JUDGMENT : ROBIN PHUKAN, J. Heard Mr. A.K. Baruah, learned counsel for the petitioner and also heard Mr. P.J. Phukan, learned standing counsel, Gauhati University, appearing for the respondents. 2. The petitioner, namely, Shri Sasanka Saikia, has instituted this proceeding, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for following relief:- (i) For setting aside and quashing the Notification dated 25.09.2021 bearing Memo. No GU/Estt/Notification/2021/5212 -5310 (Annexure - I), (ii) For issuing direction to the respondent authorities to forthwith cancel/recall/rescind and/or otherwise forebear from giving effect to the impugned Notification dated 25.09.2021, bearing Memo No. GU/Estt/Notification/2021/5212 -5310 (Annexure - I) and/or, (iii) For issuing direction to the respondent authorities to allow the petitioner to continue render his services in his respective post of 'Lower Division Assistant'. Background facts :- 3. The background facts leading to filing of the present petition, is adumbrated herein below:- “After a due selection process, the petitioner was appointed as a 'Lower Division Assistant' on 20.01.2016, by the Registrar, Gauhati University in the Office of the Secretary of the Gauhati University. The petitioner joined on 27.01.2016, and started discharging his duties to the utmost satisfaction of all concerned. Initially, he was appointed on contractual basis for one year. However, even after completion of one year, his services were not regularized but extended from time to time. Thereafter, the petitioner came to learn that services of fifteen similarly situated candidates who were appointed pursuant to the same advertisement dated 17.04.2012, were confirmed and permanently absorbed in their respective posts vide office order dated 01.11.2016. Then on 24.10.2016, 03.01.2017 and 25.07.2017, the petitioner had submitted his representations praying for regularization of his service. But, on 14.03.2017 and 24.07.2017, the Registrar, Gauhati University issued an order by way of which the service of the petitioner was extended. Thereafter, also the services of the petitioner was extended from time to time and not regularized. Being aggrieved, he had filed one writ petition, being W.P.(C) No. 4271 of 2018, which is pending for final adjudication. Thereafter, the petitioner was suddenly arrested by the Chief Minister's Special Vigilance Cell on 25.09.2021, in connection with the APDCL recruitment test. A criminal case, being Vigilance P.S. Case No. 04 of 2021, was also registered against the petitioner in this regard. Thereafter, the petitioner was suddenly arrested by the Chief Minister's Special Vigilance Cell on 25.09.2021, in connection with the APDCL recruitment test. A criminal case, being Vigilance P.S. Case No. 04 of 2021, was also registered against the petitioner in this regard. Then on the same day, i.e. on 25.09.2021, a notification was issued by the Registrar, Gauhati University by way of which the services of the petitioner was terminated with immediate effect. The said Notification, dated 25.09.2021, was issued without even show-causing the petitioner and without even providing an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner to present his case. The same was also never served upon him. The petitioner came to know about the same only when he tried to resume his duties. And till filing of the petition, the petitioner has not been officially communicated about his termination by the officials of the Gauhati University. Thereafter, on 02.03.2022, the petitioner had filed an application before the State Public Information Officer, Gauhati University through a former colleague asking as to why he has not been allowed to work in the said post. But, no response has been forthcoming from the authorities. After much effort, he could able to procure the aforesaid impugned Notification dated 25.09.2021, from reliable but unofficial sources. Thereafter, on 04.05.2022, the petitioner visited the offices of the respondent authorities to submit a representation highlighting his grievances. However, the petitioner was not allowed to enter inside the Gauhati University campus in terms of the Notification dated 25.07.2021. As such, the petitioner asked one of his former colleagues to submit the representation before the respondent no. 2. Although, the said representation was submitted in the office of the respondent no. 2, the officials refused to acknowledge the said representation by putting their official seal and signature. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present petition seeking the relief as aforesaid.” 4. The respondent No. 1 and 2 have filed their affidavit-in- opposition. In the said affidavit, they have taken a stand that the petitioner was engaged as Lower Division Assistant in the Secretary Office of the University by an Office Order under Ref. The respondent No. 1 and 2 have filed their affidavit-in- opposition. In the said affidavit, they have taken a stand that the petitioner was engaged as Lower Division Assistant in the Secretary Office of the University by an Office Order under Ref. No.- GU/Estt/C/Appt (Contractual)/ 2016/7861-82 dated 20.01.2016, and the said engagement is on purely temporary and on contractual basis initially for a period of 1 (one) Year and may be terminated at any time without assigning any reasons thereof" and that "The engagement is subject to getting the character and antecedents to be verified from the police authorities". Then, after issuance of the said Office Order dated 20.01.2016, the petitioner?s engagement period has been extended from time to time and on the last occasion, the term was "extended for another period of 6 (six) months" with effect from 01.07.2021 stipulating that "The other terms and condition of this extension period of service will be same as earlier", by an Office Order under Memo No.- GU/Estt./C/LDA(Cont.)/2021/3692-99 dated 27.07.2021, and as such the contractual term of the petitioner was to expire on 31.12.2021. It is the further stand of the respondents that the petitioner has also filed one writ petition being W.P.(C) No.4271 of 2018 along with three others, which is still pending for final adjudication before this Court. And in the meanwhile, the petitioner was arrested by the Chief Minister's Special Vigilance Cell and through a Notification under Memo No.- GU/Estt/Notification/2021/ 5212-5301 dated 25.09.2021, the said service of the petitioner "has been terminated with immediate effect as per Clause No.1 of the terms and conditions of his appointment order dated 20.01.2016", also restricting his entry inside the Gauhati University Campus and a communication, under Memo No.- GU/Estt./C/LDA (Contr.)/Terminate/2021/5303-08 dated 25.09.2021, has also been issued stating the termination of his service with immediate effect. And the said Notification dated 25.09.2021, has been immediately uploaded in the Gauhati University's official website for information of all concerned. The petitioner has also been officially intimated about the termination of his service, through a Speed Post communication dated 27.09.2021. It is also stated that the petitioner has personally visited the Office Chamber of the Registrar, GU to submit the Order dated 30.06.2022, of this Court and also met the Registrar with a representation on 01.07.2022. The petitioner has also been officially intimated about the termination of his service, through a Speed Post communication dated 27.09.2021. It is also stated that the petitioner has personally visited the Office Chamber of the Registrar, GU to submit the Order dated 30.06.2022, of this Court and also met the Registrar with a representation on 01.07.2022. Further stand of the respondents is that after the order of this Court dated 18.11.2021, in B.A. No.- 2882/2021 ( Sasanka Saikia –vs.- The State of Assam ) granting bail to the petitioner; he has not approached the Gauhati University authorities concerned for several months till submission of an RTI Application in the first part of March, 2022. And prompt reply was furnished to him by the Public Information Officer of the Gauhati University through his reply communication dated 02.03.2022, which was sent in Speed Post. It is also the stand of the respondents that the petitioner is not at all prejudiced due to the termination of his contractual engagement with effect from 25.09.2021 and further, he is also not entitled to any protection under the provisions of the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964 and/or the inquiry provision under the Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India prior to the said termination, which has also been accepted by the Executive Council, the highest executive body of the Gauhati University, exercising its power under the Gauhati University Act, 1947 (as amended). Further stand of the respondents is that the petitioner has willfully suppressed as well as misled this Court and therefore, it is contended to dismiss the petition. 5. The petitioner has filed his reply by to the affidavit-in- opposition filed by the respondents No.1 and 2, denying each of the statement and averments made therein. Further stand of the respondents is that the petitioner has willfully suppressed as well as misled this Court and therefore, it is contended to dismiss the petition. 5. The petitioner has filed his reply by to the affidavit-in- opposition filed by the respondents No.1 and 2, denying each of the statement and averments made therein. The petitioner has also categorically denied that the impugned Notification dated 25.09.2021, was duly communicated to him and that a bare perusal of the impugned Notification dated 25.09.2021, makes it abundantly clear that the same was a notification wherein copies were marked to the Secretary to the V.C, G.U., Secretary to the Registrar, G.U., Administrative Heads, G.U., Heads of academic departments and all office superintendents and the authorities did not even deem it necessary to mark and/or serve a copy thereof to the person who is most aggrieved i.e. the writ petitioner and that with unusual hurry, the petitioner was terminated on the very same date on which he was arrested. Neither any show-cause notice was issued to him informing about the charges against him nor was any departmental enquiry conducted. The petitioner also denied that he was aware of his termination order dated 25.09.2021. It is also stated that dismissal of an employee is governed by the constitutional mandate of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India and not by media trial(s). And even it is assumed that the impugned Notification dated 25.09.2021, was served upon the petitioner, the same is still liable to be interfered by this Court since the termination of the petitioner was not preceded by either any show cause notice informing the petitioner about the charges against him or a departmental enquiry in terms of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. 5.1 The petitioner has also filed an affidavit to place on record following subsequent facts that the writ petition has been filed inter- alia challenging the impugned Notification dated 25.09.2021, bearing notification Memo. No. GU/Estt/Notification/2021/5212-5310 (Annexure – I). Then on 30.06.2022, this Court was pleased to issue notice in the present writ petition and the impugned Notification dated 25.09.2021, was stayed/suspended until further orders. No. GU/Estt/Notification/2021/5212-5310 (Annexure – I). Then on 30.06.2022, this Court was pleased to issue notice in the present writ petition and the impugned Notification dated 25.09.2021, was stayed/suspended until further orders. And that during the pendency of the present writ petition, on 25.07.2023, this Court in W.P.(C) No. 4271 of 2018 (wherein the present writ petitioner was arrayed as petitioner No.3) was pleased to dispose of the same with a direction to the respondent authorities to process the cases of the petitioner and thereafter, take necessary steps for regular absorption and/or regularization of the services of all the petitioners by issuing necessary office orders. 6. The respondents have filed an additional affidavit stating that this Court by an Order dated 28.05.2024 (in W.P.(C) No. 4393/2022) after hearing both the sides has allowed the respondent Gauhati University "to file an additional affidavit-in-opposition indicating the reasons for dispensing with the enquiry", directing the matter to be listed on 06.06.2024. It is also stated that in a Note dated 25.09.2021 of the Registrar to the Vice Chancellor of the University (prior to the issuance of the termination Notification dated 25.09.2021), while inter alia stating that voluminous records of more than lakhs of OMR Sheets were there in connection with Writ Petitioner's Police Custody by CM Special Vigilance Cell and that the Writ Petitioner's engagement is purely temporary and on contractual basis initially for a period of 1 (one) year; it has further been stated that - "In such situation it is required that any such employee, who happens to be engaged by Gauhati University be immediately suspended and charge sheet is to be served upon him to start the Disciplinary Proceedings. However, this is not feasible to be done as he is presently in police custody and the relevant records to be verified for the purpose of Disciplinary Proceedings, could no longer be accessible for the University. Further, it is clear that the said disciplinary proceeding (DP, for short) will be a lengthy and time consuming one, given the voluminous documents to be checked, while his engagement is valid only up to 31.12.2021 (i.e. near about 3 months). Under the circumstances and given the situation, it is well-nigh impossible or not feasible to start an enquiry against Mr. Under the circumstances and given the situation, it is well-nigh impossible or not feasible to start an enquiry against Mr. Sasanka Saikia in the form of a DP "As such" and "being satisfied that no enquiry is feasible", the Writ Petitioner has been sought to be "terminated from service with immediate effect” in the said Note, which has subsequently been "Approved as recommended" same day by the Vice Chancellor of the University, paving way for the issuance of the aforementioned termination Notification dated 25.09.2021. It would be relevant to point out here that the entire exercise for the purpose of due termination of the Writ Petitioner's service on 25.09.2021, has been in tune with the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India including Article 311(2)(b) as well as Article 311(3) of the Constitution of India, as enunciated by Hon'ble Apex Court and the Courts thereunder on numerous occasions in this regard, including the judgments rendered in Union of India & another - Versus- Tulsiram Patel, reported in (1985) 3 SCC 398 (Constitution Bench) as well as in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi & others -Versus- State of U.P. & others, reported in (1991) 1 SCC 212 . In this context, it may be stated here that the aforementioned Constitution Bench has clearly held relying upon the "Oxford English Dictionary" and "Webster's Third New International Dictionary" that "not reasonably practicable to hold" the inquiry as contemplated in Article 311(2)(b), is "not a total or absolute impracticability", but what is "requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation". 7. The petitioner has filed reply to the said additional affidavit of the respondents. It is stated that an affidavit-in-opposition had already been filed by the respondents as far back as on 28.07.2022. And now the authorities cannot improve upon the records by manufacturing fresh ground(s) and this position is well settled in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and Another Versus The Chief Election Commissioner New Delhi and Others , reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405 . And now the authorities cannot improve upon the records by manufacturing fresh ground(s) and this position is well settled in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and Another Versus The Chief Election Commissioner New Delhi and Others , reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405 . In the note dated 25.09.2021, two things have been stated:- (i) Firstly, that it is not feasible to initiate the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner as he was in police custody and the relevant records to be verified for the purpose of disciplinary proceeding could no longer be accessed by the University. (ii) Secondly, another purported reason recorded in the note dated 25.09.2021 is that DP will be lengthy and time consuming, given the voluminous documents to be checked, while his engagement is valid only up to 31.12.2021. The petitioner also states that the purported reason as recorded above is insufficient, irrelevant, improper as well as not adequate. And that merely because DP might be lengthy and time consuming, and the documents which needed to be checked are voluminous, the authorities could not have dispensed with the enquiry, more particularly, when lifelong stigmatic remarks have been made against the petitioner. It is also stated that on 25.07.2023, this Court was pleased to direct the authorities to regularize the service of the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.4271 of 2018. Submissions:- 8. Mr. A. K. Baruah, learned counsel for the petitioner, has argued the matter at length and also supplemented the same by written argument, and in both the form, he has emphasized on the following points:- (i) Firstly, Mr. Baruah submits that before the petitioner being terminated, no show cause notice was issued to him and no departmental proceeding was held and as such, not only the principles of natural justice have been flagrantly violated in the facts and circumstances of the present case but also the procedure of inflicting penalty, as stipulated under Rule 48 of the Gauhati University Employees Service Conditions, Conduct and Appeal Rules, 1970 was also violated. (ii) Secondly, he relied upon two decisions-(i) Parshotam Lal Dhingra Vs. Union of India, so reported in AIR 1958 SC 36; and (ii) Mazid Ansari Vs. Union of India and Ors, reported in (1997) IILLJ 329 Gau., Mr. (ii) Secondly, he relied upon two decisions-(i) Parshotam Lal Dhingra Vs. Union of India, so reported in AIR 1958 SC 36; and (ii) Mazid Ansari Vs. Union of India and Ors, reported in (1997) IILLJ 329 Gau., Mr. Baruah submits that even in the case of temporary employees, if the termination order is not a termination simpliciter, but a termination attaching stigma, the protection so available under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India is applicable even to a temporary employee. (iii) Thirdly, referring two other decisions in (a) The Manager, Government Branch Press Another Vs. D.B. Belliappa, reported in (1979) 1 SCC 477 (b) Sujata Nath Vs. The State of Assam and Ors., reported in 2019 (5) GLT 774, Mr. Baruah submits that even in the case of temporary employees, Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India is applicable and in the case in hand, the principles of equality have been violated. (iv) Fourthly, relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Parshotam Lal Dhingra (supra) as well as in Mazid Ansari (supra), and also in Pavanendra Narayan Verma- Vs-Sanjay Gandhi P.G.I. of Medical Sciences & Ors ., reported in AIR 2002 SC 23 , Mr. Baruah submits that a termination order would amount to a stigma if the same impute something over and above the mere unsuitability for the job. In the present case, the impugned termination order dated 25.09.2021, was so stigmatic that even the entry of the petitioner into the Gauhati University campus was barred. Therefore, the constitutional mandates enshrined under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India could have been violated as held in the aforesaid cases by the Hon'ble Apex Court. (v) Fifthly, Mr. Baruah submits that the respondents have sought to justify the impugned termination order dated 25.09.2021, through fresh reasons/ afterthoughts by filing an additional affidavit on 06.06.2024. The same is clearly impermissible in the eyes of the law, in view of decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra). (vi) Sixthly, Mr. Baruah submits that even assuming for argument's sake that the subsequent reasons, so furnished by the respondents i.e.- i) It is not feasible to initiate departmental proceeding as the petitioner is in police custody-Once an employee is in police custody for more than 48 hours, he is deemed to be suspended as per Rule 45 (2) of GU rules. Baruah submits that even assuming for argument's sake that the subsequent reasons, so furnished by the respondents i.e.- i) It is not feasible to initiate departmental proceeding as the petitioner is in police custody-Once an employee is in police custody for more than 48 hours, he is deemed to be suspended as per Rule 45 (2) of GU rules. However, in the instant case, he was terminated from service straight away. The reason is neither cogent nor reasonable; ii) DP will be lengthy and time consuming given the voluminous documents to be checked; are clearly unsustainable in the eyes of law and the same are perverse. Merely because the documents are voluminous, the same cannot be a ground to dispense with the enquiry. (vii) Mr. Baruah, referring to following decisions – (a) Jaswant Singh-Vs-The State of Punjab and others, reported in MANU/SC/0093/1991, (b) Southern Railway Officers Assn. and Ors -Vs- UOI & Ors., reported in (2009) 9 SCC 24 , (c) Reena Rani-Vs-State of Haryana and others, reported in MANU/SC/0286/2012, (d) Ruben Kalita-Vs- The Union of India and Ors., W.P.(C) No. 2277/2010m (e) Aayush Tomar-Vs- The Union of India and Ors., reported in 2023 (6) GLT 162, (f) Md. Hussain Ali -Vs- The State of Assam and Ors., reported in 2022 (5) GLT 263, submits that the ratio laid down in the aforesaid cases shows that reasons for dispensing with an enquiry must be based on objective facts and not the outcome of whim or caprice of the concerned officer and the reasons must be cogent to arrive at a satisfaction by the authorities for not holding an enquiry. However, in the instant case, there was no assessment in this regard and as such, the vindictiveness is apparent on the face of the records. Therefore, Mr. Baruah has contended to allow this petition. 9. Per contra, Mr. Phukan, the learned standing counsel for the respondent authorities has vehemently opposed the petition. According to him, the petition becomes infructous as the petitioner has already been terminated from service and that he was a contractual employee and his term has also expired in the meantime on 31.12.2021. Producing the relevant file of the respondent authorities, Mr. Per contra, Mr. Phukan, the learned standing counsel for the respondent authorities has vehemently opposed the petition. According to him, the petition becomes infructous as the petitioner has already been terminated from service and that he was a contractual employee and his term has also expired in the meantime on 31.12.2021. Producing the relevant file of the respondent authorities, Mr. Phukan has drawn the attention of this Court to office Note dated 25.09.2021, submits that reason has been assigned for termination of service of the petitioner dispensing with the departmental enquiry and his termination is in tune with the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, including Article 311(2)(b) as well as Article 311(3) of the Constitution of India, as enunciated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tulsiram Patel (supra) as well as in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra). Referring to para No.130 of the decisions in Tulshiram Patel (supra), Mr. Phukan also submits that misquotation or absence of source of power in the impugned order does not invalidate the same. 9.1 Mr. Phukan also submits that the entry of the petitioner in the University Campus was not barred but restricted in view of the prevailing circumstances and that he has suppressed material facts that he was a contractual employee and that his term had expired on 31.12.2021, and as such his service was no more, with effect from 01.01.2022. 9.2 However, to a pointed query of this Court, Mr. Phukan submits that there is no mention in the University Rules about dispensation of departmental proceeding. 10. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties this Court has gone through the pleadings of the parties and the documents placed on the record and also perused the impugned Notification dated 25.09.2021 and also gone through the decisions so relied upon by both the parties. The Issue Before the Court:- 11. In view of the contentions made by the respective parties in the pleadings, and also in view of the submissions advanced by learned counsel for both the parties, the issues to be addressed by this Court are:- (i) Whether a temporary/contractual employee is entitled to an opportunity of being heard before termination from service? (ii) Whether the impugned termination Notification, dated 25.09.2021 is stigmatic and also violative of the principles of natural justice and Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India? (ii) Whether the impugned termination Notification, dated 25.09.2021 is stigmatic and also violative of the principles of natural justice and Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India? (iii) Whether, in the given factual backdrop, the respondent authorities had rightly dispensed with the enquiry as contemplated under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, by invoking the proviso (b) to the said Article as contended by learned counsel for the respondents? 12. Before a discussion is directed to the issues, so formulated herein above, it would be in the interest of justice to understand the legal framework/trajectory concerning the subject, which are discussed as under:- Legal Framework:- 12.1 Article 311 of the Constitution of India:- Article 311 provides for- Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State. It read as under:- (1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges: Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed: Provided further that this clause shall not apply:- (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or (c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. (3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final. 12.2 The Gauhati University Employees Service Conditions, Conduct and Appeal Rules, 1970:- Rule 46 of the said Rules provides for discipline. It mentioned the nature of penalties. Under this Rule any one or more of the following may, for good sufficient reasons and as here in after provided, be imposed by the Disciplinary Authority on an employee, namely:- (i) Censure; (ii) Withholding of increment (s); (iii) Compulsory leave; (iv) Recovery from pay of the whole of part of any pecuniary loss caused to the University by negligence or breach of orders, (v) Revision to a lower service, grade or post, or to a lower time scale, or to a lower stage in a time scale; (vi) Compulsory retirement; (vii) Removal from service which shall not be disqualification for future employment; (viii) Dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be disqualification for future employment. Explanation:- The following shall not amount to a penalty within the meaning of this rule:- (a) Stoppage of an increment at an efficiency bar in the time scale on the ground of his unfitness to cross the bar, (b) Non-promotion whether in substantive or officiating capacity of an employee, after due consideration of his case, to a service, grade or post promotion to which he may be eligible, (c) Revision to a lower service, grade or post of an employee officiating in a higher service, grade or post on the ground that he is considered after trial, to be unsuitable for such higher service, grade or post or on administrative grounds unconducted with his conduct; (d) Reversion to his permanent service, grade post of an employee appointed on probation to another service, grade or post during or at the end of the period of probation in accordance with the terms of his appointment or the rules and orders governing probation. (e) Termination of services (i) An employee appointed on probation during or at the end of the period of probation in accordance with the terms of his appointment or the rules and orders governing probation, (ii) Of an employee, employed under an agreement in accordance with the terms of such agreement, (iii) Of an employee whose terms of appointment provides for the termination of service by either party giving notice for a specific period; Of an employee in whose case the appointment is expressly stated to be on temporary basis and to have been sanctioned until further orders and it is also provided that his services may be terminated at any time without notice. Rule 48 provides for procedure for imposing penalties: (i) No order imposing on an employee any of the penalties specified in rule 46 shall be passed except after an inquiry, held as far may be in the manner herein after provided; (ii) The Disciplinary Authority shall frame definite charges on the basis of the allegations on which the inquiry is proposed to be held such charges together with a statement of the allegations on which they are based shall be communicated in writing to the employee and he shall be required to submit, within such time as may be specified by the Disciplinary Authority, a written statement of his defence and also to since whether he desires to be heard in person. (iii) The employee shall, for the purpose of his preparing his defense be permitted to inspect and on take extract from such official records as he may specify provided that such permission may be refused it for reason to be recorded in writing in the portion of the Disciplinary Authority such records are not event for purpose or it is against the interest of the University to allow his access thereto, provided that when an employee is permitted to inspect and to take extract from official records due care shall be taken against tempering, removal or destruction of records. (iv) On receipt of the written statement of defense, or if no such statement is received within the time specified, the Disciplinary Authority may itself inquire into such of the charges as are not admitted or if considers it necessary so to do, appoint for the purpose a Board of inquiry or an Inquiring Officer. (iv) On receipt of the written statement of defense, or if no such statement is received within the time specified, the Disciplinary Authority may itself inquire into such of the charges as are not admitted or if considers it necessary so to do, appoint for the purpose a Board of inquiry or an Inquiring Officer. (v) The Inquiry Authority Shall, in the course of the Inquiry, consider such documentary evidence and take such oral evidence as may relevant or materials in regard to the charges. The employee shall be entitled to cross-examine witnesses examined in support of the charges and to give evidence in person and adduce documentary and oral evidence in his defense. If the Inquiry Authority declines to examine any witness or to admit any document in evidence on the ground that his evidence or such document is not relevant or material it shall record its reasons in writing. No agent of the employee nor any legal practitioner on the employee behalf shall be allowed in such inquiry. (vi) At the conclusion of the inquiry, the Inquiry shall prepare a report of the inquiry recording its finding on each of the charges together with reasons therefore. (vii) The record of the inquiry shall include:- (a) The Charge framed against the employee and the statement of allegations furnished to him under sub-rule (2). (b) His written statement of defense, if any; (c) The oral evidence taken in the course of the inquiry. (d) The documentary evidence considered in the courses of the inquiry. (e) The orders, if any, made by the Disciplinary Authority and the inquiring authority in regard on the inquiry and Provided that where the detention is made on account of any charge not connected with his position as a University employees or continuance in office is not likely to embarrass the University or the University employee in the discharge of his duties or the charge does not involve moral turpitude, the Appointing Authority may vacate the suspension order made or deemed to have been made when he is released on bail or is not otherwise in custody or imprisonment. (f) A report setting out the finding on each charge the reasons therefore; (viii) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it is not the inquiring authority, consider the record of the inquiry and records of the inquiry. and records its finding on each charge. (f) A report setting out the finding on each charge the reasons therefore; (viii) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it is not the inquiring authority, consider the record of the inquiry and records of the inquiry. and records its finding on each charge. (ix) Major Penalties:- (a) If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its finding on the charges is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clause (v) to (viii) of rule 46 should be imposed, shall (b) Furnish to the employee a copy of the report of the Inquiring Authority and, where the Disciplinary Authority is not the Inquiring authority a statement of its findings together with brief reasons for disagreement, if any with the findings of the Inquiring authority and (c) Give him notice stating the penalty proposed to be impose on him calling upon him to submit within a specified time such representation as he may wish to make on the proposed penalty only on the basis of the evidence adduced during the enquiry. (d) The disciplinary Authority shall consider the representation, if any, made by the employee in response to the notice under clause (i) above determine what penalty, if any, should be imposed on the employee and pass appropriate final orders. If such representation contains statements, reference, request demands. etc. Not based on the evidence adduced during the inquiry such statement etc. should be ignored and this fact should be brought out in the final orders passed in the case. 12.3 The Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964. Rule - 7 of the Assam Services Discipline and Appeal Rules also provides for the nature of penalties. etc. Not based on the evidence adduced during the inquiry such statement etc. should be ignored and this fact should be brought out in the final orders passed in the case. 12.3 The Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964. Rule - 7 of the Assam Services Discipline and Appeal Rules also provides for the nature of penalties. It provides that the following penalties may for good and sufficient reason and as hereinafter provided, be imposed, on a Government servant, namely (i) Censure; (ii) Withholding of increments of promotion; (iii) Recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused by negligence or breach of orders to the Government of Assam or the Central Government or any other State Government, or any local or other authority to whom services of a Government servant had been lent; (iv) Reduction to a lower service, grade or post, or to a lower time-scale, or to a lower stage in a time-scale; (v) Compulsory retirement; (vi) Removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment; (vii) Dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment. Explanation- The following shall not amount to a penalty within the meaning of this rule- (a) withholding of increments of a Government servant for failure to pass a departmental examination or successfully undergo training prescribed in accordance with the rules or orders governing the service or post or the terms of his appointment; (b) stoppages of a Government servant at an efficiency bar in the time-scale on the ground of his unfitness to cross the bar; (c) non-promotion whether on a substantive or officiating capacity of a Government servant, after due consideration of his case to a service, grade or post for promotion to which he is eligible; (d) reversion to lower service, grade or post of a Government servant officiating in higher service, grade or post on the ground that he is considered after trial, to be unsuitable for such higher service grade or post or on administrative grounds unconnected with his conduct; (e) reversion to his permanent service, grade or post of a Government servant appointed on probation to another service grade or post during or at the end of the period of probation in accordance with the terms of his appointment or the rules and orders governing probation; (f) compulsory retirement of a Government servant after completion of 25 years qualifying service or 30 years qualifying service as the case may be, under the provisions of Articles 103, 104 of the Assam Pension Manual and Rule 1(2) of Section 1 of the Assam Liberalised Pension Rules; (g) Termination of the Services:- (i) of a Government servant appointed on probation during or at the end of the period on probation, in accordance with the terms of his appointment or the rules and orders governing probation; or (ii) of a Government servant employed under an agreement in accordance with the terms of such agreement; (iii) of a Government servant whose term of appointment provides for the termination of service by either party giving notice for a specified period; (iv) of a Government servant in whose case the appointment is expressly stated to be on temporary basis and to have been sanctioned until further orders and it is also provided that his services may be terminated at any time without notice. Rule – 9 provides for the procedure for imposing penalties. Rule – 9 provides for the procedure for imposing penalties. It provides that:- (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servant (Inquiry) Act, 1850, no order imposing on a Government servant any of the penalties specified in rule 7 shall be passed except after an inquiry, held as far as may be in the manner hereinafter provided. (2) The Disciplinary Authority shall frame definite charges on the basis of the allegations on which the inquiry is proposed to be held. Such charges, together with a statement of the allegations on which they are based, shall be communicated in writing to the Government servant, and he shall be required to submit, within such time as may be specified by the Disciplinary Authority, a written statement of his defence and also to state whether he desires to be heard in pension. ["At the time of delivering the charges, the Disciplinary Authority shall invariably furnish to the Government servant a list of documents and witnesses by which each article of charges is proposed to be sustained".] Explanation- In this sub-rule and sub-rule (3), the expression "the Disciplinary Authority" shall include the authority competent under these rules to impose upon the Government servant any of the penalties specified in Rule 7. (3) The Government servant shall, for the purpose of preparing his defence, be permitted to inspect and take extracts from such official records as he may specify, provided that such permission may be refused if for reasons to be recorded in writing, in the opinion of the Disciplinary Authority such records are not relevant for the purpose or its against the public interest to allow him access thereto : Provided that when a Government servant is permitted to inspect and take extracts from official records due case shall be taken against tempering removal or destruction of records. (4) On received of the written statement of defence, or if no such statement is received within the time specified the Disciplinary Authority may itself inquire into such of the charge as are not admitted or, if it considers it necessary so to do, appoint for the purpose a Board of Inquiry or an Inquiring Officer. (5) The Disciplinary Authority may nominate any person to present the case in support of the charges before the authority inquiring into the charges (hereinafter referred to as the inquiring authority). (5) The Disciplinary Authority may nominate any person to present the case in support of the charges before the authority inquiring into the charges (hereinafter referred to as the inquiring authority). The Government servant may present his case with the assistance of any other Government servant approved by the Disciplinary Authority, but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the person nominated by the Disciplinary Authority as aforesaid is a legal practitioner or unless the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case so permits. (6) The Enquiring Authority shall, in the course of the enquiry consider such documentary evidence and take such oral evidence as may be relevant or material in regard to the charges. The Government servant shall be entitled to cross-examine witnesses examined in support of the charges and to give evidence in person and to adduce documentary and oral evidence in his defence. The person presenting the case in support of the charges shall be entitled to cross-examine the Government servant and the witnesses examined in his defence. If the Inquiring Authority declines to examine any witness or to admit any document in evidence on the ground that his evidence or such document is not relevant or material, it shall record its reasons in writing. (7) At the conclusion of the inquiry, the inquiring Authority shall prepare a report of the enquiry, recording its findings on each of the charges together with reasons therefor. ["Explanations- If in the opinion of the Enquiring Authority the proceedings of the enquiry establish any article of charge different from the original article of the charge it may record its findings on such article of charge : Provided that the findings on such article of charge shall not be recorded unless the Government servant has either admitted the facts on which such article of charge is based or has a reasonable opportunity of defending himself against such article of charge"]. (8) The record of the inquiry, shall include (i) the charges framed against the Government servant and the statement of allegations furnished to him under sub-rule (2); (ii) his written statement of defence, if any; (iii) the oral evidence taken in the course of the enquiry; (iv) the documentary evidence considered in the course of the inquiry; (v) the orders, if any, made by the Disciplinary Authority and the Inquiring Authority in regard to the inquiry; and (vi) a report setting out the findings on each charge and the reasons therefor. (9) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it is not the Inquiring Authority; consider the record of the inquiry and record its finding on each charge. (10) Major Penalties. If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its finding on the charges and on the basis of evidence adduced during the inquiry, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in Clauses (iv) to (vii) of Rule 7 should be imposed on the Government servant it shall make an order imposing such penalty and it shall not be necessary to give the Government servant any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed: Provided that in every case where it is necessary to consult the Commission the record of the inquiry shall be forwarded by the Disciplinary Authority to the Commission for its advice and such advice shall be taken into consideration before making an order imposing and such penalty on the Government servant". (11) Minor Penalties:- If the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to its findings on the charges, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (i) to (iii) of Rule 7 should be imposed, it shall, pass appropriate orders and in every case in which it is necessary to consult the Commission, shall do so, after consulting the Commission. (12) (a) Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule, it shall not be necessary to follow the procedure laid down in the preceeding sub-rules in cases where it appears to the authority competent to impose the penalty at the initial stage of the proceedings that the penalty of censure would be adequate, but if at any later stage it is proposed to impose any other penalty specified in Rule 7, the procedure laid down in the said rules shall be followed. (b) No order imposing the penalty of censure shall however be passed, except after- (i) the Government servant is informed in writing of the proposal to take action against him and of the allegations on which it is proposed to be taken and given an opportunity to make any representation he may wish to make; and (ii) such representation, if any, is taken into consideration by the Disciplinary Authority. Rule – 10 provides for special procedure in certain cases. It provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 9 (i) where a penalty is imposed on a Government servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (ii) where the Disciplinary Authority is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in the said; or (iii) where the Governor is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the state, it is not expedient to follow such procedure, the Disciplinary Authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders thereon as it deems fit : Provided that the Commission shall be consulted before passing such orders in any case in which such consultation is necessary. The Precedents relevant on the Issue:- 13. The issue of entitlement of protection under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India was dealt with by Hon'ble Supreme Court in plethora of decisions. The sum and substance of the said decisions are that if the Government takes action against them by meeting out one of the three punishments i.e. dismissal, removal, reduction in rank then the protection under Article 311(2) will be available to them. The most cited decisions in this regard are Parshotam Lal Dhingra (supra) and also in the case of Champaklal Chimanlal Shah vs. The Union of India , reported in AIR 1964 SC 1854 . 13.1 It is to be noted here that in the case of Parshotam Lal Dhingra (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: " The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows: Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. 13.1 It is to be noted here that in the case of Parshotam Lal Dhingra (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: " The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows: Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held by this Court in Satish Chander Anand v. The Union of India (supra) [1953] S.C.R. 655,. Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Art. 311(2), as has also been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (I). ,In either of the two abovementioned cases the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, or allowances under r. 52 of the Fundamental Rules. It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive, operating on the mind of the Government is, as Chagla C.J. has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India (supra), wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Art.311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Art.311 must be complied with. As already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A termination of the service of such a servant on such grounds must be a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within Art.311, for it operates as a forfeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting his future career. A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of punishment or it may be an innocuous thing.' If the Government servant has a right to a particular rank, then the very reduction from that rank will operate as a penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank. If, however, he has no right to the particular rank, his reduction from an officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rank will not ordinarily be a punishment. But the mere fact that the servant has no title to the post or the rank and the Government has, by contract, express or implied, or under the rules, the right to reduce him to a lower post does not mean that an order of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot in any circumstances be a Punishment. The real test for determining whether the reduction in such cases is or is not by way of punishment is to find out if the order for the reduction also visits the servant with any penal consequences. Thus if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or, the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, then that circumstance may indicate that although in form the Government bad purported to exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the terms of the contract of employment or under the rules, in truth and reality the Government has terminated the employment as and by way of penalty. The use of the expression "terminate" or "discharge" is not con, elusive. The use of the expression "terminate" or "discharge" is not con, elusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court has to apply the two tests mentioned above, namely, (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to? If the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the servant has been punished and the termination of his service must be taken as a dismissal or removal from service or the reversion to his substantive rank must be regarded as a reduction in rank and if the requirements of the rules and Art.311, which give protection to Government servant have not been complied with, the termination of the service or the reduction in rank must be held to be wrongful and in violation of the constitutional right of the servant. 13.2 Again in the case of Champaklal Chimanlal Shah (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- " It is well settled that temporary servants are also entitled to the protection of Art. 311(2) in the same manner as permanent government servants, if the government takes action against them by meting out one of the three punishments i.e. dismissal, removal or reduction in rank:(see Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India [1958] S.C.R. 828). But this protection is only available where discharge, removal or reduction in rank is sought to be inflicted by way of punishment and not otherwise. It is also not disputed that the mere use of expressions like "terminate" or "discharge" is not conclusive and in spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court has to apply the two tests mentioned in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case(supra), namely- (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences; and if either of the tests is satisfied, it must be held that the servant had been punished. Further even though misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is wholly irrelevant." 13.3 Another decision of a Constitutional Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court, upon which the learned counsel for the respondents relied upon, to argue applicability of the ratio laid down in respect of proviso to Article 311(2) is the case of Tulsiram Patel(supra). The primary conditions for applicability of proviso (b) to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, so laid down in the said case, can be summarized as under:- (i) Before the disciplinary authority, there should be material to conclude that holding a departmental enquiry is not reasonably practicable/feasible, in the circumstances of the case (e.g. serious threats to witnesses, a situation of widespread violence or disorder, or circumstances where the enquiry process itself cannot function safely or effectively). (ii) Such opinion should always be based on objective facts and circumstances, not on mere convenience, departmental expediency, or a desire to avoid the safeguards of Article 311(2), of the authority concerned. (iii) The reason should be recorded in the dismissal/removal order (or in a contemporaneous note) that led the disciplinary authority to the conclusion that holding of an enquiry is not reasonably practicable. (iv) Whether holding of an enquiry is reasonably practicable/feasible or not, the test applicable is, what a reasonable man thinks about it i.e. feasibility, having regards to the prevailing situation. (v) If such a person could regard an enquiry is reasonably practicable, clause (b) cannot be used. (vi) Since the power is exceptional one, it must be used sparingly. (vii) On account of the enquiry being time consuming or difficult or on account of the believes by the authority the charges being true, the proviso does not permit dispensing with enquiry. (viii) If the reasons so recorded in the dismissal /removal order passed under proviso (b), by the authority are irrelevant, irrational, mala fide, or show that the authority has used clause (b), as a shortcut rather than out of genuine impracticability of holding the enquiry, the same is always subject to judicial interference. (viii) If the reasons so recorded in the dismissal /removal order passed under proviso (b), by the authority are irrelevant, irrational, mala fide, or show that the authority has used clause (b), as a shortcut rather than out of genuine impracticability of holding the enquiry, the same is always subject to judicial interference. 13.4 It is also useful in this context to refer to the decision in Satyavir Singh v. Union of India , reported in (1985) 4 SCC 252, wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with the relevant points as under:- ( 50 ) The three clauses of the second proviso to Article 311 are not intended to be applied in normal and ordinary situations. The second proviso is an exception to the normal rule and before any of the three clauses of that proviso is applied to the case of a civil servant, the conditions laid down in that clause must be satisfied. ( 51 ) Where a situation envisaged in one of the clauses of the second proviso to Article 311(2) exists, it is not mandatory that the punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank should be imposed upon a civil servant. The disciplinary authority will first have to decide what punishment is warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case. Such consideration would, however, be ex parte and without hearing the concerned civil servant. If the disciplinary authority comes to the conclusion that the punishment which is called for is that of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, it must dispense with the inquiry and then decide for itself which of the aforesaid three penalties should be imposed. X . C LAUSE ( A ) OF THE SECOND PROVISO ( 52 ) In a case where clause ( a ) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) applies the disciplinary authority is to take the conviction of the concerned civil servant as sufficient proof of misconduct on his part. It has thereafter to decide whether the conduct which had led to the civil servant's conviction on a criminal charge was such as to warrant the imposition of a penalty and, if so, what that penalty should be. It has thereafter to decide whether the conduct which had led to the civil servant's conviction on a criminal charge was such as to warrant the imposition of a penalty and, if so, what that penalty should be. For this purpose it must peruse the judgment of the criminal court and take into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case and the various factors set out in Challappan case [ (1976) 3 SCC 190 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 398 : (1976) 1 SCR 783 ] such as, the entire conduct of the civil servant, the gravity of the offence committed by him, the impact which his misconduct is likely to have on the administration, whether the offence for which he was convicted was of a technical or trivial nature, and the extenuating circumstances, if any, present in the case. This, however, has to be done by the disciplinary authority ex parte and without hearing the concerned civil servant. ( 53 ) The penalty imposed upon the civil servant should not be arbitrary or grossly excessive or out of all proportion to the offence committed or one not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case. ( 54 ) Where a civil servant goes to the office of his superior officer whom he believes to be responsible for stopping his increment and hits him on the head with an iron rod, so that the superior officer falls down with a bleeding head, and the delinquent civil servant is tried and convicted under Section 332 of the Penal Code, 1860 but the Magistrate, instead of sentencing him to imprisonment, applies to him the provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, and after such conviction the disciplinary authority, taking the above facts into consideration, by way of punishment compulsorily retires the delinquent civil servant under clause ( i ) of Section 19 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, it cannot be said that the punishment inflicted upon the civil servant was excessive or arbitrary. XI . C LAUSE ( B ) OF THE SECOND PROVISO ( 55 ) There are two conditions precedent which must be satisfied before clause ( b ) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) can be applied. XI . C LAUSE ( B ) OF THE SECOND PROVISO ( 55 ) There are two conditions precedent which must be satisfied before clause ( b ) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) can be applied. These conditions are: (i) there must exist a situation which makes the holding of an inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2) not reasonably practicable, and (ii) the disciplinary authority should record in writing its reason for its satisfaction that it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry. ( 56 ) Whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. ( 57 ) It is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required by clause ( b ) of the second proviso. What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation. ( 58 ) The reasonable practicability of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority and must be judged in the light of the circumstances then prevailing. The disciplinary authority is generally on the spot and knows what is happening. It is because the disciplinary authority is the best judge of the prevailing situation that clause (3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary authority on this question final. ( 59 ) It is not possible to enumerate the cases in which it would not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry. Illustrative cases would be ( 60 ) The disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department's case against the civil servant is weak and must fail. ( 61 ) The word ‚inquiry? in c lause ( b ) of the second proviso includes a part of an inquiry. It is, therefore, not necessary that the situation which makes the holding of an inquiry not reasonably practicable should exist before the inquiry is instituted against the civil servant. ( 61 ) The word ‚inquiry? in c lause ( b ) of the second proviso includes a part of an inquiry. It is, therefore, not necessary that the situation which makes the holding of an inquiry not reasonably practicable should exist before the inquiry is instituted against the civil servant. Such a situation can also come into existence subsequently during the course of the inquiry, for instance, after the service of a charge-sheet upon the civil servant or after he has filed his written statement thereto or even after evidence has been led in part. ( 62 ) It will also not be reasonably practicable to afford to the civil servant an opportunity of a hearing or further hearing, as the case may be, when at the commencement of the inquiry or pending it, the civil servant absconds and cannot be served or will not participate in the inquiry. In such cases, the matter must proceed ex parte and on the materials before the disciplinary authority. ( 63 ) The recording of the reason for dispensing with the inquiry is a condition precedent to the application of clause ( b ) of the second proviso. This is a constitutional obligation and if such reason is not recorded in writing, the order dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty following thereupon would both be void and unconstitutional. It is, however, not necessary that the reason should find a place in the final order but it would be advisable to record it in the final order in order to avoid an allegation that the reason was not recorded in writing before passing the final order but was subsequently fabricated. ( 64 ) The reason for dispensing with the inquiry need not contain detailed particulars but it cannot be vague or just a repetition of the language of clause ( b ) of the second proviso. ( 65 ) It is also not necessary to communicate the reason for dispensing with the inquiry to the concerned civil servant but it would be better to do so in order to eliminate the possibility of an allegation being made that the reason was subsequently fabricated. ( 65 ) It is also not necessary to communicate the reason for dispensing with the inquiry to the concerned civil servant but it would be better to do so in order to eliminate the possibility of an allegation being made that the reason was subsequently fabricated. ( 66 ) The obligation to record the reason in writing is provided in clause ( b ) of the second proviso so that the superiors of the disciplinary authority may be able to judge whether such authority had exercised its power under clause ( b ) properly or not with a view to judge the performance and capacity of that officer for the purposes of promotion etc. ( 67 ) It is, however, better for the disciplinary authority to communicate to the concerned civil servant its reason for dispensing with the inquiry because such communication would eliminate the possibility of an allegation being made that the reason had been subsequently fabricated. It would also enable the civil servant to approach the High Court under Article 226 or, in a fit case, the Supreme Court under Article 32. ( 68 ) The submission that where a delinquent government servant so terrorizes the disciplinary authority that neither that officer nor any other officer stationed at that place is willing to hold the inquiry, some senior officer can be sent from outside to hold the inquiry cannot be accepted. This submission itself shows that in such a case the holding of an inquiry is not reasonably practicable. It would be illogical to hold that administrative work carried out by senior officers should be paralysed just because a delinquent civil servant either by himself or along with or through others makes the holding of an inquiry by the designated disciplinary authority or inquiry officer not reasonably practicable. It would be illogical to hold that administrative work carried out by senior officers should be paralysed just because a delinquent civil servant either by himself or along with or through others makes the holding of an inquiry by the designated disciplinary authority or inquiry officer not reasonably practicable. (a) where a civil servant, particularly through or together with his associates, so terrorizes, threatens or intimidates witnesses who are going to give evidence against him with fear of reprisal as to prevent them from doing so, or (b) where the civil servant by himself or together with or through others threatens, intimidates and terrorizes the officer who is the disciplinary authority or members of his family so that he is afraid to hold the inquiry or direct it to be held, or (c) where an atmosphere of violence or of general indiscipline and insubordination prevails, it being immaterial whether the concerned civil servant is or is not a party to bringing about such a situation. In all these cases, it must be remembered that numbers coerce and terrify while an individual may not. ( 69 ) In a case falling under clause ( b ) of the second proviso it is not necessary that the civil servant should be placed under suspension until such time as the situation improves and it becomes possible to hold the inquiry because in such cases neither public interest nor public good requires that salary or subsistence allowance should be continued to be paid out of the public exchequer to the concerned civil servant. It would also be difficult to foresee how long the situation would last and when normalcy would return or be restored. In certain cases, the exigencies of a situation would require that prompt action should be taken and suspending a civil servant would not serve the purpose and sometimes not taking prompt action might result in the trouble spreading and the situation worsening and at times becoming uncontrollable. Not taking prompt action may also be construed by the trouble-makers as a sign of weakness on the part of the authorities and thus encourage them to step up their activities or agitation. Not taking prompt action may also be construed by the trouble-makers as a sign of weakness on the part of the authorities and thus encourage them to step up their activities or agitation. Where such prompt action is taken in order to prevent this happening, there is an element of deterrence in it but this is an unavoidable and necessary concomitance of such an action resulting from a situation which is not of the creation of the authorities. ( 70 ) The contention that where an inquiry into the charges against a civil servant is not reasonably practicable, nonetheless before dispensing with the inquiry there should be a preliminary inquiry into the question whether the disciplinary inquiry should be dispensed with or not is illogical and is a contradiction in terms. If an inquiry into the charges against a civil servant is not reasonably practicable, it stands to reason that an inquiry into the question whether the disciplinary inquiry should be dispensed with or not is equally not reasonably practicable. ( 71 ) Where a large group of members of the Central Industrial Security Force Unit posted at the plant of the Bokaro Steel Ltd. indulged in acts of insubordination, indiscipline, dereliction of duty, abstention from physical training and parade, taking out processions, shouting inflammatory slogans, participating in the ‚gherao? of supervisory officers, going on hunger strike and ‚dharna? near the Quarter Guard and Administrative Building of the Unit, indulging in threats of violence, bodily harm and other acts of intimidation to supervisory officers and loyal members of the said Unit, and thus created a situation whereby the normal functioning of the said Unit of the Central Industrial Security Force was made difficult and impossible, the disciplinary authority was justified in applying clause ( b of the second proviso to those who were considered responsible for such acts. Clause ( b ) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) was also properly applied in the cases of those members of the Central Industrial Security Force who were considered responsible for creating a similar situation at Hoshangabad. ( 72 ) In cases such as the above, it is not possible to state in the order of dismissal the particular acts done by each of the members of the concerned group as such cases are very much like a case under Section 149 of the Penal Code, 1860. ( 72 ) In cases such as the above, it is not possible to state in the order of dismissal the particular acts done by each of the members of the concerned group as such cases are very much like a case under Section 149 of the Penal Code, 1860. ( 73 ) In situations such as the one where a large group was acting collectively with the common object of coercing those in charge of the administration of the Central Industrial Security Force and the Government to compel them to grant recognition to their Association and to concede their demands, it is not possible to particularize in the orders of dismissal the acts of each individual member who participated in the commission of these acts. The participation of each individual might be of a greater or lesser degree but the acts of each individual contributed to the creation of a situation in which a security force itself became a security risk. ( 74 ) Railway service is a public utility service within the meaning of clause ( a ) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the proper running of the railway service is vital to the country. ( 75 ) Where, therefore, the railway employees went on an illegal all-India strike without complying with the provisions of Section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and thereby committed an offence punishable with imprisonment and fine under Section 26(1) of the said Act and the situation became such that the railway services were paralysed, loyal workers and superior officers assaulted and intimidated, the country held to ransom, and the economy of the country and public interest and public good prejudicially affected, prompt and immediate action was called for in order to bring the situation to normal. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that an inquiry was reasonably practicable or that clause ( b ) of the second proviso was not properly applied. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that an inquiry was reasonably practicable or that clause ( b ) of the second proviso was not properly applied. The fact that the railway employees may have gone on strike with the object of forcing the Government to meet their demands is not relevant because their demands were for their private gain and in their private interest and the railway employees were not entitled in seeking to have their demands conceded to cause untold hardship to the public and prejudicially affect public good and public interest and the good and interest of the nation. ( 76 ) The quantum and extent of the penalty to be imposed in cases such as the above would depend upon the gravity of the situation at a particular centre and the extent to which the acts said to be committed by particular civil servants, even though not serious in themselves, in conjunction with acts committed by others contributed to bringing about the situation. The fact, therefore, that at a particular centre certain civil servants were dismissed from service while at some other centres they were only removed from service does not mean that the penalties were arbitrarily imposed. XII . C LAUSE ( C ) OF THE SECOND PROVISO ( 77 ) The expression ‚security of the State? in clause ( c ) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) does not mean security of the entire country or a whole State but includes security of a part of a State. ( 78 ) Security of the State cannot be confined to an armed rebellion or revolt for there are various ways in which the security of the State can be affected such as by State secrets or information relating to defence production or similar matters being passed on to other countries, whether inimical or not to India, or by secret links with terrorists. ( 79 ) The way in which the security of the State is affected may be either open or clandestine. ( 80 ) One of the obvious acts which would affect the security of the State would be disaffection in the armed forces or paramilitary forces or the police force. The importance of the proper discharge of the duties by members of these forces and the maintenance of discipline among them is emphasized in Article 33 of the Constitution. ( 80 ) One of the obvious acts which would affect the security of the State would be disaffection in the armed forces or paramilitary forces or the police force. The importance of the proper discharge of the duties by members of these forces and the maintenance of discipline among them is emphasized in Article 33 of the Constitution. ( 81 ) Disaffection in any armed force or paramilitary force or police force is likely to spread because dissatisfied and disaffected members of such a force spread dissatisfaction and disaffection among other members of the force and thus induce them not to discharge their duties properly and to commit acts of indiscipline, insubordination or disobedience to the orders of their superiors. Such a situation cannot be a matter affecting only law and order or public order but is a matter vitally affecting the security of the State. ( 82 ) The interest of the security of the State can be affected by actual acts or even by the likelihood of such acts taking place. ( 83 ) In an inquiry into acts affecting the interest of the security of the State, several matters not fit or proper to be made public, including the source of information involving a civil servant in such acts, would be disclosed and thus in such cases an inquiry into acts prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State would as much prejudice the interest of the security of the State as those acts themselves would. ( 84 ) The condition for the application of clause ( c ) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) is the satisfaction of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, that it is not expedient in the interest of the security of the State to hold a disciplinary inquiry. ( 85 ) Such satisfaction is not required to be that of the President or the Governor personally but of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, acting in the constitutional sense. ( 86 ) ‚Expedient? means ‚advantageous, fit, proper, suitable or politic?. ( 85 ) Such satisfaction is not required to be that of the President or the Governor personally but of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, acting in the constitutional sense. ( 86 ) ‚Expedient? means ‚advantageous, fit, proper, suitable or politic?. W here, therefore, the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that it will not be advantageous or fit or proper or suitable or politic in the interest of the security of the State to hold an inquiry, he would be entitled to dispense with it under clause ( c of the second proviso. ( 87 ) Under clause ( c ) of the second proviso the satisfaction reached by the President or the Governor, as the case may be, must necessarily be a subjective satisfaction because expediency involves matters of policy. ( 88 ) Satisfaction of the President or the Governor under clause ( c ) of the second proviso may be arrived at as a result of secret information received by the Government about the brewing danger to the security of the State and like matters. There are other factors which are also required to be considered, weighed and balanced in order to reach the requisite satisfaction whether holding an inquiry would be expedient or not. If the requisite satisfaction has been reached as a result of secret information received by the Government, making known such information may very often result in disclosure of the source of such information and once known the particular source from which the information was received would no more be available to the Government. The reason for the satisfaction reached by the President or the Governor under clause ( c ) of the second proviso cannot, therefore, be required to be recorded in the order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank nor can it be made public. ( 89 ) The police are the guardians of law and order. They stand guard at the border between the green valleys of law and order and the rough and hilly terrain of lawlessness and public disorder, and if these guards turn law-breakers and create violent public disorder and incite others to do the same, one can only exclaim with Juvenal, Quis custodiet ipsos! Custodes? — ‚Who is to guard the guards themselves?? ( Satires , VI, 347). Custodes? — ‚Who is to guard the guards themselves?? ( Satires , VI, 347). In such a situation prompt and urgent action becomes necessary and the holding of an inquiry into the conduct of each individual member of the police force would not be expedient in the interest of the security of the State. ( 90 ) When, therefore, a number of members of the Madhya Pradesh District Police Force and the Madhya Pradesh Special Armed Force, in order to obtain the release on bail of two of their colleagues who had been refused bail and remanded into judicial custody because of an incident which took place at the annual Mela held at Gwalior in which one man was burnt alive, indulged in violent demonstrations and rioted at the Mela ground, attacked the police station at the Mela ground, ransacked it and forced the wireless operator to close down the wireless set and the situation became so dangerous that senior district and police officers had to approach the Judicial Magistrate at night to get the two arrested constables released on bail and, after discussion at a Cabinet meeting, a decision was taken and the advice of the Council of Ministers was tendered to the Governor of Madhya Pradesh who accepted it and issued orders of dismissal of these persons by applying clause ( c ) of the second proviso to them, it cannot be said that the provisions of the said clause ( c ) were not properly applied. ( 91 ) Similarly, when after these members of the Madhya Pradesh District Police Force and the Madhya Pradesh Special Armed Force were dismissed, some other members of these Forces began carrying on an active propaganda against the Government, visiting various places in the State of Madhya Pradesh, holding secret meetings, distributing leaflets and inciting the constabulary in these places to rise against the administration as a body in protest against the action taken by the Government and, on such information being received, they were also dismissed by applying clause ( c ) of the second proviso to them, it cannot be said that the said clause ( c ) was not properly applied." 13.5 Again in the case of Jaswant Singh vs. State of Punjab , reported in (1991) 1 SCC 362 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the subjective satisfaction recorded by the respondent authority has to be fortified by any independent material to justify the dispensing with of the inquiry envisaged by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Relevant para is quoted herein below:- " 5. The impugned order of April 7, 1981 itself contains the reasons for dispensing with the inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Paragraph 3 of the said order, which we have extracted earlier, gives two reasons in support of the satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry against the appellant. These are ( i ) the appellant has thrown threats that he with the help of other police employees will not allow holding of any departmental enquiry against him and ( ii ) he and his associates will not hesitate to cause physical injury to the witnesses as well as the enquiry officer. Now as stated earlier after the two revision applications were allowed on October 13, 1980, the appellant had rejoined service as Head Constable on March 5, 1981 but he was immediately placed under suspension. Thereafter, two show cause notices dated April 4, 1981 were issued against him calling upon him to reply thereto within 10 days after the receipt thereof. Before the service of these notices the incident of alleged attempt to commit suicide took place on the morning of April 6, 1981 at about 11.00 a.m. In that incident the appellant sustained an injury on his right arm with a knife. Before the service of these notices the incident of alleged attempt to commit suicide took place on the morning of April 6, 1981 at about 11.00 a.m. In that incident the appellant sustained an injury on his right arm with a knife. He was, therefore, hospitalised and while he was in hospital the two show cause notices were served on him at about 10.00 p.m. on April 6, 1981. Before the appellant could reply to the said show cause notices respondent 3 passed the impugned order on the very next day i.e. April 7, 1981. Now the earlier departmental enquiries were duly conducted against the appellant and there is no allegation that the department had found any difficulty in examining witnesses in the said inquiries. After the revision applications were allowed the show cause notices were issued and 10 days time was given to the appellant to put in his replies thereto. We, therefore, enquired from the learned counsel for the respondents to point out what impelled respondent 3 to take a decision that it was necessary to forthwith terminate the services of the appellant without holding an inquiry as required by Article 311(2). The learned counsel for the respondents could only point out clause ( iv )( a ) of sub-para 29(A) of the counter which reads as under:- "The order dated April 7, 1981 was passed as the petitioner's activities were objectionable. He was instigating his fellow police officials to cause indiscipline, show insubordination and exhibit disloyalty, spreading discontentment and hatred, etc. and his retention in service was adjudged harmful." This is no more than a mere reproduction of paragraph 3 of the impugned order. Our attention was not drawn to any material existing on the date of the impugned order in support of the allegation contained in paragraph 3 thereof that the appellant had thrown threats that he and his companions will not allow holding of any departmental enquiry against him and that they would not hesitate to cause physical injury to the witnesses as well as the enquiry officer if any such attempt was made. It was incumbent on the respondents to disclose to the court the material in existence at the date of the passing of the impugned order in support of the subjective satisfaction recorded by respondent 3 in the impugned order. It was incumbent on the respondents to disclose to the court the material in existence at the date of the passing of the impugned order in support of the subjective satisfaction recorded by respondent 3 in the impugned order. Clause ( b ) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) can be invoked only when the authority is satisfied from the material placed before him that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry. This is clear from the following observation at page 270 of Tulsiram case [ (1985) 3 SCC 398 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 672 : 1985 Supp 2 SCR 131] : (SCC p. 504, para 130) "A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the department's case against the government servant is weak and must fail." The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer. In the counter filed by respondent 3 it is contended that the appellant, instead of replying to the show cause notices, instigated his fellow police officials to disobey the superiors. It is also said that he threw threats to beat up the witnesses and the Inquiry Officer if any departmental inquiry was held against him. No particulars are given. Besides it is difficult to understand how he could have given threats, etc. when he was in hospital. It is not shown on what material respondent 3 came to the conclusion that the appellant had thrown threats as alleged in paragraph 3 of the impugned order. On a close scrutiny of the impugned order it seems the satisfaction was based on the ground that he was instigating his colleagues and was holding meetings with other police officials with a view to spreading hatred and dissatisfaction towards his superiors. This allegation is based on his alleged activities at Jullundur on April 3, 1981 reported by SHO/GRP, Jullundur. That report is not forthcoming. This allegation is based on his alleged activities at Jullundur on April 3, 1981 reported by SHO/GRP, Jullundur. That report is not forthcoming. It is no one's contention that the said SHO was threatened. Respondent 3's counter also does not reveal if he had verified the correctness of the information. To put it tersely the subjective satisfaction recorded in paragraph 3 of the impugned order is not fortified by any independent material to justify the dispensing with of the inquiry envisaged by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. We are, therefore, of the opinion that on this short ground alone the impugned order cannot be sustained. 13.6 Further, in the case of Reena Rani vs. State of Haryana , reported in (2012) 10 SCC 215 , Hon'ble Supreme Court referring to earlier decisions has held as under :- 7. In the order of dismissal, the Superintendent of Police has not disclosed any reason as to why it was not reasonably practicable to hold regular departmental enquiry. The learned Additional Advocate General fairly stated that the order of dismissal does not contain the reasons as to why it was not reasonably practicable to hold regular departmental enquiry against the appellant. He also admitted that no other record has been made available to him which would have revealed that the Superintendent of Police had recorded reasons for forming an opinion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold regular departmental enquiry for proving the particular charge(s) against the appellant. 8. In view of the above, we hold that the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court committed serious error by negating the appellant's challenge to her dismissal from service without enquiry. The Division Bench of the High Court did not examine the issue in the correct perspective and made general observations that each case is required to be decided on its own facts and no straitjacket formula can be adopted to decide whether it is reasonable and practicable to hold regular enquiry for imposing major penalty of dismissal from service. Such general observations could not have been made basis for approving her dismissal from service without enquiry. 9. In Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398 the Constitution Bench considered the scope of clauses ( a ), ( b ) and ( c ) of the second proviso to Article 311. Such general observations could not have been made basis for approving her dismissal from service without enquiry. 9. In Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398 the Constitution Bench considered the scope of clauses ( a ), ( b ) and ( c ) of the second proviso to Article 311. While dealing with clause ( b ), Madon, J., who spoke for the majority of the Constitution Bench observed: (SCC pp. 503-06, paras 130 & 133-35) " 130 . The condition precedent for the application of clause ( b ) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that ‘it is not reasonably practicable to hold’ the inquiry contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311. What is pertinent to note is that the words used are ‘not reasonably practicable’ and not ‘impracticable’. According to Oxford English Dictionary ‘practicable’ means ‘capable of being put into practice, carried out in action, effected, accomplished, or done; feasible’. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the word ‘practicable’ inter alia as meaning ‘possible to practise or perform: capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished: feasible’. Further, the words used are not ‘not practicable’ but ‘not reasonably practicable’. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the word ‘reasonably’ as ‘in a reasonable manner: to a fairly sufficient extent’. Thus, whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required by clause ( b ). What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation. It is not possible to enumerate the cases in which it would not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry, but some instances by way of illustration may, however, be given. What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation. It is not possible to enumerate the cases in which it would not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry, but some instances by way of illustration may, however, be given. It would not be reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry where the government servant, particularly through or together with his associates, so terrorises, threatens or intimidates witnesses who are going to give evidence against him with fear of reprisal as to prevent them from doing so or where the government servant by himself or together with or through others threatens, intimidates and terrorises the officer who is the disciplinary authority or members of his family so that he is afraid to hold the inquiry or direct it to be held. It would also not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry where an atmosphere of violence or of general indiscipline and insubordination prevails, and it is immaterial whether the government servant concerned is or is not a party to bringing about such an atmosphere. In this connection, we must bear in mind that numbers coerce and terrify while an individual may not. The reasonable practicability of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority. Such authority is generally on the spot and knows what is happening. It is because the disciplinary authority is the best judge of this that clause (3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary authority on this question final. A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department's case against the government servant is weak and must fail. The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is not binding upon the court so far as its power of judicial review is concerned and in such a case the court will strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order imposing penalty. … *** 133 . The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is not binding upon the court so far as its power of judicial review is concerned and in such a case the court will strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order imposing penalty. … *** 133 . The second condition necessary for the valid application of clause ( b ) of the second proviso is that the disciplinary authority should record in writing its reason for its satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2). This is a constitutional obligation and if such reason is not recorded in writing, the order dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty following thereupon would both be void and unconstitutional. 134 . It is obvious that the recording in writing of the reason for dispensing with the inquiry must precede the order imposing the penalty. The reason for dispensing with the inquiry need not, therefore, find a place in the final order. It would be usual to record the reason separately and then consider the question of the penalty to be imposed and pass the order imposing the penalty. It would, however, be better to record the reason in the final order in order to avoid the allegation that the reason was not recorded in writing before passing the final order but was subsequently fabricated. The reason for dispensing with the inquiry need not contain detailed particulars, but the reason must not be vague or just a repetition of the language of clause ( b ) of the second proviso. For instance, it would be no compliance with the requirement of clause ( b ) for the disciplinary authority simply to state that he was satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable to hold any inquiry. Sometimes a situation may be such that it is not reasonably practicable to give detailed reasons for dispensing with the inquiry. This would not, however, per se invalidate the order. Each case must be judged on its own merits and in the light of its own facts and circumstances. 135 . Sometimes a situation may be such that it is not reasonably practicable to give detailed reasons for dispensing with the inquiry. This would not, however, per se invalidate the order. Each case must be judged on its own merits and in the light of its own facts and circumstances. 135 . It was vehemently contended that if reasons are not recorded in the final order, they must be communicated to the government servant concerned to enable him to challenge the validity of the reasons in a departmental appeal or before a court of law and that failure to communicate the reasons would invalidate the order. This contention too cannot be accepted. The constitutional requirement in clause ( b ) is that the reason for dispensing with the inquiry should be recorded in writing. There is no obligation to communicate the reason to the government servant. As clause (3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary authority on this point final, the question cannot be agitated in a departmental appeal, revision or review. The obligation to record the reason in writing is provided in clause ( b so that the superiors of the disciplinary authority may be able to judge whether such authority had exercised its power under clause ( b ) properly or not with a view to judge the performance and capacity of that officer for the purposes of promotion, etc. It would, however, be better for the disciplinary authority to communicate to the government servant its reason for dispensing with the inquiry because such communication would eliminate the possibility of an allegation being made that the reasons have been subsequently fabricated. It would also enable the government servant to approach the High Court under Article 226 or, in a fit case, this Court under Article 32. If the reasons are not communicated to the government servant and the matter comes to the court, the court can direct the reasons to be produced and furnished to the government servant, and if still not produced, a presumption should be drawn that the reasons were not recorded in writing and the impugned order would then stand invalidated. Such presumption can, however, be rebutted by a satisfactory explanation for the non-production of the written reasons.? (emphasis supplied) 10. Such presumption can, however, be rebutted by a satisfactory explanation for the non-production of the written reasons.? (emphasis supplied) 10. In Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab (1991) 1 SCC 362, the two-Judge Bench referred to the ratio of Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel [ (1985) 3 SCC 398 and observed: ( Jaswant Singh case [ (1991) 1 SCC 362 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 282 : (1991) 15 ATC 729] , SCC p. 369, para 5) " 5 . … The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the authority concerned. When the satisfaction of the authority concerned is questioned in a court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the officer concerned." 11. By applying the ratio of the above extracted observations to the facts of this case, we hold that the appellant's dismissal from service was ultra vires the provisions of Article 311 and the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court committed serious error by upholding the order dated 23- 4-2010 passed by the Superintendent of Police. 13.7 In the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with the power to terminate the appointment at any time ‘without assigning any cause’ in para 13 as under:- " 13. The learned Additional Advocate General contended that clause (3) of para 7.06 says that the appointment of a District Government Counsel is only professional engagement terminable at will on either side and not appointment to a post under the government; and the government has the power to terminate the appointment at any time ‘ without assigning any cause ’. He contended that this power to terminate the appointment at any time without assigning any cause and the clear statement that the appointment is only professional engagement terminable at will on either side is sufficient to indicate that the relationship is the same as that of a private client and his counsel. In our opinion, this provision has to be read not in isolation, but in the context in which it appears and along with the connected provisions, already referred to. In our opinion, this provision has to be read not in isolation, but in the context in which it appears and along with the connected provisions, already referred to. The expression ‘professional engagement’ is used therein to distinguish it from ‘appointment to a post under the government’ in the strict sense. This, however, does not necessarily mean that a person who is not a government servant holding a post under the government does not hold any public office and the engagement is purely private with no public element attaching to it. This part of clause (3) of para 7.06 means only this and no more. The other part of clause (3) which enables the government to terminate the appointment ‘at any time without assigning any cause’ can also not be considered in the manner suggested by the learned Additional Advocate General. The expression ‘at any time’ merely means that the termination may be made even during the subsistence of the term of appointment and ‘without assigning any cause’ means without communicating any cause to the appointee whose appointment is terminated. However, ‘without assigning any cause’ is not to be equated with ‘without existence of any cause’. It merely means that the reason for which the termination is made need not to be assigned or communicated to the appointee. It was held in Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India [ (1984) 3 SCC 465 ] that the expression ‘without assigning any reason’ implies that the decision has to be communicated, but reasons for the decision have not to be stated; but the reasons must exist, otherwise, the decision would be arbitrary. The non-assigning of reasons or the non-communication thereof may be based on public policy, but termination of an appointment without the existence of any cogent reason in furtherance of the object for which the power is given would be arbitrary and, therefore, against public policy. Clause (3) of para 7.06 must, therefore, be understood to mean that the appointment of a District Government Counsel is not to be equated with appointment to a post under the government in the strict sense, which does not necessarily mean that it results in denuding the office of its public character; and that the appointment may be terminated even during currency of the term by only communicating the decision of termination without communicating the reasons which led to the termination. It does not mean that the appointment is at the sweet will of the government which can be terminated at any time, even without the existence of any cogent reason during the subsistence of the term. The construction, suggested on behalf of the State of U.P. of this provision, if accepted, would amount to conceding arbitrary power of termination to the government, which by itself is sufficient to reject the contention and thereby save it from any attack to its validity. 14. Now, adverting to the facts herein this case, we find that there is no dispute that the petitioner was appointed to the post of LD Assistant vide Office Order dated 20.01.2016 (Annexure-D of the petition), subject to the following terms and conditions:- 1. The engagement is on purely temporary and on contractual basis initially for a period of 1 (one Year) and may be terminated at any time without assigning any reasons thereof. 2. A consolidated amount of Rs. 16,000/- per month will be paid against this engagement. 3. The candidates shall have no claim for regular appointment against any, permanent post virtue of this engagement. 4. The engagement is subject to getting the character and antecedents to be verified from the police authorities. 5. The engaged candidates shall have to follow the Service Conduct Rules applicable for University employees. 6. Candidate are request to join on or before 1 st February, 2016. Sd/ Registrar Gauhati University 14.1 It is also not in dispute that after elapse of one year of the initial term his service was extended from time to time and last such extension was granted till 31.12.2021. It is also not in dispute that in the meantime, the petitioner had instituted a writ proceeding before this Court being W.P.(C) No.4271 of 2018, and during the pendency of this petition, vide order dated 25.07.2023, this Court was pleased to direct the authorities to regularize the service of the petitioner. 14.2 It is also not in dispute that during the currency of his last extension till 31.12.2021, he was arrested on 25.09.2021, in connection with Vigilance Police Station Case No. 04 of 2021, by the Chief Ministers Special Vigilance Cell. And thereafter, vide impugned Notification, dated 25.09.2021, the service of the petitioner was terminated with immediate effect. 14.2 It is also not in dispute that during the currency of his last extension till 31.12.2021, he was arrested on 25.09.2021, in connection with Vigilance Police Station Case No. 04 of 2021, by the Chief Ministers Special Vigilance Cell. And thereafter, vide impugned Notification, dated 25.09.2021, the service of the petitioner was terminated with immediate effect. The impugned Notification dated 25.09.2021 is read as under:- OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR :: GAUHATI UNIVERSITY GOPINATH BARDOLOI NAGAR :: GUWAHATI 14 :: ASSAM NOTIFICATION This is notified for information of all concerned that the Chief Minister's Special Vigilance Cell has arrested (1) Sri Sasanka Saikia, L. D. Assistant (Contractual), Office of the Secretary, University Classes, G. U. (2) Sri Tridip Sarma, (an employee of ITI. Ltd.) working for IUMS and (3) Sri Babilon Kakoti, Security In- charge (an employee of Group 5 Placement & Security Services) in connection with the APDCL Requirement test. In view of the above, the service of Sri Susanka Saikia L. D. Assistant (Contractual), Office of the Secretary, University Classes, G. U. has been terminated with immediate effect as per Clause No. 01 of the terms and condition of his appointment order, dated 20.01.2016. Further, ITI Ltd. is hereby informed to terminate the service of Sri Tridip Sarma with immediate effect and make an alternative arrangement in place of him. Also, the Security Agency i.e. Group 5 Placement & Security Service is hereby informed to terminate Sri Babilon Kakoti with immediate effect. Moreover, the entry of the above three persons is restricted inside the G.U. Campus, hence forth. This is issued with the Hon'ble V.C.'s approval dated 25/09/2021. Sd./-Registrar Gauhati University MemoNo.GU/Estt/Notification/2021/5212-5301, dated 25/09/2021, Copy for information and necessary action to:- 1. The Secretary to V.C., G.U. 2. The Secretary to Registrar, G.U. 3. The Administrative Head, G.U. 4. All Head of Academic Departments, G.U. 5. All Office Superintendents, G.U. 6. Concerned file. Sd./-Illegible Registrar Gauhati University 14.3 Thus, from a cursory perusal of the impugned Notification dated 25.09.2021, following circumstances emerges:- (i) No show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner, prior to issuance of impugned Notification dated 25.09.2021, terminating him from service; (ii) No disciplinary proceeding/enquiry was conducted prior to issuance of the impugned Notification dated 25.09.2021; (iii) Termination from service, which is an extremely harsh penalty, was imposed upon the petitioner. (iv) Entry of the petitioner into the Gauhati University Campus was restricted; (v) Even a copy of the said Notification was not marked/issued to the petitioner; 14.4 As discussed here in above, as per terms and conditions, so mentioned in Clause 5 of the Office Order dated 20.01.2016, the engaged candidates shall have to follow the Service Conduct Rules applicable for University employees. But, admittedly, in the said Rules, no such provision of termination of service of an employee, without conducting an enquiry, is available. However, it is the submission of Mr. Phukan, the learned counsel for the respondents, that the provision of Rule – 10 of the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1964 is parimateria to Article 311(2) and its proviso to the Constitution of India, which provides for special procedure in certain cases and notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 9, the Disciplinary Authority, if satisfied and for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in the said Rule; may dispense with such enquiry, and since the respondent University is a state University, the said provision of Assam Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1964 is also applicable in the case in hand. It is also his submission that in view of the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Tulshiram Patel (supra), even if the reason is not assigned and the source of power is not indicated in the termination order or if there is wrong quotation/misquotation of the provision of law, the same would not invalidate the said order. It is also the stand of the respondents that the petitioner is not entitled to any protection under the provisions of the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964 and/or the inquiry under the provision of the Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. Reliance is placed upon para No. 125, 126, 130, 133 and 135 of the said decision. Reliance is placed upon para No. 125, 126, 130, 133 and 135 of the said decision. 14.5 The counter argument is that the conduct of the authorities clearly leaves no room for any doubt that instead of providing a fair opportunity to the petitioner in terms of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India, they have deliberately stigmatize him and also inflicted upon with the punishment with adverse civil consequences, without even affording him a chance to explain his stand and thereby proceeded with an predetermined vindictive attitude, which violated the fundamental right of the petitioner guaranteed by Article 14, 16(1) and 21 of the Constitution of India. 14.6 There appears to be substance in the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner. As, upon careful evaluation of the materials placed on record, it appears that the respondents had not assigned any reason for dispensing with the requirement of enquiry, as provided under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, in the impugned Notification, dated 25.09.2021. It had simply notified for information of all concerned that the Chief Minister's Special Vigilance Cell has arrested petitioner Sri Sasanka Saikia, L. D. Assistant (Contractual), Office of the Secretary, University Classes, G. U. in connection with the APDCL Requirement test and in view of the above, the service of the petitioner has been terminated with immediate effect as per Clause No. 01 of the terms and condition of his appointment order dated 20.01.2016. 14.7 The requirement of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India is that there must be objective facts and circumstances before the respondent authorities to avoid the safeguards of Article 311(2), of the Constitution of India available to the employee concerned. This issue has already been settled in the case of Parshutom Lal Dhingra (supra). In the case in hand, there was no material, except the factum of arrest of the petitioner, in connection with the APDCL Requirement test, to conclude that holding a departmental enquiry is not reasonably practicable/feasible, in the circumstances of the case such as serious threats to witnesses, a situation of widespread violence or disorder, or circumstances where the enquiry process itself cannot function safely or effectively. Though Mr. Though Mr. Phukan, the learned counsel for the respondent has pointed out that the respondent authority had relied upon Clause No. 01 of the terms and condition of his appointment order dated 20.01.2016, yet it is well settled in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra) , and Liberty Oil Mills (supra) which he had referred to, that 'without assigning any cause' is not to be equated with 'without existence of any cause'. It merely means that the reason for which the termination is made need not to be assigned or communicated to the appointee. The expression 'without assigning any reason' implies that the decision has to be communicated, but reasons for the decision have not to be stated; but the reasons must exist. Else, the decision would be arbitrary. It is also well settled in the said decisions that non-assigning of reasons or the non-communication thereof, may be based on public policy, but termination of an appointment without the existence of any cogent reason in furtherance of the object for which the power is given would be arbitrary and, therefore, against public policy. In that view of the matter this Court is unable to record concurrence to the submission of Mr. Phukan that the respondents have the power to terminate the service of the petitioner as per Clause 1 of the appointment order without assigning any reason. 14.8 However, in the additional affidavit the respondents had reproduced one Note, dated 25.09.2021, of the Registrar to the Vice Chancellor of the University. And perusal of the same indicates that on three grounds it had dispensed with the enquiry, as required under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Firstly, due to voluminous records of more than lakhs of OMR Sheets in connection with the petitioner's police custody by CM Special Vigilance Cell and the secondly, the engagement of the petitioner is purely temporary and on contractual basis initially for a period of 1 (one) year; and though it is required that any such employee, who happens to be engaged by Gauhati University be immediately suspended and charge sheet is to be served upon him to start the Disciplinary Proceedings, yet, this is not feasible to be done as he is presently in police custody and the relevant records to be verified for the purpose of Disciplinary Proceedings, could no longer be accessible for the University. Thirdly, it is clear that the said DP will be a lengthy and time consuming one, given the voluminous documents to be checked, while his engagement is valid only up to 31.12.2021 (i.e. near about 3 months). 14.9 Under the given facts and circumstances, the respondent authorities had arrived at a finding that it is well-nigh impossible or not feasible to start an enquiry against petitioner in the form of a DP. And then being satisfied that no enquiry is feasible, the petitioner was terminated from service with immediate effect. Then after approval of the said by the Vice Chancellor, the impugned termination Notification, dated 25.09.2021, was issued. 14.10 Thus, the respondent authorities are trying to justify the impugned termination Notification, dated 25.09.2021, by filing the grounds in the additional affidavit on 06.06.2024, and also by producing the original file before this Court. But, it is the categorical submission of Mr. Baruah, the learned counsel for the petitioner that through fresh and afterthought reasons are supplied by filing the additional affidavit on 06.06.2024, the same is clearly impermissible in the eyes of the law, in view of decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra). Notably, in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill (supra), a Constitutional Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned at the time of issuance of the same, to ensure transparency and prevent after-the-fact justification. The reason cannot be supplemented in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, gets validated by additional grounds later brought out. 14.11 But, Mr. Phukan, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the reason may not be in the final order itself. It would be usual to record the reason separately, in view of the decisions in the case of Tulsiram Patel (supra). Notably, in the case of Tulshiram Patel (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has primarily, dealt with the scope of inquiry and the application of Article 311(2) of the Indian Constitution concerning protection against dismissal without inquiry. It would be usual to record the reason separately, in view of the decisions in the case of Tulsiram Patel (supra). Notably, in the case of Tulshiram Patel (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has primarily, dealt with the scope of inquiry and the application of Article 311(2) of the Indian Constitution concerning protection against dismissal without inquiry. It addressed the procedure and fairness in imposing penalties, but does not explicitly overruled or diluted the principle concerning supplementation of reasons in administrative orders in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill (supra). Though, narrow exceptions are curved out in very limited circumstances, but, the core idea that the reasoning in the administrative order is final and cannot be supplemented later remains intact. Thus, the foundational principle in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) about testing administrative orders on their original stated reasons has not been diluted in the case of Tulshiram Patel (supra). 15. This being the factual as well as legal position, the reasons for bypassing the requirement of enquiry, as provided under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, so supplemented by the respondent authorities in the additional affidavit filed by them, herein this case, cannot be reckoned with. Therefore, this Court is unable to record concurrence with the submission of Mr. Phukan, the learned standing counsel for the respondents. 16. Even for the sake of argument, the reasons for bypassing the enquiry, so supplemented by the respondents in their additional affidavit, i.e.:- (i) the records are voluminous, involving more than lakhs of OMR Sheets were there in connection with the petitioner's police custody by CM Special Vigilance Cell, (ii) the engagement of the petitioner is purely temporary and on contractual basis initially for a period of 1 (one) year; and presently he is in police custody and the relevant records to be verified for the purpose of Disciplinary Proceedings, could no longer be accessible for the University, (iii) the DP will be a lengthy and time consuming one, given the voluminous documents to be checked, while his engagement is valid only up to 31.12.2021 (i.e. near about 3 months), are examined, in the light of given factual backdrop, by applying the test of a reasonable man, as laid down in the case of Tulshiram Patel (supra), and also in the light of the given legal matrix, this Court afraid the same (grounds) would not withstand the legal scrutiny. When the right of the petitioner, under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, is balanced with the reasons mentioned above, so supplemented by the respondent authorities, the same tilted in favour of the petitioner. The grounds of inaccessibility of the voluminous documents, remaining behind the bar consequent upon arrest of the petitioner and lengthy and time consuming DP, and temporary nature of engagement, none of these appears to be sound, while neither national security nor public order, nor threat to the witnesses, as enunciated in the case of Satyavir Singh (supra), Jaswant Singh (supra), Reena Rani (supra), shown to have been existed by the respondent at the relevant time and on such count, the respondent authorities ought not to have lightly dispense with the requirement of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Thus, to the considered opinion of this Court, a clear case for interference of the impugned Notification, dated 25.09.2021, is made out. 17. Now, it has to be seen whether the impugned Notification dated 25.09.2021 is stigmatic. This issue came before the Hon'ble Supreme Court for consideration in the case of Pavanendra Narayan Verma (supra), wherein it has been held that whether an order of termination is punitive or not can be determined by seeing whether prior to the termination there was:- (a) a full scale formal enquiry; (b) allegation involving moral turpitude of misconduct and (c) the allegations culminated into a finding of guilt. 17.1 In the absence of any one of the three factors, termination order cannot be held to be punitive. Impugned order by its reading is neither punitive nor stigmatic. The relevant para are quoted herein below:- " 20. As observed by Alagiriswami, J. in S.P. Vasudeva v. State of Haryana (1976) 1 SCC 236 : "After all no government servant, a probationer or temporary, will be discharged or reverted, arbitrarily, without any rhyme or reason. If the reason is to be fathomed in all cases of discharge or reversion, it will be difficult to distinguish as to which action is discharge or reversion simplicitor and which is by way of punishment. The whole position in law is rather confusing." 21. If the reason is to be fathomed in all cases of discharge or reversion, it will be difficult to distinguish as to which action is discharge or reversion simplicitor and which is by way of punishment. The whole position in law is rather confusing." 21. One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to the termination there was (a) a full-scale formal enquiry (b) into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct which (c) culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. Conversely if any one of the three factors is missing, the termination has been upheld. xxx xxx xxx 25. In Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd. (1999) 2 SCC 21 , a full- scale inquiry was held into the allegations of bribery against a temporary employee. The Court set aside the termination because it found that the report submitted was not a preliminary inquiry report but it was in fact a final one which gave findings as to the guilt of the employee. 26. In Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta (1999) 3 SCC 60 , the termination order itself referred to three other letters. One of the letters explicitly referred to misconduct on the part of the employee and also referred to an Inquiry Committee's report, which report in its turn had found that the employee was guilty of misconduct. The termination was held to be stigmatic and set aside. xxx xxx xxx 28. Therefore, whenever a probationer challenges his termination the court's first task will be to apply the test of stigma or the "form" test. If the order survives this examination the "substance" of the termination will have to be found out. 17.2 In the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. Vs. Brijesh Kumar & Anr., Civil Appeal No. of 2024 (arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.10546 of 2019) (Non- Reportable), Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "19. The services of the respondent have been determined solely on the ground of misconduct as alleged but without holding any regular inquiry or affording any opportunity of hearing to him. Vs. Brijesh Kumar & Anr., Civil Appeal No. of 2024 (arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.10546 of 2019) (Non- Reportable), Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "19. The services of the respondent have been determined solely on the ground of misconduct as alleged but without holding any regular inquiry or affording any opportunity of hearing to him. The termination order has been passed on the basis of some report which probably was not even supplied to the respondent. No show cause notice appears to have been issued to the respondent. Therefore, the order of termination of his services, even if on contractual basis, has been passed on account of alleged misconduct without following the Principles of Natural Justice. The termination order is apparently stigmatic in nature which could not have been passed without following the Principles of Natural Justice. 20. In the light of the above facts and discussion, we are of the opinion that the order dated 30.01.2016 terminating the services of the respondent is bad in law and cannot be sustained. It has rightly been set aside though on a different ground that the respondent is a permanent employee having been appointed on compassionate basis. The appointment of the respondent, in fact, is a contractual appointment entitling him to continue as such in service and to claim regularization if so advised in accordance with law. 17.3 Thus, application of the above ratios to the given factual matrix of the case in hand, goes a long way to show that the impugned Notification dated 25.09.2021, is ex-facie stigmatic. Here in this case no show cause notice was issued to the petitioner and no enquiry was held and merely on the arrest of the petitioner, he was terminated from service, in violation of the principles of natural justice. 18. It is worth mentioning in this context that in the case of Dr. Vijayakumaran C.P.V. (S) v. Central University Of Kerala And Others (S), reported in 2020 INSC 93, a three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court has underscored the paramount importance of adhering to due process in employment termination, particularly when allegations of misconduct are involved. By distinguishing between termination simpliciter and ex facie stigmatic termination, the Court has fortified the legal safeguards surrounding employee rights and institutional responsibilities. By distinguishing between termination simpliciter and ex facie stigmatic termination, the Court has fortified the legal safeguards surrounding employee rights and institutional responsibilities. This judgment not only mandates academic institutions to conduct thorough and formal inquiries before terminating an employee, but also serves as a precedent ensuring that termination orders do not unjustly tarnish an individual's reputation. 18.1 In the instant case, by terminating the service of the petitioner by a stigmatic Notification, dated 25.09.2021, the respondents had violated not only the fundamental right of the petitioner guaranteed under Article 14, 16(1) and 21 of the Constitution of India, but also serious violation of the dignity of the petitioner. He has to carry the stigma, attributed in his termination Notification, throughout his life and it will haunt him wherever he goes. 19. Thus, on the following counts, the impugned Notification dated 25.09.2021, failed to withstand the legal scrutiny and is liable to be interfered with:- (i) The impugned Notification, dated 25.09.2021, was issued terminating the service of the petitioner without issuing any show cause notice, informing him about the charges against him. (ii) The impugned Notification, dated 25.09.2021, was issued terminating the service of the petitioner, without holding a departmental enquiry in terms of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. (iii) The petitioner was terminated from his service on the very same day of his arrest i.e. on 25.09.2021. Thus, the vindictiveness and hostile discrimination on the part of the respondents is writ large from its conduct, and the same is violative of Articles 14, 16 (1), and 21 of the Constitution of India. (iv) Even though the petitioner is a temporary/contractual employee, the basic principles of audi alteram partem cannot be violated under any circumstances, as temporary employee is also entitled to protection under Articles 14, 16, 21 and 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. (v) The respondents had not even marked a copy of the impugned Notification, dated 25.09.2021, to the petitioner. (vi) The impugned Notification, dated 25.09.2021, is stigmatic and the petitioner has to carry the same for his entire life. (vii) Inspite of granting stay of the impugned Notification, dated 25.09.2021, by this Court, vide Order dated 30.06.2022, the petitioner was not allowed to resume his duties, which reflects the indifferent attitude of the respondents towards the petitioner. (vi) The impugned Notification, dated 25.09.2021, is stigmatic and the petitioner has to carry the same for his entire life. (vii) Inspite of granting stay of the impugned Notification, dated 25.09.2021, by this Court, vide Order dated 30.06.2022, the petitioner was not allowed to resume his duties, which reflects the indifferent attitude of the respondents towards the petitioner. (viii) Except mentioning about the arrest of the petitioner in the impugned Notification, dated 25.09.2021, no ground has been assigned therein for dispensing with the enquiry, as required under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. (ix) Though, some grounds had been supplemented in the form of an additional affidavit by the respondents, the same cannot be taken into account to test the legality of impugned Notification, dated 25.09.2021, in view of the proposition laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill (supra). (x) Even, for the sake of argument, the grounds in the additional affidavit i.e. voluminous and inaccessible record, lengthy and time consuming DP and the petitioner in police custody and temporary engagement of the petitioner, if considered applying the test of a reasonable man, in the given factual and legal matrix, the same failed to withstand the legal scrutiny in as much as such grounds are not contemplated in Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, as neither national security or public order are involved nor there is any threat to the witnesses, nor the petitioner was convicted in a criminal case, though, however, he was arrested. 20. In the result, this Court finds sufficient merit in this petition. And accordingly, the same stands allowed. The impugned Notification dated 25.09.2021, by which the petitioner was terminated from service, stands set aside and quashed. 21. By a mandamus of this Court the respondents are directed to re-instate the petitioner in service with all back wages. In holding so, this Court derived authority from a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase Vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalay , reported in (2013) 10 SCC 342, wherein it has been held that in cases of wrongful termination of service, reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule. 22. And the said exercise mentioned in para 22 above, has to be carried out within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. 22. And the said exercise mentioned in para 22 above, has to be carried out within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. The petitioner shall obtain a certified copy of this order and place the same before the respondent authorities within a period of one week from today. 23. In terms of above, this petition stands disposed of leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Registry shall send down the original records forthwith.