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2025 DIGILAW 1995 (GAU)

Badal Gorh, S/O. Sri Kunu Gorh v. State of Assam Rep. By PP

2025-12-08

MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA, N.UNNI KRISHNAN NAIR

body2025
JUDGMENT : M. Zothankhuma, J. Heard Mr. B. J. Talukdar, learned Senior Counsel and Amicus Curiae for the appellant, assisted by Mr. P. K. Medhi, learned counsel. Also heard Ms. A. Begum, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, Assam. 2. This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment and order dated 16.09.2020, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Lakhimpur, North Lakhimpur, in Sessions Case No. 8(NL)/2018, by which the appellant has been convicted under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, rigorous imprisonment for one month, on account of the appellant killing his wife with a dao. 3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that an FIR dated 07.08.2017 has been submitted to the In-Charge, Silonibari Out-post by Prosecution Witness No.1 (PW-1), who is the brother of his deceased sister. The FIR states that the deceased was his elder sister and that she had been killed by her husband (appellant) around 2 am on 06.08.2017, where her neck was slit with a dao. Pursuant to the FIR, North Lakhimpur P.S. Case No. 1019/2017 under Section 302 of the IPC was registered. 4. The Investigating Officer (PW-12) thereafter took up the investigation and on completion of the investigation, filed a charge sheet, having found sufficient evidence under Section 302 of the IPC against the appellant for having killed his wife. 5. On the case being committed to the learned Trial Court for trial, charge under Section 302 of the IPC was framed against the appellant, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 6. The learned Trial Court thereafter examined 13 (thirteen) Prosecution Witnesses and after examining the appellant under Section 313 Cr.PC, the learned Trial Court came to a finding that the appellant had killed his wife with a dao, by cutting her neck inside their house. The learned Trial Court thereafter convicted the appellant and sentenced him accordingly, as stated in the earlier paragraphs. 7. The learned Amicus Curiae submits that the circumstantial evidence, on the basis of which the appellant had been found guilty by the learned Trial Court, does not form a complete chain and as such, conviction, on the basis of an incomplete circumstantial evidence, is not sustainable in law. 8. 7. The learned Amicus Curiae submits that the circumstantial evidence, on the basis of which the appellant had been found guilty by the learned Trial Court, does not form a complete chain and as such, conviction, on the basis of an incomplete circumstantial evidence, is not sustainable in law. 8. The learned Amicus Curiae further submits that the weapon (dao), which was allegedly used for killing the deceased, had not been produced in Court. Even in the respect, there is a contradiction between the place of seizure of the dao, as can be seen from the evidence of PW Nos. 5 & 12. Further, the dao was not sent to the FSL for examination and no blood stain was found on the dao. He accordingly submits that when the dao has not been properly seized and produced before the Court, conviction of the appellant was not sustainable. 9. The learned Amicus Curiae further submits that conviction cannot be made solely on the basis of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, without corroborative evidence. He also submits that the house, in which the deceased was killed, was occupied by the appellant and their two children, the elder child is being 14 years of age. However, the appellant's children had not been made witnesses, nor their statement being recorded by the learned Trial Court. He also submits that there was no eye witness to the incident, inasmuch as, the mother (PW-3) and father (PW-4) lived in a different house, but within the same compound where the house of the appellant was located. 10. Ms. A. Begum, learned Addl. PP, on the other hand, submits that the extra-judicial confession of the appellant to his mother (PW-3), PW-5, PW-12 proved that the appellant had killed his wife. Ms. A. Begum further submits that though the appellant had taken the plea of alibi to question No. 3, in his examination under Section 313 Cr.PC, where he has stated that he was not at the house at the time of the occurrence, but he was at the pam, the same was clearly rebutted by the evidence of PW Nos. 2, 3, 4 & 5. 11. Ms. 2, 3, 4 & 5. 11. Ms. A. Begum submits that there is some discrepancy with regard to the seizure of the weapon (dao), in terms of the deposition of PW-5 & PW-12, the fact remains that the appellant had caused the death of his wife by hitting her with a dao, which caused her death. When there has been an extra-judicial confession, which is corroborated by the evidence of the mother of the appellant and other witnesses, minor discrepancy, which we do not go into the root of the matter, cannot be said to be weaken the case of the prosecution. She accordingly submits that this Court should uphold the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. 12. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 13. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses is to the effect that the appellant had killed his wife with a dao around 2-3 a.m. in the early morning of 06.08.2017, while the wife was sleeping. There is no reason or motive in the evidence adduced by the witnesses as to why the appellant had apparently killed his wife except for the deposition of the Senior Medical and Health Officer, North Lakhimpur Civil Hospital (PW-11), who stated that as per the history narrated by PW-8, who is a relative of the deceased, the husband was a chronic alcoholic and was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the incident. 14. The fact that there are no eye witnesses to the crime is an admitted fact. Though the appellant lived with the deceased and their two children in the house, the children of the deceased have not been made witnesses in the case and neither have they made any statement before the police. In this respect, the evidence of PW-1, who is the brother of the deceased, is to the effect that on going to the house of the deceased after being informed of the death of his sister, he found his sister’s son and daughter, but they did not say anything regarding the murder of their mother to him. However, the evidence of PW-3 and PW-5 is to the effect that the appellant had made an extra-judicial confession to them stating that he had killed his wife. The extra-judicial confession made by the appellant to PW-12 is not admissible in evidence, as PW-12 is a Police Officer. 15. However, the evidence of PW-3 and PW-5 is to the effect that the appellant had made an extra-judicial confession to them stating that he had killed his wife. The extra-judicial confession made by the appellant to PW-12 is not admissible in evidence, as PW-12 is a Police Officer. 15. Though the evidence of PW-4, who is the father of the appellant, implies that he had been told by the appellant that he had killed his wife, when read with the evidence of PWs-1, 5 & 8, a plain reading of the evidence of PW-4 does not show that the appellant had told him that he had killed his wife. 16. The evidence of PW-1 is to the effect that on being informed over mobile phone by the villagers that his sister had been killed by her husband, he went to the house of the appellant and found the appellant’s son and daughter, who did not say anything to him regarding the murder of their mother. However, the father of the appellant, PW-4 told him that the appellant had murdered his sister. 17. The evidence of PW-2 is to the effect that on hearing the news of the killing of the deceased with a dao, he went to the house of the appellant and found the deceased dead with cut injuries over her neck. He found blood on the body and on the ground. He found the appellant in the house. On asking the appellant as to the death of his wife, the appellant told him that he had no knowledge regarding the death of his wife. Thereafter, the police came and took away the body. In his cross-examination, PW-2 stated that the appellant has two houses in his compound, one occupied by the parents of the appellant and another occupied by the appellant with his family, which consisted of his wife and two children. 18. The evidence of PW-3, who is the mother of the appellant, is to the effect while she was sleeping, she was woken up on hearing the appellant shouting that he had killed his wife by cutting. On going to the house of the appellant, PW-3 found the deceased lying dead on the ground with cut injuries over her neck while blood was oozing out. PW-3 stated that half the neck of the deceased had been cut. On going to the house of the appellant, PW-3 found the deceased lying dead on the ground with cut injuries over her neck while blood was oozing out. PW-3 stated that half the neck of the deceased had been cut. Thereafter, PW-3 informed the neighbours, who assembled in their house. The police came and took away the dead body. The police also arrested the appellant, as he had been tied in the house by neighbours. In her cross-examination, PW-3 did not deny the fact that she did not tell the police that she heard the appellant shouting that he had killed his wife by cutting her when she was woken up from her sleep. 19. The evidence of PW-4, who is the father of the deceased, is to the effect that on the night of the occurrence at about 3 a.m., the appellant came and woken him up from his sleep and told him that someone had murdered his wife by cutting her. PW-4 then told the appellant that it was none but the appellant who had killed his wife. PW-4 then went to the house of the appellant and found the deceased lying dead on the ground with cut injuries over her neck while blood was oozing out. PW-4 then informed the neighbours. However, the neighbours did not come at night. It was only in the morning that the villagers arrived and he narrated the incident. The neighbours had confined the accused by tying him up. In his cross-examination, PW-4 stated that he believed that the appellant had killed his wife, as there was no one in the house at the time of the occurrence except the appellant. 20. The evidence of PW-5 is to the effect that he knew the appellant, who was present in the dock and that the house of the appellant was situated two houses away from his house. On the night of the occurrence, he was woken up by a commotion that occurred in the house of the appellant. On going to the house of the appellant, he found the parents of the appellant as well as the neighbours. PW-5 then stated that the parents of the appellant told him that the appellant had murdered his wife by cutting her neck. On going to the house of the appellant, he found the parents of the appellant as well as the neighbours. PW-5 then stated that the parents of the appellant told him that the appellant had murdered his wife by cutting her neck. On entering the house of the appellant he found the appellant’s wife lying dead on the ground with injuries over her neck and blood was oozing out from the injury. On coming out of the house, he found the appellant in the courtyard and asked him as to what had happened. The appellant told him that he had somehow lost his temper and murdered his wife by cutting her neck. PW-5 then stated that he along with 2/3 other persons caught hold of the appellant and tied his hands behind his back and made him sit down. Thereafter, they also found a dao by his side while tying him up. The police were thereafter informed, who came and took away the dead body of the appellant. 21. The evidence of PW-6 is to the effect that he had been told that the appellant had killed his wife with a dao by cutting her neck. 22. The evidence of PW-7 is to the effect that he had written the FIR on the request of PW-1. 23. The evidence of PW-8 is to the effect that he knew the appellant who was in the dock. On the night of the occurrence, the father and mother of the appellant had come to his house and told him that he had murdered his wife in their house. On going to the house of the appellant the next morning, he saw the dead body of the deceased and he along with some other persons caught the appellant and tied him up. The police came and thereafter took away the body. The appellant also handed over to the police the dao by which he had killed his wife. 24. The evidence of PW-9 is to the effect that he heard a hue and cry when he got up at 6:30 on the day following the occurrence. He went to the house of the appellant and saw the dead body of the deceased. 25. 24. The evidence of PW-9 is to the effect that he heard a hue and cry when he got up at 6:30 on the day following the occurrence. He went to the house of the appellant and saw the dead body of the deceased. 25. The evidence of PW-10, who is a Constable at Silonibari Police Out Post, is that they had gone to the house of the appellant and found that both his hands were tied. He also saw the dead body of the appellant’s wife. The dead body was then taken to North Lakhimpur Civil Hospital for post-mortem examination. 26. The evidence of PW-11, who is the Senior Medical and Health Officer at North Lakhimpur Civil Hospital, is to the effect that on 07.08.2017 at about 3 p.m., he conducted post-mortem examination over the dead body of the deceased and his post-mortem examination showed the following:- “I. EXTERNAL APPEARANCE: 1. Condition of subject stout emaciated, decomposed etc.: Built- Average, Eye- partially open, Rigor mortis present in all the four limbs and neck. 2. Wounds-position and character: Sharp cut injury (2 Nos.) on left side of the neck below the left ear, size 8x3x5 cm. Injuries are deep and located one above the other with 2 cm gap caused by moderates heavy & sharp weapon. 3. Bruise- Nil. 4. Mark of ligature on neck dissection etc.: Absent. II. CRANIUM AND SPINAL CANAL: 1. Scalp, skull, vertebrate: Scalp & skull- Intake. Fracture of the cervical vertebrate of C2&C3 level deep to the cut injury. 2. Membrane:- Torn at the cut injury site. 3. Brain and spinal cord: Lacerating of the spinal cord seen at the level of C3 segment.” The evidence of PW-11 with regard to the detailed description of injury of the deceased and his opinion are reproduced hereinbelow as follows:- “MORE DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF INJURY OR DISEASE. As per history narrated by Sri Lakhinath Gorh (relative of the deceased), the victim Rina Gorh was attacked by her husband with a 'dao' on 06-08-2017 at about 10 PM. The husband is a chronic alcoholic and was under influence of alcohol at the time of the incident. The victim died immediately. The findings of post mortem examination has been described in appropriate columns. The injuries are lethal & ante mortem in nature. The husband is a chronic alcoholic and was under influence of alcohol at the time of the incident. The victim died immediately. The findings of post mortem examination has been described in appropriate columns. The injuries are lethal & ante mortem in nature. OPINION: In my opinion, the cause of death is spinal shock and respiratory paralysis due to fatal injury to the spinal cord. The time since death is 16-17 hours. The manner of death is apparently homicidal. Ext.2 is my post mortem examination report and Ext.2(1) is my signature in it. Ext.2(2) is the signature of Dr. Harpal Singh Suri, Joint Director of Health Services, Lakhimpur and Ext.2(3) is the signature of Dr. Nikhil Kakoti, Superintendent of North Lakhimpur Civil Hospital in Ext.2 which are known to me.” 27. The evidence of PW-12, who is the Investigating Officer, is to the effect that on 07.08.2017, while working as the In-charge of Silonibari Police Out Post under North Lakhimpur Police Station, he was informed over mobile phone that the appellant had murdered his wife with a dao, while she was sleeping. He accordingly made a G.D. Entry of the same vide G.D. Entry No.117 dated 07.08.2017 and proceeded to the house of the appellant, wherein he found the appellant tied up. He also stated that on asking the appellant, the appellant stated that he had murdered his wife with a dao and that he had kept the dao in the store room of the house. The dao was recovered from the store room. The dead body of the deceased which was found lying on the ground was then taken for post-mortem examination. The Circle Officer had also been informed for conducting inquest over the dead body. On finding evidence showing that the murder of the deceased had been caused by the appellant, he filed a charge-sheet. 28. The evidence of PW-13 is to the effect that PWs-8 & 9 had searched out the dao from the house of the appellant and handed it over to the police. 29. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses, as stated earlier, especially that of PWs-3 & 5 shows that there had been an extra-judicial confession made by the appellant to his mother (PW-3) and to PW-5, who is a neighbor. 29. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses, as stated earlier, especially that of PWs-3 & 5 shows that there had been an extra-judicial confession made by the appellant to his mother (PW-3) and to PW-5, who is a neighbor. There is nothing to show that PWs-3 & 5 would have any motive or reason to impute a wrong statement involving the appellant, especially when it relates to the death of his wife. Further, the evidence of PWs-1, 5 & 8 is to the effect that they had been informed by either one or both of the parents of the appellant that the appellant had killed his wife. There is no reason to impute any enmity between PWs-1, 5 & 8 against the appellant for making such allegation. In fact, there is no whisper of fabricated stories being made against the appellant during their cross-examination. As stated earlier, though the evidence of PW-4, who is the father of the appellant, does not specifically state that the appellant told him that the appellant had killed his wife, the evidence of PW-4 when considered with the evidence of PWs-1, 5 & 8 clearly gives rise to an inference that the appellant had killed his wife. 30. The above being said, the appellant in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. had taken the plea of alibi that he was not in his house at the time of occurrence, as he was in the pump. However, this has been clearly proved to be false by the evidence of the appellant’s mother and father, i.e., PWs-3 & 4. Further, the question and answer pertaining to question No.11 also negates the plea of alibi made in response to question No.3 during examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Question No.11 and the appellant’s answer to the same are reproduced hereinbelow as follows:- “Question No.11- P.W.-4 Sri Kunu Gorh in his evidence stated that on the night of occurrence at about 3 AM, you came out from your house and arouse him from sleeping and stated to him that someone had committed murder of your wife by cutting. Have you anything to say on this point? Answer:- Yes, it is true. I had stated to my father that someone had committed murder of my wife Rina Gorh by cutting.” 31. In the case of Pritinder Singh alias Lovely Vs. Have you anything to say on this point? Answer:- Yes, it is true. I had stated to my father that someone had committed murder of my wife Rina Gorh by cutting.” 31. In the case of Pritinder Singh alias Lovely Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2023) 7 SCC 727 , the Supreme Court at para 22 has considered various other Supreme Court judgments, where it has been held that an extra- judicial confession is a weak type of evidence and requires appreciation with a great deal of care and caution. Where an extra-judicial confession is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, it’s credibility becomes doubtful and loses it’s importance. It further held that as a rule of caution a Court would generally look for an independent reliable corroboration before basing reliance upon an extra-judicial confession. 32. However, convictions can be based on extra-judicial confession if it is proved like any other fact and the value thereof depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it is made. Further, an extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the Court. The above observations had been made in relation to Munna Kumar Upadhyay Vs. State of A.P. , reported in (2012) 6 SCC 174 , Balwinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab , reported in (1995) Supp (4) SCC 259, Kavita Vs. State of T.N. , reported in (1998) 6 SCC 108 , and State of Rajasthan Vs. Raja Ram , reported in (2003) 8 SCC 180 . 33. On considering the extra-judicial confession given by the appellant and the fact that the same had been narrated to other prosecution witnesses by the parents of the appellant, we are of the view that the appellant was involved in the murder of his wife. We also do not find any reason to doubt the testimony of the witnesses, who were told by the appellant’s parents that the appellant had killed his wife. Even though the children of the appellant have not been made witnesses, the same in our view does not weaken the prosecution case, inasmuch as, the children could have been asleep at the time of the incident. Further, it would have been very traumatic for the children to blame their father and/or they might not have seen the incident. 34. Even though the children of the appellant have not been made witnesses, the same in our view does not weaken the prosecution case, inasmuch as, the children could have been asleep at the time of the incident. Further, it would have been very traumatic for the children to blame their father and/or they might not have seen the incident. 34. The next issue to be decided is whether the circumstantial evidence forms a complete chain, which can only point to the guilt of the appellant. 35. In the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra , reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 , the Supreme Court at paras 153-154 has held as follows:- “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [ (1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047] “Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.” (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 154. 154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.” 36. There appears to be some discrepancy with the seizure of the dao, as PW- 5 had stated that he had seen the same near the appellant at the time of tying up the appellant, while PW-12 has stated that he had seized the dao, which was recovered from the store room of the appellant’s house, which is similar to the statement given by PW-8 to the effect that the appellant had handed over the dao to the police. We find that the said discrepancy is a minor discrepancy, as the same does not go to the core of the issue. It is settled law that minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. 37. Another issue that needs to be decided is with regard to whether failure of the appellant to offer reliable explanation in the discharge of the burden placed upon him in terms of Section 106 of the Evidence Act could also be a part of the circumstantial evidence pointing towards the guilt of the appellant. It would be profitable to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Nusrat Parween Vs. State of Jharkhand , reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3683, wherein it has been held that under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the onus to explain would shift on to the accused only after the prosecution succeeds in establishing the basic facts, from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer a proper explanation about the existence of the said other facts, the Court can draw an appropriate inference against the accused. In cases based on circumstantial evidence, the accused's failure to provide a reasonable explanation as required under Section 106 of the Evidence Act can serve as an additional link in the chain of circumstantial evidence. The same is however subject to the prosecution having established other essential ingredients sufficient to shift the onus on to the accused. In cases based on circumstantial evidence, the accused's failure to provide a reasonable explanation as required under Section 106 of the Evidence Act can serve as an additional link in the chain of circumstantial evidence. The same is however subject to the prosecution having established other essential ingredients sufficient to shift the onus on to the accused. It was also held that if the prosecution fails to establish a complete chain of circumstances in the first place, then the accused's failure to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act becomes irrelevant. 38. On considering the evidence which has been discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, we find that the prosecution has been able to establish the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the appellant had killed his wife with a dao. This is clear not only from his extra-judicial confession, but also from the medical evidence which proves that the injury could have been caused by sharp edged weapon. As the appellant’s plea of alibi has been shown to be false, we find that the circumstantial evidence forms a complete chain pointing towards the guilt of the appellant in killing his wife with a dao. 39. In the case of Binay Kumar Singh Vs. State of Bihar , reported in (1997) 1 SCC 283 , the Supreme Court has held that strict proof is required for establishing the plea of alibi. However, in the present case, the plea of alibi has turned out to be false. 40. In view of the reasons stated above, we do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. 41. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.