JUDGMENT : Muralee Krishna, J. This intra-court appeal is filed under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, by the 3 rd respondent in W.P.(C)No.18071 of 2025, challenging the judgment dated 17.06.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the writ petition filed by respondents 1 and 2 herein was disposed of by directing the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal to pass orders on the stay petition filed by respondents 1 and 2 within three weeks from the date of that judgment, if the application preferred by them is otherwise in order. It was further directed in that judgment that till orders are passed as directed, further coercive steps against respondents 1 and 2 shall be deferred. 2. Going by the averments in the writ petition, respondents 1 and 2 availed two loans, the first one is for Rs.3/- crores and the second one is for Rs.79/- Lakhs from the 3 rd respondent Bank. When respondents 1 and 2 defaulted repayment of the loan, the Bank initiated proceedings under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI Act’ for short). Two items of properties offered as security, viz, 6.77 Ares and 7.79 Ares with a commercial building thereon situated in survey No.1136/1 of Marathakkara Village of Thrissur Taluk was put in auction on 19.09.2024 by the 4 th respondent, Authorised Officer, in pursuance to the steps taken for recovery of the amount by selling the secured asset. The appellant participated in the auction proceedings and was declared the successful bidder for an amount of Rs.3,32,00,000/-. He remitted 25% of the bid amount on the day of auction, and the balance 75% before 15 days as mandated under the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules 2002. Challenging the sale, respondents 1 and 2 approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal by filing S.A. No. 117 of 2021 under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. During the pendency of the proceedings, the Bank sold the third item of the secured asset, having an extent of 53 cents in survey No.1434 of Amballur Village. Before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, respondents 1 and 2 contended that the total market value of three items of the property would come to more than Rs.13/- crores and the reserve price fixed is very meagre. However, the securitisation application was dismissed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal by virtue of Ext.P2 order dated 08.05.2025. Before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, respondents 1 and 2 contended that the total market value of three items of the property would come to more than Rs.13/- crores and the reserve price fixed is very meagre. However, the securitisation application was dismissed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal by virtue of Ext.P2 order dated 08.05.2025. At that stage, respondents 1 and 2 approached this court with the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking the following reliefs: “I) To issue a writ in the nature of Mandamus, directing the 1 st and 2 nd respondent not to proceed with the taking of physical possession of the immovable properties subjected in the Exhibit P1 application, till the filing of the statutory appeal before the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal as against the Exhibit P1 final order, and upon the time that may be fixed by this Honouarable Court to secure justice. II) To issue a writ in the nature of Mandamus, directing the Respondents 1 and 2 to keep in abeyance all further proceedings pursuant to Exhibit P2 order for a period of one month from today”. 3. In the writ petition, respondents 1 and 2 herein-writ petitioners contend that they intend to challenge Ext.P2 order before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. They have 30 days' time to challenge Ext.P2 order. But, meanwhile, the Bank may proceed with the matter and take possession of immovable properties which are the subject matter of Ext.P2. Till respondents 1 and 2 avail their statutory remedy, the interference of this Court is necessary to safeguard their interests. After hearing the learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 and also the Bank, the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition as stated above. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Senior Counsel for respondents 1 and 2 and the learned Standing Counsel for the Bank. 5. The learned Counsel for the appellant would argue that against Ext.P2 order of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, respondents 1 and 2 have a statutory remedy under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. However, as per the stipulation in the 2 nd proviso to Section 18 (1), to entertain the appeal, they have to deposit 50% of the debt due. However, as per the stipulation in the 2 nd proviso to Section 18 (1), to entertain the appeal, they have to deposit 50% of the debt due. The Appellate Tribunal is empowered to waive only 25% of that amount, and hence, respondents 1 and 2 have to mandatorily deposit 25% of the debt before the Appellate Tribunal. It is to escape from the same, respondents 1 and 2 approached this Court with the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel further submitted that by the judgments of the Apex Court and that of this court when a statutory appeal is provided against the steps taken under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, this court by exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India shall not interfere with the same unless the exceptional circumstances mentioned in the judgment of the Apex Court in the Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Another v. Mathew K.C. [ 2018 (1) KHC 786 ] is made out. No such exceptional circumstance is made out in the present case, and hence the direction issued by the learned Single Judge is not legally sustainable. 6. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2 would submit that respondents 1 and 2 received a physical copy of the impugned order of the Tribunal on 16.05.2025. Within the statutory period of 30 days provided under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, they filed the appeal before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. However, the appeal is yet to be numbered in its usual course and in the interregnum, there is a possibility of taking possession of the property of respondents 1 and 2 by the Bank in collusion with the appellant and hence, respondents 1 and 2 approached this Court. By relying on the judgments of the Apex Court in Anita Kushwaha and others v. Pushap Sudan and others [ (2016) 8 SCC 509 ] and that of this Court in HDFC Bank Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Tribunal-I [ 2022 (2) KLT 27 ], the learned Senior Counsel submitted that if no efficacious adjudicatory mechanism is available, then the right of the citizen for access to justice can be protected by this Court by exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Till a decision is taken by the Appellate Tribunal in the stay petition filed by respondents 1 and 2, the interest of respondents 1 and 2 can be protected only by an order of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and there is no illegality or incorrectness in the impugned judgment. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the Bank supported the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant. 8. The appellant herein is an auction purchaser of the properties of respondents 1 and 2 by the 3 rd respondent Bank through the 4 th respondent for recovery of debt, which was converted into a Non-Performing Asset. Against the same, respondents 1 and 2 approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal wherein Ext.P2 order dated 08.05.2025 was passed against respondents 1 and 2. As far as the challenge against the said order is concerned, respondents 1 and 2 have a remedy before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. The said section reads thus: “ 18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal (1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed to the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal: Provided that different fees may be prescribed for filing an appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the borrower: Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less: Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five per cent of debt referred to in the second proviso. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and rules made thereunder.” 9. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and rules made thereunder.” 9. In Narayan Chandra Ghosh v. Uco Bank [(2011) 4 SCC 548] while considering the question whether Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal has the jurisdiction to exempt a person preferring an appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act from making any predeposit in terms of the said provision, the Apex Court held thus: “8. Section 8(1) of the Act confers a statutory right on a person aggrieved by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act to prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. However, the right conferred under Section 18 (1) is subject to the condition laid down in the second proviso thereto. The second proviso postulates that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less. However, under the third proviso to the sub-section, the Appellate Tribunal has the power to reduce the amount, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, to not less than twenty - five per cent of the debt, referred to in the second proviso. Thus, there is an absolute bar to entertainment of an appeal under Section 18 of the Act unless the condition precedent, as stipulated, is fulfilled. Unless the borrower makes, with the Appellate Tribunal, a pre-deposit of fifty per cent of the debt due from him or determined, an appeal under the said provision cannot be entertained by the Appellate Tribunal. The language of the said proviso is clear and admits of no ambiguity. It is well - settled that when a Statute confers a right of appeal, while granting the right, the Legislature can impose conditions for the exercise of such right, so long as the conditions are not so onerous as to amount to unreasonable restrictions, rendering the right almost illusory. Bearing in mind the object of the Act, the conditions hedged in the said proviso cannot be said to be onerous. Bearing in mind the object of the Act, the conditions hedged in the said proviso cannot be said to be onerous. Thus, we hold that the requirement of pre - deposit under sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Act is mandatory and there is no reason whatsoever for not giving full effect to the provisions contained in Section 18 of the Act. In that view of the matter, no court, much less the Appellate Tribunal, a creature of the Act itself, can refuse to give full effect to the provisions of the Statute. We have no hesitation in holding that deposit under the second proviso to Section 18 (1) of the Act being a condition precedent for preferring an appeal under the said Section, the Appellate Tribunal had erred in law in entertaining the appeal without directing the appellant to comply with the said mandatory requirement. 9. The argument of learned counsel for the appellant that as the amount of debt due had not been determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, appeal could be entertained by the Appellate Tribunal without insisting on pre-deposit, is equally fallacious. Under the second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Act the amount of fifty per cent, which is required to be deposited by the borrower, is computed either with reference to the debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditors or as determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less. Obviously, where the amount of debt is yet to be determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the borrower, while preferring appeal, would be liable to deposit fifty per cent of the debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditors. Therefore, the condition of pre-deposit being mandatory, a complete waiver of deposit by the appellant with the Appellate Tribunal, was beyond the provisions of the Act, as is evident from the second and third proviso to the said Section. At best, the Appellate Tribunal could have, after recording the reasons, reduced the amount of deposit of fifty per cent to an amount not less than twenty-five per cent of the debt referred to in the second proviso. We are convinced that the order of the Appellate Tribunal, entertaining appellant's appeal without insisting on pre- deposit was clearly unsustainable and, therefore, the decision of the High Court in setting aside the same cannot be flawed”. 10. We are convinced that the order of the Appellate Tribunal, entertaining appellant's appeal without insisting on pre- deposit was clearly unsustainable and, therefore, the decision of the High Court in setting aside the same cannot be flawed”. 10. When complete waiver of pre-deposit is beyond the provisions of Section 18 (1) of the SARFAESI Act, it cannot be contended that, a person aggrieved by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17, can prefer an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, within the time limit specified in Section 18 (1), along with an application for complete waiver of pre-deposit under the second proviso to Section 18 (1), after remitting only the fee provided under Section 18 (1), since the Appellate Tribunal cannot grant complete waiver of pre-deposit, which is beyond the scope of the provisions contained in the second and third provisos to Section 18 (1). In that view of the matter, in an appeal filed under Section 18 of the Act, which is accompanied by an application invoking the provisions of the third proviso to Section 18 (1) for waiver of pre-deposit, as stipulated in the second proviso to Section 18 (1), the appellant has to deposit with the Appellate Tribunal twenty-five per cent of the debt referred to in the second proviso to Section 18 (1). The Appellate Tribunal cannot entertain, i.e., give judicial consideration of an appeal filed under Section 18 and the interlocutory application filed under the third proviso to Section 18 (1) for waiver of predeposit, as stipulated in the second proviso to Section 18 (1), unless the appellant has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal twenty-five per cent of the debt referred to in the second proviso to Section 18 (1). Therefore, we find absolutely no merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents-petitioners that the respondents are required to remit only the prescribed fee as provided under Section 18 (1) of the Act, at the time of preferring Ext.P2 appeal and the question of deposit with the Appellate Tribunal the pre-deposit provided under the second proviso to Section 18 (1) arises only on an order being passed by the Appellate Tribunal on the application for waiver. 11. 11. It is the specific case of the appellant that to maintain an appeal against an order under Section 17 passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, apart from the fees prescribed, respondents 1 and 2 have to deposit 50% of the amount of debt due from them. The Appellate Tribunal is entitled to reduce that amount to not less than 25%. Therefore, to entertain their appeal, it is mandatory to deposit a minimum 25% of the debt, even if respondents 1 and 2 are seeking a waiver of the remaining 25%, the maximum of which can be given by the Appellate Tribunal. It is to escape from that liability, respondents 1 and 2 approached this Court with the writ petition. While going through the second and third Provisos to Section 18 (1) of the SARFAESI Act in the light of the judgments referred to above, we find force in the said argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. 12. The maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, against the steps taken under the provisions of SARFAESI Act by the secured creditor, by invoking the power under Section 13(4), is settled by the judgments of the Apex Court as well as this Court. 13. In Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Another v. Mathew K.C. [ 2018 (1) KHC 786 ] , the Apex Court held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can entertain a writ petition only under exceptional circumstances and that it is a self imposed restraint by the High Court. The four exceptional circumstances such as, where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, were re iterated in paragraph 6 of the said judgment by relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax and Others v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal [(2014) 1 SCC 603] 14. This position was reiterated by the Apex Court in South Indian Bank Ltd. (M/s.) v. Naveen Mathew Philip [2023 (4) KLT 29] and after discussing the various judgments on the point as well as the circumstances in which the High Court can interfere with in matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act, held as under: “Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi - judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute”. 15. In PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank [2024 (3) KHC SN 3] the Apex Court held that it is more than a settled legal position of law that in matters arising out of RDB Act and SARFAESI Act, the High Court should not entertain a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution particularly when an alternative statutory remedy is available. 16. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Jasmin K. v. State Bank of India [ 2024 (3) KHC 266 ] reiterated the position of law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments. 17. From the submissions made at the Bar, we notice that the Debts Recovery Tribunal passed Ext.P2 order on 08.05.2025. According to respondents 1 and 2, they received certified copy of that order only on 16.05.2025. They have filed the above writ petition on 12.05.2025. However, they approached the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal on 13.06.2025. 17. From the submissions made at the Bar, we notice that the Debts Recovery Tribunal passed Ext.P2 order on 08.05.2025. According to respondents 1 and 2, they received certified copy of that order only on 16.05.2025. They have filed the above writ petition on 12.05.2025. However, they approached the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal on 13.06.2025. While going through this chronological events, conclusion is irresistible that the respondents 1 and 2 are trying to get more time to approach the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal by approaching this Court in the interregnum by filing the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 18. In the case of HDFC Bank Ltd. [ 2022 (2) KLT 27 ] relied by the learned Senior Counsel for respondents 1 and 2, this Court held that when the fundamental right to access to justice is denied, the aggrieved are entitled to approach this Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. But on going through the said judgment, it is clear that it was in the circumstance of absence of Presiding Officers of the Forum created under the statute, such a finding was given by this Court. In the instant case, respondents 1 and 2 have no case that the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal is facing any difficulty due to absence of Presiding Officer to consider the appeal. Therefore, the judgment in HDFC Bank Ltd. [ 2022 (2) KLT 27 ] is not applicable to the facts of the case in our hand. 19. In Anita Kushwaha [ (2016) 8 SCC 509 ] also four circumstances are mentioned in paragraph 30 of the judgment as the essence of access to justice. They are (i) the state must provide an effective adjudicatory mechanism; (ii) the mechanism so provided must be reasonably accessible in terms of distance; (iii) the process of adjudication must be speedy; and (iv) the litigants access to the adjudicatory process must be affordable. When a statutory mechanism, by way of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act is provided against an order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act, the respondents 1 and 2 cannot be heard to say that the access to justice is denied to them. Any of the four circumstances mentioned in Anita Kushwaha [ (2016) 8 SCC 509 ] is not made out by respondents 1 and 2. Any of the four circumstances mentioned in Anita Kushwaha [ (2016) 8 SCC 509 ] is not made out by respondents 1 and 2. They have no case that Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act does not provide sufficient remedy to an aggrieved in the order passed under Section 17 of the Act. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that respondents 1 and 2 have not made out any sufficient ground to maintain their writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge failed to consider these aspects while disposing of the writ petition filed by respondents 1 and 2 as mentioned above. In the result, this writ appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment dated 17.06.2025 in W.P.(C)No.18071 of 2025 and the writ petition stands dismissed.