JUDGMENT : K.K.Ramakrishnan, J. The appellant is the sole accused in S.C.No.116 of 2009, on the file of the learned Sessions Judge (PCR Cases), Sivagangai, filed this appeal challenging the conviction and sentence imposed against him, in S.C.No. 116 of 2009, dated 15.11.2018, by the learned Sessions Judge (PCR Cases), Sivagangai, and acquit the appellant. 2 . The Brief facts of the prosecution case reads as follows: Due to the money suit was decreed in favour of the defacto complainant, on 16.09.2006, at 07.00 a.m., when the defacto complainant was going near a well of the appellant situated at Koothakudi Kanmai, the appellant is said to have waylaid the accused and abused him in filthy language by using his caste name and threatened him with dire consequences. Based on which, the defacto complainant gave a complaint before the respondent police. P.W.7 registered a case in Crime No.276 of 2006, for the offences under Sections 294(b), 506(ii) of IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes, (POA) Act, 1989, (hereinafter, for the sake of brevity, referred to as “SC/ST Act”). Thereafter, P.W.8 conducted the investigation and filed the final report. The same was taken on the file in P.R.C.No.1 of 2007 by the learned Judicial Magistrate-2, Sivagangai. 3.On appearance of the appellant, copies of documents relied by the prosecution were furnished to the accused under section 207 of Cr.P.C. The learned Judicial Magistrate-2, Sivagangai, found that the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act, is triable only by the Sessions Court and committed the case under Section 209(A) of Cr.P.C., to the learned District and Sessions Court, Madurai. Thereafter, the case was taken on file in S.C.No.148 of 2007. Thereafter, the said case in S.C.No.148 of 2007 transferred from the District and Sessions Court, Madurai, to the learned Sessions Judge (PCR Cases), Sivagangai. The said learned Sessions Judge (PCR cases), Sivagangai, has taken on file in S.C.No.116 of 2009. Then, he framed necessary charges and questioned the accused. The accused denied the charges and pleaded not guilty and stood for trial. 4.To prove the case, the prosecution examined P.W.1 to P.W.8 and exhibited 9 documents as Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.9 and produced 1 material object as M.O.1. Then, he framed necessary charges and questioned the accused. The accused denied the charges and pleaded not guilty and stood for trial. 4.To prove the case, the prosecution examined P.W.1 to P.W.8 and exhibited 9 documents as Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.9 and produced 1 material object as M.O.1. Thereafter, the appellant was questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C proceedings after disclosing the incriminating evidence against him and he denied the same as false and thereafter, the case was posted for defence evidence. The accused neither produced any documents nor examined any witnesses on their side. 5. After considering the material adduced by the prosecution and also hearing the argument of the appellant and other accused, the learned trial Judge has passed the impugned order, dated 15.11.2018 and found the appellant guilty, convicted and sentenced him as detailed below:- Accused Convicted under Section Sentence of Imprisonment/ fine imposed Sole Accused 294(b) of IPC Rigorous Imprisonment for three months. 506(ii) of IPC Rigorous Imprisonment for one year. 3(1)(x) of SC/ST (POA), Act, 1989, Rigorous Imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for one month. 6. Challenging the above said conviction and sentence, the appellant has preferred the present Criminal Appeals. 7 . The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (POA) Act, are not made out. 7.1. To support his contention, he also relied the following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:- i) Swaran Singh and Others Vs. State Through Sanding Counsel and Another reported in 2008 8 SCC 435 . ii) Hitesh Verma Vs. State of Uttarakhand And Another reported in (2020) 10 SCC 710 . iii) Priti Agarwally and Others Vs. State of GNCT of Delhi and Others reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 973. 7.2. He further submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the using of caste name in public view and hence, the conviction and sentence imposed under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (POA) Act is not maintainable. 7.3. He further submitted that P.W.1 deposed about the using of the caste name. But, the particular word is absent in the said proceedings and he simply stated that the appellant scolded him by using caste name. 7.4. 7.3. He further submitted that P.W.1 deposed about the using of the caste name. But, the particular word is absent in the said proceedings and he simply stated that the appellant scolded him by using caste name. 7.4. He further submitted that the defacto complainant belongs to a political party and in chief-examination also he admitted that after discussing with the political party leaders, he made the complaint with the delay of 2 days. 7.5. P.W.2 was examined and he turned hostile. Even though in chief examination, he stated that the appellant scolded P.W.1 with caste name, in the subsequent sentence, he stated that he was not examined by the police officer. Reading of entire evidence is not reliable one. P.W.3 clearly deposed that he reached the occurrence place only after 10 minutes of the occurrence. Therefore, there is no corroborate evidence to show that the appellant scolded the victim by abusing his caste name. He also stated that due to the civil dispute pending between the parties, he made such a false complaint as if he scolded him by using his caste name. According to the appellant, even though the defacto complainant got a money decree against the appellant, without executing the same, he filed this complaint by making the false allegations. Therefore, the genesis of the complaint averments is suspicion and hence, he seeks for acquittal. 8. The learned counsel for the defacto complainant submitted that when the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.1 is corroborated with each other. The conviction and sentence passed against the appellant under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (POA) Act, is legally correct. Admittedly, the occurrence took place in the agricultural field. The agricultural field is not a private place and it is a public place. Hence, the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (POA) Act, is made out. Further, the delay of 2 days in lodging the FIR was properly explained. Hence, there is no merit in the contentions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and he prayed for dismissal of the appeal by confirming the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned trial Judge. 9. Further, the delay of 2 days in lodging the FIR was properly explained. Hence, there is no merit in the contentions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and he prayed for dismissal of the appeal by confirming the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned trial Judge. 9. The learned Government Advocate (Crl.Side) for the respondents also reiterated the said submissions made by the learned counsel for the defacto complainant and also submitted that when the learned trial Judge after considering the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2, gave a finding that the appellant scolded the defacto complainant by using caste name, this Court has power to interfere with the said finding is very much limited. Hence, he seeks for dismissal of the appeal by confirming the conviction and sentence imposed against the appellant. 10. This Court perused the records and the documents adduced by the prosecution and the grounds raised by the appellant and reply made by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor and the impugned judgment. 11. Admittedly, the defacto complainant got a money decree against the appellant. Therefore, there was some dispute between both parties. The case of the defacto complainant is that when he was crossing the agricultural field of the appellant, the appellant scolded him, criminally intimated him and took away the cycle of the defacto complainant. But, the recovery of the cycle was also not proved through the examination of the recovery witness. Further, the recovery witness had turned hostile. Even after the number of years, the defacto complainant had not made any claim over the cycle. Therefore, the case of the defacto complainant that he when was proceeding with cycle, the same was intercepted by the appellant and he caused criminal intimidation and seized the cycle is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. 12. P.W.1, in his chief examination, he deposed as follows:- 12.1. The occurrence place is an agricultural field. Except P.W.2, no other person was present in that place. Therefore, no other independent witness is present in the scene of occurrence. 13. This Court recapitulated the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Swaran Singh and Others Vs. The occurrence place is an agricultural field. Except P.W.2, no other person was present in that place. Therefore, no other independent witness is present in the scene of occurrence. 13. This Court recapitulated the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Swaran Singh and Others Vs. State Through Sanding Counsel and Another reported in 2008 8 SCC 435 and the same is gave the following definition for 'Public View':- “Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view.” 13.1. The above said ratio, laid down by the Hon'ble two Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India was confirmed by the Hon'ble three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Hitesh Verma Vs. State of Uttarakhand And Another reported in (2020) 10 SCC 710. The relevant portion of the above said judgment is as follows:- “what is to be regarded as “place in Public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh V. State. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view(sic).” 13.2. The same has reiterated in the case of Priti Agarwally and Others Vs. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view(sic).” 13.2. The same has reiterated in the case of Priti Agarwally and Others Vs. State of GNCT of Delhi and Others reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 973 and the learned Judge of this Court in Crl.A.234 of 2011 dated 02.08.2024 considered the entire case law has held as follows:- Para No.33 Para No.30 it is implicitly clear that the expression “within public view” should be construed to mean that the insult or humiliation must take place in the presence of or in the proximity of atleast one independent person From the above ratio laid down by the Apex Court, it is manifest that it is not the place which has significance in the term “in any place within public view” and what is more material therein is “within public view”, which literally means that in the said place, excluding relatives or friends, there should be presence of other persons, who are independent of the occasion and who could be termed to be public who could witness the happenings in the said place 13.3. In this case, except the P.W.1's evidence that the appellant scolded him by using his caste name no corroborative evidence is available. Even as per the evidence of P.W.1, the appellant said to have scolded the P.W.1 in the garden while P.W.1 was grazing his cattle in the garden of the appellant. No independent witnesses have been examined to prove the allegation against the appellant that he scolded P.W.1 by calling his caste name in the public view and hence, the prosecution is not proved that the appellant has scolded the victim in the public view beyond reasonable doubt. 13.4. Apart from that, in view of the strange relationship, the case of the appellant that the defacto complainant falsely made a submission before the respondent police as if he scolded him by calling his caste name is acceptable. P.W.4 was examined as independent witnesses. He has not supported the case of the prosecution. Therefore, the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act would not attract as against the appellant. Hence, the same is liable to be set aside. P.W.4 was examined as independent witnesses. He has not supported the case of the prosecution. Therefore, the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act would not attract as against the appellant. Hence, the same is liable to be set aside. 13.5 The prosecution has not proved that the appellant scolded P.W.1 by using caste name in the public view in order to humiliate him through the independent evidence. In view of the pending dispute between them, the case of the appellant that there was a false implication of the appellant is plausible, and the same is established through the various circumstances apart from the non examination of the independent witnesses other than the relatives or friends of the appellant community. The said explanation of the appellant is also further strengthened on the ground of delay in laying the complaint. The appellant gave the explanation that he contacted his political party leader and thereafter, made a complaint with the delay of 2 days. So, this Court from the said evidence of the defacto complainant, legitimately presumed that the defacto complainant had discussion with the other person and thereafter, made a false complaint against the appellant. Therefore, in all aspects, the prosecution has not proved the ingredients under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (POA) Act. 14.1. A judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Dr.Subramanian Swamy Vs. C.Pushparaj reported in 1998 SCC Online Mad 67 , has held as follows:- “An insult even if gross one is not an offence in itself under Section 504, IPC. Part II of Sec. 506, IPC is attracted if the criminal intimidation includes threat to cause death or grievous hurt. Mere outburst is not sufficient to hold that it would fall within the mischief of Sec. 506, IPC. In the instant case, the averment in the complaint and the statements in the depositions, if taken together, there are no allegations in the whole complaint that the petitioner ever made any attempt or did any act in pursuance of his alleged expression. So also, the actual words used or supposed to have been used by the petitioner is not stated either in the complaint or in the depositions. Regarding criminal intimidation to whom it was intended, whether alarm was caused, it so, what are the actual words employed are not stated either in the complaint or in the depositions. So also, the actual words used or supposed to have been used by the petitioner is not stated either in the complaint or in the depositions. Regarding criminal intimidation to whom it was intended, whether alarm was caused, it so, what are the actual words employed are not stated either in the complaint or in the depositions. In the absence of these averments touching the ingredients, mere mentioning of sections and putting a person to face the trial is nothing but the abuse of the process of the Court.” 14.2. As per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Parminder Kaur v. State of Punjab, reported in (2020) 8 SCC 811, if no assault was made, which was the material ingredient of Section 506 (i) of IPC. In the case of Manik Taneja and another Vs. State of Karnataka and another reported in 2015 [7] SCC 423 it has been held as follows:- “Threat must be intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expressions of any words, without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this Section.” 14.3. A judgement in the case of Noble Mohandass Vs. State, reported in 1988 [2] MWN Crl 184, has held as follows: “Threat should be a real one and not just a mere word when the person uttering it does exactly mean what he says and also when the person at whom thereat is launched does not feel threatened actually.” 14.4. By applying the above principles, this Court finds no ingredients to constitute the offence under Section 506(i) of IPC. 15. In so far as the offence under Section 294(b) of IPC is concerned, a judgement in the case of K.Jeyaramanuju Vs. Janakaraj & anr. , reported in 1996(1) CTC 470 , has held as follows:- "To prove the offence under Section 294 of IPC mere utterance of obscene words are not sufficient but there must be a further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others, which is lacking in the case”. 15.1. With out uttering of obscene words which would cause annoyance, the offence under Section 294(b) IPC is not made out. 15.1. With out uttering of obscene words which would cause annoyance, the offence under Section 294(b) IPC is not made out. The Hone'ble Supreme Court of India in the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N.S.Madhanagopal and another Vs. K.Lalitha (2022 LiveLaw(SC) 844), has held as follows: " ... the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences". This test has been uniformly followed in India. The Supreme Court has accepted the correctness of the test in Ranjit D.Udeshi V.State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881 . In Samuel Roth V. U.S.A., 354 US 476(1957), Chief Justice Warren said that the test of 'obscenity' is the "substantial tendency to corrupt by arousing lustful desires". Mr.Justice Harian observed that in order to be 'obscene' the matter must 'tend to sexually impure thoughts". I do not think that the words uttered in this case have such a tendency. It may be that the words are defamatory of the complainant, but I do not think that the words are 'obscene' and the utterance would constitute an offence punishable under S.294(b) IPC. " 15.2. On going through the evidence of the witnesses, P.W.1 and P.W.2 did not satisfy the ingredients of the offences under Section 294(b) of IPC. 16. Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered view that no ingredients are found to make out the case for the offences under sections 294(b) and 506(i) of IPC. Hence, this court is inclined to set aside the conviction and sentence imposed against the appellant. 17.Considering the above all aspects, this Court is inclined to allow this appeal. 18. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in the following terms: 18.1.The judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge, (PCR Cases), Sivagangai,, in S.C.No.116 of 2009, dated 15.11.2018, is set aside. 18.2.The appellant is acquitted from all the charges in S.C.No.116 of 2009, dated 15.11.2018, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, (PCR Cases), Sivagangai. 18.3.Fine amount paid by the appellant shall be refunded to him forthwith. 18.4.Bail bond executed by the appellant shall stand cancelled.