Research › Search › Judgment

Jharkhand High Court · body

2025 DIGILAW 1969 (JHR)

Syed Tarique Alam s/o `“ Syed Mahmood v. State of Jharkhand

2025-10-06

ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY

body2025
JUDGMENT : ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY, J. 1. Heard the parties. 2. Though the opposite party No.2 is appearing through the Advocate but no one turns up on behalf of the opposite party No.2 in spite of repeated calls. 3. This Criminal Miscellaneous Petition has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with the prayer to quash the order dated 13.05.2024 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Hazaribagh in Criminal Revision No.20 of 2024 whereby and where under the learned Sessions Judge, Hazaribagh has dismissed the criminal revision which was filed challenging the order dated 04.03.2025 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Hazaribagh in connection with Katkamsandi (Pelawal) P.S. Case No. 65 of 2016 whereby and where under the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Hazaribagh has rejected the application filed under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on behalf of the petitioner and also to quash the order dated 04.03.2024 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Hazaribagh and further to quash the order dated 08.07.2024 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Hazaribagh whereby and where under charge has been framed against the petitioner for having committed the offence punishable under Section 341 , 322, 504, 506, 420, 467, 471, 120B of the INDIAN PENAL CODE . 4. The allegation against the petitioner is that the petitioner in criminal conspiracy with the co-accused persons has got a power of attorney executed by the son of the informant and the informant claims his son as a mentally weak and sick person and also made him sign the sale deed executed and the co-accused persons along with the petitioner abused the informant when the informant desisted the petitioner from selling the informant’s land. The petitioner filed a petition of discharge under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Vide order dated 04.03.2024, the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Hazaribagh rejected the same and subsequently vide order dated 08.07.2024, has framed charges inter alia against the petitioner for having committed the offence punishable under Section 323, 341, 504, 506, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B of the INDIAN PENAL CODE . 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the allegation against the petitioner is false. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the allegation against the petitioner is false. It is next submitted that even though the entire allegations made against the petitioner are considered to be true in their entirety, still none of the offences in respect of which the charge has been framed against the petitioner is made out. 6. Relying upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Mahendra Singh & Another vs. The State of Jharkhand & Another passed in Cr. M.P. No. 1308 of 2022 dated 28.11.2023, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in that case, this Court relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Vinod Natesan vs. State of Kerala , (2019) 2 SCC 401 , Para-11 of which reads as under:- “11. Insofar as the submissions made on behalf of the appellant- party in person that initially the learned Judge dismissed the application and, thereafter when the judgment was dictated and pronounced, the learned Judge has allowed the application and, therefore, the impugned judgment [Tomy Mathew v. State of Kerala, 2016 SCC OnLine Ker 33330] and order passed by High Court is required to be quashed and set aside is concerned, the aforesaid has no substance. What is produced as P-45 is the docket of the file, which does not bear the signature of the learned Judge. Therefore, it cannot be said that initially the learned Judge dismissed the petition and, thereafter, when the judgment was pronounced the order was changed and the application was allowed. Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, we are more than satisfied that there was no criminality on part of the accused and a civil dispute is tried to be converted into a criminal dispute. Thus to continue the criminal proceedings against the accused would be an abuse of the process of law. Therefore, the High Court has rightly exercised the powers under Section 482 CrPC and has rightly quashed the criminal proceedings. Thus to continue the criminal proceedings against the accused would be an abuse of the process of law. Therefore, the High Court has rightly exercised the powers under Section 482 CrPC and has rightly quashed the criminal proceedings. In view of the aforesaid and for the reasons stated above, the present appeal fails and deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.” Wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the facts of that case was satisfied that there was no criminality on the part of the accused and a civil dispute was tried to be converted into a criminal dispute and observed that the entire criminal proceeding deserves to be dismissed. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that in the case of Mahendra Singh & Another vs. The State of Jharkhand & Another (supra), this Court also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Mohammad Ibrahim and Others vs. State of Bihar & Another, (2009) 8 SCC 751 para-8 of which reads as under:- “8. This Court has time and again drawn attention to the growing tendency of the complainants attempting to give the cloak of a criminal offence to matters which are essentially and purely civil in nature, obviously either to apply pressure on the accused, or out of enmity towards the accused, or to subject the accused to harassment. Criminal courts should ensure that proceedings before it are not used for settling scores or to pressurise parties to settle civil disputes. But at the same time, it should be noted that several disputes of a civil nature may also contain the ingredients of criminal offences and if so, will have to be tried as criminal offences, even if they also amount to civil disputes. (See G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. (2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513 and Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd. (2006) 6 SCC 736 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 188) Let us examine the matter keeping the said principles in mind.” Wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reiterated the growing tendency of the complainants attempting to give the cloak of a criminal offence to matters, which are essentially and purely civil in nature. 8. v. NEPC India Ltd. (2006) 6 SCC 736 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 188) Let us examine the matter keeping the said principles in mind.” Wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reiterated the growing tendency of the complainants attempting to give the cloak of a criminal offence to matters, which are essentially and purely civil in nature. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submits that in the case of Mahendra Singh & Another vs. The State of Jharkhand & Another (supra), this Court also relied upon the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Uma Shankar Gopalika vs. State of Bihar & Another reported in (2005) 10 SCC 336 para-6 of which reads as under :- 6. xxxx xxxx xxxx It is well settled that every breach of contract would not give rise to an offence of cheating and only in those cases breach of contract would amount to cheating where there was any deception played at the very inception. If the intention to cheat has developed later on, the same cannot amount to cheating. In the present case it has nowhere been stated that at the very inception there was any intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence under Section 420 IPC.” (Emphasis supplied) That when it was reiterated that every breach of contract would not give rise to an offence of cheating and only in those cases breach of contract would amount to cheating, where there was any deception played at the very inception. If the intention to cheat has developed later on, the same will not amount to cheating. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Pawan Kumar Lakhotia & Others vs. State of Jharkhand & Another passed in Cr. If the intention to cheat has developed later on, the same will not amount to cheating. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Pawan Kumar Lakhotia & Others vs. State of Jharkhand & Another passed in Cr. M.P. No. 3095 of 2021 dated 26.04.2024 and submits that wherein this Court relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Dalip Kaur vs. Jagnar Singh reported in (2009) 14 SCC 696 in para-9 of which, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reiterated the settled principle of law that cheating would be constituted when the accused has fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise or representation and a pure and simple breach of contract does not constitute an offence of cheating. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner then submits that in the case of Pawan Kumar Lakhotia & Others vs. The State of Jharkhand & Another (supra), this Court also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Vijay Kumar Ghai vs. State of W.B. (2022) 7 SCC 124 para-28 and 38 of which read as under:- “28. “Entrustment” of property under Section 405 of the Penal Code, 1860 is pivotal to constitute an offence under this. The words used are, “in any manner entrusted with property”. So, it extends to entrustments of all kinds whether to clerks, servants, business partners or other persons, provided they are holding a position of “trust”. A person who dishonestly misappropriates property entrusted to them contrary to the terms of an obligation imposed is liable for a criminal breach of trust and is punished under Section 406 of the Penal Code. 38. There can be no doubt that a mere breach of contract is not in itself a criminal offence and gives rise to the civil liability of damages. However, as held by this Court in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar, (2000) 4 SCC 168 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 786, the distinction between mere breach of contract and cheating, which is criminal offence, is a fine one. While breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating, fraudulent or dishonest intention is the basis of the offence of cheating. While breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating, fraudulent or dishonest intention is the basis of the offence of cheating. In the case at hand, complaint filed by Respondent 2 does not disclose dishonest or fraudulent intention of the appellants.” Submits that therein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reiterated the settled principle of law that mere breach of contract is not in itself a criminal offence and gives rise to the civil liability of damages and fraudulent and dishonest intention is the basis of the offence of cheating. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner then submits that in the case of Pawan Kumar Lakhotia & Others vs. State of Jharkhand & Another (supra), this Court also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Binod Kumar & Others vs. State of Bihar & Another (2014) 10 SCC 663 para-18 of which reads as under :- “18. In the present case, looking at the allegations in the complaint on the face of it, we find that no allegations are made attracting the ingredients of Section 405 IPC. Likewise, there are no allegations as to cheating or the dishonest intention of the appellants in retaining the money in order to have wrongful gain to themselves or causing wrongful loss to the complainant. Excepting the bald allegations that the appellants did not make payment to the second respondent and that the appellants utilised the amounts either by themselves or for some other work, there is no iota of allegation as to the dishonest intention in misappropriating the property. To make out a case of criminal breach of trust, it is not sufficient to show that money has been retained by the appellants. It must also be shown that the appellants dishonestly disposed of the same in some way or dishonestly retained the same. The mere fact that the appellants did not pay the money to the complainant does not amount to criminal breach of trust.” (Emphasis supplied) Wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reiterated the settled principle of law that to make out a case of criminal breach of trust, it is not sufficient to show that money has been retained by the accused. It must also be shown that the accused person dishonestly disposed of the same in some way or dishonestly retained the same. 12. It must also be shown that the accused person dishonestly disposed of the same in some way or dishonestly retained the same. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submits that in the case of Pawan Kumar Lakhotia & Others vs. The State of Jharkhand & Another (supra), this Court further relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Vikram Johar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another, (2019) 14 SCC 207 para-24 and 25 of which reads as under :- “24. Now, we revert back to the allegations in the complaint against the appellant. The allegation is that the appellant with two or three other unknown persons, one of whom was holding a revolver, came to the complainant's house and abused him in filthy language and attempted to assault him and when some neighbours arrived there the appellant and the other persons accompanying him fled the spot. The above allegation taking on its face value does not satisfy the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 as has been enumerated by this Court in the above two judgments. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The mere allegation that the appellant came and abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients as laid down in para 13 of the judgment of this Court in [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715]. (Emphasis supplied) “25. Now, reverting back to Section 506 , which is offence of criminal intimidation, the principles laid down by [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715] has also to be applied when question of finding out as to whether the ingredients of offence are made or not. Here, the only allegation is that the appellant abused the complainant. For proving an offence under Section 506 IPC, what are the ingredients which have to be proved by the prosecution? Ratanlal & Dhirajlal on Law of Crimes, 27th Edn. with regard to proof of offence states the following: “… The prosecution must prove: (i) That the accused threatened some person. For proving an offence under Section 506 IPC, what are the ingredients which have to be proved by the prosecution? Ratanlal & Dhirajlal on Law of Crimes, 27th Edn. with regard to proof of offence states the following: “… The prosecution must prove: (i) That the accused threatened some person. (ii) That such threat consisted of some injury to his person, reputation or property; or to the person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was interested; (iii) That he did so with intent to cause alarm to that person; To cause that person to do any act which he was not legally bound to do, or omit to do any act which he was legally entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat.” A plain reading of the allegations in the complaint does not satisfy all the ingredients as noticed above.’’ (Emphasis supplied) Wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reiterated the settled principle of law that in order to constitute the offence punishable under Section 504 of INDIAN PENAL CODE , there must be intentional insult of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence and in order to constitute the offence punishable under Section 506 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE , there must a criminal intimidation with the intention of causing alarm in the mind of the victim or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally bound to do, or omit to do any act which he was legally entitled to do, as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submits that the allegation against the petitioner is that the petitioner in criminal conspiracy with the co- accused persons has got the son of the informant, who as per the claim of the informant, does not have any title over the property, to execute the power of attorney and to sign the sale deed. It is further submitted that these allegations do not amount to creating any false document which is a sine qua non for the offence of forgery, which is the essential ingredient of each of the offences punishable under Sections 467 , 468 or 471 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE . It is further submitted that these allegations do not amount to creating any false document which is a sine qua non for the offence of forgery, which is the essential ingredient of each of the offences punishable under Sections 467 , 468 or 471 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE . It is further submitted that there is absolutely no allegation against the petitioner of causing hurt or wrongfully restraining anybody and in the absence of the same, neither the offence punishable under Section 323 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE nor the offence punishable under Section 341 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE is made out against the petitioner even with the aid of Section 120B of the INDIAN PENAL CODE . Hence, it is submitted that the prayer as prayed for in this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition be allowed. 14. Learned Addl. P.P. appearing for the State on the other hand vehemently opposes the prayer of the petitioner made in this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition and submits that the allegations made against the petitioner in the FIR, charge-sheet and the materials that have been collected during the investigation of the case as mentioned in the case diary, are sufficient to constitute each of the offences, in respect of which charges have been framed against the petitioner. Hence, it is submitted that this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition, being without any merit, be dismissed. 15. Having heard the rival submissions made at the Bar and after carefully going through the materials available in the record, it is pertinent to mention here that in order to constitute the offences punishable under Section 467 , 468 and 471 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE , the essential ingredients is commission of forgery, for which creation of a false document is sine qua non. 16. Section 464 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE which reads as under:- “464. A person is said to make a false document: 1. 16. Section 464 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE which reads as under:- “464. A person is said to make a false document: 1. Who dishonestly or fraudulently makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document, or makes any mark denoting the execution of a document, with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of a document was made, signed, sealed or executed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed or executed, or at a time at which he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed or executed; or 2. Who, without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part thereof, after it has been made or executed either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such alteration; or 3. Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document, knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practised upon him, he does not know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration. Has laid down the essential ingredients for creating a false document. 17. Now coming to the facts of the case, the only allegation against the petitioner is that the petitioner made the son of the informant execute a power of attorney and sign the sale deed executed by the co-accused person in favour of the petitioner. The undisputed facts remains that it is the son of the informant who himself has signed the power of attorney and who himself has also signed the sale deed. There is no allegation of any impersonation. Even if assuming for the sake of argument, that the son of the informant was not having any right, title or interest over the property in respect of which he has executed the power of attorney or signed the sale deed, that will not amount to creation of a false document. 18. There is no allegation of any impersonation. Even if assuming for the sake of argument, that the son of the informant was not having any right, title or interest over the property in respect of which he has executed the power of attorney or signed the sale deed, that will not amount to creation of a false document. 18. Under such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that even if the entire allegations made against the petitioner is considered to be true in their entirety, none of the offence punishable under Section 467 , 468 and 471 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE is made out. 19. So far as the offence punishable under Section 420 of INDIAN PENAL CODE is concerned, the essential ingredients to constitute the offence punishable under Section 420 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE is as follows:- (a) Deceit, that is to say dishonest or fraudulent misrepresentation. (b) Inducing the person deceived to part with property; as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Ram Narayan Popli vs. Central Bureau of Investigation , (2003) 3 SCC 641 . 20. Now coming to the facts of the case, there is absolutely no allegation against the petitioner of inducing any person deceived to part with property. Under such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that even if the entire allegations made against the petitioner is considered to be true in their entirety, still the offence punishable under Section 420 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE is not made out. 21. So far as the offences punishable under Section 504 and 506 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE are concerned, the only allegation against the petitioner is that the petitioner along with the co-accused persons abused the informant but there is no allegation that he intentionally insulted in such a manner which can provoke the informant or anyone else to commit any breach of peace or any other offence nor there is any allegation that the abuse was of such a nature which will amount to criminal intimidation; punishment for which has been provided for in Section 506 of INDIAN PENAL CODE in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Vikram Johar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (supra). Hence, this Court is of the considered view that even if the entire allegation made against the petitioner are considered to be true in their entirety, still neither the offence punishable under Section 504 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE nor the offence punishable under Section 506 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE is made out. 22. So far as the offences punishable under Section 341 and 323 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE are concerned, there is absolutely no allegation against the petitioner of either causing any hurt to anyone or wrongfully restraining anyone. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that even if the entire allegation made against the petitioner are considered to be true in their entirety, still neither the offence punishable under Section 341 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE nor the offence punishable under Section 323 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE is made out. 23. So far as the offence punishable under Section 120B of the INDIAN PENAL CODE is concerned, the essential ingredients of the said offence are as follows:- (i) An agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence (ii) In doing so, either commit or caused to be done an illegal act or act which is not in itself illegal, by illegal means (iii) such an act done or caused to be done; was an offence punishable under the INDIAN PENAL CODE and (iv) If the act so done was not an offence then an overt act had been done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof. 24. Now coming to the facts of the case, there is absolutely no allegation against the petitioner of having committed any acts of commission or omission to constitute the offence punishable under Section 120B of the INDIAN PENAL CODE . Under such circumstances, this Court has no hesitation in holding that even if the entire allegations made against the petitioner are considered to be true in their entirety, still the offence punishable under Section 120B of the INDIAN PENAL CODE is not made out against the petitioner in the facts of the case and basically this is a case where the civil dispute has been cloaked as criminal case. 25. 25. In view of the discussions made above, since none of the offence for which the charges have been framed inter alia against the petitioner is made out against the petitioner even if the entire allegations made against the petitioner are considered to be true in their entirety. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that the continuation of the criminal proceeding against the petitioner will amount to abuse of process of law. Therefore, this is a fit case where the order dated 13.05.2024 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Hazaribagh in Criminal Revision No.20 of 2024, the order dated 04.03.2024 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Hazaribagh and the order dated 08.07.2024 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Hazaribagh be quashed and set aside qua the petitioner only. 26. Accordingly, the order dated 13.05.2024 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Hazaribagh in Criminal Revision No.20 of 2024, the order dated 04.03.2024 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Hazaribagh and the order dated 08.07.2024 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Hazaribagh is quashed and set aside qua the petitioner only. 27. In the result, this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent only. 28. It is made clear that the said orders in respect of other accused persons are maintained.