ORDER : MUKESH RAJPUROHIT, J. 1. The instant application for bail under Section 483 of BNSS (439 of Cr.P.C.) has been filed by the petitioner who has been arrested in the present matter. The requisite details of the matterare tabulated herein below: S. No. Particulars of the case 1 FIR Number 56/2025 2 Police Station Bhawanda 3 District Nagaur 4 Offences alleged in the FIR u/s 64(1), 74, 79 & 3(5) of B.N.S., Sections 3 & 4 of POCSO Act, 2012 and Sections 3(1)(w)(i) & 3(2)(v) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 5 Offences added, if any u/s 332(B) of B.N.S. 2. Heard learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, learned Public Prosecutor and learned counsel for the complainant. 3. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is innocent and has been falsely implicated. It is argued that age of the prosecutrix has not been proved and is doubtful. Inviting the Court’s attention towards written report and the prosecutrix’s statement recorded under Section 180 (3) of the B.N.S.S., it has been submitted that although, the prosecutrix had admittedly passed the Class X Examination, the investigating agency failed to collect her Secondary School Examination mark- sheet. He has further pointed out that school record collected during investigation reflects her date of birth as 06.03.2010, whereas, the prosecutrix herself mentioned her date of birth as 06.03.2007 in both the written report and her statement under (3) B.N.S.S. 4. Learned Senior Counsel has submitted that Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 specifically prescribes the hierarchy of documents to be relied upon for age determination, giving primacy to the date of birth certificate from the school (or the matriculation/Secondary School Examination certificate), followed by birth certificate from the municipal authority, and only thereafter permitting medical opinion. In the present case, despite the availability of a statutorily preferred document i.e. Class X mark-sheet, the police did not collect the same. Instead, they relied upon inconsistent and doubtful school records, which stand contradicted by the prosecutrix’s own disclosure of age. 5. During the course of arguments, learned Senior Counsel has produced a copy of the prosecutrix’s Secondary School Examination result/mark-sheet downloaded from the website of the Board of Secondary Education, Rajasthan, which also records her date of birth as 06.03.2007. Instead, they relied upon inconsistent and doubtful school records, which stand contradicted by the prosecutrix’s own disclosure of age. 5. During the course of arguments, learned Senior Counsel has produced a copy of the prosecutrix’s Secondary School Examination result/mark-sheet downloaded from the website of the Board of Secondary Education, Rajasthan, which also records her date of birth as 06.03.2007. Based on this date, the prosecutrix would have been 17 years, 5 months and 7 days on the date of the first alleged incident, i.e. 13.08.2024. Learned Senior Counsel has, therefore, submitted that the prosecution has failed to satisfy the statutory mandate of Section 94 of the Act of 2015. Hence, age of the prosecutrix cannot be said to be conclusively established. 6. It has also been contended by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the F.I.R. itself indicates that the petitioner and the prosecutrix, being of a similar age group, were acquainted with each other and were in a consensual relationship. They regularly communicated through social media platforms and over the phone. Learned Senior Counsel has also highlighted that although, the prosecution alleges that first incident occurred in 2024, the FIR was lodged only on 22.05.2025. Such an inordinate and unexplained delay, according to learned Senior Counsel, gravely undermines the prosecution case and is fatal to its credibility. 7. It has also been contended that challan has already been filed in the present case; the petitioner is in custody since 06.06.2025 and trial of the case is likely to consume sufficient long time, therefore, it has been prayed that the petitioner may be enlarged on bail. 8. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor as well as learned counsel for the complainant have vehemently opposed the prayer for bail. It is submitted that prosecutrix was a minor at the time of the alleged incident and her date of birth stands duly established from her school records collected during investigation. Drawing the Court’s attention to the Admission Forms and S.R. Register, learned counsel for the complainant has submitted that prosecutrix was initially admitted to Class I in Shri H.R. Gedar Senior Secondary School, Bu-Narawata, Tehsil Mundwa, District Nagaur, where her date of birth was clearly recorded as 06.03.2010 in the admission form. Drawing the Court’s attention to the Admission Forms and S.R. Register, learned counsel for the complainant has submitted that prosecutrix was initially admitted to Class I in Shri H.R. Gedar Senior Secondary School, Bu-Narawata, Tehsil Mundwa, District Nagaur, where her date of birth was clearly recorded as 06.03.2010 in the admission form. Subsequently, on the basis of the Transfer Certificate dated 02.07.2024, she was admitted to Class II in Government Primary School, Nayakon Ki Dhani, Senani and her date of birth was again mentioned as 06.03.2010. It has been further submitted that Secondary School Examination mark- sheet relied upon by the petitioner is not part of the challan papers, therefore, it cannot be accorded any evidentiary value at this stage. On the strength of the school records, which are the primary documents under the law for age determination, it has been asserted that prosecutrix was indisputably a minor on the date of the incident. Learned counsel has further contended that there are clear and specific allegations of forcible sexual assault against the petitioner. In view of the gravity of the accusations and the established minority of the victim, it has been prayed that the petitioner is not entitled to the concession of bail. 9. I have considered the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 10. Having considered the rival submissions and carefully examined the material available on record, this Court finds that there is prima facie discrepancy in date of birth of the prosecutrix recorded in her school record as well as claimed prosecutrix herself in the written report and her statement under Section180(3). 11. In the case of Mahadeo v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 2010), decided on 23.07.2013, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the question of determination of the age of the victim, has observed as under: “10. We can also in this connection make a reference to a statutory provision contained in the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Rules, 2007, whereunder Rule 12, the procedure to be followed in determining the age of a juvenile has been set out. We can also in this connection make a reference to a statutory provision contained in the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Rules, 2007, whereunder Rule 12, the procedure to be followed in determining the age of a juvenile has been set out. We can usefully refer to the said provision in this context, inasmuch as under Rule 12 (3) of the said Rules, it is stated that in every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination enquiry shall be conducted by the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, by the committee by seeking evidence by obtaining:- (a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school); first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; 11. Under Rule 12 (3) (b), it is specifically provided that only in the ab- sence of alternative methods described under 12 (3) (a) (i) to (iii), the medical opinion can be sought for. In the light of such a statutory rule prevailing for ascertainment of the age of a juvenile, in our considered opinion, the same yardstick can be rightly followed by considered opinion, the same yardstick can be rightly followed by the Courts for the purpose of ascertaining the age of a victim as well.” Similarly, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, in the case of Tanwar Singh v. State of Rajasthan (S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 526 of 1993) decided on 01.07.2024 , has held that in cases involving uncertainty regarding age of the victim and ab- sence of corroborative evidence in sexual offences, benefit of doubt must enure to the accused. The relevant portion reads as under: “25. Thus, the offence under section 376 IPC is also not found to be proved. Therefore, the conviction of the accused appellant for the offence under Section 376 IPC is not sustainable. 26. It is a well-settled law that in case of possibility of two views, the view beneficial to the accused is to be accepted. 27. Consequently, the criminal appeal of accused appellant of Tanwar Singh is allowed, and his conviction for the offences under sections 363 and 376 IPC is set aside and he is acquitted from the aforesaid charges. 26. It is a well-settled law that in case of possibility of two views, the view beneficial to the accused is to be accepted. 27. Consequently, the criminal appeal of accused appellant of Tanwar Singh is allowed, and his conviction for the offences under sections 363 and 376 IPC is set aside and he is acquitted from the aforesaid charges. The accused appellant is on bail, his bail bonds stand cancelled.” 12. Taking into consideration the aforesaid ratio of law and having considered the rival submissions and carefully examining material available on record, this Court finds that principal issue raised by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner regarding age of the prosecutrix cannot be said to have been conclusively settled at this stage. Although, the prosecution has relied upon school admission records to assert that the prosecutrix was a minor, the material placed before this Court reveals noticeable inconsistencies in the entries relating to her date of birth. The mark-sheet of Secondary School Examination is, though, not part of the challan papers but its contents correspond with the date of birth disclosed by the prosecutrix herself. At this stage, therefore, discrepancies between the school records and the prosecutrix’s own declarations create a prima facie uncertainty regarding exact age of the prosecutrix. In such circumstances, the statutory presumption under Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act cannot be considered to have been satisfied with the requisite degree of conclusiveness. 13. Having heard and considered the rival submissions, facts and circumstances of the case as well as perused the material available on record and considering the fact that the petitioner is in custody since 06.06.2025 and the trial of the case will take sufficiently long time to conclude, without expressing any opinion on merits/demerits of the case, this Court is inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail. 14. Consequently, the bail application under Section 483 of BNSS (439 of Cr.P.C.) is allowed. It is ordered that the accused- petitioner as named in the cause title, arrested in connection with the above mentioned FIR, shall be released on bail, if not wanted in any other case, provided he furnishes a personal bond of Rs.50,000/- and two sureties of Rs.25,000/- each, to the satisfaction of learned trial court, for his appearance before that court on each & every date of hearing and whenever called upon to do so till completion of the trial. 15. 15. It is made clear that observations made by this Court in this order are confined only to the consideration of the bail application and shall not have any binding effect on the trial court during the course of trial.