JUDGMENT : PARTHIVJYOTISAIKIA, J. Heard Mr. S. A. Ahmed, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. A. Hussain, the learned counsel representing the respondent no. 2. 2. This is an application under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code whereby the judgment and order dated 23.02.2024 passed by the learned Sessions Judge (FTC), Barpeta in Criminal Appeal No. 12/2023 affirming the judgment dated 05.04.2023 passed by the learned SDJM, Barpeta in NI Case No. 84/2021 is put to challenge. 3. The cheque in question was issued on 21.04.2021. The same was presented to the bank on 23.04.2021. The bank informed on 26.04.2021 about dishonour of the cheque. The complainant sent a legal notice to the drawer of the cheque on 06.05.2021 i.e. after 10 (ten) days of dishonour of the cheque. The notice was received by the drawer on 27.05.2021. The complainant filed the complaint case on 16.06.2021. 4. The present petitioner has claimed that the cause of action for the case arose on 23.04.2021, on which date the bank informed the complainant about dishonour of the cheque. According to the petitioner, the complaint petition was filed after 19 (nineteen) days from 27.05.2021. 5. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels of both sides. 6. At this stage, I shall rely upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that was delivered in Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Shah , (2008) 13 SCC 689 . Paragraphs 12, 14, 19 and 21 of the said judgment are quoted as under: “ 12. Before embarking on the questions raised, we may notice that the proviso appended to Section 138 of the Act limits the applicability of the main provision stating: “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc. Paragraphs 12, 14, 19 and 21 of the said judgment are quoted as under: “ 12. Before embarking on the questions raised, we may notice that the proviso appended to Section 138 of the Act limits the applicability of the main provision stating: “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc. of funds in the account.— Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless— (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.” Section 142 of the Act also puts a limitation on the power of the court to take cognizance of the offences, which reads as under: “142. Cognizance of offences.—Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),— (a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque; (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138: Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period. (c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class shall try any offence punishable under Section 138.” 14. (c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class shall try any offence punishable under Section 138.” 14. A complaint petition alleging commission of an offence under Section 138 of the Act must demonstrate that the following ingredients exist i.e.: (a) a cheque was issued; (b) the same was presented; (c) but, it was dishonoured; (d) a notice in terms of the said provision was served on the person sought to be made liable; and (e) despite service of notice, neither any payment was made nor other obligations, if any, were complied with within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice. [See S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla [ (2007) 4 SCC 70 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 192] , Saroj Kumar Poddar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [ (2007) 3 SCC 693 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 135] and DCM Financial Services Ltd. v. J.N. Sareen [ (2008) 8 SCC 1 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 401 : (2008) 8 Scale 54 ] .] 19. A complaint petition in view of clause (b) of Section 142 of the Act was required to be filed within one month from the date on which the cause of action arose in terms of clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act which stipulates that: “138. (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.” 21. In Jindal Steel and Power Ltd. v. Ashoka Alloy Steel Ltd. [ (2006) 9 SCC 340 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 540] this Court held: (SCC p. 341, para 2) “2. By the impugned order, the High Court has quashed the prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short “the Act”) and Section 420 of the Penal Code, on the sole ground that the complaint was filed two days after the expiry of limitation. In the present case, notice was sent under Section 138 of the Act on 4-1-1997, which was served on the accused on 10-1-1997, giving him 15 days' time for making payment, which expired on 25-1-1997. In the present case, notice was sent under Section 138 of the Act on 4-1-1997, which was served on the accused on 10-1-1997, giving him 15 days' time for making payment, which expired on 25-1-1997. Cause of action to file the complaint accrued on 26-1-1997, which day has to be excluded in computing the period of limitation, as required under Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, the limitation would be counted from 27-1-1997 and the complaint was filed on 26-2-1997, within a period of one month from that date, as such, the same was filed well within time. We find that the point is concluded by a judgment of this Court in Saketh India Ltd. v. India Securities Ltd. [ (1999) 3 SCC 1 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 329] in which case taking into consideration the provisions of Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, it was laid down that the day on which cause of action had accrued has to be excluded for reckoning the period of limitation for filing a complaint under Section 138 of the Act. In the present case, after excluding the day when cause of action accrued, the complaint was filed well within time; as such the High Court was not justified in holding that there was two days' delay in filing the complaint. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in quashing prosecution of the respondents.” 7. Coming back to the case in hand, the notice upon the drawer was served on 27.05.2021. Therefore, cause of action for the case arose on 28.05.2021. This day has to be excluded in computing the period of limitation, as required under Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, the limitation would be counted from 28.05.2021. The complaint was filed on 16.06.2021, within a period of 1 (one) month. 8. Under the aforesaid premised reasons, this revision petition is found to be devoid of merit. 9. The criminal revision petition is dismissed and disposed of accordingly.