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2025 DIGILAW 1991 (RAJ)

Bhanwar Singh S/o Shri Banshi Singh Rajput v. Ramesh Kumar Sabu S/o Shri Jugal Kishore Sabu

2025-12-11

CHANDRA SHEKHAR SHARMA

body2025
ORDER : CHANDRA SHEKHAR SHARMA, J. Appellant-claimant– Bhanwar Singh has preferred this appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the Act’) against the impugned judgment dated 28.02.2013 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bhilwara (for short ‘the Tribunal’) in claim case No.590/2013 (470/2005) whereby the Tribunal rejected the claim petition filed by the claimant. 2. Brief facts of the case in nut shell are that the appellant- claimant was driving a Maruti Car bearing registration No.RJ14- 01C-9856. At about 12:30 am, when he reached near M.T.M. Mill, an unidentified truck collided with the car, as a result of which the appellant–claimant sustained various injuries of simple as well as grievous in nature. Thus, a claim petition was filed by the appellant-claimant. After service of notice, respondent No.2- Insurance company filed its reply and denied the averments made in the petition. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed following three issues on 12.10.2009:- In support of his case, the appellant-claimant produced two witnesses and also exhibited-documents. After conclusion of the trial, the Tribunal rejected the claim petition of the appellant-claimant. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the impugned judgment dated 28.02.2013 passed by the Tribunal is ex-facie illegal, arbitrary, perverse, and wholly contrary to the settled principles of law governing adjudication under Section 163 -A of the Act. Learned counsel submitted that the Tribunal, despite rightly recorded the findings on the occurrence of the accident and the resultant 12% permanent disability as well as on the fact that the offending vehicle was duly insured with Respondent No.2, committed grave illegality while passing the order impugned. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the Tribunal, in deciding Issue No.3, manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction, as the claim petition was filed under Section 163 -A of the Act. Learned counsel argued that there were no pleadings alleging negligence, no issue framed to that effect, and no evidence whatsoever led by the respondents to substantiate such a case and therefore any finding based on negligence is wholly unsustainable. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the dismissal of the claim petition on a ground which was neither pleaded by the parties nor framed as an issue, and for which no evidence was led, is a clear violation of the principles of natural justice. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the dismissal of the claim petition on a ground which was neither pleaded by the parties nor framed as an issue, and for which no evidence was led, is a clear violation of the principles of natural justice. It is contended that the appellant was never given an opportunity to meet or rebut any allegation of negligence, as such a question was not part of the dispute before the Tribunal. Therefore, the impugned order is not sustainable in the eye of law. In these circumstances, learned counsel for the appellant prayed that the impugned judgment dated 28.02.2013 may be quashed and set aside and reasonable amount as claimed in the claim petition may be awarded in favour of the claimant. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent–Insurance Company, on the other hand, supported the impugned judgment and submitted that the Tribunal has rightly dismissed the claim petition. It is argued that the evidence on record clearly indicates that the accident occurred solely due to the negligence of the appellant himself, and therefore, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the claimant was not entitled to any compensation. Thus, it is prayed that the impugned judgment does not warrant interference by this Court and deserves to be upheld. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the impugned order and the findings recorded by the Tribunal. 8. Section 163 -A of the Act was inserted in the Act via an amendment in the year 1994. It is a beneficial legislation as it awards compensation to the claimants on a ‘No Fault Liability’ basis. -A of the Act reads as under:- Section 163 -A – Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis [1]Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be. Explanation For the purposes of this sub-section, “permanent disability” shall have the same meaning and extent as in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923). Explanation For the purposes of this sub-section, “permanent disability” shall have the same meaning and extent as in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923). [2]In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. [3]The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule. 9. By the 2019 amendment, which came into force on 01.04.2022, Section 163 -A of the Act has now been repealed for the reason that a similar provision has been inserted in the Act, in fact, an entirely new Chapter, i.e. Chapter XI which bears the similar provision in Section 164 of the Act, is now incorporated. Be that as it may, for our purposes, what is relevant is that at the time when the accident occurred, it was -A of the Act, which was applicable. 10. The Court takes note that the object behind the insertion of Section 163 -A into the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, by the 1994 Amendment, was to provide a speedy and effective remedy to motor accident victims through a social security scheme based on a structured formula. -A establishes a system of no-fault liability, under which claimants are not required to plead or prove any wrongful act, neglect, or default of the vehicle owner or driver, thereby departing from the traditional fault-based claims under Section 166 of the Act. The provision ensures immediate and final relief, avoiding prolonged litigation, and allows victims or their legal heirs to receive lump-sum compensation promptly. Compensation is determined according to a structured formula in the Second Schedule, taking into account factors such as the victim’s age and income, and is designed to provide uniform and swift relief. The section begins with a “notwithstanding” clause, giving it overriding effect over other provisions of the Act and establishing a distinct, self-contained compensation scheme. Compensation is determined according to a structured formula in the Second Schedule, taking into account factors such as the victim’s age and income, and is designed to provide uniform and swift relief. The section begins with a “notwithstanding” clause, giving it overriding effect over other provisions of the Act and establishing a distinct, self-contained compensation scheme. In view of this legislative intent, any attempt to import considerations of negligence into proceedings under -A of the Act would be contrary to the statutory scheme and the clear purpose of providing quick and certain compensation to accident victims. 11. The Apex Court in the case of Shivaji Vs. Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & ors. reported in AIR 2018 Supreme Court 3705 relying upon the judgment in the case of United India Insurance co. Ltd. v. Sunil Kumar & Anr. reported in AIR 2017 SC 5710 observed as under: “5. The issue which arises before us is no longer res integra and is covered by a recent judgment of three judges of this Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sunil Kumar & Anr., wherein it was held that to permit a defence of negligence of the claimant by the insurer and/ or to understand Section 163A of the Act as contemplating such a situation, would be inconsistent with the legislative object behind introduction of this provision, which is “final compensation within a limited time frame on the basis of the structured formula to overcome situations where the claims of compensation on the basis of fault liability was taking an unduly long time”. The Court observed that if an insurer was permitted to raise a defence of negligence under Section 163A of the Act, it would “bring a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act at par with the proceeding under Section 166 of the Act which would not only be self- contradictory but also defeat the very legislative intention”. Consequently, it was held that in a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act, the insurer cannot raise any defence of negligence on the part of the victim to counter a claim for compensation.” 12. Hon’ble the Supreme Court, recently in the case of The New India Assurance Company Ltd. vs. Usha Devi & Ors. (Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.15191 of 2020) decided on 14.07.2025, observed as under:- “….. Hon’ble the Supreme Court, recently in the case of The New India Assurance Company Ltd. vs. Usha Devi & Ors. (Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.15191 of 2020) decided on 14.07.2025, observed as under:- “….. The High Court took note of the fact that there was collision between two vehicles, as the claim petition had been filed under Section 163A of the Act does not require any proof of negligence for seeking compensation. While entertaining a claim petition u/s 163A of the Act, the question of negligence cannot be looked into. This court in the case of United India Insurance Company Ltd. V. Sunil Kumar & Anr.[(2019) 12 SCC 398] has held: “8. From the above discussion, it is clear that grant of compensation under Section 163 -A of the Act on the basis of the structured formula is in nature of a final award and the adjudication thereunder is required to be made without any requirement of any proof of negligence of the driver/owner of the vehicle(s) involved in the accident. This is made explicit by - A(2). Though the aforesaid section of the Act does not specifically exclude a possible defence of the insurer based on the negligence of the claimant as contemplated by Section 140(4), to permit such defence to be introduced by the insurer and / or to understand the provisions of -A of the Act to be contemplating any such situation would go contrary to the very legislative object behind introduction of -A of the Act, namely, final compensation within a limited time-frame on the basis of the structured formula to overcome situations where the claims of compensation on the basis of fault liability were taking an unduly long time. In fact, to understand - A of the Act to permit the insurer to raise the defence of negligence would be to bring a proceeding under -A of the act on a par with the proceeding under Section 166 of the Act which would not only be self- contradictory but would also defeat the very legislative intention.” 13. Having considered the submissions of learned counsel and the material on record, this Court finds that the learned Tribunal committed a manifest jurisdictional error in embarking upon an inquiry into the alleged negligence of the appellant while adjudicating a claim petition filed under Section 163 -A of the Act. Having considered the submissions of learned counsel and the material on record, this Court finds that the learned Tribunal committed a manifest jurisdictional error in embarking upon an inquiry into the alleged negligence of the appellant while adjudicating a claim petition filed under Section 163 -A of the Act. The Court unequivocally holds that in a claim petition filed under -A of the Act, the question of negligence cannot be inquired into by the Tribunal. The statutory scheme of -A embodies a no-fault liability regime, and the claimants are entitled to compensation solely on the basis of the structured formula prescribed in the Second Schedule of the Act, without any requirement to plead or prove negligence. 14. It is further noted that the Tribunal, after considering the evidence, had already come to a definite finding that the accident resulted in 12% permanent disability to the appellant and the offending vehicle was duly insured with Respondent No.2. No counter-claim or appeal was filed by the insurance company disputing these findings. Thus, the insurer cannot be permitted to raise any question of negligence at this stage as the same has attained finality. 15. In the light of settled judicial pronouncements, it is well- established that in proceedings under Section 163 -A of the Act, no finding can be recorded attributing negligence to the claimant, as such a finding would undermine the very object and purpose of the provision. In the present case, the Tribunal, while deciding Issue No. 3, recorded a finding of rashness and negligence against the appellant and, on the basis of the same, proceeded to decide Issue No. 2 against him. Such an approach is legally untenable and cannot be sustained. 16. Accordingly, the finding recorded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bhilwara, in the impugned order dated 28.02.2013, to the extent it concerns Issue No. 2, is hereby set aside. The remainder of the discussion made by the Tribunal on Issue No. 1 shall remain undisturbed. The matter is remanded to the learned Tribunal to reconsider Issue No. 2 afresh, in accordance with law and in light of the observations made herein, strictly applying the provisions of Section 163 -A, and after affording both parties a fair and adequate opportunity of hearing. The matter is remanded to the learned Tribunal to reconsider Issue No. 2 afresh, in accordance with law and in light of the observations made herein, strictly applying the provisions of Section 163 -A, and after affording both parties a fair and adequate opportunity of hearing. The Tribunal is directed to conclude the proceedings expeditiously within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. A copy of this order be sent through E-mail to the concerned Trial Court forthwith. 17. With these observations, the present appeal stands disposed of. Stay petition and all pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.