ORDER : 1. The petitioner has approached this Court seeking to direct the respondents to consider his representation dated 23.04.2022 and fix compensation in respect of the land acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956 by applying Right To Fair Compensation And Transparency In Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (herein referred to as ‘Act 2013’) and the comprehensive guidelines issued by the Ministry of Road, Transport and Highways (‘MORTH’ for short) dated 28.12.2017. Brief facts 2. The petitioner’s land measuring 05 guntas in Sy. No. 183/9A1 now 183/12 of Arishinakunte Village, Dasanapura Hobli, Nelamangala Taluk, was acquired for the purpose of widening NH4. The preliminary and the final notifications were issued in 2007, under Sections 3A and 3D of the National Highways Act, 1956 (‘NH Act, 1956’ for short). The competent authority passed an award on 12.12.2007 fixing Rs. 400/- per square feet, which was disbursed on 30.05.2008. Upon arbitration under Section 3G sub-clause (5) of the NH Act, 1956, the amount was enhanced to Rs. 720/- per square feet on 11.09.2018. 3. The petitioner now seeks for reconsideration of compensation under Act, 2013, claiming multiplier benefits, 100% solatium, interest and structural value on the ground that his property was commercially converted. OBJECTIONS BY NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA 4. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3 oppose the petition contending that: (i) The award and payment was completed in 2007-2008 long before Act, 2013 came into force. (ii) The Act, 2013 under Section 105 expressly excluded the NH Act, 1956, and it was made applicable only from 01.01.2015 to an extent (First, Second and the Third Schedules), through the Removal of Difficulties Order, 2015. (iii) The MORTH guidelines of 2017 apply only if the award was passed before 01.01.2015 and full amount of compensation had not been deposited. (iv) Since compensation and enhanced compensation were already paid, no re-computation is permissible. (v) The petitioner had a statutory alternative remedy under Section 3G (5) of the NH Act, 1956 for determination of compensation by arbitration and cannot invoke writ jurisdiction to reopen concluded proceedings. 5. Heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri B.V. Shankara Narayana Rao for the petitioner, learned AGA for respondent No.1 and Smt. Shilpa Shah, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Contentions of the petitioner 6. 5. Heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri B.V. Shankara Narayana Rao for the petitioner, learned AGA for respondent No.1 and Smt. Shilpa Shah, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Contentions of the petitioner 6. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contends that the land acquired under the NH Act, 1956 was commercially converted land with the existing structures, and that the compensation awarded in the year 2007, did not reflect the true market value, nature of the land or value of the structures standing therein. It is further submitted that though the acquisition was initiated prior to the coming into force of the Act, 2013, the petitioner's claim remained pending and incomplete for want of just and fair compensation, and therefore the provisions of 2013, Act ought to be applied. Learned Senior Counsel places reliance on the MORTH guidelines dated 28.12.2017 to contend that where compensation under the NH Act, 1956 was not finally settled in accordance with law, the authorities were obliged to re- compute the compensation by applying the First Schedule of Act, 2013, including multiplier solatium and other statutory benefits of the Act, 2013. It is further contended that denial of benefits available under the Act, 2013 is arbitrary, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, particularly when similarly situated landowners whose lands were acquired under other statutes are extended higher compensation. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Another vs. Tarsem Singh and Others , (2019) 9 SCC 304 (Tarsem Singh) to contend that the exclusion of benefits under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (‘Act, 1894’ for short) in respect of the National Highways Acquisition has been held unconstitutional, and therefore, the petitioner is entitled to the benefits falling from the new acquisition regime. RESPONDENTS CONTENTIONS 7. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for respondents 2 and 3 submits that the writ petition is not maintainable, as the petitioner has an effective alternative statutory remedy under Section 3G(5) of the NH Act, 1956 by way of arbitration, which was already availed resulting in enhancement of compensation by arbitral award dated 11.09.2018. It is contended that the award was passed in 2007 and the compensation was fully deposited and disbursed in 2008, much prior to the coming into force of the Act, 2013 and therefore, the acquisition proceedings have attained finality. It is contended that the award was passed in 2007 and the compensation was fully deposited and disbursed in 2008, much prior to the coming into force of the Act, 2013 and therefore, the acquisition proceedings have attained finality. The petitioner cannot invoke writ jurisdiction to reopen a concluded award after more than a decade. It is submitted that by virtue of Section 105 of the Act, 2013, the provisions of Act, 2013 were explicitly excluded from applicability to enactments listed in Fourth Schedule, including the NH Act, 1956 and that limited extension of First, Second and Third Schedules to the NH Act, 1956 was made prospectively with effect from 01.01.2015 and hence the new Act has no retrospective application. It is further contended that the MORTH guidelines dated 28.12.2017 apply only to cases where, though the award was passed prior to 01.01.2015, the full amount of compensation had not been deposited as on that date. Since in the present case the entire compensation stood paid long before 2015, the said guidelines are wholly inapplicable. 8. With regard to Tarsem Singh (supra), learned counsel submits that the said judgment only declared Section 3J of the NH Act, 1956 unconstitutional to the limited extent of exclusion of solatium and interest and does not permit reopening of concluded awards or application of the Act, 2013 to acquisition completed prior to 01.01.2015. 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the point that arises for consideration is “Whether the Act, 2013 or the MORTH guidelines 2017 can be invoked to reopen the compensation already finalized, already attained finality under the NH Act, 1956?” FINDINGS 10. Under Section 3G(5) of the NH Act, 1956, any person aggrieved by the determination of compensation has a specific statutory remedy by way of arbitration before the competent authority, and the arbitral award is further challengeable under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘Act, 1996’ for short). In the present case, the petitioner has already exercised the remedy, and an arbitral award dated 11.09.2018 enhanced the compensation. The remedy having been availed and the award having attained finality, the petitioner cannot re-adjudicate the same claim under Article 226 of the Constitution. 11. The reliance placed by the petitioner on MORTH guidelines dated 28.12.2017 is wholly misconceived. In the present case, the petitioner has already exercised the remedy, and an arbitral award dated 11.09.2018 enhanced the compensation. The remedy having been availed and the award having attained finality, the petitioner cannot re-adjudicate the same claim under Article 226 of the Constitution. 11. The reliance placed by the petitioner on MORTH guidelines dated 28.12.2017 is wholly misconceived. The said guidelines are in the nature of executive instruction issued to deal with the transitional situations under the NH Act, 1956, where although the award under Section 3G was passed prior to 01.01.2015, the full amount of compensation had not been deposited or paid as on the said date. The guidelines are expressly conditional and apply only to financially pending acquisition. In the present case, the award was passed in the year 2007 and the compensation was fully deposited and disbursed by 2008 long prior to 01.01.2015. Therefore, the MORTH guidelines have no application and cannot be invoked to reopen or re-compute compensation that has already attained finality. 12. The Apex Court in Tarsem Singh (supra) has held at para No.52 as under: “52. There is no doubt that the learned Solicitor General, in the aforesaid two orders, has conceded the issue raised in these cases. This assumes importance in view of the plea of Shri Divan that the impugned judgments should be set aside on the ground that when the arbitral awards did not provide for solatium or interest, no Section 34 petition having been filed by the landowners on this score, the Division Bench judgments that are impugned before us ought not to have allowed solatium and/or interest. Ordinarily, we would have acceded to this plea, but given the fact that the Government itself is of the view that solatium and interest should be granted even in cases that arise between 1997 and 2015, in the interest of justice we decline to interfere with such orders, given our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. We therefore declare that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act relating to solatium and interest contained in Sections 23(1-A) and (2) and interest payable in terms of Section 28 proviso will apply to acquisitions made under the National Highways Act. Consequently, the provision of Section 3-J is, to this extent, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, declared to be unconstitutional. Consequently, the provision of Section 3-J is, to this extent, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, declared to be unconstitutional. Accordingly, appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.9599 of 2019 is dismissed.” 13. The said decision declared Section 3J of the NH Act, 1956 unconstitutional only to the limited extent it excluded solatium and interests, thereby extending those statutory benefits to acquisition made between 1997 and 01.01.2015. The Apex Court has expressly clarified that the said judgment does not reopen concluded awards or permit re-determination of compensation under Act, 2013. The Act, 2013 came into force on 01.01.2014 and by virtue of Section 105, its provision did not apply to enactment mentioned in Fourth Schedule including the NH Act, 1956. The applicability of the First, Second and Third Schedules to the NH Act, 1956 were notified prospectively from 01.01.2015, and hence does not extend to acquisition completed earlier. 14. The petitioner's acquisition was concluded in 2007-2008 and the award was fully satisfied. Therefore, the Act, 2013 is inapplicable. The reliance placed on Tarsem (supra) by the petitioner would not advance any merit to the petitioner. In Miscellaneous Application No. 1773 of 2021, application filed by the Union of India and NHAI to clarify 2019 judgment should operate only prospectively, the Court held that declaration of law in Tarsem Singh’s case was clear and categorical, unless the Court expressly restricts the effect, Section 3G is unconstitutional to extent of excluding solatium and interest. Once a provision is struck down as unconstitutional, it is void ab initio unless the Court expressly restricts the effect which it does not. Hence, Tarsem Singh operates retrospectively covering acquisition from 1997 to 2015. The Apex Court clearly observed that this judgment does not open the entire acquisition process of quantum of compensation, but only directs payment of statutory benefits, solatium and interest, which have been unlawfully withheld. The object of Tarsem Singh was to remove discrimination between the landowners of the NH Act, 1956 and those under the Act, 1894. The Apex Court clearly observed that this judgment does not open the entire acquisition process of quantum of compensation, but only directs payment of statutory benefits, solatium and interest, which have been unlawfully withheld. The object of Tarsem Singh was to remove discrimination between the landowners of the NH Act, 1956 and those under the Act, 1894. Declining to restrict the operation of Tarsem Singh’s case prospectively in Civil Miscellaneous No.1773/2021 in CA No. 7064/2019 by its order dated 02.03.2022, the Apex Court reiterated that the declaration of unconstitutionality of Section 3J of the NH Act, 1956 operates retrospectively and that the landowners whose lands were acquired under the said Act between 1997 and 01.01.2015 were entitled to solatium and interest on parity with the Act, 1894. 15. The acquisition in the present case was initiated and concluded in the year 2007 under the NH Act, 1956, 1956. The decision of the Apex Court in Tarsem Singh (supra) no doubt covers acquisition made under the said Act during the period 1997 to 01.01.2015 and the decision declared 3J of the NH Act, 1956 unconstitutional and extended the excluded solatium and interest to the eligible land owners, however, Tarsem Singh (supra) does not observe about the reopening of the concluded awards, re- determination of market value or application of the Act, 2013, to acquisition completed prior to 01.01.2015. Accordingly, while 2007 acquisition may entitle the land owner to solatium and interest and if such components were not paid, Tarsem Singh affirm no basis for reopen the compensation or invoke Act, 2013. Accordingly, the point framed for consideration is answered and this Court pass the following: ORDER: i. The Writ Petition is dismissed. ii. It is held that the acquisition in question having been completed in the year 2007, the petitioner having availed the alternative statutory remedy under Section 3G of the NH Act, 1956, which has attained finality, is not entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction to reopen the concluded proceedings. iii. It is further clarified that the judgment of the Apex court in Tarsem Singh’s case applies to the acquisition of the year 2007 only to the extent of entitlement of solatium and interest, if such statutory benefits were not already paid and does not permit re-determination of compensation or application of the Act, 2013. iv. iii. It is further clarified that the judgment of the Apex court in Tarsem Singh’s case applies to the acquisition of the year 2007 only to the extent of entitlement of solatium and interest, if such statutory benefits were not already paid and does not permit re-determination of compensation or application of the Act, 2013. iv. Liberty to the petitioner shall be confined strictly to the above limited extent and in accordance with law. v. In view of the Review Petition filed by NHAI in Review Petition (Civil) Diary No. 44096/2025 seeking clarification of the order dated 19.09.2019 passed in Tarsem Singh’s case regarding retrospective effect 1997 to 2015, the entitlement of the petitioner would be subject to the final outcome of Review Petition (Civil) Diary No. 44096/2025.