JUDGMENT : DEVASHIS BARUAH, J. Heard Mr. BK Singh, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Food Corporation of India. Mr. B Pathak, the learned counsel appears on behalf of the Workmen. 2. Each of the parties i.e. the Food Corporation of India (for short, the FCI) as well as the Workmen have filed respective writ petitions assailing the impugned Award dated 09.12.2019 passed in Reference Case No.1/2018. 3. FCI is the writ petitioner in WP(C)No.2429/2020 whereby the Award dated 09.12.2019 passed in Reference Case No.1/2018 is assailed on the ground that the FCI was directed to pay the bonus to the Workmen involved in the Reference proceedings w.e.f. the year 2003 as per the applicable rates till the date of the Award and with a further direction that the payment of the bonus shall also continue thereafter till such date, the concerned workers are in employment of the Management. 4. The Workmen are the writ petitioners in WP(C)No.2092/2021 and they are aggrieved by the Award dated 09.12.2019 passed in Reference Case No.1/2018 on the ground that their case for regularization of their employment was rejected by the learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Guwahati vide the impugned Award. 5. Before proceeding to adjudicate upon the respective issues raised in both the writ petitions, this Court finds it relevant to take note of the material facts which led to the filing of both the writ petitions. 6. It is the case of the Workmen, who are the petitioners in WP(C)No.2092/2021 that they have been rendering services in the establishment of the FCI on regular basis as casual workers. In the Claim Statement so filed by the Workmen, the details are provided at paragraph No.3(e) of the Claim Petition. The chart so provided in the said paragraph is reproduced hereinunder: Petitioners No. Date of Birth Date of Joining 1. Sri Jogen Boro 12.11.1964 April, 1983 2. Sri Babui Das 1.1.1967 November, 1984 3. Sri Sukuram Rabha 1.5.1970 April, 1984 4. Sri Ganga Sahani 6.5.1964 December, 1982 5. Sri Prabin Borua 16.6.1968 June, 1983 6. Sri Haricharan Boro 20.2.1972 November, 1984 7. From the above-quoted chart, it is seen that all the six Workmen were engaged by the FCI sometime in the year 1982 to 1984. Sri Babui Das 1.1.1967 November, 1984 3. Sri Sukuram Rabha 1.5.1970 April, 1984 4. Sri Ganga Sahani 6.5.1964 December, 1982 5. Sri Prabin Borua 16.6.1968 June, 1983 6. Sri Haricharan Boro 20.2.1972 November, 1984 7. From the above-quoted chart, it is seen that all the six Workmen were engaged by the FCI sometime in the year 1982 to 1984. The materials on record further reveal that the FCI took steps for regularization of its casual employees and in that regard had issued a Circular dated 06.05.1987, wherein it was mentioned that those casual/daily rated workers who have completed 3(three) months period on 02.05.1986 and fulfilled the conditions prescribed for any entry level Category-III and IV would be regularized. 8. It is the case of the Workmen that though large numbers of casual workers were regularized, but many of them were also left out including the Workmen, though they were qualified to be regularized. Subsequent thereto, another Circular was issued bearing Circular No.38/1996 dated 09.09.1996 wherein also the FCI took a decision to regularize all casual/daily rated employees who had continuously worked for more than 3(three) months on the cut-off date i.e. 02.05.1986 and fulfilled the conditions prescribed in the E.P. Section confidential letter No.EP.1(4)/85-Vol II, dated 06.05.1987. It was also mentioned in the said Circular that casual/ daily rated employees engaged on or after 02.05.1986 should be retrenched summarily by paying them retrenchment compensation. 9. It is also very pertinent to take note of another very relevant aspect as it appears from paragraph No.3 of the Circular dated 09.09.1996, which stipulates that many casual/ daily rated workers are still continuing and the officers of the FCI continued to engage casual/ daily rated workers without specific approval of the Headquarters in spite of engagement of the permanent workers. 10. The record reveals that the services of the Workmen along with three others were terminated with effect from 09.02.1993. This resulted in an Industrial Dispute, and under such circumstances, the Appropriate Government made a Reference in terms with Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1947’) to the learned Industrial Tribunal, Guwahati. On the basis of the said Reference made to the learned Industrial Tribunal, Guwahati, a case being Reference Case No. 1(C)/1994 was registered. 11. On the basis of the said Reference made to the learned Industrial Tribunal, Guwahati, a case being Reference Case No. 1(C)/1994 was registered. 11. In the said proceedings, the stand which was taken by the FCI, were that these nine Workmen, which included the Workmen of the present proceedings would not be entitled to any protection under Section 25F of the Act of 1947, as they were not in continuous service in the Industry. 12. The learned Industrial Tribunal passed an Award on 24.04.1995, holding inter alia that the Workmen in the said proceedings were entitled to the benefit under Section 25F of the Act of 1947 and as steps were not taken in accordance with Section 25F of the Act of 1947, the termination of those Workmen were held to be invalid. 13. Be that as it may, a very important aspect which touches on the present proceedings was discussed and opined in the Award dated 24.04.1995. It was categorically opined that though the Management alleged that the Workmen have worked for 19 days in each month and they were paid their wages at the end of the month, but from exhibits Ka, Kha, Ga, Gha and Ungo which were bonus registered showed payment of bonus every year to these Workmen against their wages for 19 days in a month. It is further opined that counting the period of 240 days come only when a Workman is not in continuous service, within the meaning of Clause (1) of Section 25B of the Act of 1947 for a period of one year. It was also opined that counting of 240 days for a period of one year is relevant, if the employment does not exceed one year, but when the employment exceeds one year, counting of 240 days in a year is redundant. 14. A challenge to the impugned Award dated 24.04.1995 in Reference Case No.1(C)/1994 was made before this Court, by the FCI in a writ petition which was registered and numbered as Civil Rule No.4274/1996. The learned Coordinate Bench vide an Judgment and Order dated 03.04.2001 upheld the Award dated 24.04.1995 passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, Guwahati in Reference Case 1(C)/1994. The present set of Workmen were parties to the said writ proceedings. 15. The learned Coordinate Bench vide an Judgment and Order dated 03.04.2001 upheld the Award dated 24.04.1995 passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, Guwahati in Reference Case 1(C)/1994. The present set of Workmen were parties to the said writ proceedings. 15. The FCI dissatisfied with the judgment passed by the learned Coordinate Bench dated 03.04.2001 in Civil Rule No.4274/1996 preferred a Writ Appeal which was registered and numbered as WA No.446/2001 and the learned Division Bench of this Court by the order dated 23.09.2002 dismissed the same. The order dated 23.09.2002 being relevant for the purpose of disposal of the instant proceedings is reproduced hereinunder: “By the impugned order dated 9.2.93 the Food Corporation of India has retrenched the services of 9 casual workmen of Food Storage Depot, Tangla and one workman Hari Charan Boro, Food Storage Depot, Bindukuri with effect from 16.2.93. These workmen raised an industrial dispute and the matter was referred by the Central Government for adjudication of the dispute by the Industrial Tribunal, Guwahati, Assam. After the relevant papers have been submitted before the Industrial Tribunal, the Industrial Tribunal has held that the termination of the workmen was not in compliance with the provisions of Section 25(F) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 and directed reinstatement of the workmen with 50% back wages. Aggrieved by the said order a writ petition was filed in this High Court. The learned Single Judge by order dated 03.04.2001 passed in Civil Rule No. 4274/96 has upheld the order dated 24.4.95 passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Guwahati in Reference No. 1(C) of 1994. Hence this appeal before us. It has found as a fact by the Industrial Tribunal that the retrenched workmen were working in the company for more than 10 years. The only submission made before us by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the Industrial Tribunal should have seen that the workmen who have been retrenched had worked with the company for more than 240 days during the period of twelve calendar months preceding the date of termination order is made and in the absence of such finding their termination cannot be said to a termination within the meaning of Section 2(OO) of the Industrial Dispute Act has no application. The submission made by the counsel is devoid of any substance. The submission made by the counsel is devoid of any substance. The period of work of 240 days shall be taken into consideration in case of a workman, who has worked with the company for less than a period of one year. It is for the purposes of calculation of a year's service, 240 days are to be taken into consideration where the workman is in employment of the company for less than a year. This provision has no application if the workman is working continuously with the company for more than a year. We do not find any illegality or infirmity either in the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal or by the learned Single Judge of this Court. In the result the appeal is dismissed.” 16. It is seen that pursuant thereto, the FCI approached the Supreme Court of India by filing a Special Leave to Appeal which was registered and numbered as Special Leave to Appeal(C) No.5559/2003. The Supreme Court vide an order dated 14.07.2003 dismissed the said Special Leave petition. 17. The record further reveals that the Workmen in the present writ petition continued to render services and were engaged as casual employees. It is the further case of the Workmen that instead of regularizing the services of the Workmen, who have been engaged as casual employees, the FCI took steps for filling up the vacancies by way of a special recruitment. It is under such circumstances, the Workmen along with the Food Corporation of India Workers’ Union joined together and filed the writ petition before this Court which was registered and numbered as WP(C)No.1390/2005. In the said writ petition, the Workmen sought for a direction for regularization of their services in terms with the policy adopted by the Food Corporation of India. 18. The said writ petition which was registered and numbered as WP(C)No.1390/2005 was disposed of by the judgment and order dated 18.07.2007, whereby the learned Coordinate Bench of this Court observed that it would not be justified in directing the regularization of the services of the Workmen, without being posted on the position prevailing in the FCI as on the date of the said judgment inasmuch as the Circular on the basis of which the Workmen claimed regularization was dated 06.05.1987 which was two decades old. The learned Coordinate Bench had also observed that taking into account the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and others Vs. Umadevi and others reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 , the Court would not be competent to pass orders for regularization of the services of the Workmen and such orders would be clearly contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court. However, it was also observed that the non-entertainment of the writ petition should not be understood to mean that this Court had given a finding that the Workmen were not at all entitled to have their services regularized, if otherwise, they can establish their right for such regularization as envisaged under the Industrial Law and liberty was granted to the Workmen to take recourse to such measures as may be available to them under the law for that purpose. 19. The record reveals that the Ministry of Labour, Government of India, New Delhi vide an order No. L-22011/23/2017-IR(CM-II) dated 11.12.2017 made a Reference to the learned Industrial Tribunal. The questions referred in the Schedule to the communication reads as under: "1. Regularization of 3 workmen out of 10 petitioners is an unfair labour practice sec. 2(ra) & Fifth schedule of the industrial disputes Act, 1947 and also violation of basic Article 16 of the Constitution. If not, the reason thereof. 2. The 6 petitioners in the instant case are deprived of the benefit of regularization. They should be regularized with retrospective effect from the date the others 3 workmen were done so, if not, then the relief to be accorded to the petitioners in the instant case. 3. Non-payment of bonus above statutory bonus which the workmen had been getting from 1982 till 2003, should they not get their customary benefits which they had been getting. If no, reason thereof." 20. Pursuant to the Reference so made, the proceedings were registered as Reference Case No.1/2018. The record reveals that the Workmen submitted their Statement of Claim and the FCI also submitted their Statement of Defence. On behalf of the Workmen, six witnesses were examined, who were also cross examined by the FCI. However, on behalf of the FCI, there was no evidence adduced. 21. The record reveals that the Workmen submitted their Statement of Claim and the FCI also submitted their Statement of Defence. On behalf of the Workmen, six witnesses were examined, who were also cross examined by the FCI. However, on behalf of the FCI, there was no evidence adduced. 21. The learned Tribunal vide the Award dated 09.12.2019 held that the Workmen were entitled to bonus under the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 (for short, ‘the Act of 1965’) w.e.f the year 2003. However on the question of regularization, the same was turned down by the learned Labour Court, resultantly the present two petitions, one by the FCI challenging the direction for payment of bonus w.e.f. the year 2003 and the other by the Workmen challenging the rejection of their claim to regularization. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE LEARNED COUNSELS FOR THE PARTIES: 22. Mr. B Pathak, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Workmen submitted that the learned Labour Court, while deciding the issue pertaining to regularization had failed to take into consideration the Award passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal dated 24.04.1995, in Reference Case 1(C)/1994, wherein there are categorical observations that the Workmen have been under employment for a period of more than 3(three) years as on 02.05.1986 as well as there are also categorical observations that the Workmen concerned were rendering continuous service for the last 10(ten) years. The learned counsel further submitted that these findings have attained finality in view of the Award dated 24.04.1995 having been upheld right up to the Supreme Court. The learned counsel further submitted that at paragraph No.3(e) of the Statement of Claim various details have been given as to from when the workmen had joined their services and were rendering their continuous service as casual employee. Further referring to the written statement filed by the FCI, the learned counsel submitted that there is no any denial to the said aspect, rather it was vaguely denied that the Workmen have been working continuously without any break in service and they were engaged on regular basis. Under such circumstances, the learned Industrial Tribunal ought not to have rejected the claim for regularization on the basis that there were no specific material to show that the Workmen were rendering their service prior to 02.05.1986. 23. Under such circumstances, the learned Industrial Tribunal ought not to have rejected the claim for regularization on the basis that there were no specific material to show that the Workmen were rendering their service prior to 02.05.1986. 23. The learned counsel further submitted that a perusal of the Circulars dated 06.05.1986 as well as 09.09.1996 would categorically show that there was an attempt made by the FCI for the purpose of regularization of all casual employees, who have rendered 3(three) months continuous service prior to 02.05.1986. The learned counsel further submitted that the FCI for reasons best known did not consider the case of the Workmen, though the Workmen were eligible to be regularized as far back in the year 1986. In that regard, the learned counsel referred to the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dharam Singh and Others Vs. State of U.P. and another reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 1735 , wherein the Supreme Court issued various directions in Paragraph No. 19 of the said judgment. The learned counsel submitted that the facts involved in the present case are similar, taking into account that the FCI had continued to take the services of the Workmen for the last three decades and have not regularized their services. 24. The learned counsel further submitted that similar observations have also been made by the Supreme Court in the cases of Vinod Kumar and Others Vs. Union of India and others reported in (2024) 9 SCC 327 , Jaggo Vs. Union of India reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826 as well as Shripal & Another Vs. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 221. 25. The learned counsel also submitted that though the Supreme Court in the case of Uma Devi (supra) issued directions that a Court cannot issue a writ for regularization of an employee, but the said directions would not, however, apply to an adjudication made by an Industrial Tribunal in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Durgapur Casual Workers Union & Ors. Vs. Food Corporation of India & Ors . reported in (2015) 5 SCC 786 . Vs. Food Corporation of India & Ors . reported in (2015) 5 SCC 786 . Adding further the learned counsel further submitted the reason behind is that the aspect pertaining to unfair labour practices can be very well gone into by the Industrial Tribunal and one of the questions so referred by the Central Government in the Reference was as to whether not regularizing the Workmen in the present proceedings constituted an unfair labour practice, when three other Workmen were regularised who were similarly situated. 26. The learned counsel submitted that though a writ petition has been filed by the FCI challenging the directions of payment of bonus, but taking into account the definition of ‘employee ’ contained in Section 2(13) of the Act of 1965, the directions passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal in the impugned Award do not require any interference. 27. Mr. BK Singh, the learned counsel, who represents the FCI submitted that the materials on record, and more particularly the findings in the Award dated 24.04.1995 in Reference Case No.1(C)/1994 show that till 2003, the FCI authorities paid bonus. However, as the Workmen in question did not render continuous service of 240 days in a year, the Workmen are not entitled to bonus. 28. Mr. BK Singh, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the FCI submitted that there is no infirmity in the impugned Award dated 24.04.1995 in holding that there were no materials placed that the Workmen had worked prior to 25.02.1986 and had the requisite qualification to be entitled for regularisation in terms with the Circular dated 02.05.1986 as well as 09.09.1996. The learned counsel further submitted that the workmen had earlier approached this Court seeking directions upon the FCI that the Workmen should be regularized. The learned Coordinate Bench of this Court vide the judgment and order dated 18.07.2007 in WP(C)No.1390/2005, rejected such a plea. This rejection was in the year 2007 and, thereupon, the Reference was made in the year 2017 by the Government of India. Under such circumstances, the Reference so made was a stale Reference inasmuch as, there was no industrial dispute in existence. This rejection was in the year 2007 and, thereupon, the Reference was made in the year 2017 by the Government of India. Under such circumstances, the Reference so made was a stale Reference inasmuch as, there was no industrial dispute in existence. The learned counsel further submitted that the delay in making the Reference, that too, in the year 2017 have also caused great prejudice to the FCI for the purpose of adducing evidence inasmuch as, the witnesses at that relevant point of time were no longer available. 29. Mr. B Pathak, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Workmen countering the afore-noted arguments made by the learned counsel for the FCI, however, submitted that the authorities in the FCI, pursuant to the judgment and order passed by the learned Coordinate Bench dated 18.07.2007 in WP(C)No.1390/2005 had recommended the names of the petitioners for regularization, however, the FCI did not agree to the same resulting in a conciliation proceedings in the year 2015 and when the conciliation proceedings have failed, the Reference was made by the Central Government on 11.12.2017. The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the industrial dispute is still alive. ANALYSIS & DETERMINATION: 30. Upon perusal of the materials on record and taking into account the submissions so made by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties, two points arises for consideration: (i). Whether the impugned Award dated 09.12.2019 passed in Reference Case No.1/2018 thereby directing the FCI to pay to the Workmen the bonus w.e.f. the year 2003 as per the applicable rates till the date of the Award, as well as to pay future bonus till the Workmen are in employment calls for any interference? (ii). Whether the impugned Award dated 09.12.2019 passed in Reference Case No.1/2018 thereby rejecting the claim of the Workmen for regularization calls for any interference? FIRST POINT FOR CONSIDERATION: 30. This Court has duly taken note of the materials on record, including the Statement of Claim and the written statement filed by the parties before the learned Industrial Tribunal in Reference Case No.1/2018. In the claim petition filed by the Workmen, it was categorically mentioned that the Workmen were earlier paid bonus since 1982 which was stopped/withdrawn with effect from 24.09.2003. The FCI, however, have not denied the said claim made in the Statement of Claim by the Workmen. In the claim petition filed by the Workmen, it was categorically mentioned that the Workmen were earlier paid bonus since 1982 which was stopped/withdrawn with effect from 24.09.2003. The FCI, however, have not denied the said claim made in the Statement of Claim by the Workmen. What was emphasized by the FCI in their written statement is that the Workmen were not in continuous service at least for a period of 20 days in a month or for 240 days in a year, which clearly differentiates the Workmen from the status of regularly working Workmen in continuous service without any break. 31. The question, therefore, arises is as to whether the Workmen having not 240 days of employment in a year can be deprived off the benefits under the Act of 1965? 32. A perusal of the Act of 1965 reveals that the said Act was enacted to provide for payment of bonus to persons employed in certain establishments on the basis of profits or on the basis of production or productivity, and for matters connected therewith. Which are the establishments which would be covered, have been mentioned in Section 1(3) of the Act of 1965. It is relevant to observe that the FCI have not taken a plea that it is exempted in terms with the proviso to Section 1(3) of the Act of 1965. 33. This Court further finds it relevant to take note of the definition of ‘employee’ as defined in Section 2 (13) of the Act of 1965, which being relevant for the purpose of adjudication of the present dispute is reproduced hereinunder: 2(13). “employee” means any person (other than an apprentice) employed on a salary or wage not exceeding [twenty-one thousand rupees] per mensem in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, managerial, administrative, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied”. 34. A perusal of the above-quoted definition would show that ‘employee’ means any person other than an apprentice employed on a salary or wage not exceeding Rs.21,000/- per mensem in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, managerial, administrative, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied. 34. A perusal of the above-quoted definition would show that ‘employee’ means any person other than an apprentice employed on a salary or wage not exceeding Rs.21,000/- per mensem in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, managerial, administrative, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied. It is further relevant to take note of that the amount mentioned of Rs.21,000/- per mensem came into existence w.e.f. 01.04.2014 and prior to that the amount was Rs.10,000/- per mensem. Neither there are any pleadings on behalf of the FCI nor anything has been placed before the learned Industrial Tribunal or before this Court that the present Workmen do not come within the ambit of the definition of ‘employee’ as defined in Section 2(13) of the Act of 1965. 35. Section 8 of the Act of 1965 stipulates the eligibility for bonus. The said section being relevant is reproduced hereinunder: “8. Eligibility for bonus.—Every employee shall be entitled to be paid by his employer in an accounting year, bonus, in accordance with the provisions of this Act, provided he has worked in the establishment for not less than thirty working days in that year.” 34. A perusal of the above-quoted section would reveal that every employee shall be entitled to be paid by his/her employer in any accounting year bonus in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1965, provided he had worked in the establishment for not less than 30 working days in that year. 35. It being an admitted case of the FCI that the Workmen had rendered service every month of the year for 19 days, it is, therefore, the opinion of this Court that the Workmen are entitled to bonus in terms with Section 8 of the Act of 1965. 36. Considering the above, it is, therefore, the opinion of this Court that the learned Industrial Tribunal was justified in awarding that the Workmen are entitled to bonus with effect from 2003 onwards at the appropriate rates and would be further entitled to bonus till the Workmen continues to render service in the Management. This answers the first point for consideration. SECOND POINT FOR CONSIDERATION 36. The second point for consideration is as to whether the learned Industrial Tribunal was justified in rejecting the claim for regularization of the Workmen. This answers the first point for consideration. SECOND POINT FOR CONSIDERATION 36. The second point for consideration is as to whether the learned Industrial Tribunal was justified in rejecting the claim for regularization of the Workmen. In the previous segments of the instant judgment, this Court had provided the details as stated in the Statement of Claim, as to when the Workmen joined their services and have been rendering service as casual employees. There is no specific denial to the said aspect, rather it is the case of the FCI that these Workmen have not rendered continuous service for a period of 240 days. It is very pertinent to take note of that this very issue was raised by the FCI in Reference Case No.1(C)/1994 and the learned Industrial Tribunal vide the Award dated 24.04.1995 categorically opined that the said requirement of having worked for 240 days would be only applicable in respect to a workman who has worked with the company for less than a period of one year. It was also opined that the said aspect would, however, not be applicable where the workman is in employment of the company continuously for more than a year. These observations so passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal in the Award dated 24.04.1995 in a dispute between the FCI and the Workmen of the present case had attained finality, taking into account that not only the learned Coordinate Bench, the learned Division Bench, but also the Supreme Court had upheld the said observations. Under such circumstances, the plea so taken by the FCI that as the Workmen did not render continuous service for 240 days and, as such, disentitle the Workmen is misconceived. 37. The records further reveal that in the Award dated 24.04.1995, the learned Industrial Tribunal had categorically observed that the Workmen in the said Reference proceedings which included the Workmen of the present proceedings as on 02.05.1986 had not only rendered three months, but more than three years. It was also opined that the Workmen have rendered 10 years of continuous service. Additionally, it was also opined that to terminate those Workmen was in clear violation to the Circular dated 02.05.1986. It was also opined that the Workmen have rendered 10 years of continuous service. Additionally, it was also opined that to terminate those Workmen was in clear violation to the Circular dated 02.05.1986. At the cost of repetition, this Court finds it apposite to observe that this Circular dated 02.05.1986 is a Circular by which the FCI took a decision to regularize those casual/daily rated workers, who have rendered three months continuous service prior to 02.05.1986. These findings of facts so arrived at have attained finality. 38. It is very surprising to take note of that the learned Industrial Tribunal while addressing the issue pertaining to regularization simply rejected the claim by stating that the Workmen have not produced materials that they have been in service prior to 02.05.1986 and had the requisite qualifications. Furthermore, it is not the stand of the FCI at any stage that the Workmen did not have the requisite qualifications. 39. The appreciation, therefore, by the learned Industrial Tribunal appears to be contrary to the records and suffers from perversity. Taking into account that the learned Industrial Tribunal did not decide the issue pertaining to regularization in accordance with law and the said dispute as regards the claim of the Workmen have been pending since more than a decade, it is the opinion of this Court that now relegating the matter back to the learned Industrial Tribunal would not be in the interest of justice. Accordingly, this Court, therefore, takes up the issue as to whether the Workmen are entitled to regularization. 40. Before discussing and analyzing the facts of the present case, this Court finds it pertinent to take note of as to why the Reference was made to the learned Industrial Tribunal. The Central Government, inter alia, while making the Reference raised the question as to whether the FCI was justified in not regularizing the 6(six) Workmen out of 9(nine) Workmen, thereby violating Article 16 of the Constitution which resulted in unfair labour practice. It is seen that the learned Industrial Tribunal did not touch on this aspect at all, while rejecting the claim for regularization. 41. The concept of unfair trade practice and more particularly, in the context of the Act of 1947 was dealt with by the Supreme Court in the case of Siemens Ltd. and Anr. Vs. Siemens Employees Union and Anr. , reported in (2011)9 SCC 775 . 41. The concept of unfair trade practice and more particularly, in the context of the Act of 1947 was dealt with by the Supreme Court in the case of Siemens Ltd. and Anr. Vs. Siemens Employees Union and Anr. , reported in (2011)9 SCC 775 . The Supreme Court observed that the very concept of unfair trade practice must have some element of arbitrariness and unreasonableness which upon being proved would bring about a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was further observed by the Supreme Court that it is for the complainant who alleges unfair trade practice to allege victimization. Paragraph Nos.18 to 21 of the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow: “18. Before proceeding further in this matter, this Court proposes to examine the concept of unfair labour practice and the way it has been dealt with under the Maharashtra Act and also under the ID Act. Any unfair labour practice within its very concept must have some elements of arbitrariness and unreasonableness and if unfair labour practice is established the same would bring about a violation of guarantee under Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore, it is axiomatic that anyone who alleges unfair labour practice must plead it specifically and such allegations must be established properly before any forum can pronounce on the same. It is also to be kept in mind that in the changed economic scenario, the concept of unfair labour practice is also required to be understood in the changed context. Today every State, which has to don the mantle of a welfare State, must keep in mind that twin objectives of industrial peace and economic justice and the courts and statutory bodies while deciding what unfair labour practice is must also be cognizant of the aforesaid twin objects. 19. Unfair labour practice, for the first time, was defined and codified in the Maharashtra Act referred to hereinabove. But insofar as the Industrial Disputes Act, Central law, is concerned, unfair labour practice was codified and brought into force by the amending Act 46 of 1982 with effect from 21-8-1984. 20. Clause (ra) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act defines unfair labour practice to mean the practices specified in the Fifth Schedule and the Fifth Schedule was also inserted by the said amending Act. The Fifth Schedule has two parts. 20. Clause (ra) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act defines unfair labour practice to mean the practices specified in the Fifth Schedule and the Fifth Schedule was also inserted by the said amending Act. The Fifth Schedule has two parts. The first part refers to unfair labour practices on the part of the employers and trade unions of employers and the second part refers to unfair labour practices on the part of the workmen and trade union of workmen. However, there is some difference between the provisions relating to unfair labour practices in the Maharashtra Act and those in the Central Act i.e. the Industrial Disputes Act. The Industrial Disputes Act prohibits an employer or workman or a trade union from committing any unfair labour practice while the Maharashtra Act prohibits an employer or union or an employee from engaging in any unfair labour practice. The prohibition under the Industrial Disputes Act is aimed at preventing the commission of an unfair labour practice while the Maharashtra Act mandates that the parties concerned cannot be engaged in any unfair labour practice. The word “engage” is more comprehensive in nature as compared to the word “commit” (see Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Ashok Vishnu Kate2 SCC at p. 345, para 37 of the Report). 21. In the instant case no allegation of victimisation has been made by the respondent Union in its complaint. In the absence of any allegation of victimisation it is rather difficult to find out a case of unfair labour practice against the management in the context of the allegations in the complaint. It is nobody’s case that the management is punishing any workman in any manner. It may be also mentioned here that no workman of the appellant Company has made any complaint either to the management or to the Union that the management is indulging in any act of unfair labour practice. Even then the Labour Court, Thane, has come to certain findings of unfair labour practice against the management and which have been referred to above.” 42. In the instant case, the very question referred by the Central Government to the learned Industrial Tribunal is that out of the 9(nine) Workmen only 3(three) Workmen were regularised, whereas the remaining 6(six) Workmen were not regularised. In the instant case, the very question referred by the Central Government to the learned Industrial Tribunal is that out of the 9(nine) Workmen only 3(three) Workmen were regularised, whereas the remaining 6(six) Workmen were not regularised. A perusal of the Claim Petition would show that specific instances of discrimination against the Workmen have been alleged, whereby the Workmen inspite of being eligible were not regularised, whereas various other casual workers were regularised. In fact, the Workmen were retrenched and after the interference made to the decision of retrenchment of the Workmen in the Reference Case No.1/1994, three out of the nine Workmen were regularised leaving behind the six Workmen, who are the petitioners in WP(C)No.2092/2021. The FCI, on the other hand, rather than responding to the allegations of unfair labour practices, victimization and unequal treatment, took the stand that the Workmen were not in continuous service, which aspect had already attained finality qua the Workmen of the present proceedings as already discussed hereinabove. 43. This Court had also perused the records wherein the Workmen have adduced evidence in support of the allegation of unfair labour practice, victimization as well as unequal treatment. The cross examination of the witnesses by the FCI were again limited to the aspect that the Workmen were not in continuous service. At the cost of repetition, the said aspect had already attained finality qua the Workmen in the present proceedings that the Workmen were in continuous service. 44. The above analysis, therefore, shows that not only the Workmen have alleged unfair labour practice, but also proved the same. No pleadings or evidence has been adduced by the FCI to differentiate the Workmen from those casual Workmen, who were regularised. Under such circumstances, it is the opinion of this Court that a case of unfair labour practice had been made against the FCI. 45. At this stage, this Court finds it relevant to take note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Uma Devi (supra), whereby the Supreme Court in unequivocal terms expressed that the Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot direct regularization. 46. 45. At this stage, this Court finds it relevant to take note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Uma Devi (supra), whereby the Supreme Court in unequivocal terms expressed that the Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot direct regularization. 46. It is relevant at this stage to take note of another subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in Durgapur Casual Workers Union (supra) wherein the Supreme Court dealt with the effect of the judgment rendered in the case of Uma Devi (supra) in a case coming within the ambit of unfair labour practice. This Court finds it relevant to reproduce some of the paragraphs of the said judgment which would reflect the position of law. Paragraph Nos.12, 13, 14, 20 and 21 are reproduced hereinunder: “12. The industrial establishment or undertaking as defined in the Act not only includes the State public undertakings, the subsidiary companies set up by the principal undertaking and autonomous bodies owned or controlled by the State Government or the Central Government but also the private industries and undertakings. The Industrial Disputes Act is applicable to all the industries as defined under the Act, whether the government undertaking or private industry. If any unfair labour practice is committed by any industrial establishment, whether the government undertaking or private undertaking, pursuant to reference made by the appropriate Government the Labour Court/Tribunal will decide the question of unfair labour practice. 13. In the matter of appointment in the services of the “State”, including a public establishment or undertaking, Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India are attracted. However, Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India are not attracted in the matter of appointment in a private establishment or undertaking. 14. An undertaking of the Government, which comes within the meaning of industry or its establishment, cannot justify its illegal action including unfair labour practice nor can ask for different treatment on the ground that public undertaking is guided by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and the private industries are not guided by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 20. The effect of the Constitution Bench decision in Umadevi in case of unfair labour practice was considered by this Court in Maharashtra SRTC v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana. 20. The effect of the Constitution Bench decision in Umadevi in case of unfair labour practice was considered by this Court in Maharashtra SRTC v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana. In the said case, this Court held that Umadevi case has not overridden powers of the Industrial and Labour Courts in passing appropriate order, once unfair labour practice on the part of the employer is established. This Court observed and held as follows : (Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana case, SCC pp. 573-74 & 579, paras 34-36 & 47) 34. It is true that Dharwad District PWD Literate Daily Wages Employees’ Assn. v. State of Karnataka, arising out of industrial adjudication has been considered in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi and that decision has been held to be not laying down the correct law but a careful and complete reading of the decision in Umadevi leaves no manner of doubt that what this Court was concerned with in Umadevi was the exercise of power by the High Courts under Article 226 and this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India in the matters of public employment where the employees have been engaged as contractual, temporary or casual workers not based on proper selection as recognised by the rules or procedure and yet orders of their regularisation and conferring them status of permanency have been passed. 35. Umadevi is an authoritative pronouncement for the proposition that the Supreme Court (Article 32) and the High Courts (Article 226) should not issue directions of absorption, regularisation or permanent continuance of temporary, contractual, casual, daily wage or ad hoc employees unless the recruitment itself was made regularly in terms of the constitutional scheme. 36. Umadevi does not denude the Industrial and Labour Courts of their statutory power under Section 30 read with Section 32 of the MRTU and PULP Act to order permanency of the workers who have been victims of unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under Item 6 of Schedule IV where the posts on which they have been working exist. Umadevi cannot be held to have overridden the powers of the Industrial and Labour Courts in passing appropriate order under Section 30 of the MRTU and PULP Act, once unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under Item 6 of Schedule IV is established. 47. Umadevi cannot be held to have overridden the powers of the Industrial and Labour Courts in passing appropriate order under Section 30 of the MRTU and PULP Act, once unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under Item 6 of Schedule IV is established. 47. It was strenuously urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the Corporation that the Industrial Court having found that the Corporation indulged in unfair labour practice in employing the complainants as casuals on piece-rate basis, the only direction that could have been given to the Corporation was to cease and desist from indulging in such unfair labour practice and no direction of according permanency to these employees could have been given. We are afraid, the argument ignores and overlooks the specific power given to the Industrial/Labour Court under Section 30(1)(b) to take affirmative action against the erring employer which as noticed above is of wide amplitude and comprehends within its fold a direction to the employer to accord permanency to the employees affected by such unfair labour practice.” 21. Almost a similar issue relating to unfair trade practice by employer and the effect of decision of Umadevi in the grant of relief was considered by this Court in Ajaypal Singh v. Haryana Warehousing Corpn. decided on 9-7-2014. In the said case, this Court observed and held as follows: “20. The provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and the powers of the Industrial and Labour Courts provided therein were not at all under consideration in Umadevi case. The issue pertaining to unfair labour practice was neither the subject-matter for decision nor was it decided in Umadevi case. 21. We have noticed that the Industrial Disputes Act is made for settlement of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes as mentioned therein. It prohibits unfair labour practice on the part of the employer in engaging employees as casual or temporary employees for a long period without giving them the status and privileges of permanent employees. 22. Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 stipulates conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. A workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer is entitled to benefit under the said provision if the employer retrenches the workman. 22. Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 stipulates conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. A workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer is entitled to benefit under the said provision if the employer retrenches the workman. Such a workman cannot be retrenched until he/she is given one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice apart from compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months. It also mandates the employer to serve a notice in the prescribed manner on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette. If any part of the provisions of Section 25-F is violated and the employer thereby, resorts to unfair trade practice with the object to deprive the workman with the privilege as provided under the Act, the employer cannot justify such an action by taking a plea that the initial appointment of the employee was in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 23. Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act relates to re-employment of retrenched workmen. Retrenched workmen shall be given preference over other persons if the employee proposes to employ any person. 24. We have held that the provisions of Section 25-H are in conformity with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, though the aforesaid provisions (Articles 14 and 16) are not attracted in the matter of re-employment of retrenched workmen in private industrial establishments and undertakings. Without giving any specific reason to that effect at the time of retrenchment, it is not open to the employer of a public industrial establishment and undertaking to take a plea that initial appointment of such workman was made in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India or the workman was a back door appointee. 25. Without giving any specific reason to that effect at the time of retrenchment, it is not open to the employer of a public industrial establishment and undertaking to take a plea that initial appointment of such workman was made in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India or the workman was a back door appointee. 25. It is always open to the employer to issue an order of ‘retrenchment’ on the ground that the initial appointment of the workman was not in conformity with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India or in accordance with the rules. Even for retrenchment on such ground, unfair labour practice cannot be resorted to and thereby workman cannot be retrenched on such ground without notice, pay and other benefits in terms of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, if continued for more than 240 days in a calendar year. 26. However, in other cases, when no such plea is taken by the employer in the order of retrenchment that the workman was appointed in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India or in violation of any statutory rule or his appointment was a back door appointment, while granting relief, the employer cannot take a plea that initial appointment was in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, in absence of a reference made by the appropriate Government for determination of the question whether the initial appointment of the workman was in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India or statutory rules. Only if such reference is made, a workman is required to lead evidence to prove that he was appointed by the following the procedure prescribed under the Rules and his initial appointment was legal.” 47. In the backdrop of the afore-stated projection of law, this Court is of the opinion that as a case of unfair trade practice had been made out qua the Workmen, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Uma Devi (supra) would not come in the way of granting the relief of regularization to which the Workmen are entitled to. 48. 48. This Court finds it relevant to take note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dharam Singh (supra) wherein the Supreme Court was dealing with a question as to whether the employees therein, who were rendering service as Class IV employees between 1989 and 1992 and their services have been continued from time to time should be regularized or not? The Supreme Court referring to the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Uma Devi (supra) categorically observed that the said judgment of the Constitution Bench was not to non-suit the Appellants therein inasmuch as what was challenged in the said proceedings is not to bypass the constitutional scheme of public employment, but rather was a challenge to the State's arbitrary refusal to sanction post despite the employer's own acknowledgment of needs and decades of continuous reliance on the very workforce. This Court finds it relevant to take note of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Dharam Singh (supra), more particularly, at paragraph No. 11, wherein the Supreme Court referring to various earlier pronouncements in the case of Jaggo (supra), Shripal (supra) observed as hereinunder: “11. Furthermore, it must be clarified that the reliance placed by the High Court on Umadevi (Supra) to non- suit the appellants is misplaced. Unlike Umadevi (Supra), the challenge before us is not an invitation to bypass the constitutional scheme of public employment. It is a challenge to the State’s arbitrary refusals to sanction posts despite the employer’s own acknowledgement of need and decades of continuous reliance on the very workforce. On the other hand, Umadevi (Supra) draws a distinction between illegal appointments and irregular engagements and does not endorse the perpetuation of precarious employment where the work itself is permanent and the State has failed, for years, to put its house in order. Recent decisions of this Court in Jaggo v. Union of India and in Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad have emphatically cautioned that Umadevi (Supra) cannot be deployed as a shield to justify exploitation through long- term “ad hocism”, the use of outsourcing as a proxy, or the denial of basic parity where identical duties are exacted over extended periods. The principles articulated therein apply with full force to the present case. The relevant paras from Shripal (supra) have been reproduced hereinunder: “14. The principles articulated therein apply with full force to the present case. The relevant paras from Shripal (supra) have been reproduced hereinunder: “14. The Respondent Employer places reliance on Umadevi (supra) to contend that daily-wage or temporary employees cannot claim permanent absorption in the absence of statutory rules providing such absorption. However, as frequently reiterated, Uma Devi itself distinguishes between appointments that are “illegal” and those that are “irregular,” the latter being eligible for regularization if they meet certain conditions. More importantly, Uma Devi cannot serve as a shield to justify exploitative engagements persisting for years without the Employer undertaking legitimate recruitment. Given the record which shows no true contractor-based arrangement and a consistent need for permanent horticultural staff the alleged asserted ban on fresh recruitment, though real, cannot justify indefinite daily-wage status or continued unfair practices. 15. It is manifest that the Appellant Workmen continuously rendered their services over several years, sometimes spanning more than a decade. Even if certain muster rolls were not produced in full, the Employer's failure to furnish such records- despite directions to do so-allows an adverse inference under well-established labour jurisprudence. Indian labour law strongly disfavors perpetual daily-wage or contractual engagements in circumstances where the work is permanent in nature. Morally and legally, workers who fulfil ongoing municipal requirements year after year cannot be dismissed summarily as dispensable, particularly in the absence of a genuine contractor agreement. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to recall the broader critique of indefinite “temporary” employment practices as done by a recent judgment of this court in Jaggo v. Union of India in the following paragraphs: “22. The pervasive misuse of temporary employment contracts, as exemplified in this case, reflects a broader systemic issue that adversely affects workers' rights and job security. In the private sector, the rise of the gig economy has led to an increase in precarious employment arrangements, often characterized by lack of benefits, job security, and fair treatment. Such practices have been criticized for exploiting workers and undermining labour standards. Government institutions, entrusted with upholding the principles of fairness and justice, bear an even greater responsibility to avoid such exploitative employment practices. When public sector entities engage in misuse of temporary contracts, it not only mirrors the detrimental trends observed in the gig economy but also sets a concerning precedent that can erode public trust in governmental operations. 25. Government institutions, entrusted with upholding the principles of fairness and justice, bear an even greater responsibility to avoid such exploitative employment practices. When public sector entities engage in misuse of temporary contracts, it not only mirrors the detrimental trends observed in the gig economy but also sets a concerning precedent that can erode public trust in governmental operations. 25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary employees, particularly in government institutions, often face multifaceted forms of exploitation. While the foundational purpose of temporary contracts may have been to address short-term or seasonal needs, they have increasingly become a mechanism to evade long-term obligations owed to employees. These practices manifest in several ways: • Misuse of “Temporary” Labels: Employees engaged for work that is essential, recurring, and integral to the functioning of an institution are often labelled as “temporary” or “contractual,” even when their roles mirror those of regular employees. Such misclassification deprives workers of the dignity, security, and benefits that regular employees are entitled to, despite performing identical tasks. • Arbitrary Termination: Temporary employees are frequently dismissed without cause or notice, as seen in the present case. This practice undermines the principles of natural justice and subjects workers to a state of constant insecurity, regardless of the quality or duration of their service. • Lack of Career Progression: Temporary employees often find themselves excluded from opportunities for skill development, promotions, or incremental pay raises. They remain stagnant in their roles, creating a systemic disparity between them and their regular counterparts, despite their contributions being equally significant. • Using Outsourcing as a Shield: Institutions increasingly resort to outsourcing roles performed by temporary employees, effectively replacing one set of exploited workers with another. This practice not only perpetuates exploitation but also demonstrates a deliberate effort to bypass the obligation to offer regular employment. • Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits: Temporary employees are often denied fundamental benefits such as pension, provident fund, health insurance, and paid leave, even when their tenure spans decades. This lack of social security subjects them and their families to undue hardship, especially in cases of illness, retirement, or unforeseen circumstances.” 49. Taking into account the above proposition, this Court also finds it relevant to rely upon the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Dharam Singh (supra), more particularly, paragraph Nos. This lack of social security subjects them and their families to undue hardship, especially in cases of illness, retirement, or unforeseen circumstances.” 49. Taking into account the above proposition, this Court also finds it relevant to rely upon the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Dharam Singh (supra), more particularly, paragraph Nos. 18, 19 and 20, inasmuch as, the said observation in the opinion of this Court can be applied for issuing the appropriate directions in the present case. The paragraph Nos. 18, 19 and 20 of Dharam Singh (supra) are reproduced hereinunder: “18. Moreover, it must necessarily be noted that “ad-hocism” thrives where administration is opaque. The State Departments must keep and produce accurate establishment registers, muster rolls and outsourcing arrangements, and they must explain, with evidence, why they prefer precarious engagement over sanctioned posts where the work is perennial. If “constraint” is invoked, the record should show what alternatives were considered, why similarly placed workers were treated differently, and how the chosen course aligns with Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Sensitivity to the human consequences of prolonged insecurity is not sentimentality. It is a constitutional discipline that should inform every decision affecting those who keep public offices running. 19. Having regard to the long, undisputed service of the appellants, the admitted perennial nature of their duties, and the material indicating vacancies and comparator regularisations, we issue the following directions: i. Regularization and creation of Supernumerary posts : All appellants shall stand regularized with effect from 24.04.2002, the date on which the High Court directed a fresh recommendation by the Commission and a fresh decision by the State on sanctioning posts for the appellants. For this purpose, the State and the successor establishment (U.P. Education Services Selection Commission) shall create supernumerary posts in the corresponding cadres, Class-III (Driver or equivalent) and Class-IV (Peon/Attendant/Guard or equivalent) without any caveats or preconditions. On regularization, each appellant shall be placed at not less than the minimum of the regular pay-scale for the post, with protection of last-drawn wages, if higher and the appellants shall be entitled to the subsequent increments in the pay scale as per the pay grade. For seniority and promotion, service shall count from the date of regularization as given above. ii. For seniority and promotion, service shall count from the date of regularization as given above. ii. Financial consequences and arrears : Each appellant shall be paid as arrears the full difference between (a) the pay and admissible allowances at the minimum of the regular pay-level for the post from time to time, and (b) the amounts actually paid, for the period from 24.04.2002 until the date of regularization /retirement/death, as the case may be. Amounts already paid under previous interim directions shall be so adjusted. The net arrears shall be released within three months and if in default, the unpaid amount shall carry compound interest at 6% per annum from the date of default until payment. iii. Retired appellants : Any appellant who has already retired shall be granted regularization with effect from 24.04.2002 until the date of superannuation for pay fixation, arrears under clause (ii), and recalculation of pension, gratuity and other terminal dues. The revised pension and terminal dues shall be paid within three months of this Judgment. iv. Deceased appellants : In the case of Appellant No. 5 and any other appellant who has died during pendency, his/her legal representatives on record shall be paid the arrears under clause (ii) up to the date of death, together with all terminal/retiral dues recalculated consistently with clause (i), within three months of this Judgment. v. Compliance affidavit : The Principal Secretary, Higher Education Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh, or the Secretary of the U.P. Education Services Selection Commission or the prevalent competent authority, shall file an affidavit of compliance before this Court within four months of this Judgment. 20. We have framed these directions comprehensively because, case after case, orders of this Court in such matters have been met with fresh technicalities, rolling “reconsiderations,” and administrative drift which further prolongs the insecurity for those who have already laboured for years on daily wages. Therefore, we have learned that Justice in such cases cannot rest on simpliciter directions, but it demands imposition of clear duties, fixed timelines, and verifiable compliance. As a constitutional employer, the State is held to a higher standard and therefore it must organise its perennial workers on a sanctioned footing, create a budget for lawful engagement, and implement judicial directions in letter and spirit. As a constitutional employer, the State is held to a higher standard and therefore it must organise its perennial workers on a sanctioned footing, create a budget for lawful engagement, and implement judicial directions in letter and spirit. Delay to follow these obligations is not mere negligence but rather it is a conscious method of denial that erodes livelihoods and dignity for these workers. The operative scheme we have set here comprising of creation of supernumerary posts, full regularization, subsequent financial benefits, and a sworn affidavit of compliance, is therefore a pathway designed to convert rights into outcomes and to reaffirm that fairness in engagement and transparency in administration are not matters of grace, but obligations under Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.” 50. It is the opinion of this Court that the directions so passed by the Supreme Court at paragraph No.19 as quoted above can be applied for granting due reliefs to the Workmen in the present case. 51. Before passing the appropriate directions, this Court would deal with another submissions made by Mr. B.K Singh, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the FCI during the course of dictating the judgment. The learned counsel submitted that after the judgment passed by the learned Coordinate Bench dated 18.07.2007 in WP(C)No.3790/2005, the Reference was made only on 11.12.2017 and it was a delayed Reference and, as such, even if directions are issued for regularization, this Court may consider to limit the pecuniary benefits. 52. This Court had given an anxious consideration to the said submissions. The record reveals that the learned Coordinate Bench vide the judgment and order dated 18.07.2007 in WP(C)No.3790/2005 gave liberty to the Workmen to pursue their grievances for regularization as per the Industrial Laws. The Workmen thereupon continued to press for their demands for regularization. The FCI authorities have recommended their names, but the FCI authorities at the Headquarter refused to regularise the Workmen. It is also apparent from the records that the conciliation proceedings failed in the year 2015 and in the year 2017, the Reference was made. It is the opinion of this Court that the Industrial Dispute though was a live dispute, however, only on 11.12.2017, the Central Government made the Reference to the learned Industrial Tribunal. It is also apparent from the records that the conciliation proceedings failed in the year 2015 and in the year 2017, the Reference was made. It is the opinion of this Court that the Industrial Dispute though was a live dispute, however, only on 11.12.2017, the Central Government made the Reference to the learned Industrial Tribunal. Under such circumstances, it is the opinion of this Court that while issuing directions for regularization of the workmen, the pecuniary benefits is required to be limited at least from 11.12.2017 as the dispute was under adjudication. 53. Accordingly, both the writ petitions, therefore, stand disposed of with the following observations and directions: (i). WP(C)No.2429/2020 filed by the FCI challenging the Award dated 09.12.2019 in Reference Case No.1/2018, in so far as directions issued for payment of bonus to the Workmen is dismissed. FCI is directed to comply with the Award dated 09.12.2014 as regards payment of bonus to the Workmen within 60(sixty) days from the date of a certified copy of the instant judgment is served upon the petitioner in WP(C)No.2429/2020. (ii). The FCI is directed to regularize the services of the Workmen i.e. the petitioners in WP(C) No.2092/2021 with effect from 11.12.2017 i.e. the date on which the Central Government made the Reference to the learned Industrial Tribunal. (iii). Upon regularization, each of the Workmen shall be placed at not less than the minimum of the regular pay scale for the posts with protection of the last drawn wages, if higher and the Workmen shall be entitled to subsequent increment in the pay scale as per the pay grade. Further to that, for seniority and promotion, the service shall count from date of regularization as mentioned hereinabove. (iv). This Court further clarifies that taking into account the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Dharam Singh (supra) at paragraph No.19.iii, as petitioner Nos.1 and 4 in WP(C) No.2092/2021 have already retired, they shall be granted regularization with effect from 11.12.2017, until the date of superannuation for pay fixation, arrears, and calculation of pension, gratuity and other terminal dues. (v). (v). This Court further, for the sake of clarity observes and directs that any payment made during the period w.e.f. 11.12.2017, while engaging the Workmen/petitioners in WP(C) No.2092/2021 as casual workers shall be set off, while making payment of the pecuniary benefits by the FCI in consequence to the directions passed hereinabove. (vi). The said exercise as mentioned in Clauses (ii) to (v) hereinabove be complied within 60(sixty) days from the date, a certified copy of the instant judgment is served upon the Executive Director (NEF Zone) FCI i.e. the respondent No.1 in WP(C)No.2092/2021. (vii). The Registry shall return the records to the learned Tribunal. (viii). No costs.