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2025 DIGILAW 198 (KER)

Aswanth K. L. v. Regional Transport Authority

2025-02-06

GOPINATH P.

body2025
JUDGMENT : Gopinath P., J. The petitioner purchased a vehicle bearing registration No.KL-08-Z-9855, and petitioner, along with the previous owner of the vehicle, filed a joint application for transfer of the permit, which has been issued in respect of the said vehicle, before the 1st respondent. The 1st respondent, in its meeting held on 12-07-2023, allowed the transfer of permit as is evident from Ext.P2. There were certain civil proceedings numbered as O.S.No.790/2023 on the file of the Munsiff Court, Kodungallur, and the vehicle bearing registration No.KL-08-Z-9855 was also subject matter of the proceedings before the said Court. According to the petitioner, owing to the civil proceedings, the petitioner was unable to produce the original documents in relation to the vehicle, and consequently, the petitioner could not surrender the records of the vehicle within the time contemplated by Rule 178 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the 1989 Rules'). The suit has now been compromised. The compromise decree dated 08-11-2024 is on record as Ext.P3. The petitioner is before this Court being aggrieved by the fact that when the petitioner produced the records of the vehicle before the 2nd respondent for endorsement of the transfer of permit, the 2nd respondent refused to endorse the transfer of permit on the ground that the petitioner has not produced the vehicle within the time specified in Rule 178 of the 1989 Rules. 2. Sri. Sajeev Kumar K. Gopal, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would submit that Rule 178 of the 1989 Rules does not contemplate any outer time limit within which the records of the vehicle have to be produced, once the application for transfer of permit has been allowed by the Regional Transport Authority. It is submitted that the provision requiring the production of records within seven days can be treated only as directory and not mandatory, especially when no consequence of non-production is contemplated by the rule. It is submitted that in such circumstances, the failure of the 2nd respondent to make necessary endorsements is clearly illegal and unsustainable in law. 3. Sri. It is submitted that the provision requiring the production of records within seven days can be treated only as directory and not mandatory, especially when no consequence of non-production is contemplated by the rule. It is submitted that in such circumstances, the failure of the 2nd respondent to make necessary endorsements is clearly illegal and unsustainable in law. 3. Sri. Sreejith V.S., the learned Government Pleader, referred to the provisions of Rule 178 of the 1989 Rules and submits that when a permit is ordered to be transferred on joint application, the fact of such transfer has to be immediately endorsed on the permit and other records of the vehicle, and that is why the 1989 Rules require the records of the vehicle to be produced within seven days. It is submitted that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the Regional Transport Authority had permitted the transfer as early as in the month of July, 2023, and the petitioner had admittedly approached the 2nd respondent with the records of the vehicle only after about 14 months. It is submitted that in such circumstances, the question of transfer has to be again considered by the Regional Transport Authority, and no transfer of permit can be endorsed on the basis of the decision taken by the Regional Transport Authority originally on 12-07-2023. 4. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader, I am of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the context of Rule 178 of the 1989 Rules, when there is a reasonable explanation for the delay in producing the records of the vehicle, the delay in the production of records need not necessarily lead to a cancellation of the decision taken by the Regional Transport Authority on 12-07-2023 to permit the transfer. It is clear from the facts narrated above that there were certain civil disputes, which finally ended in a compromise only in the month of November, 2024, and immediately thereafter, the petitioner produced the records of the vehicle for making the necessary endorsements on the records of the vehicle. It is clear from the facts narrated above that there were certain civil disputes, which finally ended in a compromise only in the month of November, 2024, and immediately thereafter, the petitioner produced the records of the vehicle for making the necessary endorsements on the records of the vehicle. The provisions of Rule 178 of the 1989 Rules, though requiring the production of the records of the vehicle within seven days of the communication of the decision by the Regional Transport Authority, do not provide for any consequence for not producing the records within the aforesaid period of seven days. In Topline Shoes Ltd. v. Corpn. Bank; (2002) 6 SCC 33 , the Supreme Court, while considering the requirement to file a reply, within 30 days or such extended period not exceeding fifteen days as may be granted by the District Forum, under Section 13(2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, held that provisions which do not specify consequences for non-compliance should be interpreted as directory rather than mandatory. The relevant portion of the judgment reads thus: “8. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 indicates that it has been enacted to promote and protect the rights and interests of consumers and to provide them speedy and simple redressal of their grievances. Hence, quasi-judicial machinery has been set up for the purpose, at different levels. These quasi-judicial bodies have to observe the principles of natural justice as per clause 4 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons, which reads as under: “4. To provide speedy and simple redressal to consumer disputes, a quasi-judicial machinery is sought to be set up at the district, State and Central levels. These quasi-judicial bodies will observe the principles of natural justice and have been empowered to give reliefs of a specific nature and to award, wherever appropriate, compensation to consumers. Penalties for non-compliance of the orders given by the quasi-judicial bodies have also been provided.” (emphasis supplied) Thus the intention to provide a time-frame to file reply, is really meant to expedite the hearing of such matters and to avoid unnecessary adjournments to linger on the proceedings on the pretext of filing reply. The provision, however, as framed, does not indicate that it is mandatory in nature. In case the extended time exceeds 15 days, no penal consequences are prescribed therefor. The provision, however, as framed, does not indicate that it is mandatory in nature. In case the extended time exceeds 15 days, no penal consequences are prescribed therefor. The period of extension of time “not exceeding 15 days”, does not prescribe any kind of period of limitation. The provision appears to be directory in nature, which the consumer forums are ordinarily supposed to apply in the proceedings before them. We do not find force in the submission made by the appellant-in-person, that in no event, whatsoever, the reply of the respondent could be taken on record beyond the period of 45 days. The provision is more by way of procedure to achieve the object of speedy disposal of such disputes. It is an expression of “desirability” in strong terms. But it falls short of creating any kind of substantive right in favour of the complainant by reason of which the respondent may be debarred from placing his version in defence in any circumstances whatsoever. It is for the Forum or the Commission to consider all facts and circumstances along with the provisions of the Act providing time-frame to file reply, as a guideline, and then to exercise its discretion as best as it may serve the ends of justice and achieve the object of speedy disposal of such cases keeping in mind the principles of natural justice as well. The Forum may refuse to extend time beyond 15 days, in view of Section 13(2)(a) of the Act but exceeding the period of 15 days of extension, would not cause any fatal illegality in the order. 9. On behalf of the appellant reliance has been placed on a few decisions of this Court such as reported in Sharif-ud-Din v. Abdul Gani Lone. The case relates to election dispute under the Representation of the People Act, and non-compliance with requirements as provided; such provisions were held to be mandatory in nature. Specific consequences as a result of non-compliance, were provided for. It is also observed that normally procedural rules should not be considered as mandatory in nature. The election law is a technical law which also provides consequences of non-compliance with certain provisions but in the present case we find that no consequence is provided in case the time granted to file reply exceeds the total period of 45 days. It is also observed that normally procedural rules should not be considered as mandatory in nature. The election law is a technical law which also provides consequences of non-compliance with certain provisions but in the present case we find that no consequence is provided in case the time granted to file reply exceeds the total period of 45 days. It may at best be said to be an irregular way of exercise of discretion. Normally the Forum or Commission would act in accordance with the provision relating to procedural matters and while considering the question whether any further time may or may not be granted, it would be relevant to take into account the limit placed for extension of time in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In the absence of any penal consequences to follow, it will not be open for the appellant to contend that the reply filed by the respondent within the time granted though beyond 45 days, is liable to be rejected. The appellant therefore cannot derive any help from the decision referred to above. ………” This position of law was later reiterated by the Supreme Court in Kailash v. Nanhku; (2005) 4 SCC 480 where it reads thus: “35. Two decisions, having a direct bearing on the issue arising for decision before us, have been brought to our notice, one each by the learned counsel for either party. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that in Topline Shoes Ltd. v. Corpn. Bank a pari materia provision contained in Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 came up for the consideration of the Court. The provision requires the opposite party to a complaint to give his version of the case within a period of 30 days or such extended period not exceeding 15 days as may be granted by the District Forum. The Court took into consideration the Statement of Objects and Reasons and the legislative intent behind providing a time-frame to file reply and held: (i) that the provision as framed was not mandatory in nature as no penal consequences are prescribed if the extended time exceeds 15 days, and; (ii) that the provision was directory in nature and could not be interpreted to mean that in no event whatsoever the reply of the respondent could be taken on record beyond the period of 45 days. 36. 36. The Court further held that the provision is more by way of procedure to achieve the object of speedy disposal of such disputes. The strong terms in which the provision is couched are an expression of “desirability” but do not create any kind of substantive right in favour of the complainant by reason of delay so as to debar the respondent from placing his version in defence in any circumstances whatsoever. 37. In our opinion, the view of the law so taken by this Court squarely applies to the issue before us and we find ourselves in agreement with the law stated by the two-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Topline Shoes Ltd.” The provisions of Rule 178 are in distinction to the provisions of Rule 159 dealing with the grant of a regular permit and Rule 172 dealing with the renewal of a permit where consequences are specifically provided. Thus, it could be safely held that the time limit prescribed in Rule 178 of the 1989 Rules is only directory and not mandatory. Therefore, this writ petition is allowed, and the 2nd respondent is directed to make necessary endorsement on the records of the vehicle pursuant to the decision taken by the Regional Transport Authority on 12-07-2023. I make it clear that where there is no reasonable explanation for producing the records of the vehicle, it may be well within the jurisdiction of the authorities to deny the endorsement of the transfer of the permit, even in a case covered by Rule 178 of the 1989 Rules.