JUDGMENT : 1. Pursuant to order of this Court dated 28.01.2025, learned counsel for the petitioners does not dispute the thumb impressions of the petitioners on the compromise deed dated 09.01.2002. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 05.03.2024 passed by the Board of Revenue Rajasthan, Ajmer (for brevity, “BoR”) whereby, while dismissing the revision petition preferred by the petitioners/defendants (for brevity, “defendants”), the order dated 16.11.2016 passed by Revenue Appellate Authority, Jaipur allowing the application filed by the respondents/plaintiffs (for brevity, “plaintiffs”) under Section 5 Limitation Act, 1963 (for brevity, “the Act, 1963”) has been affirmed. 2. The relevant facts in brief are that the suit filed by the plaintiffs/respondents (for brevity, “plaintiffs”) against the defendants for declaration and correction of entries came to be dismissed by the Court of Sub-Divisional Officer, Jaipur-Ist (for brevity, “trial Court”) vide judgment and decree dated 28.09.2002. Thereafter, they filed another suit against the defendants qua the same agriculture land for declaration, partition and permanent injunction which came to be dismissed by the trial Court vide order dated 07.04.2015 while allowing the application filed by the defendants under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC treating it to be hit by the principle of res judicata. Thereafter, the plaintiffs assailed the judgment and decree dated 28.09.2002 by way of an appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Jaipur District, Jaipur. Alongwith the memo of appeal, they filed an application under Section 5 of the Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay. The application was allowed by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 16.11.2016 which was unsuccessfully challenged by the defendants before the Board of Revenue. 3. Assailing the order, learned counsel for the defendants, inviting attention of this Court towards the contents of the application filed by the plaintiffs under Section 5 of the Act, 1963 would contend that even assuming that they were unaware of the dismissal of the suit by the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 28.09.2002, in any case, it came to their knowledge on 12.07.2012 still, the appeal was filed with a delay of about three years. He further submits that the inordinate delay in preferring the appeal has been condoned by the Revenue Courts without appreciating this important aspect of the matter. He further submits that the inordinate delay in preferring the appeal has been condoned by the Revenue Courts without appreciating this important aspect of the matter. He, therefore, prays that the writ petition be allowed, the order impugned dated 05.03.2024 be quashed and set aside and the application filed by the plaintiffs under Section 5 of the Act, 1963 be dismissed. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, supporting the findings recorded by the Revenue Courts, prays for dismissal of the writ petition. 5. Heard. Considered. 6. While allowing the application filed by the plaintiffs under Section 5 of the Act, 1963, the first appellate authority has held that in the suit filed by them, the parties have entered into a compromise which was submitted before the trial Court and was also verified by it. It has also relied upon the contentions of the plaintiffs that on the assurance extended by their learned counsel that the suit would be disposed of in terms of compromise, they did not proceed further; however, it came to be dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 28.09.2002. It was further held that these circumstances furnished the plaintiffs sufficient cause in filing the appeal with delay. These findings have been affirmed by the Board of Revenue vide order dated 05.03.2024. A perusal of the judgment dated 28.09.2002 reflects a categorical finding therein that both the parties have submitted a compromise deed dated 09.01.2002 wherein, the defendants have given their no objection if the suit filed by the plaintiffs is decreed and it was further stipulated therein that the defendants have no objection if after deleting their name in the revenue record, name of the plaintiffs and the defendant no.4 is recorded. In view of the aforesaid categorical averments in the compromise deed submitted by the respective parties before the trial Court, this Court finds no error in the findings so recorded by the Revenue Appellate Authority and affirmed by the Board of Revenue. 7. It has further been held by the Revenue Courts that the plaintiffs were not given correct and proper legal advice by their counsel which resulted into filing of the second suit and its consequential dismissal on an application filed by the defendants under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Indisputably, after dismissal of their second suit, the plantiffs have preferred the appeal assailing the judgment and decree dated 28.09.2002 without further delay. Indisputably, after dismissal of their second suit, the plantiffs have preferred the appeal assailing the judgment and decree dated 28.09.2002 without further delay. Relying upon the precedential law that technicalities should not come in way of imparting substantial justice and a lis should be decided on its merit and a party to it should not be non-suited on the technicalities, while accepting the application under Section 5 of the Act, 1963 filed by the plaintiffs, delay has been condoned. This Court is in the respectful agreement with the findings so recorded by the Appellate Authority and affirmed by the Board of Revenue. 8. The matter can be examined from another angle as well. Section 14 of the Act of 1963 provides as under: “ 14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction. — (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court under rule 1 of that Order where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,— (a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted; (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding; (c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction. 9. A Division Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court held, in the case of Somnath Banerjee and Others vs. Vivek Salvi and Others : AIR 1988 Calcutta 366 , as under: “4. In Ram Lal v. Rewa Coalfields , AIR 1962 SC 361 (supra) the Supreme Court has quoted with approval the observations of the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan (1890) ILR 13 Mad 269 to the effect that "the words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant. Now though our procedural laws, in theory, permit a party to conduct his case in person without a lawyer, the labyrinth of our laws, both procedural and substantive, and the enigmatic features prevailing under our present adversary legal system leave him almost with no option but to engage a Counsel to prosecute his case. In such a case, to quote from the Supreme Court decision in Rafiq v. Munshilal, AIR 1981 Sc 1400 at p. 1401, "the obligation of the parties is to select his advocate, brief him, pay the fees demanded by him and then trust the learned advocate to do the rest of the things" as "after engaging a lawyer, the party may remain supremely confident that the lawyer will look after his interest". If a party has done that, then, as the Supreme Court has proceeded to have observed further in the form of a question, "what is the fault of the party who having done everything in his power and expected of him would suffer because of default of his advocate". If a party has done that, then, as the Supreme Court has proceeded to have observed further in the form of a question, "what is the fault of the party who having done everything in his power and expected of him would suffer because of default of his advocate". This has again been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Goswami Krishna Murarilal v. Dhan Prakash, (1981) 4 SCC 574 and these observations have again been quoted with approval in a later decision of the Supreme Court in Lachi Tewari v. Director of Land Records, AIR 1984 SC 41 at p.42. It should be noted that in Rafiq v. Munshilal (supra), the Supreme Court, after raising the question as to whether a party should suffer for the inaction, negligence or other fault of the advocate, has answered by declaring that "the answer is obviously in the negative". 5. In the case at hand, it is not disputed that the appellants engaged lawyers to prefer appeals against the impugned order and these appeals were filed in a wrong Court in accordance with the advice of their lawyers. It is also on record that the respondents themselves also lodged caveat in that wrong Court and that the said Court also had no hesitation to admit those appeals after hearing the lawyers for both the parties and also to keep the appeals on its file for all these days. If these appeals could get entry in this wrong Court only because of the obviously wrong and/or negligent advice of the lawyers and also inaction and negligence on the part of the Court, then it is difficult to understand as to why the appellants shall not be regarded to have made out sufficient cause for the condonation of the delay resulting from such wrong institution. As already stated, our laws and forensic procedure compel a party to engage a lawyer in proceedings in Courts and, therefore, the Courts must see that the parties do not suffer because their lawyers have blundered. 6. Even if it cannot be always put into a straight-jacket formula of universal application, it has been repeatedly held by both our pre-independence and post- independence apex Courts that mistake or mistaken advice of lawyer may be a good ground for condoning the delay resulting from such mistake or mistaken advice. 6. Even if it cannot be always put into a straight-jacket formula of universal application, it has been repeatedly held by both our pre-independence and post- independence apex Courts that mistake or mistaken advice of lawyer may be a good ground for condoning the delay resulting from such mistake or mistaken advice. Relying on the Privy Council decision in Kunwar Rajendra Bahadur v. Raj Rajeshwari Bali, AIR 1937 PC 276 (supra), it has been held by the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749 at p. 757 that "if a party had acted in a particular manner on a wrong advice given by his legal adviser, he cannot be guilty of negligence so as to disentitle the party to plead sufficient cause under S. 5 of the Limitation Act". And relying on those observations, and also the aforesaid Privy Council decision, it has again been held by the Supreme Court in Punjabi University v. A. Section Ganesh, AIR 1972 SC 1973 at Pp. 1974-75 that "a mistake by a lawyer is good ground for condoning the delay in filing the appeal". 10. As is apparent from the law laid down in the aforesaid case relying upon the precedential law of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that sufficient cause under Section 14 should receive liberal construction so as to advance justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant and his bona fide is reflected if he has engaged a lawyer and goes by his advice. 11. A three-Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has, in the case of Badlu and Another vs. Shiv Charan and Others : (1980) 4 SCC 401 , pronounced the law as under: “xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx There could be no doubt that if the appellants filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge due to a mistake of law or fact resulting from a bona fide but mistaken advice given to them by their lawyer, this would be a good ground for condoning the delay. Moreover, it is well settled that if a litigant is pursuing a bona fide civil proceeding with due diligence and in good faith in any appeal or revision he is entitled to the exclusion of the time taken in such proceeding.” 12. Moreover, it is well settled that if a litigant is pursuing a bona fide civil proceeding with due diligence and in good faith in any appeal or revision he is entitled to the exclusion of the time taken in such proceeding.” 12. A Full Bench of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held in the case of Mathura Singh vs. Bhawani Singh and Others: (1900) ILR 22 All. 248, that the protection under Section 14 is available not only where the remedy is pursued in the wrong court; but, also when, though, the Court is having jurisdiction; but, could not decide the case on merit for the reasons analogues to the defect of jurisdiction. Similarly, in the present case, the second suit was held to be not maintainable being hit by the doctrine of res judicata. The Full Court held as under: “xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx But the question is--was the Court unable to entertain the suit from “other cause of alike nature” to defect of jurisdiction? Before dealing with these words it is necessary to bear in mind the essential object of Section 14 and the principle which underlies it. The principle is, broadly speaking, the protection against the bar of limitation of a man honestly doing his best to get his case tried on the merits, but failing through the Court being unable to give him such a trial. That is the principle; and I think it is clearly applicable, not only to cases in which a man brings his suit in the wrong Court, that is, a Court having no jurisdiction to entertain it, but also where he brings his suit in the right Court, but is nevertheless prevented from getting a trial on the merits by something, which, though not a defect of jurisdiction, is analogous to that defect.” 13. In the instant case as well, as the facts demonstrate, the plaintiffs, who are rustic illiterate villagers, having engaged a counsel, had no option but, to rely upon the advice given by him. In the instant case as well, as the facts demonstrate, the plaintiffs, who are rustic illiterate villagers, having engaged a counsel, had no option but, to rely upon the advice given by him. It is specifically stated in the application filed by them under Section 5 of the Act of 1963 submitted alongwith the memo of first appeal that when they contacted their counsel on receipt of a threat from the defendants on 12.07.2012, he advised them to file a new suit before the learned trial Court which came to be dismissed on 28.04.2015 being hit by the principle of res judicata. Thereafter, they contacted another counsel who adviced them to prefer an appeal against the earlier judgment and decree dismissing their suit. After obtaining the certified copies of the relevant documents, before the appeal could be preferred, one of the plaintiffs namely Shri Harnath expired resulting into further delay in preferring the appeal. A perusal of the order dated 28.04.2015 reflects that probably the counsel was also under a bona fide misconception that the second suit having been filed for different relief(s) than the relief(s) claimed in the earlier suit, it would be maintainable. 14. In view of the aforesaid facts and in the backdrop of the aforesaid precedential law, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the plaintiffs were also entitled for condonation of delay under Section 14 of the Act of 1963. 15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the defendants do not merit acceptance and this Court finds no reason, under its limited supervisory jurisdiction vide Article 227 of the Constitution of India, to interfere with the order impugned passed by the BoR in exercise of its judicious discretion based on sound legal principles. 16. Resultantly, this writ petition is dismissed. However, it is made clear that observation made by this Court in the preceding paras shall not affect the merits of the pending appeal. 17. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of accordingly.