JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, C.J. 1. Aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Writ Court, the writ petitioner/appellant has filed the instant Letters Patent Appeal. 2. The parties shall be referred to as they were before the learned Writ Court. 3. The writ petitioner had filed the writ petition for the grant of following substantial reliefs:- “…. for issuance of an appropriate Writ(s)/Order(s)/direction(s) commanding upon the Respondents to pay his due salary, amount of D.A. admissible from time to time with penal interest since 06.07.2013 to till today as he has worked as an Assistant Professor of Geology during the above period in St. Columba’s College, Hazaribagh against sanctioned post of the college with other similar Assistant Professors with all consequential benefits. Further prayer is to direct the Vice Chancellor of Vinoba Bhave University, Hazaribagh to approve the appointment of petitioner as an Assistant Professor of Geology in St. Columba’s College, Hazaribagh as similar person like Amit Amar Soren, Assistant Professor of Geography in St. Columba’s College, Hazaribagh, appointment was approved by the Vice Chancellor of Vinoba Bhave University, Hazaribagh vide Memo No. VBU/Estt./154/2012 dated 21.01.2012. …. to quash the letter vide Ref. SCC/1786/20 dated 16.03.2020 issued by the Principal, St. Columba’s College, Hazaribagh, by which the petitioner has been debarred from taking classes of Geology in absence of Notification regarding appointment of petitioner by the University.” 4. It is contended that the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Professor of Geology in St. Columba’s College, Hazaribagh against vacant sanctioned post with effect from 05.07.2013 under the provisions of the agreement between Diocese of the Chotanagpur and the then Ranchi University (now under the Vinoba Bhave University, Hazaribagh) vide order dated 05.07.2013. On the basis of this letter, the petitioner joined as a Assistant Professor of Geology in the said College on 06.07.2013. On the basis of the appointment letter issued by the Diocese of the Chotanagpur, the Principal, St. Columba’s College, Hazaribagh sent the appointment letter to the University for its approval vide letter dated 26.07.2013. 5. In spite of the above letter, the Vice-Chancellor of the University did not grant approval for the appointment of the petitioner as Assistant Professor, although the University had issued notification regarding approval of appointment of one Amit Amar Soren who was also appointed by the Diocese of the Chotanagpur as Assistant Professor in St. Columba’s College, Hazaribagh on 21.01.2012. 6. In spite of the above letter, the Vice-Chancellor of the University did not grant approval for the appointment of the petitioner as Assistant Professor, although the University had issued notification regarding approval of appointment of one Amit Amar Soren who was also appointed by the Diocese of the Chotanagpur as Assistant Professor in St. Columba’s College, Hazaribagh on 21.01.2012. 6. It is further averred that the petitioner was discharging his duties regularly to the entire satisfaction of the Principal but the University did not issue notification regarding approval of appointment of the petitioner as an Assistant Professor which led to the Principal of the College issuing a letter to the petitioner debarring him from taking classes of Geology in absence of the notification constraining the petitioner to approach the learned Writ Court for the reliefs as quoted above. 7. The respondents-University contested the petition by filing a counter affidavit wherein it was averred that there is only one sanctioned post of Teacher in the Department of Geology at St. Columba’s College, Hazaribagh, against which, one Dr. Deepak Kumar had been working and even his appointment had not been approved. 8. The petitioner has filed a rejoinder wherein he has averred that the Director, Higher Education had issued Memo No.1265 dated 29.07.2024 whereby fixation of salary of late Dr. Deepak Kumar had been rejected due to the post of Assistant Professor being not vacant in Geology Department, but when the petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Professor on 05.07.2013, he had been regularly taking the classes of Geology in the College and at that time, the post was vacant. 9. The learned Writ Court held that since the appointment of Assistant Professor in the University is governed by the Jharkhand State Universities Act, 2000 and since there is no approval granted by it, therefore, the writ petitioner was not entitled to any relief. 10. It is vehemently argued by Sri A. Allam, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Pradeep Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, that the findings recorded by the learned Writ Court are perverse, as the Diocese of the Chotanagpur was duly authorized as per the statute to make appointment. 11. On the other hand, Mr. 10. It is vehemently argued by Sri A. Allam, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Pradeep Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, that the findings recorded by the learned Writ Court are perverse, as the Diocese of the Chotanagpur was duly authorized as per the statute to make appointment. 11. On the other hand, Mr. Mithilesh Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-University, has vehemently contended that prior to bifurcation of the State of Bihar and prior to formation of the State of Jharkhand, it was the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976 that was in force and after formation of the State of Jharkhand or reorganization of the State of Bihar, the State Universities Act was adopted vide Notification No.18 dated 13.12.2000 and thereafter, the appointments of Teachers and Officers have essentially to be complied with Section 57 of the Act. 12. It is not in dispute that after the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976, all the appointments in the erstwhile State of Bihar were to be regulated by the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976. However, thereafter, with effect from 13.12.2000, the appointments of Teachers and Officers were required to be made strictly in terms of Section 57 of the Jharkhand State Universities Act, 2000. 13. Section 57 of the Act lays down the procedures as to how Professors as well as Assistant Professors, etc, are to be appointed. It clearly provides that except the appointment of Vice-Chancellor, Pro Vice-Chancellor, Proctor, Dean-Students Welfare, Coordinator, College Development Council and Deans of Faculty, all other appointments and promotions of teaching Staffs and Officers have to be made on the basis of the recommendation made by the Jharkhand Public Service Commission. It is also not in dispute that the Jharkhand Public Service Commission has neither been consulted nor has the name of petitioner been recommended for appointment to the post of Assistant Professor in the College. 14. That apart, records reveal that only one post of Assistant Professor in Geology Department is there in the said College and the said post was not vacant at the time of appointment of the petitioner that was made by the Diocese. 14. That apart, records reveal that only one post of Assistant Professor in Geology Department is there in the said College and the said post was not vacant at the time of appointment of the petitioner that was made by the Diocese. As regards the authority of the Diocese, no doubt, the petitioner has placed for our perusal an extract of the Ranchi University Code, whereby, in Clause 6 of Chapter XIV of Statute, it has been provided as follows – “(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the aforesaid sub-clauses of this article but always subject in the terms of agreement signed between the Diocese of the Chotanagpur and University of Ranchi on the 3 rd December, 1963 in respect of St. Columba’s College, Hazaribagh. (i) The Principal and a certain number of teachers, which shall not be in excess of one-third of the total number of teachers employed in the College in each class will be appointed by the Diocese from amongst persons in (i) holy orders, or (ii) belonging to a Christian Religious order, subject, firstly, to the persons selected for appointment possessing the necessary academic and other qualifications prescribed by the Statutes of the University for the post and secondly the approval of the appointment in each case by the Vice-Chancellor of the University. (Emphasis supplied) 15. However, as already observed above, once the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976 had come into operation, the terms of the “statutes”, unless incorporated in the Act, would be redundant as would be no longer enforceable. 16. That apart, as per the own allegation of the petitioner, his appointment as Assistant Professor has been made on 06.07.2013, by which time the Jharkhand State Universities Act, 2000 had already come into operation and as observed above, the appointment after the coming into force of the aforesaid Act could only be made strictly in accordance with Section 57 of the Act. 17. Even if it is assumed for a moment that there was some kind of Statute operative at one of time, in this case upto 1970, and the same is considered to be prevailing even as on the date, even then, the Statute will have to give way to an Act. 18. In every legal system, there is a hierarchy of norms as noted by eminent jurist Kelsen in his “Pure Theory of Law”. 19. 18. In every legal system, there is a hierarchy of norms as noted by eminent jurist Kelsen in his “Pure Theory of Law”. 19. In the Indian Legal System, this “hierarchy” is as follows– (i) The Constitution. (ii) Statutory laws which may either be made by the Parliament or the State Legislature. (iii) Delegated legislation, which may be either in the form of Rules, Regulations or Statutes made under the Act. (iv) Executive instructions or government orders. 20. In the above hierarchy, if there is a conflict between the higher layer or the lower layer, the higher layer will prevail. The Statutes in the instant case are the part of the third layer in a hierarchy, whereas, the Act, i.e. the Jharkhand State Universities Act, 2000, is the part of the second layer and hence, the Act will prevail over the statute. 21. As regards the plea of parity with one Amit Amar Soren as Assistant Professor in the Department of Geography, suffice it to state that what the petitioner is urging is a plea of negative parity which cannot be claimed and enforced in a court of law as it was only a right that can be enforced in a court of law. 22. In this context, it would be apposite to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Odisha and Another v. Anup Kumar Senapati and Another, (2019) 19 SCC 626 , wherein it has been held as under:- “39. It was lastly submitted that concerning other persons, the orders have been passed by the Tribunal, which was affirmed by the High Court and grants-in-aid have been released under the 1994 Order as such on the ground of parity this Court should not interfere. No doubt, there had been a divergence of opinion on the aforesaid issue. Be that as it may. In our opinion, there is no concept of negative equality under Article 14 of the Constitution. In case the person has a right, he has to be treated equally, but where right is not available a person cannot claim rights to be treated equally as the right does not exist, negative equality when the right does not exist, cannot be claimed. 40. In Basawaraj v. LAO [Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14 SCC 81 ] , it was held thus : (SCC p. 85, para 8) “8. 40. In Basawaraj v. LAO [Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14 SCC 81 ] , it was held thus : (SCC p. 85, para 8) “8. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases. The said provision does not envisage negative equality but has only a positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some relief/benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does not confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as well. If a wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated. Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing a similarly wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise, Article 14 cannot be stretched too far for otherwise it would make functioning of administration impossible. (Vide Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh [Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh, (1995) 1 SCC 745 ] , Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana [Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2005) 9 SCC 164 ] , K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. [K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P., (2006) 3 SCC 581 ] and Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab [Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2010) 11 SCC 455 ] .)” 41. In Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab [Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab, (2014) 15 SCC 715 : (2015) 3 SCC (L&S) 678] , it was observed as under : (SCC pp. 720-21, para 16) “16. More so, it is also settled legal proposition that Article 14 does not envisage for negative equality. In case a wrong benefit has been conferred upon someone inadvertently or otherwise, it may not be a ground to grant similar relief to others. 720-21, para 16) “16. More so, it is also settled legal proposition that Article 14 does not envisage for negative equality. In case a wrong benefit has been conferred upon someone inadvertently or otherwise, it may not be a ground to grant similar relief to others. This Court in Basawaraj v. LAO [Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14 SCC 81 ] considered this issue and held as under: (SCC p. 85, para 8) ‘8. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases. The said provision does not envisage negative equality but has only a positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some relief/benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does not confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as well. If a wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated. Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing a similarly wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise, Article 14 cannot be stretched too far for otherwise it would make functioning of administration impossible. (Vide Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh [Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh, (1995) 1 SCC 745 ] , Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana [Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2005) 9 SCC 164 ] , K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. [K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P., (2006) 3 SCC 581 ] and Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab [Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2010) 11 SCC 455 ] .)’ ” 42. In Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab [Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2010) 11 SCC 455 ] , it was observed thus : (SCC p. 462, para 11) “11. In Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab [Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2010) 11 SCC 455 ] , it was observed thus : (SCC p. 462, para 11) “11. The respondent cannot claim parity with D.S. Longia v. State of Punjab [D.S. Longia v. State of Punjab, 1992 SCC OnLine P&H 1027 : AIR 1993 P&H 54] , in view of the settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not envisage negative equality. Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud. Article 14 of the Constitution has a positive concept. Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing a wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim the benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise Article 14 cannot be stretched too far otherwise it would make function of the administration impossible. (Vide Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd. v. Union of India [Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd. v. Union of India, 1984 Supp SCC 457 : 1984 SCC (Tax) 225] , Panchi Devi v. State of Rajasthan [Panchi Devi v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 2 SCC 589 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 408] and Shanti Sports Club v. Union of India [Shanti Sports Club v. Union of India, (2009) 15 SCC 705 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 707] .)” 43. In Doiwala Sehkari Shram Samvida Samiti Ltd. v. State of Uttaranchal [Doiwala Sehkari Shram Samvida Samiti Ltd. v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 11 SCC 641 ] , this Court in the context of negative equality observed thus : (SCC pp. 655-56, para 28) “28. This Court in Union of India v. International Trading Co. [Union of India v. International Trading Co., (2003) 5 SCC 437 ] has held that two wrongs do not make one right. The appellant cannot claim that since something wrong has been done in another case, directions should be given for doing another wrong. 655-56, para 28) “28. This Court in Union of India v. International Trading Co. [Union of India v. International Trading Co., (2003) 5 SCC 437 ] has held that two wrongs do not make one right. The appellant cannot claim that since something wrong has been done in another case, directions should be given for doing another wrong. It would not be setting a wrong right but could be perpetuating another wrong and in such matters, there is no discrimination involved. The concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article 14 cannot be pressed into service in such cases. But the concept of equal treatment presupposes existence of similar legal foothold. It does not countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring wrongs on a par. The affected parties have to establish strength of their case on some other basis and not by claiming negative quality. In view of the law laid down by this Court in the above matter, the submission of the appellant has no force. In case, some of the persons have been granted permits wrongly, the appellant cannot claim the benefit of the wrong done by the Government.” 44. In Bondu Ramaswamy v. BDA [Bondu Ramaswamy v. BDA, (2010) 7 SCC 129 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 1] , this Court observed thus : (SCC p. 194, para 146) “146. If the rules/scheme/policy provides for deletion of certain categories of land and if the petitioner falls under those categories, he will be entitled to relief. But if under the rules or scheme or policy for deletion, his land is not eligible for deletion, his land cannot be deleted merely on the ground that some other land similarly situated had been deleted (even though that land also did not fall under any category eligible to be deleted), as that would amount to enforcing negative equality. But where large extents of land of others are indiscriminately and arbitrarily deleted, then the court may grant relief, if on account of such deletions, the development scheme for that area has become inexecutable or has resulted in abandonment of the scheme.” 45. But where large extents of land of others are indiscriminately and arbitrarily deleted, then the court may grant relief, if on account of such deletions, the development scheme for that area has become inexecutable or has resulted in abandonment of the scheme.” 45. In Kulwinder Pal Singh v. State of Punjab [Kulwinder Pal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2016) 6 SCC 532 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 102] , this Court while relying upon State of U.P. v. Rajkumar Sharma [State of U.P. v. Rajkumar Sharma, (2006) 3 SCC 330 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 565] , observed as under : (Kulwinder Pal Singh case [Kulwinder Pal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2016) 6 SCC 532 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 102] , SCC pp. 539-40, para 16) “16. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that when the other candidates were appointed in the post against dereserved category, the same benefit should also be extended to the appellants. Article 14 of the Constitution of India is not to perpetuate illegality and it does not envisage negative equalities. In State of U.P. v. Rajkumar Sharma [State of U.P. v. Rajkumar Sharma, (2006) 3 SCC 330 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 565] it was held as under : (SCC p. 337, para 15) ‘15. Even if in some cases appointments have been made by mistake or wrongly, that does not confer any right on another person. Article 14 of the Constitution does not envisage negative equality, and if the State committed the mistake it cannot be forced to perpetuate the same mistake. Even if in some cases appointments have been made by mistake or wrongly, that does not confer any right on another person. Article 14 of the Constitution does not envisage negative equality, and if the State committed the mistake it cannot be forced to perpetuate the same mistake. (See Sneh Prabha v. State of U.P. [Sneh Prabha v. State of U.P., (1996) 7 SCC 426 ] ; Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain [Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain, (1997) 1 SCC 35 ] ; State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann [State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann, (1997) 3 SCC 321 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 801] ; Faridabad CT Scan Centre v. D.G. Health Services [Faridabad CT Scan Centre v. D.G. Health Services, (1997) 7 SCC 752 ] ; Jalandhar Improvement Trust v. Sampuran Singh [Jalandhar Improvement Trust v. Sampuran Singh, (1999) 3 SCC 494 ] ; State of Punjab v. Rajeev Sarwal [State of Punjab v. Rajeev Sarwal, (1999) 9 SCC 240 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1171] ; Yogesh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Yogesh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 3 SCC 548 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 346] ; Union of India v. International Trading Co. [Union of India v. International Trading Co., (2003) 5 SCC 437 ] and Kastha Niwarak Grahnirman Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit v. Indore Development Authority [Kastha Niwarak Grahnirman Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit v. Indore Development Authority, (2006) 2 SCC 604 ] .)” Merely because some persons have been granted benefit illegally or by mistake, it does not confer right upon the appellants to claim equality.” 46. In Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corpn. v. Subhash Sindhi Coop. Housing Society [Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corpn. v. Subhash Sindhi Coop. Housing Society, (2013) 5 SCC 427 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 121] , this Court held as under : (SCC p. 436, para 19) “19. Even if the lands of other similarly situated persons have been released, the Society must satisfy the Court that it is similarly situated in all respects, and has an independent right to get the land released. Article 14 of the Constitution does not envisage negative equality, and it cannot be used to perpetuate any illegality. Even if the lands of other similarly situated persons have been released, the Society must satisfy the Court that it is similarly situated in all respects, and has an independent right to get the land released. Article 14 of the Constitution does not envisage negative equality, and it cannot be used to perpetuate any illegality. The doctrine of discrimination based upon the existence of an enforceable right, and Article 14 would hence apply, only when invidious discrimination is meted out to equals, similarly circumstanced without any rational basis, or to relationship that would warrant such discrimination. [Vide Sneh Prabha v. State of U.P. [Sneh Prabha v. State of U.P., (1996) 7 SCC 426 ] , Yogesh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Yogesh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 3 SCC 548 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 346] , State of W.B. v. Debasish Mukherjee [State of W.B. v. Debasish Mukherjee, (2011) 14 SCC 187 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 869] and Priya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh [Priya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 7 SCC 433 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 367] .]” 47. In Arup Das v. State of Assam [Arup Das v. State of Assam, (2012) 5 SCC 559 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 24], this Court observed as under : (SCC pp. 564-65, para 19) “19. In a recent decision rendered by this Court in State of U.P. v. Rajkumar Sharma [State of U.P. v. Rajkumar Sharma, (2006) 3 SCC 330 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 565] , this Court once again had to consider the question of filling up of vacancies over and above the number of vacancies advertised. Referring to the various decisions rendered on this issue, this Court held that filling up of vacancies over and above the number of vacancies advertised would be violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and that selectees could not claim appointments as a matter of right. It was reiterated that mere inclusion of candidates in the select list does not confer any right to be selected, even if some of the vacancies remained unfilled. It was reiterated that mere inclusion of candidates in the select list does not confer any right to be selected, even if some of the vacancies remained unfilled. This Court went on to observe further that even if in some cases appointments had been made by mistake or wrongly, that did not confer any right of appointment to another person, as Article 14 of the Constitution does not envisage negative equality and if the State had committed a mistake, it cannot be forced to perpetuate the said mistake.” 48. In State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty [State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 83] , it was observed : (SCC p. 458, para 56) “56. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality and it does not envisage negative equality. Thus, even if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such order does not confer any legal right on the petitioner to get the same relief. [Vide Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh [Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh, (1995) 1 SCC 745 ] , Yogesh Kumar v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi) [Yogesh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 3 SCC 548 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 346] , Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana [Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2005) 9 SCC 164 ] , K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. [K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P., (2006) 3 SCC 581 ] , Krishan Bhatt v. State of J&K [Krishan Bhatt v. State of J&K, (2008) 9 SCC 24 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 783] , State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh [State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh, (2009) 5 SCC 65 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 1019] and Union of India v. Kartick Chandra Mondal [Union of India v. Kartick Chandra Mondal, (2010) 2 SCC 422 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 385] .]” 23. In view of the aforesaid discussions and the reasons stated above, we find no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.