ORDER : 1. The point that arises for consideration is, whether after the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO), upon enquiry under Section 28 (3) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (‘KIAD Act’ for short), has specifically recommended deletion of the petitioners’ land from acquisition on the ground that it falls within the buffer zone and is not suitable for industrial development, the State Government can nevertheless issue a final notification under Section 28 (4) without either accepting such recommendation or assigning independent and cogent reasons for deferring from it? 2. Since the issues involved in these writ petitions are interconnected, arising out common acquisition notification, and raising similar questions of law and fact, they are heard together and disposed of by the common order. Brief facts: 3. The petitioners in these writ petitions are owners of agricultural lands situated at Adinarayana Hosahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Doddaballapura Taluk, Bengaluru Rural District, which proposed to be acquired under the provision of the KIAD Act, 1966 for industrial development. 4. A preliminary notification under Section 28 (1) dated 14.06.2013, was issued by the State Government, followed by final notifications under Section 28 (4) in the year 2015, and 2018, notifying the petitioners’ land. 5. The petitioners filed objections under Section 28 (3) of the KIAD Act. In an earlier round of litigation, this Court remanded the matter to the authorities for fresh consideration of objections, in accordance with law. 6. Pursuant to the remand, the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) conducted a detailed enquiry and in several cases, specifically recommended deletion of the petitioners’ land from acquisition, holding that the lands fall within the buffer zone of the National Highway and are not suitable for the industrial development. It was also noted that the neighbouring lands, including Sy. Nos.79/1, 79/2 and 79/3 have been treated as buffer zone lands. 7. The said recommendations were placed before the competent authorities. However, the State Government issued final notifications under Section 28(4), proceeding with the acquisition without assigning reasons for disagreeing with the SLAO’s recommendation. Aggrieved by the issuance of the final notifications, the petitioners have approached this Court. 8. Nos.79/1, 79/2 and 79/3 have been treated as buffer zone lands. 7. The said recommendations were placed before the competent authorities. However, the State Government issued final notifications under Section 28(4), proceeding with the acquisition without assigning reasons for disagreeing with the SLAO’s recommendation. Aggrieved by the issuance of the final notifications, the petitioners have approached this Court. 8. Heard Sri D.R. Ravishankar, learned senior counsel for Sri Phaniraj Kashyap, learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P. Nos.5788/2019, 5790/2019 and 5795/2019, Sri Venkatesh P. Dalwai, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P. No.50930/2016, Sri Harisha A.S., learned counsel for the respondents-State, Sri Shashikiran Shetty, learned senior counsel for Sri B.B. Patil, learned counsel for respondent No.2-KIADB and Smt. Shilpa Shah, learned counsel for respondent No.3-National Highways Authority. Petitioners’ contention: 9. Learned senior counsel Sri D.R. Ravishankar for the petitioners in W.P. Nos.5788/2019, 5790/2019 and 5795/2019 submits that after remand by this Court, the SLAO, upon enquiry under Section 28 (3) of the KIAD Act, has specifically recommended deletion of the petitioners’ land from acquisition, holding that the lands fall within the buffer zone of National Highway and are not suitable for industrial development. It is argued that once the SLAO records a reasoned finding recommending deletion, the State Government is bound either to accept the recommendation or to record independent or cogent reasons for disagreeing with it. Issuance of final notification under Section 28 (4) without assigning reasons amounts to a non-application of mind. Learned senior counsel points out that the neighbouring lands bearing Sy. Nos.79/1, 79/2 and 79/3 have already been treated as a buffer zone lands and excluded from acquisition, retaining the petitioners’ lands, which are similarly situated, without recording distinguishing reasons, is arbitrary and discriminatory, violating Article 14 of the Constitution. 10. Relying upon the decision of the Co-Ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Sri Chava Chinnaveera Bhadraiah Vs. The State of Karnataka and others, W.P. No. 6635/2014 dated 09.07.2021 (Chava Chinnaveera Bhadraiah), it is contended that the power of eminent domain is subject to principles of fairness and non-arbitrariness and that departure from statutory or expert recommendations without reasons renders the acquisition invalid. On similar lines, reliance is also placed on the judgments of this Court in N. Somashekar and others Vs. State of Karnataka and others , (1997) 7 Kant LJ 410 (N. Somashekar) and Sri Anil Kumar and another Vs. On similar lines, reliance is also placed on the judgments of this Court in N. Somashekar and others Vs. State of Karnataka and others , (1997) 7 Kant LJ 410 (N. Somashekar) and Sri Anil Kumar and another Vs. State of Karnataka and others , W.P. No. 26087/2018 dated 12.01.2021 (Anil Kumar). 11. The petitioner in W.P. No.50930/2016 adopts the argument advanced by the learned senior counsel and submits that the SLAO having given a reasoned finding recommending deletion, the State Government under Section 28 (4) is required to assign reasons for not accepting the recommendation. Respondents contention: 12. Per contra, Sri Shashkiran Shetty, learned senior counsel submits that the acquisition is for industrial development/infrastructure and therefore, deserves to be upheld. It is submitted that once public purpose is established, the scope of judicial interference is limited. It is argued that the State Government’s satisfaction under Section 28 (4) is independent of the recommendation made by the SLAO under Section 28 (3), the SLAO recommendation is not binding on the State. Strong reliance is placed on N. Somashekar’s case stated supra to contend that the issuance of final notification is not automatic after Section 28 (3), but once the Government is satisfied that the land is required for the public purpose, the declaration cannot be faulted. It is further submitted that the earlier challenge to the acquisition had already been considered by this Court, and that the present writ petition amounts to re-adjudication of issues which is impermissible. 13. Learned counsel for Respondent No.3-NHAI submits that the portions of the lands were acquired for national highway development, a vital public infrastructure project, and the delay caused by interim orders has stalled execution and adversely affected public interest. It is contended that the Courts should exercise judicial restraint in matters relating to infrastructure projects, particularly where acquisition is for public purpose. 14. This Court has carefully considered the rival contentions and perused the material on record. 15. In the earlier round of writ petitions, this Court did not annul the acquisition, remanded the matter to the authorities for fresh consideration of the objections under Section 28(3). The remand casted a statutory obligation on the authorities to meaningfully reconsider the objections and take a reasoned decision thereafter. In this context, it is relevant to extract sections 28(3) and 28(4) of the KIAD Act, which read thus: “ 28. The remand casted a statutory obligation on the authorities to meaningfully reconsider the objections and take a reasoned decision thereafter. In this context, it is relevant to extract sections 28(3) and 28(4) of the KIAD Act, which read thus: “ 28. Acquisition of land.– (1) xxx (3) After considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of the land and by any other person interested therein, and after giving such owner and person an opportunity of being heard, the State Government may pass such orders as it deems fit. (4) After orders are passed under sub-section (3), where the State Government is satisfied that any land should be acquired for the purpose specified in the notification issued under sub-section (1), a declaration shall, by notification in the official Gazette, be made to that effect.” 16. The State Government as referred to Section 28(3) is the ‘SLAO’ who is delegated with power by virtue of Rule 14 of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Rules, 1966 (‘KIAD Rules 1966’ for short) and while the State Government as referred to Section 28 (4) is the ‘Government’ which issues the notification. The SLAO, while acting under Section 28 (3) performs a quasi- adjudicatory function. After conducting enquiry, local inspection, and considering objections, the SLAO under Section 28(3) would constitute or could be described as a ‘raw material’ for the Government under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act to decide, after recording its satisfaction, that the land is required for the purpose of the Act. The nature of the distinct stages under Sections 28(3) and 28(4) of the KIAD Act has been dealt in detail in the case of Malligamma Vs. State of Karnataka , ILR 2013 KAR 4449 (Malligamma). The Co-Ordinate Bench of this Court in Anil Kumar’s case has held at paragraph Nos.22, 23, and 26 as under: “22. However, in the present case, what could be faulted is the decision to pass a revised order under Section 28(3) by the SLAO in the year 2016. The sanctity attached to the report of SLAO is that it forms a basis for the Government to arrive at a decision resulting in the notification under Section 28(4). The scheme itself provides for a distinct role as regards the SLAO and requisite importance is to be attached to the report of SLAO. 23. The sanctity attached to the report of SLAO is that it forms a basis for the Government to arrive at a decision resulting in the notification under Section 28(4). The scheme itself provides for a distinct role as regards the SLAO and requisite importance is to be attached to the report of SLAO. 23. The beneficiary cannot at its instance have the order of SLAO revised, if the SLAO has recommended for exclusion of land. It is for the Government to satisfy itself from all the information available including the report of the SLAO. But in the case on hand, it is to be noted that the show cause notice has been issued by the KIADB to SLAO to explain as to how the land was recommended for exclusion without concurrence of the Board and the Development Officer of the Board. The extract of the order of SLAO at Annexure-R1 refers to the said aspect, which is as follows: xxx 26. The Government has to take an independent decision as regards the stage of 28(4) notification. Insofar as the reconsideration of order of SLAO at the request of beneficiary has resulted in a situation where the Government is taking a decision under Section 28(4) on the basis of the report which is a reconsidered order at the dictate of the beneficiary, which is impermissible. Under the nature of power conferred under Section 28(3) of SLAO, once order is passed and report is made by the SLAO, such report cannot be tinkered with, though the Government is at liberty to call for additional material and take an independent decision under Section 28(4).” 17. The another Co-Ordinate Bench of this Court in similar circumstances, in the case of Chava Chinnaveera Bhadraiah , has held at paragraph No.23 as under: “23. The another Co-Ordinate Bench of this Court in similar circumstances, in the case of Chava Chinnaveera Bhadraiah , has held at paragraph No.23 as under: “23. It is therefore clear that as held by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, upon passing of an order under Section 28(3) of the Act directing dropping/deletion of the lands notified under Section 28(1) of the Act, the State Government has only two options viz., either accept the 28(3) order passed by the SLAO and take necessary action pursuant thereto OR alternatively, apply its mind to the entire material on record and take into account all the relevant facts and circumstances and record its satisfaction that the land is required for the purpose notified under Section 28(1) and consequently issue a final notification in this regard. It follows there from that immediately upon the KIADB passing an order under Section 28(3) of the Act, the SLAO as well as the KIADB become functus officio and do not have jurisdiction or authority of law to either issue a fresh notice under Section 28(2) of the Act or conduct fresh/de novo enquiry under Section 28(3), much less pass a fresh order under Section 28(3) particularly when the earlier order under Section 28(3) of the Act directing dropping/deleting of the notified lands from acquisition was is subsisting and operative between the parties.” 18. This Court in N. Somashekar stated supra has held at paragraph Nos.17 and 18 as under: “17. Two questions arise for consideration viz., (a) whether the scheme underlying Section 28 of the Act envisages the satisfaction of the State Government over and above the orders passed by its delegate under Section 28(3) and (b) whether any such satisfaction was recorded by the State Government in the instant case. Insofar as the first question is concerned, Section 28(4) itself provides a complete answer. According to that provision, after orders under sub-section (3) of Section 28 are passed, a declaration shall be notified in the Official Gazette be made about the acquisition of the land for the purpose mentioned in the preliminary notification if the Government is satisfied that such land is required for the specified purpose. According to that provision, after orders under sub-section (3) of Section 28 are passed, a declaration shall be notified in the Official Gazette be made about the acquisition of the land for the purpose mentioned in the preliminary notification if the Government is satisfied that such land is required for the specified purpose. The expressions “after orders are passed under sub- section (3)” and “where the State Government is satisfied” clearly show that the provisions of sub- section (4) do not envisage the issue of a final declaration by the Government as an inevitable consequence flowing from the rejection of the objections raised by the land owners by either itself or its delegate under Section 28. The satisfaction of the Government is a requirement independent of the need and the power to consider and dispose of the objections filed by the interested persons. ‘Any other interpretation would render the provisions of sub-section (4) a superfluity. It is one of the cardinal principles of interpretation that the provisions contained in a statute should be so construed as not to render any part thereof redundant. The expressions noticed above appearing in sub-section (4) have therefore to be interpreted to mean that the Government must be independently satisfied of the need to acquire the notified land for the purpose mentioned in the preliminary notification, for otherwise the requirement of the Government being ‘satisfied’ before the issue of any such declaration would be rendered wholly meaningless. The submission made by Mr. Ramachandra, that the issue of a declaration under sub-section (4) of Section 28 is not a mechanical act and that any such declaration can be validly made only if the Government have considered and been satisfied that the issue of any such declaration is necessary for the public purpose notified in the preliminary notification is accordingly upheld. 18. That brings me to the other aspect viz., whether the Government have in the instant case recorded their satisfaction before issuing the declarations. Two circumstances are in this regard relevant. The first and the foremost is that the declarations issued by the State Government themselves record the satisfaction of the Government that the lands mentioned therein are needed for the public purpose mentioned in the preliminary notification. There is a presumption of correctness in favour of the statement made in these declarations. The Supreme Court has in Bajirao T. Kote (Dead) by LRs. There is a presumption of correctness in favour of the statement made in these declarations. The Supreme Court has in Bajirao T. Kote (Dead) by LRs. v. State of Maharashtra, (1995) 2 SCC 442 , held that once the purpose is a public purpose, the satisfaction of the State Government as regards the need to acquire the land for satisfaction of that purpose cannot be questioned.” 19. The SLAO ,upon passing an order under Section 28 (3) of the KIAD Act, directing dropping/deletion of the lands notified under Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act, the State Government has only two options: i. Either accept 28 (3) order passed by SLAO and take necessary action pursuant thereto or alternatively. ii. Apply its mind to the entire material on record and take into account all the relevant facts and circumstances and record its satisfaction that the land is required for the purpose of notify under Section 28 (1) and consequently, issue a final notification in this regard. 20. It is also true that the state government’s satisfaction under Section 28 (4) is independent and that the SLAO’s recommendation is not binding. However, independence of satisfaction does not mean unreasoned, or mechanical satisfaction. When the State chooses to depart from a specific and reasoned recommendation of the SLAO, the statute requires the State to record independent and cogent reasons justifying such departures. 21. The reliance in N. Somashekar’s case by the learned senior counsel does not authorize the State to ignore a reasoned recommendation of deletion without assigning reasons. On the other hand, the decisions specifically observe that the Government has to record their satisfaction before issuing the declaration. 22. The submission of the learned senior counsel that the acquisition is for public purpose and therefore, immune from challenge cannot be accepted in the present context, as the petitioners do not dispute the concept of public purpose. The challenge is to the decision making process, namely issuance of final notification without reasons, despite clear recommendation for deletion and parity. 23. In the present case, the SLAO specifically recorded that the petitioners’ lands fall within the buffer zone and are not suitable for industrial development and recommended deletion. The State Government issued final notification under Section 28(4) without assigning any reasons from deferring from this recommendation. The neighbouring lands Sy. Nos.79/1, 79/2, and 79/3 have been treated as buffer zone lands. In the present case, the SLAO specifically recorded that the petitioners’ lands fall within the buffer zone and are not suitable for industrial development and recommended deletion. The State Government issued final notification under Section 28(4) without assigning any reasons from deferring from this recommendation. The neighbouring lands Sy. Nos.79/1, 79/2, and 79/3 have been treated as buffer zone lands. From the decisions stated supra, and the material on record, this Court holds that it is settled position of law that the State Government must arrive at an independent satisfaction that the land is required for a public purpose. The Government is required to apply its mind to the entire material on record, and take into account whether the recommendation made by the SLAO is just and proper, and record its satisfaction that the land is required for the purpose notified under Section 28 (1) of the KIAD Act and cannot issue a final notification in a mechanical manner. 24. The facts of the present case reveal a classic instance where the statutory fact-finding authority has recommended deletion of lands on objective ground, yet the State proceeded to issue final notification without recording any reasons for disagreement and hence, cannot be sustained viewed in the light of the principles laid down in the case of Chava Chinnaveera Bhadraiah, N. Somashekar and Anil Kumar as it reflects non- application of mind and an arbitrary exercise of the eminent domain, particularly when similarly situated neighbouring lands have been treated as buffer zone lands and the point framed for consideration is answered and this Court pass the following: ORDER: i. The writ petitions are allowed. ii. The final notifications issued under Section 28 (4) of the KIAD Act dated 30.01.2015 and 21.07.2018 insofar as it relates to the petitioners’ lands are hereby quashed. iii. The matter is remitted to the State Government for fresh consideration strictly in accordance with law. iv. Until such consideration and fresh decision being taken, the respondents shall not dispossess the petitioners from the schedule lands.