JUDGMENT : D.K. SINGH, J. 1. The present two appeals have been filed by the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board (hereinafter referred to as KIADB), as well as August Ventures Private Limited, who were respondent Nos.2 and 4, respectively before the writ court. 2. The parties are referred to as per their ranking in the writ petition for the sake of convenience. 3. The petitioners filed the writ petition before the learned Single Judge with following prayers: “(i) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ or order Quashing notification bearing No. C1255SPQ2001 (P) dated 9.2.2004 under Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act, ANNEXURE B and final notification No.CI:126:SPQ: 2005 dated 19.12.2005 under Section 28(4) of KIAD Act ANNEXURE-D. (ii) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ or order quashing allotment letter bearing No. IADB/HO/Allot/Secy/1540-SUC/16093/14-15 dated 10.3.2015 ANNEXURE-Q and the possession certificate bearing No. IADB/DO/-2/2336/2015-16 dated 25.1.2016 and consequently direct the Respondent 2 to 4 to hand over possession of item No. 1,2, and 4 of the scheduled properties and direct respondent 2 and 3 to hand over possession of item No. 3 of schedule property. (ii)(a) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ or order Quashing General Award dated 05.02.2018 and dated 22.08.2023 Annexure T and U passed by the respondent No.3. (iii) Grant such other and further relief as just in the interest of justice.” 4. The petitioners claim to be the absolute owner of the property bearing survey No.117/2 measuring 31 guntas, survey No.117/3 measuring 33 guntas, survey No.116 measuring 35 guntas and survey No.117/3 measuring 18.5 guntas, totally 2 acres 37.5 guntas, situated at Amani Bellanduru Khane Village, Varthur Hobli, Bangalore East Taluk, Bengaluru. 5. The State Government issued a notification on 10.12.2001 under Section 3(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as KIAD Act), for acquiring large extent of land, including the aforesaid land for declaring the lands as the industrial area. Thereafter, preliminary notification for acquiring the aforesaid land was issued on 09.02.2004 under Section 281 (1) of the KIAD Act. The final notification came to be issued on 19.12.2005. 6. After issuing the final notification, no award came to be passed in respect of the lands which the petitioners claimed to be the owner. In view thereof, the petitioners had filed writ petition in WP.No.7994/2017 (LA-KIADB) with the prayers as mentioned above. The final notification came to be issued on 19.12.2005. 6. After issuing the final notification, no award came to be passed in respect of the lands which the petitioners claimed to be the owner. In view thereof, the petitioners had filed writ petition in WP.No.7994/2017 (LA-KIADB) with the prayers as mentioned above. The learned single judge having considered the submissions and pleadings had framed the following issues in paragraph No.9 of the impugned judgment as below: (i) Whether the petitioners are entitled to maintain the present writ petition? (ii) Whether in law and on the facts of this case the General Award dated 05.02.2018 and 22.08.2023 passed by the respondent-SLAO is sustainable? (iii) Whether petitioners have made out grounds for shifting of date of acquisition for the purpose of determination of compensation from date of issuance of preliminary notification that is 09.02.2004 to the present date? 7. So far as the question No.1 is concerned, learned Single Judge said that the issue, whether the petitioners are entitled for compensation is to be decided by Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) and the writ court would not determine the said issue as it is not that the issue would be one of the question of fact and the SLAO would be the competent authority to decide the said issue. 8. So far as the second and third issues are concerned, the writ court on the facts of the case found that the award was not passed even on the date of filing of the writ petition and when the writ petition was pending for final determination, the award came to be passed on 05.02.2018 under the Provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In view of the aforesaid facts, the learned Single judge was of the view that, if the respondent would like to retain the land, they must pay the compensation as per the prevailing market value on 05.02.2018. Thus, the learned Single judge shifted the date of acquisition to the date of award. 9. Sri. Vikram Huilgol, learned Senior Counsel assisted by learned counsel Sri.Chandrashekar P.V., appearing for KIADB has submitted that the award was not passed for the reason that the entire land acquisition was under challenge and several proceedings were pending before this court. In some of the proceedings/petitions, status quo orders were issued. Therefore, the authority/SLAO cannot be blamed for not passing the award on time. 10. In some of the proceedings/petitions, status quo orders were issued. Therefore, the authority/SLAO cannot be blamed for not passing the award on time. 10. It is further submitted that the judgment relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners in case of Bernard Francis Joseph VAZ and Others Vs. Government of Karnataka and Others, (2025) 7 SCC 580 is distinguishable on the facts of the present case. It is submitted that in the said case, the SLAO did not pass the award, where there was no hurdle for him to passing the award. Therefore, the judgment is not applicable in the facts of the present case. It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge ought not to have shifted the date of acquisition to the date of award on the 05.02.2018 and thus the writ petition was liable to be dismissed. 11. Sri. Rohan Hosmath, learned counsel appearing for another appellant i.e., August Ventures Pvt,. Ltd., who is respondent No.4 in WA No.1106/2025 has concurred with the submissions made by Sri.Vikram Huilgol, learned Senior Counsel appearing for appellants in WA No.1106/2025. 12. On the other hand Sri.K.N.Phanindra, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Miss.Kruthika Raghavan has submitted that the petitioners never challenged the land acquisition proceedings before filing the writ petition in the year 2017. The petitioners came to this court on the ground that the land acquisition proceedings in respect of the petitioner's land had lapsed and no award was passed. Therefore, they sought for setting aside of the preliminary and final notification. There was no interim order or any deterrence for the Special Land Acquisition Officer to determine the compensation and pass the award in spite of the petitioner's time. It is therefore submitted that when there was no hindrance or deterrence for passing the award by the Land Acquisition Officer, if he has not passed the award for all these years, i.e., upto 05.02.2018, though the final notification was issued way back on 19.12.2005, the land acquisition stood lapsed. However, if the authority wants to utilize the land, they must pay the compensation, as per the prevailing market rate, at least on the date of the award i.e., 05.02.2018. 13. We have considered these submissions and also perused the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single judge. 14. However, if the authority wants to utilize the land, they must pay the compensation, as per the prevailing market rate, at least on the date of the award i.e., 05.02.2018. 13. We have considered these submissions and also perused the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single judge. 14. The facts as stated are not disputed by the learned counsels for the appellants or the respondents. The Supreme Court in Bernard Francis Joseph case stated supra has held that when the notification regarding the acquisition of land is invalid because it failed to meet the statutory requirements and also having found that taking possession of the land of land owners, in pursuance to the acquisition notification was not in accordance with the law and amount of compensation payable to the land owners was not determined, the landowners would be entitled for appropriate compensation. Right to property though ceased to be a fundamental right, but certainly taking possession or acquiring the property of a citizen would amount to deprivation of such right of property, which is a constitutional right under Article 300 of the Constitution of India. The acquisition of land for public purpose is undertaken under the power of the eminent domain of the government, much against the wishes of the owners of the land. Therefore, when such a power is exercised, it is coupled with the bound and duty and obligation, on the part of the Government Body to ensure that the owners whose lands get acquired, are paid compensation, awarded amount as declared by the statutory award at the earliest. The Paragraph Nos.42 to 47 of the Bernard Francis Joseph judgment stated supra are extracted hereunder. “42. In Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd. v. Mast Ram, (2025) 1 SCC 798 : (2025) 1 SCC (Civ) 379 : (2025) 253 Comp Cas 1, this Court observed thus: (SCC pp. 820-22, paras 46-53) “D. Role of the State under Article 300-A of the Constitution 46. The right to property in our country is a net of intersecting rights which has been explained by this Court in Kolkata Municipal Corpn. v. Bimal Kumar Shah, (2024) 10 SCC 533 : (2024) 4 SCC (Civ) 573. A Division Bench of this Court identified seven non-exhaustive sub-rights that accrue to a landowner when the State intends to acquire his/her property. v. Bimal Kumar Shah, (2024) 10 SCC 533 : (2024) 4 SCC (Civ) 573. A Division Bench of this Court identified seven non-exhaustive sub-rights that accrue to a landowner when the State intends to acquire his/her property. The relevant observations of this Court under the said judgment are reproduced below: (SCC pp. 550-51, para 30) ‘30. … Seven such sub-rights can be identified, albeit non-exhaustive. These are: (i) The duty of the State to inform the person that it intends to acquire his property — the right to notice, (ii) The duty of the State to hear objections to the acquisition — the right to be heard, (iii) The duty of the State to inform the person of its decision to acquire — the right to a reasoned decision, (iv) The duty of the State to demonstrate that the acquisition is for public purpose — the duty to acquire only for public purpose, (v) The duty of the State to restitute and rehabilitate — the right of restitution or fair compensation, (vi) The duty of the State to conduct the process of acquisition efficiently and within prescribed timelines of the proceedings — the right to an efficient and expeditious process, and (vii) The final conclusion of the proceedings leading to vesting — the right of conclusion.’ This Court held that a fair and reasonable compensation is the sine qua non for any acquisition process. 47. In Roy Estate v. State of Jharkhand, (2009) 12 SCC 194 : (2009) 4 SCC (Civ) 666; Union of India v. Mahendra Girji, (2010) 15 SCC 682 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 274 and Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak, (1984) 1 SCC 125 , this Court underscored the importance of following timelines prescribed by the statutes as well as determining and disbursing compensation amount expeditiously within reasonable time. 48. The subject land came to be acquired by invoking special powers in cases of urgency under Section 17(4) of the 1894 Act. The invocation of Section 17(4) extinguishes the statutory avenue for the landowners under Section 5-A to raise objections to the acquisition proceedings. These circumstances impose onerous duty on the State to facilitate justice to the landowners by providing them with fair and reasonable compensation expeditiously. The seven sub-rights of the landowners identified by this Court in Kolkata Municipal Corpn. The invocation of Section 17(4) extinguishes the statutory avenue for the landowners under Section 5-A to raise objections to the acquisition proceedings. These circumstances impose onerous duty on the State to facilitate justice to the landowners by providing them with fair and reasonable compensation expeditiously. The seven sub-rights of the landowners identified by this Court in Kolkata Municipal Corpn. v. Bimal Kumar Shah, (2024) 10 SCC 533 : (2024) 4 SCC (Civ) 573 are corresponding duties of the State. We regret to note that the amount of Rs 3,05,31,095 determined as compensation under the Supplementary award has not been paid to the landowners for a period of more than two years and the State of Himachal Pradesh as a welfare State has made no effort to get the same paid at the earliest. 49. This Court has held in Dharnidhar Mishra v. State of Bihar, (2024) 10 SCC 605 : (2024) 4 SCC (Civ) 611 and State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 769 that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. This Court held in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491 that in a welfare State, the statutory authorities are legally bound to pay adequate compensation and rehabilitate the persons whose lands are being acquired. The non-fulfilment of such obligations under the garb of industrial development, is not permissible for any welfare State as that would tantamount to uprooting a person and depriving them of their constitutional/human right. 50. That time is of the essence in determination and payment of compensation is also evident from this Court's judgment in Kukreja Construction Co. v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 14 SCC 594 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2547 wherein it has been held that once the compensation has been determined, the same is payable immediately without any requirement of a representation or request by the landowners and a duty is cast on the State to pay such compensation to the land losers, otherwise there would be a breach of Article 300-A of the Constitution. 51. 51. In the present case, the Government of Himachal Pradesh as a welfare State ought to have proactively intervened in the matter with a view to ensure that the requisite amount towards compensation is paid at the earliest. The State cannot abdicate its constitutional and statutory responsibility of payment of compensation by arguing that its role was limited to initiating acquisition proceedings under the MOU signed between the appellant, JAL and itself. We find that the delay in the payment of compensation to the landowners after taking away ownership of the subject land from them is in contravention to the spirit of the constitutional scheme of Article 300-A and the idea of a welfare State. 52. Acquisition of land for public purpose is undertaken under the power of eminent domain of the government much against the wishes of the owners of the land which gets acquired. When such a power is exercised, it is coupled with a bounden duty and obligation on the part of the government body to ensure that the owners whose lands get acquired are paid compensation/awarded amount as declared by the statutory award at the earliest. 53. The State Government, in peculiar circumstances, was expected to make the requisite payment towards compensation to the landowners from its own treasury and should have thereafter proceeded to recover the same from JAL. Instead of making the poor landowners to run after the powerful corporate houses, it should have compelled JAL to make the necessary payment.” (Emphasis in original and supplied) 43. Right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continues to be a human right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. 44. Article 300-A of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. 45. This Court in the aforesaid case of Vidya Devi v. State of H.P., (2020) 2 SCC 569 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 799 observed that in a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. 45. This Court in the aforesaid case of Vidya Devi v. State of H.P., (2020) 2 SCC 569 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 799 observed that in a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. It was further observed that the State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. 46. Recently, this Court in the aforesaid case of Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd. v. Mast Ram, (2025) 1 SCC 798 : (2025) 1 SCC (Civ) 379 : (2025) 253 Comp Cas 1 observed that the Government as a welfare State ought to have proactively intervened in the matter with a view to ensure that the requisite amount towards compensation is paid at the earliest. It was further observed that the State cannot abdicate its constitutional and statutory responsibility of payment of compensation by arguing that its role was limited to initiating acquisition proceedings. It was, therefore, observed that the delay in the payment of compensation, in accordance with law, to the landowners after taking away ownership of the subject land from them is in contravention to the spirit of the constitutional scheme of Article 300-A and the idea of a welfare State. 47. In the aforesaid case of Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd. v. Mast Ram, (2025) 1 SCC 798 : (2025) 1 SCC (Civ) 379 : (2025) 253 Comp Cas 1, this Court further observed that acquisition of land for public purpose is undertaken under the power of eminent domain of the Government much against the wishes of the owners of the land which gets acquired. It was, therefore, observed that when such a power is exercised, it is coupled with a bounden duty and obligation on the part of the government body to ensure that the owners whose lands get acquired are paid compensation/awarded amount as declared by the statutory award at the earliest.” 15. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment further found that there was no delay which could be attributed to the landowners not getting the compensation. But it was on account of lethargic attitude of the officers of the KIADB in that case, as is the present case, that the landowners were deprived of compensation for long years. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment further found that there was no delay which could be attributed to the landowners not getting the compensation. But it was on account of lethargic attitude of the officers of the KIADB in that case, as is the present case, that the landowners were deprived of compensation for long years. Therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the considered view, that it was a fit case that the SLAO to be directed to compute the compensation at the present market value. 16. We have considered the said judgment and we are of the view that the facts of the aforesaid judgment passed by the Supreme Court in Bernard Francis Joseph stated supra are squarely, if not identical, similar to the facts of the present case. Here also without any delay which could be attributed to the landowners, the SLAO had postponed for passing the award till 05.02.2018. This is not the case of the respondent that the petitioners have attributed some delay in passing the award. As the Supreme Court has already held that the right to property is a constitutional recognized right under Article 300A and the person who is deprived of his rights by land acquisition proceedings, is entitled to get just and fair compensation on time and if there is a delay on the part of the authorities to determine and pay the compensation, the landowners would be entitled for the fair compensation. 17. In view thereof, we find that the impugned order is just and fair for awarding the compensation at the market value, prevailing on 05.02.2018 with statutory interests etc. 18. Thus we dismiss these appeals and affirm the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge. However, we make it clear that the present judgment and observations are confined to the facts of the present case.