JUDGMENT : HARISANKAR V. MENON, J. 1. The petitioner had enrolled in the service of the Border Security Force (‘BSF’ for short) as a Constable in the year 1969, and pursuant to the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him, he was discharged from service in the year 1977. The allegation against the petitioner was with reference to a scuffle between certain employees of BSF. Contending that the co-accused had only been provided a lesser punishment, the petitioner had challenged his discharge before this Court, unsuccessfully. Later in the year 2016, contending that the petitioner had to undergo treatment for some neurological disorders, he sought for compassionate allowance under the provisions of Rule 41 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the “Rules” for brevity). The said claim was sought to be enforced by filing a writ petition before this Court, which was rejected by a learned Single Judge, essentially on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. In an appeal filed at the instance of the petitioner, a Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.1664 of 2018, by a judgment dated 06.09.2018, found that this Court had jurisdiction and directed the authority under the Pension Rules to consider the claim with reference to the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Mahinder Dutt Sharma v. Union of India , (2014) 11 SCC 684 . On the basis of the afore directions, Ext.P2 order has been issued by the 2 nd respondent, holding that the petitioner would not be entitled for the benefits. It is in such circumstances that the petitioner has filed the captioned writ petition, seeking to challenge Ext.P2 order issued by the 2 nd respondent. 2. I have heard Sri.R.Rajasekharan Pillai, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri.Dayasindhu Shreehari N.S., the learned Senior Panel Counsel for the respondents. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner Sri.Pillai, would contend that the consideration made while issuing the order at Ext.P2 was flawed. According to him, the petitioner was entitled for the benefit of the provisions of Rule 41, going by the factual situation recorded by the Division Bench of this Court in Ext.P1. 4. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner Sri.Pillai, would contend that the consideration made while issuing the order at Ext.P2 was flawed. According to him, the petitioner was entitled for the benefit of the provisions of Rule 41, going by the factual situation recorded by the Division Bench of this Court in Ext.P1. 4. Per contra, Sri.Dayasindhu Shreehari, the learned Senior Panel Counsel for the respondents, would contend that the petitioner was not entitled for the benefits insofar as, admittedly, the petitioner had no “pensionable service”, since he was discharged even before completion of 20 years of service. In answer to the afore contention, Sri.Pillai, the learned counsel for the petitioner, would contend that the entitlement is with reference to the proviso to Rule 41, which in turn makes reference to the eligibility for “compensation pension” under the provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules. 5. I have considered the rival contentions as well as the connected records. 6. The facts are not in dispute. The petitioner was discharged for the reason noticed earlier. True, the petitioner did not raise the claim for compassionate allowance at that point of time. However, the Division Bench of this Court, through Ext.P1 judgment, permitted the issue to be raised and adjudicated by the respondent, with specific reference to the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Mahinder Dutt Sharma (supra). On the basis of the afore, the impugned order at Ext.P2 had been issued, noticing the principles laid down in Mahinder Dutt Sharma (supra). A reading of the judgment of the Apex Court in Mahinder Dutt Sharma (supra) shows that with reference to an adjudication under Rule 41, the same has to be with reference to the five circumstances noticed thereunder. The first circumstance is with reference to the infliction of punishment on account of “moral turpitude”. The second circumstance is the punishment on account of the “dishonesty towards the employer”. The third one is with reference to the dismissal from service on account of the actions taken for the “personal gains” from the employer. The fourth one is with reference to the punishment on account of “harming a third-party interest”. The last one is with reference to “an otherwise unacceptable reason”, on account of which punishment has been imposed. A reading of the five situations as above would show that, none of them are attracted to the case at hand. The fourth one is with reference to the punishment on account of “harming a third-party interest”. The last one is with reference to “an otherwise unacceptable reason”, on account of which punishment has been imposed. A reading of the five situations as above would show that, none of them are attracted to the case at hand. In the case at hand, this Court notices that the punishment was on account of the involvement in a scuffle between the employees. This took place in the 1970s. The petitioner has been proceeded against and also discharged from service. The reason for seeking the compassionate allowance arose only in the year 2016 on account of the reason already noticed. When that be so, the claim has to be considered with reference to the factual situation at that point of time. This is especially so, when a Division Bench of this Court in Ext.P1 judgment, had found that the petitioner required the afore benefit with reference to the neurosurgery undergone by him during March, 2016. In such circumstances, I am of the opinion that the situations as highlighted by the Apex Court would not apply to the case at hand. 7. This Court also notices the consideration made in paragraph Nos.7, 8 and 9 of Ext.P2 order to the effect that “poverty is not an essential condition precedent to the grant of Compassionate Allowance”. However, the fact that the petitioner had served in the BSF for a period of around ten years is not in dispute. The special circumstances, on account of which the claim was made, are also to be noticed. It is also to be further seen that during the admitted period of his service, apart from the allegation which ultimately led to the discharge, there were no allegations whatsoever against the petitioner herein. When that be so, the petitioner’s case, I am of the opinion, is to be considered as an exceptional circumstance and has to be granted the benefit of Rule 41. 8. In that view of the matter, the findings contained in Ext.P2 to the effect that the petitioner is not entitled for the benefits cannot be sustained. 9. I also take note of the contention raised by Sri.Dayasindhu Shreehari, that the petitioner did not have the required pensionary service, and hence Rule 41 would not apply. However, this Court notices the judgment cited by Sri.Pillai in Ex. Const. 9. I also take note of the contention raised by Sri.Dayasindhu Shreehari, that the petitioner did not have the required pensionary service, and hence Rule 41 would not apply. However, this Court notices the judgment cited by Sri.Pillai in Ex. Const. Ram Niwas v. UOI and Ors. 2012 SCC OnLine Del 4225 , wherein it has been held that even in such a situation, the benefit has to be extended. To the same effect is the subsequent judgment of the Delhi High Court in Gauri Shankar v. Central Reserve Police Force & Anr. MANU/DE/1690/2022. Resultantly, the captioned writ petition would stand allowed, setting aside Ext.P2. There will be a direction to the 2 nd respondent to extend the benefit of the provisions of Rule 41 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, to the petitioner, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment.