ORDER Heard learned counsel for the appellants and the learned Special P.P. appearing on behalf of the State. 2. The present appeal has been filed against the order dated 12.12.2018 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ist-cum-Special Judge, Gopalganj in Gopalganj S.C./S.T. P.S.Case No. 16 of 2018 arising out Tr. No. 97 of 2018 of Gopalganj (S.C./S.T.) P.S. Case No. 16 of 2018 whereby and whereunder the learned court below has taken cognizance against the appellants for the offences under Sections 341, 323, 354, 504 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1)(r) (w) of S.C./S.T. Act. 3. The prosecution case in brief is as follows:— 4. On the basis of written statement of informant, the present F.I.R. has been lodged stating therein that on 11.05.2018 his villagers came at about 01:00 P.M. and demolished the house of the informant made of asbestos and took away some asbestos. When the mother of the informant made a protest, she was slapped. It is further alleged that when the informant came to his village and enquired about the matter with the accused persons consequently, the informant was also assaulted by fists and slaps and the accused persons threatened him to kill. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the police, after investigation, filed charge sheet on 28.09.2018 against one person namely Radha Mohan Chauhan (appellant no.1) under sections 447, 341, 323, 354B, 379, 504, 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3(1)(r)(w)(s), 2 IV, VA of the S.C./S.T. Act. He further submits that at the same time, the police submitted final form against other two named accused persons stating that no evidence has been found against the aforesaid two accused persons namely Umesh Chauhan (appellant nos. 2) and co-accused Rama Shankar Giri. 6. It is also submitted on behalf of the appellants that the learned Sessions Judge, Gopalganj differing with the police report, had taken cognizance against all the accused persons including the present appellant, under Sections 341, 323, 354, 504 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 3(1)(r) (w) of S.C./S.T. Act. 7. It is also submitted that the present case has been filed to settle the score and teach a lesson to the appellants because the appellants alongwith other villagers have filed a petition before the Circle Officer, Vijaipur for removal of encroachment made by the informant over plot no. 7. It is also submitted that the present case has been filed to settle the score and teach a lesson to the appellants because the appellants alongwith other villagers have filed a petition before the Circle Officer, Vijaipur for removal of encroachment made by the informant over plot no. 330 which is a road for general public. During the course of investigation, it has come to light that, after measurement being done by the C.O., the C.O., Vijaipur has demolished the encroachment made by the informant. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants has argued that no offence under different sections of Indian Penal Code and S.C./S.T. Act are being made out. The appellants have no role to play in the incident. Since a public road has been encroached by the informant, the Circle Officer, Vijaipur has taken action against the informant. The appellants and other villagers were complainant before the C.O., Vijaipur and only due to this reason they have falsely been implicated in the present case. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that the Court below has failed to consider the fact that the incident as alleged, even if found true, would not constitute an offence under provisions of S.C./S.T. Act. Nothing has been done by the appellants as described in the F.I.R. which can be said to be in a public view. It is also submitted that the informant has also not disclosed his caste name in the F.I.R. Learned counsel though denies the occurrence of the incident however submits even considering the allegations levelled the incident happened at the door of the informant. At that time nobody/no one was present at the place of occurrence. It cannot be said that the incident took place in public view, which is one of the essential ingredient for making out a case under the S.C./S.T. Act. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the investigation by police is also contrary the rules prescribed under Rule 7 of the S.C./S.T. Rules, 1995. Rule 7 describes about investigation officer. An offence committed under the Act shall only be investigated by a police officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police. In the present case, the matter has been investigated by the A.S.I. who neither has to investigate nor was he duly authorized to investigate the present case. 11. Rule 7 describes about investigation officer. An offence committed under the Act shall only be investigated by a police officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police. In the present case, the matter has been investigated by the A.S.I. who neither has to investigate nor was he duly authorized to investigate the present case. 11. It is also argued that there is a delay in filing of the F.I.R. The first occurrence took place on 11.05.2018. Learned counsel argues that an attempt has been made by stating that the FIR was filed only when the informant came to his house, which according to the learned counsel is unconvincing and an afterthought, employed in retaliation to extract vengeance against the appellants owing to the encroachment case wherein the instant appellants were the complainant. 12. Learned counsel for the State and the learned counsel for the informant have opposed the present application and have supported the impugned order by which cognizance has been taken. 13. I have considered the submission of the parties. 14. From the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, it is clear that the police after investigation had submitted final form exonerating two accused persons and had chargesheeted only one accused i.e. the appellant No. 1 (Radha Mohan Chauhan). 15. From the impugned order, it appears that the same is a cryptic and non-speaking order. The Special Judge has not discussed the materials available against the accused persons for summoning them. 16. In the case of M/s JM Laboratories and others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:— “8. In the judgment and order of even date in criminal appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2345 of 2024 titled “INOX Air Products Limited Now Known as INOX Air Products Private Limited and Another vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh”, we have observed thus: “33. It could be seen from the aforesaid order that except recording the submissions of the complainant, no reasons are recorded for issuing the process against the accused persons. 34. In this respect, it will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others, (1998) 5 SCC 749 (supra): “28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. 34. In this respect, it will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others, (1998) 5 SCC 749 (supra): “28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.” 35. This Court has clearly held that summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. It has been held that the order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. This Court held that the Magistrate is required to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence, both oral and documentary in support thereof and as to whether that would be sufficient for proceeding against the accused. It has been held that the Magistrate is not a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning the accused. 36. It has been held that the Magistrate is not a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning the accused. 36. The said law would be consistently following by this Court in a catena of judgments including in the cases of Sunil Bharti Mittal vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (2015) 4 SCC 609 , Mehmood Ul Rehman vs. Khazir Mohammad Tunda and Others (2015) 12 SCC 420 and Krishna Lal Chawla and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another (2021) 5 SCC 435 . 37. Recently, a Bench of this Court to which one of us (Gavai, J.) was a Member, in the case of Lalankumar Singh and Others vs. State of Maharashtra 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1383 (supra), has observed thus: “38. The order of issuance of process is not an empty formality. The Magistrate is required to apply his mind as to whether sufficient ground for proceeding exists in the case or not. The formation of such an opinion is required to be stated in the order itself. The order is liable to be set aside if no reasons are given therein while coming to the conclusion that there is a prima facie case against the accused. No doubt, that the order need not contain detailed reasons. A reference in this respect could be made to the judgment of this Court in the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, which reads thus: “51. On the other hand, Section 204 of the Code deals with the issue of process, if in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding. This section relates to commencement of a criminal proceeding. If the Magistrate taking cognizance of a case (it may be the Magistrate receiving the complaint or to whom it has been transferred under Section 192), upon a consideration of the materials before him (i.e. the complaint, examination of the complainant and his witnesses, if present, or report of inquiry, if any), thinks that there is a prima facie case for proceeding in respect of an offence, he shall issue process against the accused. 52. A wide discretion has been given as to grant or refusal of process and it must be judicially exercised. A person ought not to be dragged into court merely because a complaint has been filed. 52. A wide discretion has been given as to grant or refusal of process and it must be judicially exercised. A person ought not to be dragged into court merely because a complaint has been filed. If a prima facie case has been made out, the Magistrate ought to issue process and it cannot be refused merely because he thinks that it is unlikely to result in a conviction. 53. However, the words “sufficient ground for proceeding” appearing in Section 204 are of immense importance. It is these words which amply suggest that an opinion is to be formed only after due application of mind that there is sufficient basis for proceeding against the said accused and formation of such an opinion is to be stated in the order itself. The order is liable to be set aside if no reason is given therein while coming to the conclusion that there is prima facie case against the accused, though the order need not contain detailed reasons. A fortiori, the order would be bad in law if the reason given turns out to be ex facie incorrect.” 39. A similar view has been taken by this Court in the case of Ashoke Mal Bafna (supra). 40. In the present case, leaving aside there being no reasons in support of the order of the issuance of process, as a matter of fact, it is clear from the order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court, that there was no such order passed at all. The learned Single Judge of the High Court, based on the record, has presumed that there was an order of issuance of process. We find that such an approach is unsustainable in law. The appeal therefore deserves to be allowed.” 9. In the present case also, no reasons even for the namesake have been assigned by the learned Magistrate. The summoning order is totally a non-speaking one. We find that such an approach is unsustainable in law. The appeal therefore deserves to be allowed.” 9. In the present case also, no reasons even for the namesake have been assigned by the learned Magistrate. The summoning order is totally a non-speaking one. We therefore find that in light of the view taken by us in criminal appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2345 of 2024 titled “INOX Air Products Limited Now Known as INOX Air Products Private Limited and Another vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh”, and the legal position as has been laid down by this Court in a catena of judgments including in the cases of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others, Sunil Bharti Mittal vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, Mehmood Ul Rehman vs. Khazir Mohammad Tunda and Others and Krishna Lal Chawla and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, the present appeal deserves to be allowed.” 17. In the present case also, the order taking cognizance and summoning the accused reads as follows:— ^^U;k;ky; izFke vij ftyk ,oa l= U;k;kèkh'k lg&fo'ks"k U;k;kèkh'k] xksikyxatA xksikyxat vuqñ tkfr@tutkfr Fkkuk dkaM lañ 16@18@Vhñvkjñ 97@18 ljdkj cuke jkèkkeksgu pkSgku vkj&gfjtu ,Vªks 90@18 12-12-18 tekurh; ,d ek=k vfHk;qDr jkèkk eksgu pkSgku dh gkftjh nh x;h ,oa mlds rjQ ls lwph ds lkFk dkxtkr nkf[ky fd;k x;kA izkFkfedh vkjksi i= ,oa dsl Mk;jh dk voyksdu fd;k x;kA vkjksi i=] izkFkfedh ds uketn dqy rhu vfHk;qDrksa us nks vfHk;qDr mes'k pkSgku ,oa jkek'kadj fxjh ds fo:) lk{; dh deh dks fn[kkrs gq, vfHk;qDr jkèkk eksgu pkSgku ds fo:) èkkjk 341] 323] 354] 504 Hkkñnañfoñ ,oa 3(1)(r)(w)(s) 2(iv) (VA) SC/ST P.O.A. Act ds vUrxZr lefiZr fd;k x;k gSA dsl Mk;jh esa ntZ xokgksa ds c;ku esa ?kVuk ds lacaèk dks crk;k x;k gS rFkk vfHk;qDr mes'k pkSgku oks jkek'kadj fxjh dh Hkh lafyIr ?kVuk esa izrhr gksrh gS ftlesa izkFkfedh ds uketn lHkh rhu vfHk;qDRkksa ds fo:) vkjksfir èkkjkvksa ds vUrxZr vijkèk ds fy, izFke n`"V;k ekeyk curk gSA vr% izkFkfedh esa uketn lHkh rhu vfHk;qDr 1- jkèkk eksgu pkSgku] 2- mes'k pkSgku] 3- jkek'kadj fxjh ds fo:) èkkjk 341] 323] 354] 504 Hkkñnañfoñ ,oa 3(1)(r)(w)(s) 2(iv) (vA) SC/ST P.O.A. Act ds vUrxZr vijkèk dk laKku fy;k tkrk gSA dk;kZy; vfHk;qDr mes'k pkSgku ,oa jkek'kadj fxjh ds mifLFkfr gsrq lEeu fuxZr djsaA fnukad 23-10-19 dks 2&vfHkqDrksa dh mifLFkfr ,oa lwpd ds iwoZ esa nkf[ky vkosnu ij lquokbZ gsrqA** 18. It is evident that the crucial threshold of “sufficient ground for proceeding” ought to be satisfied which is lacking in the impugned order. I find that no reasons have been assigned in the order taking cognizance and summoning the accused. As such, the impugned order is unsustainable. 19. I also find that no reasons have been assigned in the order taking cognizance and summoning the accused. 20. In view of the discussions above, this application is allowed. 21. The impugned order dated 12.12.2018 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ist -cum- Special Judge, Gopalganj in Gopalganj is hereby quashed. 22. The appellant shall be discharged from the liabilities of bail bonds. 23. Interlocutory application, if any, is also disposed of accordingly.