JUDGMENT, J. RAJESH RAI K, J. 1. This is defendants' second appeal. 2. The plaintiff has filed the suit against the defendants for declaration, specific performance of Agreement of Sale Deed dated 20.10.1988 executed by Chikkavenkatappa (husband of defendant No.1 and father of defendants 2 to 6) in favour of the plaintiff and for the relief of injunction. 3. It is the case of the plaintiff that the land measuring 3 acres 20 guntas in Sy.No.21, situated at Savakanahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Devanahalli Taluk, Bangalore District (for brevity, " suit schedule property ") originally belongs to one Mallappa. After his death, his wife Basamma and her children inherited the suit schedule property and their names came to be entered in the revenue records. 4. The said Basamma and her children sold the suit schedule property to Chikkavenkatappa vide registered Sale Deed dated 14.07.1980. After purchase, the name of Chikkavenkatappa got entered in the revenue records and he continued in cultivation of the suit schedule property till the year 1997. After his demise, his wife and children i.e., the defendants got entered their names in the revenue records and continued to be in possession. 5. It is the further case of the plaintiff that on 20.10.1988, Chikkavenkatappa entered into an Agreement of Sale with the plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule property for a total sale consideration of Rs.45,000/- and he received Rs.20,000/- on the date of execution of the Agreement of Sale and a sum of Rs.5,000/- on 06.06.1991 and further sum of Rs.10,000/- on 10.03.1996, endorsing the same to the Agreement of Sale. Thus, Chikkavenkatappa totally received a total sum of Rs.35,000/-. According to the plaintiff, after execution of said agreement, he misplaced the same. However, he was in possession of the suit schedule property for more than five decades. Later, on 20.02.1999, he has also filed Form No.7A under Section 77A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act before the Assistant Commissioner of Doddaballapur Sub-Division to register him as an occupant and grant him the occupancy right in respect of the suit schedule property. However, the said application came to be rejected on 31.01.2003. 6. In the meanwhile, Chikkavenkatappa died in the year 1997. As such, the plaintiff has called upon the defendants to receive the balance sale consideration and execute the Sale Deed in favour of the plaintiff by issuing a notice dated 11.07.2003. However, the said application came to be rejected on 31.01.2003. 6. In the meanwhile, Chikkavenkatappa died in the year 1997. As such, the plaintiff has called upon the defendants to receive the balance sale consideration and execute the Sale Deed in favour of the plaintiff by issuing a notice dated 11.07.2003. Since the defendants failed to comply with the legal notice by executing a Sale Deed, left with no other option, the plaintiff has filed the present suit for declaration and specific performance of the aforesaid Agreement. 7. Upon service of suit summons, the defendants appeared through their counsel and filed a written statement by denying the averments made in the plaint and stated that at no point in time, Chikkavenkatappa executed the Agreement of Sale in favour of the plaintiff and the plaintiff was never in possession of suit schedule property and the Agreement of Sale is a concocted document. 8. On considering the rival pleadings, the Trial Court framed the relevant issues and on assessment of oral and documentary evidence, partly decreed the suit with costs and held that the plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of Agreement of Sale dated 20.10.1988 and the plaintiff shall deposit the remaining sale consideration amount of Rs.10,000/- within one month of the said judgment. Further, directed defendant Nos.2 to 6 to execute the registered Sale Deed in respect of the suit schedule property in favour of the plaintiff within two months, failing which, the plaintiff was given liberty to get the Sale Deed registered in his name by due process of law. Further, a consequential injunction was also granted by restraining defendant Nos.2 to 6 from interfering with the suit schedule property. 9. On appeal by the defendants, the First Appellate Court, after re-assessment of evidence and documents on record, dismissed the appeal filed by the defendants by affirming the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court. Challenge to the same is lis before this court. 10. I have heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri S.S.Naganand, for Sri Krishna Gowda B., learned counsel for the appellant and Sri S.P.Shankar, learned Senior Counsel for Sri Vijayashekara Gowda V., learned counsel for caveator/respondent. 11. Challenge to the same is lis before this court. 10. I have heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri S.S.Naganand, for Sri Krishna Gowda B., learned counsel for the appellant and Sri S.P.Shankar, learned Senior Counsel for Sri Vijayashekara Gowda V., learned counsel for caveator/respondent. 11. The primary contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants/defendants is that both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have grossly erred while allowing the suit filed by the plaintiff without appreciating the evidence and documents in proper perspective. The learned Senior Counsel further contended that the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have erred in holding that the time is not the essence of the contract though the Agreement for Sale was executed on 20.10.1988 and the plaintiff had issued notice on 11.07.2003 calling upon the defendants to execute the Sale Deed and the suit filed i.e., after lapse of 15 years. According to the learned Senior Counsel, Article 54 of the Limitation Act specifies the suit for specific performance has to be initiated within 3 years from the date of refusal of the performance of contract. By enunciating this contention, the learned Senior Counsel by emphasizing the admission of PW.1 in paragraph 39 of the cross-examination, submitted that the limitation starts to file suit from the year 1998, however, the suit was filed in the year 2003, as such, the suit is clearly barred by limitation. 12. He further contended that the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have also erred in not considering the fact that in the year 1999, the plaintiff made an attempt to grab the suit schedule property by filing Form No.7A and the said application was rejected on the ground that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit schedule property. After rejection of said application, the plaintiff once again made his effort to grab the suit schedule property by creating a forged Agreement of Sale. 13. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have also erred in not considering the contention of the defendant that the agreement in dispute is a concocted document by forging the signature of Chikkavenkattappa. 13. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have also erred in not considering the contention of the defendant that the agreement in dispute is a concocted document by forging the signature of Chikkavenkattappa. Accordingly, the signature on the Agreement of Sale - Ex.P6 is totally denied by the defendants and they filed I.A.No.15 before the Trial Court to refer Ex.P2 i.e., the original Sale Deed, which had the admitted signature of Chikkavenkatappa and Ex.P6 the alleged Agreement of Sale to handwriting expert for comparison of signatures of Chikkavenkatappa. The said application was rejected by the Trial Court. The said order was not challenged by the defendants with the hope that the same would be considered by the Trial Court during the course of the judgment. However, the Trial Court has totally failed to appreciate the same and it has not even framed any issue on that aspect. In such circumstance, when the execution of the agreement and the signature on it, are seriously disputed by the defendants, the Trial Court ought to have referred the matter to the handwriting expert to get an opinion in respect of genuineness of the execution of the same. 14. He also contended that there is no cause of action for filing the suit and the same is an imaginary and illusive cause of action. In such circumstance, he prays to allow the appeal by setting aside the impugned judgments. 15. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent/plaintiff contended that both the Courts have concurrently held that Ex.P6 makes it clear that the time is not the essence of contract. The plaintiff has paid a sum of Rs.35,000/- out of Rs.45,000/- and no time was fixed or bargained for completing the transaction. Thereafter, the possession of land was given and the documents of title were also delivered by the vendor to the purchaser by way of part performance of Agreement for Sale. According to the learned Senior Counsel, there is no stipulation in the Agreement for Sale regarding time within which the transaction of sale has to be completed. Thereafter, the possession of land was given and the documents of title were also delivered by the vendor to the purchaser by way of part performance of Agreement for Sale. According to the learned Senior Counsel, there is no stipulation in the Agreement for Sale regarding time within which the transaction of sale has to be completed. On the rumor that defendants were trying to sell the suit schedule property, the plaintiff got issued a legal notice on 11.07.2003 and accordingly, as per the terms of Article 54 of the Limitation Act, the suit for specific performance was filed on 25.08.2003 without any loss of time. In such circumstance, the suit was well within time. 16. He further contended that the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court compared the signature of Chikkavenkatappa on Ex.P6 - Agreement of Sale and after examining the signature with Ex.P2 - Sale Deed, the Courts came to the conclusion that there is no doubt with regard to the signature of Chikkavenkatappa and as such, there is no necessity to refer the same to the handwriting expert. Accordingly, the application filed by the defendants was rejected. However, the defendants have not challenged the said order. As such, the same has attained finality. In such circumstances, the defendants now cannot claim that the signature on Ex.P6 is a forged one. 17. He also contended that the plaintiff has paid Rs.35,000/- to the defendant out of Rs.45,000/-. As such, his readiness and willingness to perform the contract was also proved and accordingly, the Trial Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the agreement was proved. 18. The learned Senior Counsel further contended that, the evidence of PWs.1 and 2 established the Agreement of Sale. PW.2 has categorically stated that the agreement was executed in his presence and the part of sale consideration was paid by the plaintiff in his presence. The said evidence of PWs.1 and 2 was not rebutted by the defendants by placing relevant documents though the defendants disputed the agreement in question and also the amount paid by the plaintiff. 19. PW.2 has categorically stated that the agreement was executed in his presence and the part of sale consideration was paid by the plaintiff in his presence. The said evidence of PWs.1 and 2 was not rebutted by the defendants by placing relevant documents though the defendants disputed the agreement in question and also the amount paid by the plaintiff. 19. By enunciating his contention, he submitted that while Chikkavenkatappa has not denied the execution of Ex.P6 - the Agreement of Sale and had not denied further endorsements - Ex.P6A and Ex.P6B which was in his handwriting, during his lifetime, his legal heirs, who had not participated in the negotiation leading to Agreement of Sale, cannot lead any rebuttal evidence as they were neither in possession nor produced any documents having the admitted signature of Chikkavenkatappa to compare the same with the signatures in Ex.P6 and for referring the same to scientific examination under Order XXVI Rule 10A of CPC. The scope and purpose of scientific examination is to compare the disputed signature with the admitted or exemplar signature, the defendants did not provide any material for comparison of disputed signature with the admitted signature of Chikkavenkatappa. As such, the scientific examination is impossible in the absence of any admitted signature. Accordingly, he prays to dismiss the appeal. 20. This appeal was admitted to consider the following substantial questions of law: i) Whether the Appellate Court could have relied upon its own comparison of the disputed signatures with the admitted signatures when a request for forensic examination of such signatures was rejected by the Trial Court and one of the grounds urged in the appeal was as regards such rejection? ii) Whether the finding by the Courts below on the question of limitation is based on evidence and in the light of the settled law? 21. In order to answer the first substantial question of law, it is relevant to observe that it is the specific case of the defendants that the agreement in question Ex.P6 is a concocted document and at no point of time, their father Chikkavenkatappa entered into the said agreement with the plaintiff. The defendants denied the signature on Ex.P6. 21. In order to answer the first substantial question of law, it is relevant to observe that it is the specific case of the defendants that the agreement in question Ex.P6 is a concocted document and at no point of time, their father Chikkavenkatappa entered into the said agreement with the plaintiff. The defendants denied the signature on Ex.P6. It is equally important to note that the defendants, by relying on the admitted signature of Chikkavenkatappa on Ex.P2 - Sale Deed, contended that there is a huge difference in the signature of Chikkavenkatappa in Ex.P2 and Ex.P6 in respect of pattern in handwritings i.e., the form of size, skill, slant, speed, letter designs, strokes etc. As such, the defendants filed IA.No.15 before the Trial Court for comparison and reference of same to the handwriting expert. As the said application was filed after the plaintiff and defendants evidence, when the matter was posted for arguments, the Trial Court rejected the same observing that it was not proper at that stage to record findings on the same. By observing so, the Trial Court has neither discussed the said aspect in the judgment nor framed any issues in that regard. 22. On perusal of the reasoning for rejection of I.A.No.15, I am of the view that the Trial Court has erred in applying the law laid down by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of BASAVARAJ Vs. ASHOK & OTHERS - ILR 2007 KAR 247 , wherein this Court has specifically held that when the Court entertains a slightest doubt with regard to the signatures, then it shall not hesitate to compare the signature and the same shall be sent for examination by the expert. However, in the said judgment, the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has held that if there is no application by both the parties, the Court has power to compare the disputed signature under Section 73 of CPC. But in the instant case, when the defendants had filed the application disputing the signature of Chikkavenkatappa on the alleged Agreement - Ex.P6, the Court ought to have sent the documents for examination by the handwriting expert. 23. It is equally important to note that the defendants in their written statement itself denied the signature of Chikkavenkatappa on Ex.P6. It is their specific case in the written statement that the signatures are forged one. 23. It is equally important to note that the defendants in their written statement itself denied the signature of Chikkavenkatappa on Ex.P6. It is their specific case in the written statement that the signatures are forged one. Further, strangely, the plaintiff filed an application in Form-7A in respect of suit schedule property in the year 1999 under Section 77A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act claiming occupancy right. The said application was rejected in the year 2003 and thereafter, he issued the legal notice to the defendants in respect of execution of the agreement and performance of the contract. Such being the position, the Trial Court ought to have entertained the application filed by the defendants for referring the disputed signatures to handwriting experts for comparison. Thus, in my considered view, the first substantial question of law is answered in favour of the defendants. 24. In respect of second substantial question of law is concerned, admittedly Ex.P6 - the alleged agreement was executed in the year 1988 and the remaining payments were also made in the year 1991 and 1996. No doubt, as per Article 54 of the Limitation Act, the limitation starts from the date of refusal of the contract, but in the instant case, on careful examination of the evidence of PW.1 in his cross-examination, he has categorically admitted that after death of Chikkavenkatappa in the year 1997, he requested his wife - defendant No.1 in the year 1998 to execute the Sale Deed, however, she refused to execute the same. In such circumstances, it is to be examined in detail that whether the refusal of execution of the Sale Deed starts from 1998 and whether the limitation point also starts from the said date. This aspect of the matter was not properly considered by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court and the issues raised in respect of the same were not answered properly by referring to the evidence of PW1. In such circumstances, in my considered view, the said aspect of the matter has to be re- considered by the Trial Court. Thus, the second substantial question of law is also answered in favour of the defendants. 25. In such circumstances, in my considered view, the said aspect of the matter has to be re- considered by the Trial Court. Thus, the second substantial question of law is also answered in favour of the defendants. 25. In view of the above discussion, in my considered view, the matter requires reconsideration at the hands of the Trial Court by referring the disputed signatures of Chikkavenkatappa in Ex.P6 with the admitted signature in Ex.P2, to the handwriting expert for comparison and also by framing the relevant issues on that aspect as well as a considered finding on the issue of limitation. Accordingly, I pass the following: ORDER i) The second appeal is allowed. ii) The impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Trial Court in O.S.No.410/2006 (old O.S.No.670/2003) dated 03.11.2018 and the First Appellate Court in R.A.No.15058/2018 dated 20.03.2019 are set aside. iii) The matter is remitted back to the Trial Court for fresh consideration by extending opportunity to the parties and referring the disputed signatures of Chikkavenkatappa in Ex.P6 with his admitted signature on Ex.P2 to the handwriting expert and also re- appreciating the question of limitation by considering the evidence of PW.1. iv) The Trial Court shall frame additional issues with regard to aforesaid aspects. v) The parties are also permitted to lead evidence and to produce the relevant documents, if any. vi) The Trial Court is directed to dispose off the suit as early as possible and in accordance with the Karnataka (Case Flow management in Subordinate Courts) Rules, 2005.