ORDER : SUDDALA CHALAPATHI RAO, J. The application vide I.A.No.2 of 2022 is filed to condone the delay of (508) days in filing the appeal against the order, dt.26.10.2018 in OP.No.93 of 2013 on the file of the Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-I Addl. District Judge at Nalgonda (for short ‘the Tribunal’). Brief facts of the Case : 2. The petitioner/appellant is the owner of the offending vehicle i.e., Hero Honda Passion Plus Motor Cycle bearing No.AP 29 AF 2341. The respondents/claimants herein had filed a claim petition in O.P. No. 93 of 2013 before the Tribunal seeking compensation on account of the death of the deceased- Singireddy Malla Reddy deceased. The said claim petition was partly allowed by the Tribunal by the impugned award granting compensation of Rs.6,00,000/- with proportionate costs and interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till the date of realization, fixing joint and several liability on the petitioner/respondent No.2, being the owner, and the 5 th respondent/respondent No.1, being the driver of the offending vehicle. Aggrieved by the said award, the present appeal has been filed by the petitioner/appellant. 3. Along with appeal, the petitioner/appellant filed the underlying interlocutory application vide I.A.No.2 of 2022 seeking condonation of delay of 508 days. 4. In the affidavit filed in support the application, it is stated that after completion of his chief-examination and cross- examination on 16.02.2018, he was under the bona fide belief, based on the assurance of his counsel, that he would be informed about the disposal of the O.P., and thereafter he did not make further enquiries with his counsel. 5. It is further contended that only in the month of May, 2021, upon receipt of notice in E.P. No. 284 of 2021 filed for attachment of his immovable property, the petitioner/appellant came to know about the disposal of the claim petition. It is further contended that when he attempted to contact his earlier counsel regarding the same, there was no response. Due to the prevailing pandemic situation, the petitioner/appellant thereafter approached another advocate, Sri G. Ramu, who, upon examining the matter, advised that there were good and tenable grounds to challenge the award, and on his advice, the petitioner/appellant obtained certified copies and filed the present appeal along with the application for condonation of delay. 6. Due to the prevailing pandemic situation, the petitioner/appellant thereafter approached another advocate, Sri G. Ramu, who, upon examining the matter, advised that there were good and tenable grounds to challenge the award, and on his advice, the petitioner/appellant obtained certified copies and filed the present appeal along with the application for condonation of delay. 6. It is further stated that, while computing the delay, the petitioner/appellant has excluded the period from 15.03.2020 to 02.10.2021 in terms of the directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020, by order, dt.08.03.2021 and subsequent orders, whereby the period of limitation stood extended on account of the COVID-19 pandemic situation. The appellant, therefore, contends that the delay was neither wilful nor deliberate, but occurred due to the circumstances explained above, and accordingly seeks condonation of the delay of 508 days. 7. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner/appellant. There is no representation on behalf of the respondents, despite service of notice. Perused the material available on record. 8. It is evident from the record that the petitioner/appellant actively participated in the proceedings before the Tribunal and had adduced his evidence by way of chief-examination and cross-examination, which concluded on 16.02.2018. The explanation offered is that thereafter he did not pursue the matter on the premise that his counsel would inform him about the disposal of the O.P. However, such an explanation cannot be accepted as sufficient cause. A litigant who has participated in the proceedings is expected to remain vigilant and take reasonable steps to follow up the case. 9. It is also evident that the appellant claims to have acquired knowledge of the award only upon receipt of notice in the execution proceedings. Mere reliance on the alleged assurance of the counsel does not absolve the litigant of the responsibility to diligently prosecute the matter. 10. The plea that knowledge of the award was gained only upon receipt of notice in the execution proceedings does not satisfactorily explain the prolonged inaction. The record does not disclose any acceptable justification for the delay, and non- communication by counsel, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone such inordinate delay. 11. 10. The plea that knowledge of the award was gained only upon receipt of notice in the execution proceedings does not satisfactorily explain the prolonged inaction. The record does not disclose any acceptable justification for the delay, and non- communication by counsel, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone such inordinate delay. 11. In Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by Legal Representatives & Others v. Speciay Deputy Collector (LA) , (2024) 12 Supreme Court Cases 336 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of delay cannot be granted on equitable considerations or on grounds of hardship, and that a right or remedy not exercised or availed within the prescribed period or for a prolonged period, must come to an end or cease to exist. 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajneesh Kumar & Anr v. Ved Prakash , S.L.P. (CIVIL) NOS. 935-936 OF 2021,d t.21.11.2024 , while dealing with a similar situation of condoning the delay of (534) days held as under: “10. It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief. 11. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a decision of this Court in the case of Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd reported in (1993) 2 SCC 185 , wherein this Court observed as under: “8. The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and statements, made within the limits of authority given to him, are the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the party who engage him. The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and statements, made within the limits of authority given to him, are the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the party who engage him. It is true that in certain situations, the court may, in the interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex parte decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or misdemeanour of the advocate where it finds that the client was an innocent litigant but there is no such absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at any time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognized. Such an absolute rule would make the working of the system extremely difficult. The observations made in Rafiq [ AIR 1981 SC 1400 ] must not be understood as an absolute proposition. As we have mentioned hereinabove, this was an on-going suit posted for final hearing after a lapse of seven years of its institution. It was not a second appeal filed by a villager residing away from the city, where the court is located. The defendant is also not a rustic ignorant villager but a private limited company with its head office at Calcutta itself and managed by educated businessmen who know where their interest lies. It is evident that when their applications were not deposed of before taking up the suit for final hearing they felt piqued and refused to appear before the court. May be, it was part of their delaying tactics as alleged by the plaintiff. May be not. But one thing is clear they chose to non-cooperate with the court. Having adopted such a stand towards the court, the defendant has no right to ask its indulgence. Putting the entire blame upon the advocate and trying to make it out as if they were totally unaware of the nature or significance of the proceedings is a theory which cannot be accepted and ought not to have been accepted.” (Emphasis supplied) 12. As regards the law of limitation, we may refer to the decision of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. As regards the law of limitation, we may refer to the decision of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v. The Employees State Insurance Corporation , (1971) 2 SCC 860 , wherein this Court held as under: “The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to ensure that actions are commenced within a particular period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect to the principle that law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura subveniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims.” (Emphasis supplied)” 13. Further, the reliance placed by the petitioner/appellant on the orders passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020 extending the period of limitation due to the COVID-19 pandemic, does not support his case. The said directions were issued to safeguard the litigants who were prevented from initiating proceedings within the prescribed period owing to the exceptional circumstances arising from the pandemic. Such benefit cannot be extended to a litigant who had already allowed the limitation period to expire well before 15.03.2020. 14. In the present case, a substantial portion of the delay had occurred prior to the outbreak of the pandemic. The delay from the date of the award till 15.03.2020 remains unexplained. The extension of limitation granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court cannot be relied upon to condone delay attributable to inaction or negligence that existed independent of the pandemic. 15. The plea that knowledge of the award was acquired only upon receipt of notice in the execution proceedings further indicates lack of due diligence. A party to the proceedings, who had actively participated therein, cannot remain inactive for years together and thereafter seek indulgence of the Court by invoking the benefit of the pandemic-related orders. 16. 15. The plea that knowledge of the award was acquired only upon receipt of notice in the execution proceedings further indicates lack of due diligence. A party to the proceedings, who had actively participated therein, cannot remain inactive for years together and thereafter seek indulgence of the Court by invoking the benefit of the pandemic-related orders. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that the orders extending limitation during the pandemic do not create a fresh cause of action, nor do they revive remedies that had already become time-barred. The extension was procedural in nature and cannot be construed as a blanket condonation of delay irrespective of the conduct of the litigant. 17. In view of the aforesaid legal position and the facts of the present case, this Court is of the considered view that the explanation furnished by the petitioner/appellant does not satisfactorily account for the delay. The circumstances pleaded do not establish that the delay was beyond his control. On the contrary, the delay appears to have occurred due to negligence and lack of due diligence, and therefore does not warrant condonation. 18. Accordingly, the Interlocutory Application vide IA.No.2 of 2022 is dismissed. Consequently, the MACMA stands dismissed. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.