Research › Search › Judgment

Karnataka High Court · body

2025 DIGILAW 1973 (KAR)

Tahsildhar v. K. R Rajagopal

2025-12-18

H.P.SANDESH

body2025
JUDGMENT : H.P.SANDESH, J. Heard both the learned counsel on admission. The learned counsel for the respondent would contend that the appellants were represented through the District Government Pleader on 21.06.1997 and objection was also filed to the application filed under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of CPC and subsequently, the Trial Court noted that written statement was not filed on 24.07.1998 and thereafter, proceeded to consider the matter and the appellants have not pursued the matter diligently. However, appeal is filed before the First Appellate Court after a delay of 23 years and the First Appellate Court while considering the application in respect of the delay is concerned, observed that the reason assigned in the application is that the plaintiff has sought for the relief of declaration of his title by way of adverse possession against the appellants, who are the State Government and its mechanism. 2. The learned counsel for the appellants contend that the suit is filed for the relief of adverse possession as against the Government, but in the case on hand, only there was 27 years i.e., less than 30 years and while seeking the relief of adverse possession against the Government, it must be 30 years. However, it is pleaded for condonation of delay before the First Appellate Court that the length of delay is not matter and merely because the delay is at length, the appeal cannot be dismissed and right of the appellants cannot be thrown away. Under the Limitation Act, no specific period to be condoned is fixed. Hence, there is no legal bar to condone the delay of any length. The appellants are the State Government and mechanism and it has to look after several acts day to day.Admittedly, there is some sort of negligence on the part of the Government Officials/Tahsildar and it is natural due to bureaucratic process, but it is not intentional one. When this averment was made in the application, the First Appellate Court allowed the appellants to examine the witness and witness is also examined in support of the said application to condone the delay. 3. The First Appellate Court having considered the material on record, in paragraph No.9 made an observation that the delay is not of few years. The delay is of 8,580 days i.e., more than 23 years and 6 months. 3. The First Appellate Court having considered the material on record, in paragraph No.9 made an observation that the delay is not of few years. The delay is of 8,580 days i.e., more than 23 years and 6 months. This is an inordinate delay and the appeal is barred by law of limitation. There is gross and utter negligence on the part of the appellants and its officials. The First Appellate Court also taken note of that though Deputy Commissioner has ordered to prefer an appeal in the year 2005 and 2008 and though they were aware of the judgment long back, the officials have kept mum and not taken any action. They cannot blame the earlier DGP (District Government Pleader) as the officials were aware about the proceedings of the suit. When the respondent initiated writ proceedings before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka, they were directed to mutate his name, but it was also not done by them. When he initiated contempt proceedings, the appellant No.1 has appeared before the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka and undertook to comply the said order. But, instead of doing so, the present appeal has been filed just to deprive the benefit of decree and right of the respondent. The appellants are not sure about their case and they have not shown any bonafide reasons to condone the delay and hence, comes to the conclusion that the reason assigned in the application is not sufficient to condone the inordinate delay of 23 years and detailed order has been passed dismissing the same. 4. The said order is challenged before this Court in this second appeal. 5. The main grounds urged in the second appeal are that the First Appellate Court gravely erred in failing to see that the judgment and decree in O.S.No.95/1997 was passed in ignorance of the right of the defendant and that the schedule property being Government kharab land, ought to be protected. In failing to interfere with the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the learned Appellate Judge, there has been an unjust deprivation of the right of the defendants. The judgment and decree of the Trial Court is perverse and the First Appellate Court should have refrained from substituting its conclusions and opinions on the ground of delay. In failing to interfere with the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the learned Appellate Judge, there has been an unjust deprivation of the right of the defendants. The judgment and decree of the Trial Court is perverse and the First Appellate Court should have refrained from substituting its conclusions and opinions on the ground of delay. The learned counsel for the appellants also would contend that the judgment and decree of the Trial Court is only in three lines and the same was affirmed by the First Appellate Court in dismissing the appeal and hence, this Court has to show its lenience in condoning the delay and the matter may be remitted to the First Appellate Court to consider the matter on merits by condoning the delay. 6. Per contra, the counsel for the respondent would submit that the very affidavit filed before the First Appellate Court for condonation of delay is that there is some sort of negligence on the part of the Government Officials/Tahsildar and it is natural due to bureaucratic process, but it is not intentional one. When there was a delay of 23 years, it is contended that it was natural in a bureaucratic process and not intentional one and the same is taken note of by the First Appellate Court while considering the application and dismissing the appeal since there was an inordinate delay of 23 years. The learned counsel would vehemently contend that the judgment was within the knowledge of the State and the Deputy Commissioner of Bangalore District, vide communication dated 01.12.2005, directed to file an appeal, but not filed the appeal. In 2008 also once again directed to file an appeal, but not filed the appeal and officials kept mum. Only when the writ petition was filed and contempt proceedings was initiated and though undertaken to comply with the direction of this Court in the writ petition as well as contempt proceedings, filed the appeal with a delay of 23 years. The First Appellate Court also taken note of that they were having the knowledge about the judgment in the year 2005 itself, though decree was passed in 2000 and even at that time also not filed the appeal and though they were represented in the original suit, but not contested. 7. The First Appellate Court also taken note of that they were having the knowledge about the judgment in the year 2005 itself, though decree was passed in 2000 and even at that time also not filed the appeal and though they were represented in the original suit, but not contested. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel for the respondent, no doubt, the suit was filed in the year 1997, which is numbered as O.S.No.75/1997 and judgment and decree of the Trial Court was passed on 18.03.2000. It is also borne out from the records that the District Government Pleader appeared before the Trial Court on 21.06.1997 and took time to file objections. However, filed the objections in the month of February 1998 and thereafter, time was granted to file written statement and written statement was not filed and the same was recorded on 24.07.1998. Thereafter, the Trial Court proceeded to consider the matter and ultimately took three years time to dispose of the suit and the same was disposed of in 2000. It is important to note that it is not the case of the appellants that they were not having the knowledge about the suit and judgment and decree of the Trial Court. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent brought to the notice of this Court the communication issued by the Deputy Commissioner to file an appeal in 2005 and also in 2008 and the same is also referred by the First Appellate Court while dismissing the application and submits that they were having full-fledged knowledge with regard to the earlier judgment and decree. However, when the proceedings was initiated before this Court in the writ petition and subsequently, when the order passed in writ petition is not complied, contempt proceedings was also initiated, wherein undertook to comply with the order passed in the writ petition. But instead of complying the same, filed the appeal with delay of 23 years. The delay of 23 years is not properly explained before the First Appellate Court. In a casual manner pleaded before the First Appellate Court that the appellants are the State Government and mechanism and it has to look after several acts day to day and also admitted that there was negligence on the part of the Government officials. The delay of 23 years is not properly explained before the First Appellate Court. In a casual manner pleaded before the First Appellate Court that the appellants are the State Government and mechanism and it has to look after several acts day to day and also admitted that there was negligence on the part of the Government officials. It is contented that it is natural due to bureaucratic process, but it is not intentional one. The manner in which the application is filed before the First Appellate Court is that the Government can do anything and even if there is a long delay, the same is not applicable and even gone to the extent of making an averment in the application that under the Limitation Act, no specific period to be condoned is fixed and also there is no legal bar to condone the delay of any length. 9. This Court would like to rely upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of SHIVAMMA (DEAD) BY LRS., v. KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD AND OTHERS reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 1969, wherein it is categorically held that it is immaterial whether it is a State or a private party and there cannot be two yardsticks to consider the delay. Even if the Government is involved in any mechanism, the same cannot be a ground to condone the delay. The Apex Court in paragraph No.140 has held that the Courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay and purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. In paragraph No.141 it is held that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Further, an observation is also made that the judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. This ensures that the ultimate adjudication of rights occurs in a neutral and unprejudiced setting. 10. The Apex Court in paragraph Nos.259 and 260 of the said judgment in detail discussed with regard to delay is concerned and taken note of delay of 3,966 days in the said case and in paragraph No.260 held that, it is abundantly clear that the High Court has erroneously condoned a massive delay of 3,966 days on account of certain lapses at the administrative levels and of there being no follow-ups in the proceedings, along with finding certain merits in the case of respondent No.1 against the maintainability of the suit of the appellant and that of the relief molded by the First Appellate Court. It is further observed that we have no hesitation in stating that such grounds are nowhere near to being “sufficient cause” as per Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The High Court lost sight of the fact that the precedents and authorities it relied upon by it had delay of two-digits, or even that of single-digit, more particularly the delay in those cases was supported by sufficient cause. The present case, however, stands on a different footing, owing to such an enormous delay. Hence, we are not inclined to accept the condonation of delay by the High Court. 11. In paragraph No.262, the Apex Court gave a conclusion that the High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional Courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional Courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until significant causes exists, as by doing so the Courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law. No litigants should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the Courts to misuse the process of law. 12. The Apex Court in its recent judgment made an observation when the High Court condoned the delay of 1,500 days that, it is dismay that the High Court has even not seen the judgment of Shivamma case (supra). The observation made by the Apex Court in Shivamma case (supra), is that lethargic persons, whether it is the Government or a private party, cannot be encouraged by condoning the delay. In the case on hand, the delay is 23 years and in the case of Shivamma (supra), the delay was 3,996 days. This Court while considering the similar set of facts in a case of appeal filed by the State in R.S.A.No.1401/2023 dated 28.10.2025, when there was a delay of 6,658 days, dismissed the appeal. In the present case on hand, there is a delay of 23 years i.e., 8,580 days. Having taken note of all these factors into consideration and also the reasons assigned before the First Appellate Court to condone the delay, it is not a case to entertain the second appeal when there is a lethargic attitude on the part of the Government and the reasons are also like it is natural when the bureaucratic process is involved and length of delay is immaterial as against the principles laid down in the judgment of Shivamma case. Hence, I do not find any ground to entertain the second appeal. The learned counsel for the appellants would submit that this Court has to take note of the reasons assigned by the First Appellate Court considering the matter. Hence, I do not find any ground to entertain the second appeal. The learned counsel for the appellants would submit that this Court has to take note of the reasons assigned by the First Appellate Court considering the matter. The Apex Court in its judgment in the case of Shivamma (supra), has categorically held that there must be a sufficient cause to condone the delay and unless sufficient cause is shown to condone the delay, the appeal cannot be entertained on merits in paragraph Nos.140 to 143 of the judgment. When such observation is made, I do not find any ground to entertain this second appeal and the First Appellate Court taken note of the inordinate delay of 23 years and passed the order. Hence, the second appeal is dismissed. In view of the dismissal of the appeal, pending I.As., if any, stands disposed of.