JUDGMENT : M.A. ABDUL HAKHIM, J. 1. This appeal is filed against the order dismissing O.P. No.7/2022, filed seeking leave to institute the suit filed by the appellants under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure . The appellants filed the Original Petition seeking leave, alleging mismanagement of the 1 st respondent Society on the allegation that directions of the Court are necessary for the administration of the 1 st respondent Trust. 2. The appellants/petitioners were two among 169 ordinary members of the 1 st respondent Society. The 1 st respondent Society is registered under the Societies Registration Act , 1860, in the year 1964 as per Registration No.38/1964. The petitioners’ claim is that they are ordinary members of the 1st respondent Society as per Membership Nos. 141 and 202; that they used to renew their membership but the 13 th defendant who is the Secretary of the 1 st respondent sent a letter dated 20.09.2022 to them returning the cheques for the renewal fee and informing that O.S No.11/2015 before the Sub Court Hosdurg was settled on 05.09.2019 and as per the settlement, the membership to the society would be restricted only for life members and there would be no ordinary members since 2019 and hence the application for renewal of membership cannot be considered. The contention of the petitioners is that Swami Nithyananda who had his Samadhi in the year 1961 was a great asserting Yogi with large number of devotees and followers; that there were substantial contributions to the fold of Swami and that thus assets came into existence on which Swami had ostensible ownership but the beneficial interest vested with general public to be used for the general welfare of the public. The public trust so created, after the samadhi of the said Swami was required to be managed properly and hence the same was registered as a charitable society under the name “Sree Nithyananda Vidya Kendra” dedicated to Swami's ideals; that even if the trust is registered as a society, it by itself will not change the character of the trust as that of a society. 3. 3. It is revealed from the pleadings that the Society originally started a Polytechnic with the name Swami Nithyananda Polytechnic in the year 1966 and a Self-Financing Engineering College under the name “Sadguru Swami Nithyananda Institute of Technology in the year 2010 at Kanhangad and the Engineering College is not functioning now. The management of the educational institution owned by the Society, including appointment of staff, fixing of salary, disciplinary power, etc., is vested with the Society. The Director Board of the Society are selected by the members of the General Body in the Annual General Body meeting to be held as per Clause 10 of the Byelaw of the Society at the Ashram Premises at Kanhangad. The term of the Director Board is three years from the date of election. The Director Board is to have a minimum strength of 8 members and a maximum strength of 31 members as decided by the General Body. The office bearers of the Society are President, Vice President, Secretary, Joint Secretary and Treasurer, who have to be elected from among the elected members of the Director Board. Under clause 5 of the Byelaw, the General Body shall be made up of two class of members namely, life members who have to pay a onetime lifetime membership fee of Rs.5,000/- and ordinary members who have to pay one-time admission fee of Rs.1,000/- with annual renewal membership fee of Rs.101/-. Clause 11 of the Bye-law provides that any amendment of the Bye-law can be effected only by the General body of the Society without altering the basic characteristics and objects of the society. There were two factions of members competing to procure management of the Society. Several litigations were instituted before the Court on account of the management disputes. One among them was O.S No.11/2015 before the Sub Court, Hosdurg, challenging the General Body and for declaration that the Director Board elected in May 2012 was entitled to hold over the office until a new Board of Directors were elected by the General Body. The subject matter of the said suit was settled through an out-of- court settlement dated 19.04.2018. The said settlement was recorded before the Court as per the decree dated 05.09.2019. Pursuant to the compromise in O.S. No.11/2015, all other litigations pending between the two factions were closed. The subject matter of the said suit was settled through an out-of- court settlement dated 19.04.2018. The said settlement was recorded before the Court as per the decree dated 05.09.2019. Pursuant to the compromise in O.S. No.11/2015, all other litigations pending between the two factions were closed. One among the terms of the compromise was that the membership of the society would be restricted only to the life members and there would be no ordinary members. 4. The petitioners claim that originally there were about 210 ordinary members in the society enrolled till the year 2012 and later 500 members were admitted in 2015. As on the crucial date of 12.05.2015 referred to in the compromise, there were about 600 ordinary members in the society. There was no General Body either before or after the said settlement to deprive the membership of the said 600 members. The petitioners claim that the said terms of the compromise, doing away with ordinary membership without the concurrence of the General Body appear to be incompetent, void and ultra vires of the Bye-law. The substantial contention of the petitioners is against the removal of the ordinary members from the General Body of the society who have voting rights to elect the Director Board. The appellants claim that the 1 st respondent is a public charity as defined under Section 92 of the CPC. Under the said circumstances, considering the welfare and best interest of the society and efficient administration of the educational institutions owned by the society and larger public interest, intervention of the court is required in an appropriate manner to ensure an efficient, smooth and transparent administration of the society and its institutions in accordance with law and to secure the objects of the society. A new director board office bearers and governing body is to be elected after settlement of a comprehensive scheme for resolving the controversy related to admissibility to ordinary members in the general body of the 1 st defendant and during the interregnum period the management of the society and institutions are to be taken over by a receiver to be appointed under the suit. 5. 5. The prayers in the plaint include declaration that the petitioners and 167 members shown in plaint C schedule are ordinary members of the Society; Declaration that the defendants 2 to 8, 10, 21 to 24 are not the elected members of the Director Board of the 1 st respondent and trustees of the 1 st respondent, restraining them from managing or interfering the affairs of the 1 st respondent and its institutions; Mandatory injunction directing the 1 st respondent to constitute new Director Board after due election as per the Bye-law; Appointment of an Advocate Commissioner to supervise the Annual General Body Meeting for election of the Office Bearers; Settlement of a comprehensive scheme including for resolving the controversy related to the admissibility of ordinary members in the General Body of the 1 st respondent and to prepare a correct and proper list of the ordinary and life members of the 1 st respondent society. 6. The respondents 3 to 6 contested the Original Petition contending, inter alia, that the 1 st respondent Society is not a public trust and hence would not fall under the purview of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure . The 1 st respondent was not established for the purpose of charity or charitable work. The devotees of Swami Nithyananda formed a public Trust by the name Swami Nithyananda Ashram for charitable activities and it is engaged in various charitable activities, serving the needs of the public, especially those of the devotees. The 1 st respondent has not undertaken any public, religious or charitable activities. It operates two educational institutions in Kanhangad. The educational institutions are not to be considered as public charitable institutions. 7. No oral evidence was adduced by the parties. Exts. A1 to A17 were marked on the side of the petitioners and Ext.B1 is marked on the side of the contesting respondents. 8. The Trial Court dismissed the Original Petition holding that there is no evidence before the Court to conclude prima facie that the 1 st respondent is a trust within the meaning of Section 92 CPC. 9. I heard the learned counsel for the appellants, Sri. Vinod Bhatt S and the learned Senior counsel for the respondents 1,3,5,6, Sri. T. Sethumadhavan, instructed by Sri. K Sujai Sathian. 10. 9. I heard the learned counsel for the appellants, Sri. Vinod Bhatt S and the learned Senior counsel for the respondents 1,3,5,6, Sri. T. Sethumadhavan, instructed by Sri. K Sujai Sathian. 10. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that a public trust was created even before the incorporation of the society. The said public trust was having assets procured out of the contributions from the devotees and followers of Swami Nithyananda. The 1 st respondent society was formed after the Samadhi of Swami to manage the said properties. The said properties were procured for charitable and religious purposes. The beneficial interest of the same was vested with the general public to be used for the welfare of the general public. The learned counsel invited my attention to the specific averments in paragraph No. 6 of the Original Petition which refers to the existence of such public trust before the creation of the 1 st respondent society. The learned counsel contended that when a public trust is created and later a society was also created to manage the said public trust, the nature and character of the public trust will not be lost by the formation of the society and the society continues as the trust which originated earlier. The learned Counsel cited the decision of this Court in Shanmughan v. Vishnu Bharatheeyan and others, MANU/KE/0442/2003 and Kesava Panicker v. Damodara Panicker and Others, 1975 KHC 125 to substantiate the point that the trust for advancement of education would also come within the meaning of charity. The learned counsel tried to distinguish Abhaya v. J.A. Raheem, AIR 2005 Ker 233 relied on by the Trial Court by contending that even though the said decision lays down that formation of the society under the Societies Registration Act for charitable or social purposes cannot be considered as creating a trust for the application of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure , since a public trust is preceded by the formation of the 1 st respondent, the said decision is not applicable in the case on hand. The learned counsel stressed the necessity of the orders of the Court in the matter of administration of the 1 st respondent citing mismanagement of the affairs of the 1 st respondent by the limited numbers of life members illegally excluding large numbers of ordinary members who have voting rights in the General Body on the strength of a compromise decree which is not binding on the ordinary members. 11. On the other hand, the learned Senior counsel for the contesting respondents contended that the prime condition for entertaining an application for leave under Section 92 of CPC is that there is no mala fides on the part of the applicants and the application is not for vindicating the individual rights of the petitioners. The sequence of events will clearly reveal that the present Original Petition is filed by the petitioners at the instance of the 13 th respondent. The 13 th respondent was the secretary of the 1 st respondent Society only till 23.12.2021. Thereafter, the 6 th respondent was the secretary of the 1 st respondent. The petitioners wanted to see that the 13 th respondent and its supporters are reinstated in the management of the 1 st respondent society. The petitioners are not having any interest in the affairs of the 1 st respondent society as they are not members of the 1 st respondent society as on the date of the filing of the Original Petition. The Trial Court rightly found that there is no public trust created in order to invoke Section 92 CPC. The learned Senior Counsel cited the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bishwanath v. Thakur Radha Ballabhli, AIR 1967 SC 1044 and Vidyodaya Trust v. Mohan Prasad R. and Others, (2008) 4 SCC 115 and the decisions of this Court in Mayer Simon v. Advocate General, Kerala and Others, 1975 KLT 78 , Kesava Panicker v. Damodara Panicker and Others, 1975 KLT 797 , Kerala High Court Advocates’ Association and Others v. Babbalan and Another, 2010 (2) KHC 1 , Church of South India v. John, 2012 (2) KLT 606 and Valia Koonambaikulam Sree Bhadrakali Temple v. Rajendran, 2018 (1) KLT 936 in support of his contentions. 12. I had considered the rival contentions. 13. 12. I had considered the rival contentions. 13. In the recent decision of this Court in Iruvaikonam Bhagavathi Temple v. State of Kerala, 2025 KHC 587 , it was held that the following points are to be satisfied by the Court before granting an application for leave by the Court under Section 92 CPC. 1. Firstly, satisfaction regarding the existence of a Trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature. 2. Secondly, prima facie satisfaction of existence of real, substantive, and existing right of the Applicants in the Trust. 3. Thirdly, the satisfaction that there is no lack of bona fides on the part of the Applicants and it is not intended to vindicate individual rights of the parties. 4. Fourthly, prima facie satisfaction of existence of either breach of trust or of necessity of direction of the Court for the administration of the Trust. 5. Lastly, the reliefs prayed for in the suit shall be for the matters covered under Clause (a) to (h) in S.92(1) CPC. 14. The first and foremost condition is the existence of a trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature. The petitioners claim that there existed a public trust before the formation of the 1 st respondent Society and the public trust was having assets acquired with the contributions offered in favour of Swami Nithyananda. Even though the petitioners made such a claim, there is no evidence before the Court to prove the said contention. The contention of the counsel for the appellants is that all the records relating to the properties of the 1 st respondent are in the hands of the contesting respondents. The contesting respondents did not produce those records before the court in support of their contention that all the assets were acquired by the Society. On account of the refusal on the part of the contesting respondents to produce the relevant records, the only probability which could be arrived at by the court is that there were assets of the public trust even before the formation of the 1 st respondent and such assets necessitated the formation of the society. I am unable to accept the said contention. I am unable to accept the said contention. The petitioners were also active members of the Society for a considerable length of time and hence it must be within their knowledge also if any property was acquired even before the formation of the 1 st respondent society. When the petitioner contends that a public trust with properties was created even before the formation of the 1 st respondent society, it is the burden of the petitioners to prove such contention at least on a prima facie basis for maintaining an application under S.92 CPC. In Kesava Panicker (supra), this Court found that an application under S.92 is maintainable with respect to a society registered under the Societies Registration Act on the grounds that there is evidence to show that long before the registration of the Society, funds were collected from the public towards share money; that there has been a clear intention to form a trust; that a trust fund was created and the fund was utilised for the construction of school building and ancillary purposes for establishing and maintaining the work of the school. It is further held that if there was a trust created by the public for a public charitable purpose namely establishing, maintaining and running a school, the fact of the registration of a society could not change the character of the properties which has been already constituted as trust property and impressed with the trust and any addition to those properties must also have the same character. In the case on hand, there is no evidence to prove that a trust was existing before the formation of the 1 st respondent society. Since the petitioners failed to discharge their burden, I am of the view that the application under S.92 of the CPC filed by the petitioners is not maintainable, since no public trust is in existence with respect to the properties of the 1 st respondent Society. 15. Since the petitioners failed to discharge their burden, I am of the view that the application under S.92 of the CPC filed by the petitioners is not maintainable, since no public trust is in existence with respect to the properties of the 1 st respondent Society. 15. Even though the learned Senior Counsel for the contesting respondents contended that the petitioners were not have any existing interest in the 1 st respondent Society as on the date of filing of the Original Petition, I am of the view that they had real, substantive and existing rights in the 1 st respondent as on the date of filing of the Original Petition since they were ordinary members of the 1 st respondent society and admittedly all the ordinary members were excluded from the 1 st respondent Society based on a compromise between the parties to O.S No.11/2015 in which the ordinary members were not parties. It is the specific contention of the petitioners that such removal of ordinary members from the membership of the 1 st respondent Society is illegal. It is seen that the ordinary members were also having voting rights in the General Body to elect the Director Board members and that the contention of the petitioners is that the Bye-law can be amended only by a decision in a properly constituted General Body. Prima facie, it appears that the membership of the petitioners was lost on account of the acts of the contesting respondents and hence I am of the view that they had real, substantive and existing rights in the 1 st respondent as on the date of filing of the Original Petition. The validity of the removal of ordinary members from the membership of the 1 st respondent Society is a matter to be agitated in a properly instituted proceedings, as the present proceedings under S.92 CPC is found to be not maintainable against the 1 st respondent Society. 16. Even though the learned Senior Counsel for the contesting respondents contended that the petitioners have filed this Original Petition at the instance of the 13 th respondent and his supporters with the mala fide intention to reinstate them in the Director Board, I am of the view that the said contention is not prima facie sustainable. 16. Even though the learned Senior Counsel for the contesting respondents contended that the petitioners have filed this Original Petition at the instance of the 13 th respondent and his supporters with the mala fide intention to reinstate them in the Director Board, I am of the view that the said contention is not prima facie sustainable. The decision in Church of South India (supra ) is cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the contesting respondents to substantiate the point that the petitioners should show that they have real interest of their own in the administration of the trust and not the interest of some others and that there must be real, substantive and existing interest in the particular trust. The decision in Kerala High Court Advocates’ Association (Supra) is cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the contesting respondents to substantiate the point that while granting leave under Section 92 , the authority giving sanction must consider various aspects before granting sanction and one important consideration should be as regards the good faith, status and position of those who come forward to represent the community. The decision in Vidyodaya Trust (supra) was cited by the learned Senior counsel to contend that a suit under S.92 is a suit of special nature which presupposes existence of a public trust of a religious or charitable character, and the petitioners have to make out breach of trust which is the very foundation of the suit and even if all the ingredients in a suit under S.92 are made out, if it is clear that the petitioners are not suing to vindicate the right of the public but are seeking a declaration of their individual or personal right or the individual or personal rights of any other person or persons in whom they are interested, then the suit would be outside the scope of S.92. It is the dominant purpose of the suit that has to be taken into consideration in the light of the allegation in the plaint and it is the object and purpose of the suit and not the reliefs that should decide whether it is one for vindicating the right of the public or the individual rights of the petitioners or the third persons. The court has to go beyond the relief and focus on the purpose for which the suit is filed. The court has to go beyond the relief and focus on the purpose for which the suit is filed. It is the object or purpose of filing the suit and not essentially the relief which is of paramount importance. In the case on hand, the petitioners had ordinary membership in the 1 st respondent Society and they had requested for renewal of ordinary membership by tendering the renewal fee. Their membership was not renewed relying on the compromise in a suit in which the life members alone were parties. Whether the removal of ordinary members from the membership of the 1 st respondent is legal and sustainable is a matter to be decided in a properly instituted proceeding. It could not be said that on account of the non-renewal of the membership of the ordinary members, including the petitioners, at the instance of the respondents who represent the life members could not be taken as a ground to hold that the petitioners do not have any interest in the administration of the 1 st respondent. The pleading and the prayers sought for do not in any way indicate that the petitioners want to reinstate the 13 th respondent and his supporters in the Director Board. The pleadings and prayers would indicate that their grievance is primarily against the removal of ordinary members, including them, from the membership of the 1 st respondent society and thus they lost their right to elect the Director Board members. They contended that since the Director Board members are elected not in accordance with the Bye-law of the 1 st respondent Society, they are to be elected after holding an annual general body meeting in accordance with the Bye-law. Hence, there is no lack of bona fide on the part of petitioners in the Original Petition and it is not intended to vindicate their individual rights alone. The intention of the petitioners as revealed from the pleadings and prayers is to elect a proper Director Board after holding a General Body including the ordinary members as per the Bye-law of the Society. Merely because the 13 th respondent is shown as the representative of the 1 st respondent, it could not be assumed that the petitioners filed the Original Petition at the instance of the 13 th respondent and his supporters. Merely because the 13 th respondent is shown as the representative of the 1 st respondent, it could not be assumed that the petitioners filed the Original Petition at the instance of the 13 th respondent and his supporters. Since one of the prayers in the plaint is for the settlement of a comprehensive scheme for the management of the 1 st respondent, I find that the prayer would come within Section 92 (1)(g) CPC. 17. In Mayer Simon (supra), the Full Bench of this Court has held that the main purpose of S.92(1) is to give protection to the trust of a charitable or religious nature from being subjected to harassment by suits being filed against them and hence it is necessary to ascertain whether the persons approaching the Advocate General are persons really interested in trust and are not those whose motives are impure. In the case on hand, the facts would reveal that the petitioners are persons really interested in the 1 st respondent and their motives are not impure. The decision in Valia Koonambaikulam Sree Bhadrakali Temple (supra) is cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the contesting respondents to substantiate the point that it is incumbent on the petitioners in a suit under S.92 to clearly mention in the pleading their interest in the trust as material in the fact. On going through the plaint, the petitioners have specifically pleaded their interest in the trust as a material fact by stating that they were ordinary members of the 1 st respondent and the membership of all the ordinary members were removed illegally by the life members by a compromise decree in which the ordinary members are not parties. 18. In decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bishwanath (Supra), it is held that to invoke S.92 of the Code of Civil Procedure , 3 conditions have to be satisfied, namely, (i) the trust is created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, (ii) there was a breach of trust or a direction of Court is necessary in the administration of such a trust, and (iii) the relief claimed is one or other of the reliefs enumerated therein and that if any of the 3 conditions is not satisfied, the suit falls outside the scope of the said section. In the case on hand, the first condition is not satisfied and hence the suit is outside the scope of Section 92 CPC. 19. In view of my finding that the appellants/petitioners could not prove the existence of a public trust before the formation of the 1 st respondent society, I am of the view that the Original Petition for leave to institute the suit with respect to the affairs of the 1 st respondent is not maintainable. The Trial Court rightly dismissed the Original Petition. I do not find any ground or reason to interfere with the impugned order. 20. The appeal is therefore dismissed.