JUDGMENT : RAJESH RAI K, J. 1. This is plaintiffs' second appeal. 2. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the suit schedule properties are the ancestral properties which were granted to one Mayanna who was the father of defendant No.1 and the grandfather of the plaintiffs and defendant Nos.3 and 4. The said Mayanna died intestate and subsequently, his wife also died. 3. Further, the case of the plaintiffs is that defendant Nos.1 and 2, who are the parents of plaintiffs and defendant Nos.3 and 4, though were in joint possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties under the joint family status, have sold several properties in favour of defendant Nos.5, 6, 7 and 8 by executing the Sale Deed in their favour and the said Sale Deeds were not executed for the benefit and welfare of the joint family. Thus, the said Sale Deeds were not binding on the plaintiffs and no legal rights, title and interest of the plaintiffs could be defeated by defendant Nos.1 and 2, as the said sale deeds are illegal and void under law. 4. Further, defendant Nos.3 and 4 filed partition suit after knowing the alleged transactions by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in O.S.No.46/1997 and the said suit was compromised on 09.11.1998 and the decree was also passed in that respect. However, the plaintiffs, being the equal share holders in respect of suit schedule properties, were not arrayed as parties to the said partition suit. Since the plaintiffs were in joint possession and enjoyment of item No.4 of the suit schedule properties along with defendant Nos.1 to 4, the Sale Deeds and Gift Deeds were not binding on the plaintiffs in respect of their lawful 1/5 th share each over the suit schedule properties. Hence, the plaintiffs filed the suit in O.S.No.80/2009 for partition and separate possession. 5. After service of summons, defendant Nos.1 to 3 remained absent. Defendant Nos.1 to 3, legal representatives of defendant No.5 and defendant No.7 were placed ex parte. Defendant No.4 has appeared in person. Defendant Nos.6 & 8 and defendant Nos.9 to 11, have contested the matter through their counsel. However, only defendant Nos.9 to 11 have filed written statement, denying the plaint averments. 6. Defendant Nos.1 to 3, legal representatives of defendant No.5 and defendant No.7 were placed ex parte. Defendant No.4 has appeared in person. Defendant Nos.6 & 8 and defendant Nos.9 to 11, have contested the matter through their counsel. However, only defendant Nos.9 to 11 have filed written statement, denying the plaint averments. 6. The Trial Court, after considering the rival pleadings, framed relevant issues and after examining the evidence in detail, dismissed the suit on the ground that, as per Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, the daughters born before 09.09.2005 would be coparceners only when the coparcener dies and the succession opens and until then there is no devolution of interest. In the instant case, the plaintiffs have filed a suit during the lifetime of defendant No.1 and as such, they have no right to file a suit for partition and separate possession. 7. On appeal by the plaintiffs, the First Appellate Court, upon re-appreciation of evidence, dismissed I.A.No.1 filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act by the plaintiffs for condoning the delay of 705 days in filing the appeal and consequently, dismissed the appeal. 8. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs are before this Court. 9. I have heard Sri.Abubacker Shafi, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs and Sri G.Manivannan, learned counsel for respondent Nos.4 to 8/defendant Nos.6 to 11. 10. The primary contention of the plaintiffs/appellants is that the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' suit and have failed to consider that the Sale Deeds executed by defendant Nos.1 and 2 in respect of suit schedule properties in favour of defendant Nos.5 to 8 were not for the benefit or welfare of the joint family. He further contended that defendant Nos.3 and 4 compromised the suit in O.S.No.46/1997 on 09.11.1998 without arraying the plaintiffs as parties to the said suit and compromise. 11. He further contended that the Trial Court and the First appellate Court have also failed to consider the settled position of law that the first appeal is a valuable right of the appellant, wherein, all the question of fact and law decided by the Trial Court are open for reconsideration as contemplated under Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC. 11. He further contended that the Trial Court and the First appellate Court have also failed to consider the settled position of law that the first appeal is a valuable right of the appellant, wherein, all the question of fact and law decided by the Trial Court are open for reconsideration as contemplated under Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC. As such, the First Appellate Court has grossly erred by dismissing the appeal only on the ground of delay, that too after the appellants explaining delay with sufficient cause that the appellant/plaintiff No.1 was suffering from severe illness. Accordingly, he prays to allow the appeal. 12. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent Nos.4 to 8 contends that the First Appellate Court has rightly dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay since there was inordinate delay of 705 days in filing the appeal. According to him, the reason explained by the 1 st plaintiff for condonation of delay was not at all reliable. The reason assigned for the delay was that the 1 st plaintiff was suffering from viral fever from 20.12.2015 to 22.03.2016 and she was unable to move. However, the Trial Court has passed the judgment on 24.03.2014 and she has not explained the reason for not approaching the First Appellate Court from 24.03.2014 till 20.12.2015. As such, the reasons were inadequate and were not justifiable and the First Appellate Court has thus rightly rejected the application for condonation of delay and consequently, the appeal. 13. Alternatively, he contended on merits also that the appeal is liable to be rejected for the reason that defendant Nos.1 and 2 have sold the suit schedule properties to defendant Nos.5 to 8 in the year 1994. As such, as per the prohibition contained in Section 6 of the amended Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the same did not have any effect on the registered Sale Deed which was executed prior to 20.12.2004 i.e., before enactment of the amended provision in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma - (2020) 9 SCC 1 . Accordingly, he prays to dismiss the appeal. 14. I have given my anxious consideration to the contentions of learned counsel for both the parties, so also to the impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts. 15. Accordingly, he prays to dismiss the appeal. 14. I have given my anxious consideration to the contentions of learned counsel for both the parties, so also to the impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts. 15. As could be gathered from records, the First Appellate Court has dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay in filing the appeal i.e., 705 days. Further, it is seen that the appellant/plaintiff No.1 has failed to assign the justifiable reason to condone the delay. According to the appellant/plaintiff No.1, she was suffering from jaundice from 20.12.2015 to 22.03.2016. However, the judgment and decree was passed by the Trial Court on 24.03.2014. The appellant/plaintiff No.1 has not stated as to why she had not filed any appeal from 24.03.2014 to 20.12.2015. Further, she has also failed to place any reliable documents to that effect. 16. It is settled position of law by the Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of judgments that the Courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the Court, the inquiry is confined to whether "sufficient cause" has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to the said inquiry. If the Courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural question and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had reasonable justification for the delay. The test of "sufficient cause" cannot be substituted by examination of the merits of the case. This aspect of the matter has been clearly dealt with by the First Appellate Court and had dismissed the application filed for condonation of delay. I find no good ground to interfere with the said reasoning of the First Appellate Court. 17. The test of "sufficient cause" cannot be substituted by examination of the merits of the case. This aspect of the matter has been clearly dealt with by the First Appellate Court and had dismissed the application filed for condonation of delay. I find no good ground to interfere with the said reasoning of the First Appellate Court. 17. Nevertheless, the contention of the appellants that Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC has not been complied by the First Appellate Court by giving them an opportunity before deciding the case on merits does not hold much water for the simple reason that the appellants have filed the suit in the year 2009 against the defendants for the properties which were sold in the year 1994 by defendant Nos.1 and 2 to defendant Nos.5 to 8 on the ground that in view of the amendment to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, the appellants/plaintiffs are entitled for share in the property. However, it is settled position of law that Section 6 of the amended Hindu Succession Act, 1956 did not have any effect on the registered Sale Deed which was executed prior in point of time i.e., 20.12.2004, before the enactment of amending provision as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vineeta Sharma Vs. Rakesh Sharma - (2020) 9 SCC 1 . In such circumstance, the claim of the plaintiffs is not sustainable under law. Hence, the Trial Court has rightly dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs on merit also. As such, there is absolutely no question of law, much less substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal.. Accordingly, the appeal lacks merit and the same is dismissed.