled principle that the question of limitation is, quintessentially, a mixed question of law and fact. Unless the bar of limitation stares from the face of the pleadings with stark and unambiguous certainty leaving no scope for judicial exploration, the plaintiff cannot be non-suited at the very threshold by invoking Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. 8. Accordingly, the instant civil first appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree dated 07.10.2024 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No.1, Jodhpur Metropolitan is set aside. The record be sent back to the learned trial Court who in turn shall re-register the suit at its original number and whereafter the suit shall be proceeded as per law. 9. Pending applications, if any, stands disposed of.