JUDGMENT : Heard, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents. 2. Petitioner in this writ petition has challenged the order of punishment dated 23.11.2019 thereafter the appellate order and thereafter the review order. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that notices which were served to the petitioner requesting him to join the services has not been received by him. He further submits that the explanation given for his absence was not accepted by the respondents. The medical certificate which was issued were doubted by the respondents, which is absolutely illegal. As the petitioner was suffering from hepatitis, he could not attend his service and his absence was thoroughly justified. He submits that he had given intimation also, but same was not considered. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent-CCL submits that exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, this Court cannot act as an Appellate Court. He submits that all the documents were proved and the petitioner participated in the full-fledged departmental enquiry. Every opportunity was given to the petitioner, and thereafter considering the case of the petitioner, punishment was imposed. The quantum of punishment was stoppage of two increments only. He submits that petitioner was absent from 20.05.2016. The Chargesheet/ Memorandum charge was issued on 13.09.2017, for his long absence, which was unauthorized. He further submits that letters and notices were issued to the petitioner to join but inspite of the same, he did not join. He submits that it is an admitted fact that the petitioner has remained absent unauthorizedly and the disciplinary authority took into consideration, the said fact which is a misconduct. 5. After hearing the parties, I find that the petitioner is an employee of Central Coalfields Limited. He was absenting from duty with effect from 20.05.2016. Memorandum of charge was issued to him on the allegation of absenting from duty for such a long period, which is misconduct. The petitioner participated in the departmental proceeding wherein witnesses were examined and the documents were produced and proved. The misconduct of the petitioner was proved in the proceeding, thus, the petitioner was punished by the Disciplinary Authority. The punishment imposed was stoppage of two increments without any cumulative effect. Petitioner thereafter preferred an appeal stating that he was ill and he could not appear. He produced his medical document. The misconduct of the petitioner was proved in the proceeding, thus, the petitioner was punished by the Disciplinary Authority. The punishment imposed was stoppage of two increments without any cumulative effect. Petitioner thereafter preferred an appeal stating that he was ill and he could not appear. He produced his medical document. The Appellate Authority also considered each and every point raised by him and thereafter, dismissed the appeal. The Review Application was also dismissed. 6. In a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution while dealing with a departmental proceeding and punishment, the High Court does not sit as a Court of appeal over the findings of the Disciplinary Authority. So long as the findings of the disciplinary authority are supported by some evidence, the High Court should not reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a different conclusion, even if the said conclusion is a possibility. Reappreciation of evidence is not within the domain of judicial review. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. Umesh , reported in (2022) 6 SCC 563 at paragraph 22 has held as under:- 22. In the exercise of judicial review, the Court does not act as an appellate forum over the findings of the disciplinary authority. The court does not reappreciate the evidence on the basis of which the finding of misconduct has been arrived at in the course of a disciplinary enquiry. The Court in the exercise of judicial review must restrict its review to determine whether: (i) the rules of natural justice have been complied with; (ii) the finding of misconduct is based on some evidence; (iii) the statutory rules governing the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have been observed; and (iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority suffer from perversity; and (v) the penalty is disproportionate to the proven misconduct. ……. 7. Further the high court has a limited scope of interference in the punishment order also. It can interfere when the punishment shocks the conscience of the Court and the same is disproportionate to the proved misconduct. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh , reported in (2013) 12 SCC 372 at paragraph 19 has summarized the principles as under:- 19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarized as follows: 19.1. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh , reported in (2013) 12 SCC 372 at paragraph 19 has summarized the principles as under:- 19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarized as follows: 19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co- delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable. 8. After going through the records, I find that there is no perversity in the order. Admittedly, the petitioner was absent for a long period i.e. more than a year, without informing the authorities. This absence is a misconduct under the disciplinary rules. The Inquiry Officer found that the charges are proved and he has filed the report which was accepted by the Disciplinary Authority and the punishment was imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. Admittedly, the petitioner was absent for a long period i.e. more than a year, without informing the authorities. This absence is a misconduct under the disciplinary rules. The Inquiry Officer found that the charges are proved and he has filed the report which was accepted by the Disciplinary Authority and the punishment was imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. The punishment is also not disproportionate to the proved misconduct. Further, I find that a fair opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner to defend his case which he has availed. Merely not consideration of some point cannot be treated to be perversity or illegality in this order as the petitioner has appeared and has participated in the departmental proceeding and based on the evidence of the departmental proceeding, petitioner has been punished. There is neither any procedural irregularity also nor the order can be said to be perverse. 9. Thus, I find no merit in this writ petition. The same is dismissed.