JUDGMENT : Arun Dev Choudhury, J. 1. Heard Mr. B. Purkaystha, learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr. A. Ganguly, learned counsel, as well as Mr. A. Dhanuba, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The present intra-court appeal is filed against the judgment and order dated 14.05.2024 passed by the learned Single judge in WP(C) No. 3368/2014, whereby the challenge made by the appellant to the order dated 30.12.2013 dismissing him from service and the appellate order dated 03.04.2014 upholding such dismissal were negated. 3. The appellant, who was serving as a Clerk-cum-Cashier under the respondent bank, was departmentally proceeded for alleged misappropriation of the bank’s money to the tune of Rs. 5,87,675/-. 4. The basic ground of challenge projected by the appellant, firstly was that the appellant was not given any effective opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses; secondly that though three other officers of the bank were charged on the same allegation, no common enquiry was held in derogation of the Regulation 42 of the Assam Gramin Vikash Bank Officers and Employees’ Service Regulations, 2010; thirdly, unlisted witnesses were examined by the employer bank to the surprise of the appellant. Finally, it was also contended that the appellant was not allowed to be represented by a lawyer in the departmental proceeding. 5. The learned Single Judge having due regards to the materials available on record and after considering the rival submissions, concluded that the materials on records including the averments made by the appellant himself at paragraph 10 of the writ petition clearly showed that the appellant had duly cross-examined the witnesses. 6. Regarding the assistance of the legal practitioner, the learned Single Judge opined that no prejudice can be said to have been caused to the appellant, inasmuch as, the bank was also not represented by any legal practitioner as well as the relevant rules in this regards, gives a discretionary power to allow representation of a legal practitioner. 7. The learned Single Judge further concluded that Regulation 42, even if a strict interpretation is given, only stipulates that such can be permitted only when two officers in different grades or one officer and one employee are involved in the same incident, such a common enquiry is required; however, in the case at hand, there were more than two employees involved. The learned Single Judge also opined that Regulation 42 only facilitates holding of a common enquiry, and there is no bar in holding a separate enquiry. 8. As regards the unlisted witnesses, it was on record that the appellant duly cross-examined such witnesses without any objection. Therefore, it cannot be said that any prejudice has been caused to the appellant. 9. While dismissing the aforenoted writ petition, the learned Single Judge took due note of the admitted facts that the amounts alleged to have been misappropriated were, in fact, deposited in the bank account of the appellant. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, argues before us on the merit of the findings in addition what was argued before the learned single Judge, inasmuch as, it is his contention that the appellant did not sign any form/folio for transferring/crediting amounts in question to his bank account, and that the cheques crediting such amount were not issued under the signature of the appellant. 11. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties, given our thoughtful considerations to the materials available on record. 12. We find no infirmity in the view taken by the learned Single Judge. 13. The record clearly establishes that the appellant cross-examined all the witnesses produced by the bank. The appellant’s own averments in the paragraph 10 of the writ petition acknowledge such cross-examination. Nothing has been shown to us that the cross-examination was curtailed or any question disallowed in a manner that caused prejudice. Mere assertion of ineffective opportunity, unsupported by the materials, cannot undue and otherwise valid enquiry. 14. As regards the representation by a legal practitioner, the relevant rules confer discretion on the disciplinary authority and the bank itself was not represented by a lawyer in the departmental proceeding. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the absence of legal representation. It is well settled that no employee has an absolute right to be represented by a lawyer in disciplinary proceedings; unless the case is complicated or unless the employer engages a legally trained prosecutor, denial of such representation does not vitiate the enquiry. 15. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the absence of legal representation. It is well settled that no employee has an absolute right to be represented by a lawyer in disciplinary proceedings; unless the case is complicated or unless the employer engages a legally trained prosecutor, denial of such representation does not vitiate the enquiry. 15. With respect to the plea under Regulation 42, the learned Single Judge rightly held that the regulation merely facilitates a common enquiry; it does not impose a mandatory requirement that all employees involved must be proceeded against jointly, particularly where more than two employees are implicated. The appellant has not demonstrated any prejudice from holding a separate enquiry. 16. The allegation regarding unlisted witnesses, it is evident from the record that the appellant did not object at the time of examination of such witnesses, rather cross-examined all of them. It is settled that a party who acquiesces in the examination of such witnesses and fully cross-examines them cannot subsequently claim surprise or prejudice. 17. At this stage, it is necessary to restate the well settled principle guiding the exercise power of judicial review over disciplinary proceeding, more particularly, in cases involving misappropriation by the bank employees. 18. The Apex Court has consistently held that the Court does not act as an appellate authority over finding of fact recorded by the departmental authority. Judicial review is confined to examining whether the enquiry was held by a competent authority; the rules of natural justice were complied with; the findings are based on some evidence; the conclusions are not perverse; and irrelevant materials were neither considered, nor relevant materials were ignored. 19. It is equally well settled that in such a case of judicial review, the High Court should not re-appreciate evidence; substitute its own conclusion on penalty; enter into adequacy or reliability of evidence or decide whether the findings of guilt is correct . 20. In the context of the bank employees and allegation of misappropriation, the Apex Court has repeatedly emphasized that the rigor and the discipline in banking institution must be maintained at the highest level. Even the acts that display lack of integrity, short of actual financial loss, justify severe punishment, including dismissal, since banks function on public trust. 20. In the context of the bank employees and allegation of misappropriation, the Apex Court has repeatedly emphasized that the rigor and the discipline in banking institution must be maintained at the highest level. Even the acts that display lack of integrity, short of actual financial loss, justify severe punishment, including dismissal, since banks function on public trust. If the charges relate to misappropriation, manipulation of accounts, or acts affecting the integrity of the banking system, the penalty of dismissal is ordinarily justified, and the Court should be slow to interfere. 21. Applying the above principles, we find that the enquiry was conducted by a competent authority, after issuing a proper show cause, supplying the documents, permitting a written defence and allowing cross-examination. 22. The findings of guilt are based on the evidence, including the admitted fact that the three amounts in question were deposited into the appellant’s own bank account. 23. No procedural violation or violation of natural justice has been demonstrated by the appellant. The conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority is rational and supported by the evidence. 24. In our estimation, the seriousness of the charge involving the misappropriation of the bank’s funds does not warrant any interference with the penalty of dismissal. 25. The appellant defends that he did not sign the relevant form or folio or that the cheques bore no signature of the appellant, has been duly considered by the enquiry officer and disbelieved the same on appreciation of the material evidence. Such findings of facts on evidence are not open to re-appreciation in judicial review. This Court cannot substitute its own opinion regarding sufficiency or reliability of the evidence. 26. At this stage, Mr. Purkayastha, learned counsel for the appellant contends that a lenient view should be taken and the employer be directed to impose a lesser punishment. 27. It is true that there is no absolute bar on the constitutional Courts to examine the proportionality of punishment. However, such exercise of power is based on the doctrine of proportionality and is guided by principle of selecting the most appropriate and least restrictive measures to achieve the intended objective. 28. In our opinion, more particularly, in the backdrop of the determination made hereinabove, the punishment inflicted upon the appellant, does not shock our consciences, inasmuch as, the punishment cannot be said to be disproportionate or excessive in the context of the proved charge. 28. In our opinion, more particularly, in the backdrop of the determination made hereinabove, the punishment inflicted upon the appellant, does not shock our consciences, inasmuch as, the punishment cannot be said to be disproportionate or excessive in the context of the proved charge. 29. For all the reasons stated hereinabove and in view of the limited scope of judicial review over the disciplinary proceeding, particularly, where charges involved misappropriation by a bank employee, we find no reason to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment of the learned Single Judge. 30. The appeal is devoid of merit. Accordingly, the judgment and order dated 14.05.2024 passed in WP(C) No. 3368/2014 is affirmed, and the order of dismissal dated 30.12.2013 and the appellate order dated 03.04.2014 stand upheld. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Parties to bear their own cost.