JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. Both the writ petitions have been tagged together vide order dated25.07.2025 passed by a co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court. 2. In W.P.(C) No.3475 of 2025 the issue involved is pertaining to grant of lease and execution of mining lease deed whereas in W.P(C)No.3525 of 2025 the issue involved is pertaining to quashing of the order by which the mining lease granted in favour of the petitioner has been cancelled by the competent authority. 3. Since the factual aspects and the grounds taken on behalf of the writ petitioners are different and, as such, both the writ petitions are being dealt with separately, however, the same is being reflected in the common order. W.P.(C) No.3475 of 2025 4. The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the following reliefs: “For issuance of an appropriate writ (s)/ order (s)/direction(s) particularly writ of mandamus commanding upon the respondents to forthwith grant mining lease in favour of the petitioner and execute mining lease deed for the period of 10 years of stone minerals in relation to an area admeasuring 2.36 Acres situated at Baliapur Circle, Mouza Salpatra, Khata No. 78, Plot No. 77, District- Dhanbad.” Factual Matrix 5. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ petition needs to refer herein which reads as under: (i) The grievance of the writ petitioner as per the pleadings made in the writ petition is that the petitioner is a partnership firm and the instant matter relates to the inordinate delay on part of the respondents in grant of mining lease in favour of the petitioner and execution of lease deed in relation to an area of 2.36 Acres situated at Baliapur Circle, Mouza- Salpatra, Khata No. 78, Plot No. 77, District- Dhanbad (hereinafter referred as "land in question"). (ii) The petitioner submitted an application dated07.12.2015 for grant of mining lease in respect of the land in question for mining of stone boulder, which was duly received by the Office of District Mining Officer, Dhanbad. (iii) Thereafter, the Assistant Mining Officer, Dhanbad vide letter no.2237 dated 07.12.2015 directed the Circle Officer, Baliapur to submit an enquiry report with respect to the land in question. (iii) Thereafter, the Assistant Mining Officer, Dhanbad vide letter no.2237 dated 07.12.2015 directed the Circle Officer, Baliapur to submit an enquiry report with respect to the land in question. (iv) The Circle Officer Baliapur vide letter no.1164 dated11.12.2015 informed the Assistant Mining Officer, Dhanbad that the land in question is gairmajurwa and it is not a forest land as per khatiyan and further the land is not situated within the 500 meters radius of river, human settlement, educational institution, hospital etc. (v) The Divisional Forest Officer, Dhanbad vide letter no. 2145 dated 19.12.2015 informed the Assistant Mining Officer, Dhanbad that land in question is not a forest land and there is no National Park/ Sanctuary/biodiversity within the radius of 10 ??. (vi) The Assistant Mining Officer, Dhanbad vide letter no. 46 dated 13.01.2016 informed the petitioner that the Deputy Commissioner vide order dated 02.01.2016 has given approval for grant of mining lease deed in favour of the petitioner and further directed the petitioner to submit mining plan for approval and obtain environmental clearance from concerned authority. (vii) Thereafter, the Assistant Mining Officer, Dhanbad vide memo no. 1582/M dated 14.07.2016 approved the Mining Plan along with Progressive Mine closure Plan submitted by the petitioner in relation to the land in question. (viii) Accordingly, the petitioner submitted an application before the District Environmental Impact Assessment Authority (DEIAA), Dhanbad for grant of Environmental clearance. The DEIAA in its meeting dated 17.04.2017 decided not to grant environmental clearance to the petitioner. (ix) The Assistant Mining Officer, Dhanbad vide letter ??. 1126 dated 24.06.2017 informed the petitioner the DEIAA, Dhanbad has decided not to grant environmental clearance to the petitioner. (x) The petitioner vide letter dated 24.08.2017 requested the Member Secretary, State Level Environment Impact Assessment Authority, Jharkhand to consider the case of petitioner for grant of environmental clearance. (xi) The State Level Environment Impact Assessment Authority Jharkhand (SEIAA) in its meeting held on 11.11.2017 directed the District Environmental Impact Assessment Authority, Dhanbad to reconsider the argument of petitioner and pass speaking order.. (xii) Meanwhile, the Assistant Mining Officer, Dhanbad vide letter no. 610 dated 19.03.2018 informed the petitioner that the LOI for grant of mining lease in favour of petitioner has been rejected in terms of the Rules 9(1)(e) of the Jharkhand Minor Minerals Concession Amendment Rules, 2017. (xii) Meanwhile, the Assistant Mining Officer, Dhanbad vide letter no. 610 dated 19.03.2018 informed the petitioner that the LOI for grant of mining lease in favour of petitioner has been rejected in terms of the Rules 9(1)(e) of the Jharkhand Minor Minerals Concession Amendment Rules, 2017. (xiii) Later on, the District Level Environment Impact Assessment Authority, Dhanbad vide letter No. 1412 dated 08.12.2018 granted Environmental Clearance in favour of the petitioner. (xiv) Further, the petitioner filed an application dated28.01.2019 before the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad for grant of stone mining lease over the land in question in favour of the petitioner. (xv) The District Mining Officer, Dhanbad vide memo no.349 dated 25.02.2019 informed the petitioner that the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad vide order dated 11.02.2019 has rejected the application filed by the petitioner. (xvi) Thereafter, the petitioner preferred Revision Case No. 22/2019 before the Mines Commissioner, Ranchi challenging the decision of the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad. (xvii) The Mines Commissioner, Ranchi vide order dated08.02.2022 set aside the order dated 11.02.2019 by condoning the delay in submission of environmental clearance and remanded the matter back to the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad to examine afresh and dispose the matter subject to submission of statutory clearances and fulfilment of legal compliances as per provision contained in JMMC Rules, 2004. (xviii)Consequently, the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad vide letter no. 913 dated 23.03.2022 the requested Mines Secretary, Department of Mines and Geology, Jharkhand requested to give appropriate direction regarding the applicability of Rule 9(1)(a) of JMMC Rules, 2004 as contained at the time of issuance of Letter of Intent (LOI) or Rule 9(1)(a) of the JMMC (Amendment) Rules, 2019 would be applicable in the case of petitioner. (xix) The petitioner vide letter dated 09.01.2025 requested the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad to execute mining lease in favour of the petitioner for mining of stones over the land in question. (xx) It is the case of the petitioner that the grant of Letter of Intent vide order dated 02.01.2016 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad creates enforceable right in favour of the petitioner and the respondents cannot decline the execution of mining lease on the ground which was non-existent on the date of grant of mining lease by the Deputy Commissioner vide order dated 02.01.2016. 6. 6. The petitioner has approached this Court by filing the instant writ petition on the ground that after issuance of Letter of Intent (L.O.I) the mining lease has not been granted even though the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad has made communication to the Commissioner, Mines and Geological Department, Government of Jharkhand to give proper guideline with respect to sanction of the lease deed, but having no decision taken the writ petition has been filed in the year 2025. Submission on behalf of the writ petitioner: 7. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned order: (i) The contention has been raised after issuance of L.O.I, a right has been accrued in favour of the writ petitioner and the right once created the same cannot be taken away even after statutory restriction as has been inflicted by virtue of insertion of provision of JMMC Rules, 2004 amended in 2017. (ii) The ground has been taken that the question of accrual of right is required consideration on the basis of the issuance of L.O.I moreover, the fact about the accrual of right has been taken into consideration by this Court in the judgment passed in W.P(C) No.454 of 2016 titled “ Kohinoor Steel Private Limited vs. Union of India and others ” 8. The learned counsel based upon the aforesaid ground has submitted that the impugned order therefore, needs interference by this Court. Submission on behalf of the Respondents: 9. Per contra, Mr. Ashutosh Anand, the learned AAG-III appearing for the respondent-State to defend the impugned order has raised the following grounds: (i) It has been contended that after the statutory restriction imposed by virtue of the amendment there cannot be any lease deed to be executed in favour of the writ petitioner. (ii) So far as the issuance of L.O.I, based upon that the ground of accrual of right has been taken, is concerned the same is not available in view of the specific provision as mandated under the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004 particularly 9(1) ¼³½ . (iii) The reliance has been placed by referring the judgment rendered in the case of “Kohinoor Steel Private Limited” (supra), on fact applicability of the statutory provision, the said judgment will not be applicable in the fact and circumstances of the present case. (iii) The reliance has been placed by referring the judgment rendered in the case of “Kohinoor Steel Private Limited” (supra), on fact applicability of the statutory provision, the said judgment will not be applicable in the fact and circumstances of the present case. (iv) The reason for the same has been argued that the judgment in the case of “Kohinoor Steel Private Limited” (supra) pertaining to the major mineral and the consideration of issuance of L.O.I said to be accrual right has been considered on the basis of the statutory provision of eligibility as provided under the provision of Section 10A(2)(b) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015. (v) It has been contended that in the present case, there is no such provision as under the JMMC Rules, 2004. 10. The learned AAG-III appearing for the State of Jharkhand, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that it is case where the petitioner is not entitled for any relief in view of the statutory restrictions as provided under the provision of JMMC Rules, 2004 as amended time to time. Response of the learned counsel for the petitioner: 11. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, in response, has submitted that the question of the statutory restriction having been imposed as has been taken on behalf of the State is concerned, the same is not fit to be accepted in view of the conflict in the provision of Rule 9 of JMMC Rules, 2004 amended in 2017 taking into consideration the specific provision providing of accrued right in case of issuance of L.O.I as provided under Section 10A(2)(c) Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015. 12. It has been contended that JMMC Rules, 2004, being a sub- ordinate legislation, cannot be allowed to prevail upon the parents Act, i.e., the Act of 1957. Analysis 13. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and appreciated the arguments advanced on their behalf as also go through the material available on record. 14. This Court requires to consider the following issues: (i) Whether on the issuance of L.O.I. can it be said to be an accrued right in favour of the petitioner so as to prevail even upon the statutory restrictions as has been stipulated in JMMC Rule 2004 amended time to time. 14. This Court requires to consider the following issues: (i) Whether on the issuance of L.O.I. can it be said to be an accrued right in favour of the petitioner so as to prevail even upon the statutory restrictions as has been stipulated in JMMC Rule 2004 amended time to time. (ii) Whether the provision as contained under Rules, 2004 enacted in exercise of power conferred under section 15 of the Act of 1957 can be said to be in conflict to the provision of MMDR Act, 1957. 15. Both the issues are being taken up separately. 16. The issue no.(ii) is being first taken into consideration. 17. It needs to refer herein the core object of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (MMDR Act) is to provide for the development and regulation of mines and minerals in India under the control of the Union Government. Overall purpose and objective of the MMDR Act as well as the Rules framed thereunder is to ensure that mining operations are carried out in a scientific manner with a high degree of responsibility including responsibility in protecting and preserving the environment and the flora of the area, reference in this regard be made to the Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Common Cause Vs. Union of India & Ors [ (2017) 9 SCC 499 ], for ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted as under: "84. Briefly therefore, the overall purpose and objective of the MMDR Act as well as the Rules framed thereunder is to ensure that mining operations are carried out in a scientific manner with a high degree of responsibility including responsibility in protecting and preserving the environment and the flora of the area. Through this process, the holder of a mining lease is obliged to adhere to the standards laid down under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 or the EPA as well as the laws pertaining to air and water pollution and also by necessary implication, the provisions of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (for short "the FC Act"). Exploitation of the natural resources is ruled out. Exploitation of the natural resources is ruled out. If the holder of a mining lease does not adhere to the provisions of the statutes or the rules or the terms and conditions of the mining lease, that person is liable to incur penalties under Section 21 of the MMDR Act. In addition thereto, Section 4-A of the MMDR Act which provides for the termination of a mining lease is applicable. This provides that where the Central Government, after consultation with the State Government is of the opinion that it is expedient in the interest of regulation of mines and mineral development, preservation of natural environment, prevention of pollution, etc. then the Central Government may request the State Government to prematurely terminate a mining lease." 18. The Act of 1957 contains provisions conferring power to the State to make out rule, i.e. Rule 15 herein which is relevant under which the JMMC Rules, 2004 has been formulated, for ready reference Rule 15 is being quoted hereunder as: “15. Power of State Governments to make rules in respect of minor minerals.? (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for, regulating the grant of [quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions] in respect of minor minerals and for purposes connected therewith. [(1A) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:? [(1A) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:? (a) the person by whom and the manner in which, applications for quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions may be made and the fees to be paid therefor; (b) the time within which, and the form in which, acknowledgement of the receipt of any such applications may be sent; (c) the matters which may be considered where applications in respect of the same land are received within the same day; (d) the terms on which, and the conditions subject to which and the authority by which quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions may be granted or renewed; (e) the procedure for obtaining quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions; (f) the facilities to be afforded by holders of quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions to persons deputed by the Government for the purpose of undertaking research or training in matters relating to mining operations; (g) the fixing and collection of rent, royalty, fees, dead rent, fines or other charges and the time within which and the manner in which these shall be payable; (h) the manner in which rights of third parties may be protected (whether by way of payment of compensation or otherwise) in cases where any such party is prejudicially affected by reason of any prospecting or mining operations; (i) the manner in which rehabilitation of flora and other vegetation such as trees, shrubs and the like destroyed by reason of any quarrying or mining operations shall be made in the same area or in any other area selected by the State Government (whether by way of reimbursement of the cost of rehabilitation or otherwise) by the person holding the quarrying or mining lease; (j) the manner in which and the conditions subject to which, a quarry lease, mining lease or other mineral concession may be transferred; (k) the construction, maintenance and use of roads power transmission lines, tramways, railways, serial rope ways, pipelines and the making of passage for water for mining purposes on any land comprised in a quarry or mining lease or other mineral concession; (l) the form of registers to be maintained under this Act; (m) the reports and statements to be submitted by holders of quarry or mining leases or other mineral concessions and the authority to which such reports and statements shall be submitted; (n) the period within which and the manner in which and the authority to which applications for revision of any order passed by any authority under these rules may be made, the fees to be paid therefore, and the powers of the revisional authority; and (o) any other matter which is to be, or may be, prescribed.] (2) Until rules are made under sub-section (1), any rules made by a state Government regulating the grant of [quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions] in respect of minor minerals which are in force immediately before the commencement of these Act shall continue in force. (3) The holder of a mining lease or any other mineral concession granted under any rule made under sub-section (1) shall pay [royalty or dead rent, whichever is more] in respect of minor minerals removed or consumed by him or by his agent, manager, employee, contractor or sub-lessee at the rate prescribed for the time being in the rules framed by the State Government in respect of minor minerals: Provided that the State Government shall not enhance the rate of [royalty or dead rent] in respect of any minor mineral for more than once during any period of [three] years.] [(4) Without prejudice to sub-sections (1), (2) and sub-section (3), the State Government may, by notification, make rules for regulating the provisions of this Act for the following, namely:? (a) the manner in which the District Mineral Foundation shall work for the interest and benefit of persons and areas affected by mining under sub-section (2) of section 9B; (b) the composition and functions of the District Mineral Foundation under sub-section (3) of section 9B; and (c) the amount of payment to be made to the District Mineral Foundation by concession holders of minor minerals under section15A.]” 19. The JMMC Rules, 2004 has been enacted by the State under the conferment of power as provided under section 15 of the Act of 1957. 20. The question of having overriding of effect of the Act of 1957 is the issue raised herein. The issue is not res integra that in our Constitution, in Seven Schedule, is having three lists, i.e., List-I, List-II and List-III. 21. List-I has the subject matter wherein the power to formulate laws has been conferred to the Central Government. 22. List-II has the subject matter wherein the laws making power has been conferred to the State Government being the State subject. 23. List-III concurrent list has the subject matter upon which the Central Government as well as State Government can formulate the law. 24. Under List-I the entry 54 pertain to the minerals. The Central Government in order to take care of its development and regulation, has enacted the Act of 1957. 25. Entry 23 in the list-II speaks about Regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union. The Central Government in order to take care of its development and regulation, has enacted the Act of 1957. 25. Entry 23 in the list-II speaks about Regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union. Further, Entry 50 in the List-II also speaks about the Taxes on minerals and, as such, being the State subject, the State is to formulate its own legislation to regulate the issue of minor minerals. 26. The issue of overlapping of the Entry-54 of the List-I and Entry- 50 of the List-II has been taken into consideration by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench in the case of Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. reported in M/S Steel Authority of India & Anr Etc. 2024 INSC 554 wherein it has been held that the Entry-54 in the List I and the Entry 50 of the List-II are not overlapping to each other, however, subject to limitation for which the Parliament has been conferred with the power, the relevant paragraph is being quoted hereunder as: 28.Although the above entries are substantially similar to the scheme under the GOI Act 1935, one of the differences lies in the removal of “oil fields” from Entry 54 of List I and Entry 23 of List II. The regulation and development of oil fields is now enumerated under Entry 53 of List I.18 The other difference is that while the GOI Act 1935 required a declaration by Federal law, the Constitution now requires a declaration by Parliament. The entry pertaining to taxes on mineral rights is largely similar to Entry 44 of the Provincial Legislative List, except for the fact that Entry 44 provided for imposition of “any limitations” by “any Act” enacted by the Federal Legislature relating to mineral development, while Entry 50 of List II does not include the expression “any Act” enacted by Parliament. Before we delve into the intricacies of the interpretation of the legislative entries, we need to bear in mind the constitutional philosophy underlying the Indian federal setup. 32. Article 245 (read with Article 246) is the source of the legislative powers of Parliament and the State legislatures. The entries in the Seventh Schedule delineate the subject matter over which the appropriate legislature can enact laws. 32. Article 245 (read with Article 246) is the source of the legislative powers of Parliament and the State legislatures. The entries in the Seventh Schedule delineate the subject matter over which the appropriate legislature can enact laws. The entries are legislative heads and not the source of legislative powers.24 A legislation could be composite in nature, drawing upon several entries in a particular list. 25 Such a legislation is referred to as a “ragbag” legislation. 33. Article 254 clarifies that if the law made by a State legislature is repugnant to any provisions of a law made by Parliament with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III, the law made by Parliament would prevail and the law made by the State legislature would be void to the extent of the repugnancy. The issue of repugnancy arises only when both the legislatures are competent to legislate on the subject with respect to List III.26 The issue of repugnancy does not arise if the legislations enacted by Parliament and the State legislatures deal with separate and distinct legislative subject matters. By virtue of Article 248, Parliament has exclusive legislative powers to make laws with respect to any of the matters not enumerated in List II or List III.27 However, how should courts deal with a situation where two legislations, enacted by Parliament and State legislature in pursuance of their respective legislative powers, appear to conflict with each other? The answer lies in Article 246 itself. 35. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals (supra) laid down the following principles to resolve any direct conflict between the entries in List I and List II: (i) in case of seeming conflict, the two entries should be read together without giving a narrow and restricted reading to either of them; (ii) an attempt should be made to see whether the two entries can be reconciled so as to avoid a conflict of jurisdiction; and (iii) no question of conflict arises between two Lists if the impugned legislation in pith and substance appears to fall exclusively under one list and the encroachment upon the other list is incidental. 36. Articles 245 and 246 embody the essence of Indian federalism. The division of legislative powers between Union and States is an emanation of the federal project.31 This division also serves as a constitutional limitation on legislative powers. 36. Articles 245 and 246 embody the essence of Indian federalism. The division of legislative powers between Union and States is an emanation of the federal project.31 This division also serves as a constitutional limitation on legislative powers. Parliament cannot entrench upon the plenary power of the State legislatures in the ordinary course, except where the Constitution itself specifically allows it.32 The appropriate legislature must possess legislative competence to enact a law on the subject matter it seeks to legislate. 39. The above position of law has been expressly affirmed by the nine-Judge Bench of this Court in Jindal Stainless Ltd v. State of Haryana.36 Thus, it is an accepted principle that the subject matter of taxation is dealt with under distinct entries and, therefore, cannot be traced to a non-taxing entry. The taxing powers of Parliament and the State legislatures are mutually exclusive and clearly demarcated. There can be no overlap between the taxing powers of the Union and the States. Entries relating to taxing powers must be construed with clarity and precision to maintain exclusivity and a construction of a taxation entry which may lead to overlapping must be eschewed.37 If a taxing power is enumerated within a particular legislative list, it is automatically excluded from the purview of subject-matters in other legislative lists. The residuary power of Parliament also includes the power of making any law imposing a tax not mentioned in either List II or List III. 41. Many entries in the Seventh Schedule may appear to overlap because of the language used in the entries. The necessary corollary to the scheme of legislative distribution is that that any invasion by Parliament in the field assigned to the States and vice versa is a breach of the Constitution.41 Even though the Constitution distributes legislative powers between the Union and the States, there have been situations where a legislation purporting to deal with a subject in one list, touches on a subject in another list. To remedy such situation, the doctrine of pith and substance is used to examine whether the legislature has the competence to enact a law with regard to either of the three lists under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.42 There may arise situations where a legislature may frame a law that in substance and reality transgresses its legislative competence. To remedy such situation, the doctrine of pith and substance is used to examine whether the legislature has the competence to enact a law with regard to either of the three lists under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.42 There may arise situations where a legislature may frame a law that in substance and reality transgresses its legislative competence. Such a piece of legislation is called “colourable legislation” because the legislature veils its transgression by making it seem as if the legislation is within its legislative competence.43 To examine whether the legislature has transgressed its legislative competence, the substance of the legislation is material. If the subject-matter is in substance beyond the legislative powers of the legislature, the form in which the law is clothed would not save it from the vice of unconstitutionality. 42. The Constitution has used specific expressions to resolve potential overlaps or conflicts between and among the entries in the three Lists. The entries in the Seventh Schedule have used different phraseologies to either subject or restrict their scope and ambit. Some of the legislative entries in the State List have been made subject to broad or specific limitations or restrictions with respect to the entries in the Union List or Concurrent List.---- 43. The above table is an indication of the extent to which the legislative powers of the States have been restricted, limited, or altogether precluded. The use of the expression “other than” or “not including” serves the purpose of redacting from the ambit of the legislative power of the States to the extent suggested. Where the Constitution intends to limit or preclude the legislative powers of the State to a particular extent, it has used specific terminologies such as “other than” and “not including”. 44. Where the entries have used the phrase “subject to”, the legislative power of the State is made subordinate to Parliament with respect to either the Union List or the Concurrent List. The expression “subject to” conveys the idea of a provision yielding place to another provision or other provisions to which it is made subject.45 Therefore, where the Constitution intends to displace or override46 the legislative powers of the States, it has used specific terminology – “subject to”. However, the Constitution has also indicated the extent to which a particular legislative entry under List II is subordinated. However, the Constitution has also indicated the extent to which a particular legislative entry under List II is subordinated. For instance, the subjection is either with respect to provisions of List I or List III, or it can also be to the extent of “any limitations” imposed by Parliament by law. Thus, it is imperative that the entries in List II must be read and interpreted in their proper context to understand the extent of their subordination to Union powers. 47. The Constitution deploys three expressions to signify the manner in which the legislative power could be exercised by Parliament – “declared by or under law”, and “declared by Parliament by law”, and “imposed by Parliament by law” The difference in the character of these provisions can be gathered from the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 1956 which substituted the expression “declared by Parliament by law” with “declared by or under law made by Parliament” in Entry 6748 of the Union List. The object of the amendment was to enable the delegate under the statute to make the required declaration.49 The expression “by law” means that the legislative power should be effectuated through the provisions of a statute. In comparison, “by or under law” means that the legislative intent could be effectuated either through the provisions of the statute or by any subordinate authority vested with powers in that behalf by the statute.50 It is important to note that Entry 50 of List II use the expression “by law relating to mineral development”. We will have to bear the meaning of the expression “by law” in mind to give an appropriate interpretation to the entry. 57. The principle which emanates from the above discussion is that the State holds all natural resources, including minerals, as a trustee of the public and must deal with them in a manner consistent with the nature of such a trust.79 58. The Central Government or the State Government may not always be the “owner” of the underlying minerals. But the Constitution empowers both Parliament (under Entry 54 of List I) and the State legislatures (under Entry 23 of List II) to regulate mines and mineral development, the entrustment to the State being subject to the power of Parliament to regulate the domain. But the Constitution empowers both Parliament (under Entry 54 of List I) and the State legislatures (under Entry 23 of List II) to regulate mines and mineral development, the entrustment to the State being subject to the power of Parliament to regulate the domain. The Constitution has entrusted the Union and the States with the responsibility to regulate mines and mineral development in consonance with the principles of the public trust doctrine and sustainable development of mineral resources. Under the MMDR Act, the Central Government, acting as a public trustee of minerals, regulates prospecting and mining operations in public interest.80 In the process, the legislation seeks to increase awareness of the compelling need to restore the serious ecological imbalance and protect against damage being caused to the nature.81 In Pradeep S Wodeyar v. State of Karnataka,82 one of us (Justice D Y Chandrachud) observed that the essence of the MMDR Act is to “protect humankind and every species whose existence depends on natural resources from the destruction which is caused by rapacious and unregulated mining.” The Court noted that the restrictions under Section 4 of the MMDR Act are intrinsically meant to protect the environment and communities who depend on the environment. 27. Herein the parameter since has been fixed for applicability of both the Act, i.e, the Act of 1957 and the JMMC Rules, 2004 formulated under section 15 of the Act of 1957, therefore, is having no overlapping effect rather both provisions are to be enacted by the Central Government and the State Government so far as the Act of 1957 and JMMC Rules, 2004 respectively are concerned. 28. The law is well settled that once the power has been conferred to the State under the parent legislation, herein section 15 of the Act of 1957, and if the State has come out with a rule in exercise of conferment of the said power it is not available to say that if the rule has been formulated by the State under the conferment of the aforesaid power the issue of inconsistency in between the State legislation and the Central legislation is available to be raised. 29. 29. If the contention of the writ petitioner will be accepted, then the entire object, basing upon which the Section 15 of the MMDR Act, 1957 has been formulated, will become redundant and ultimately the MMDR Act, 1957 will prevail upon the State legislation. The same is not the scheme of bifurcation of power to treat the federal system as per the mandate carved out in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. 30. This Court, therefore, is of the view that once the power has been conferred of formulating the rule in view of the provision of section 15 of the MMDR Act, 1957, and if the said Act will be applicable which is not available for the writ petitioner to take aid of the MMDR Act, 1957 which is operative in entirely different phase having its own self-contained provision therein. 31. The issue no.(ii), therefore, is answered accordingly. 32. This Court is now adverting into the issue no.(i) i.e. whether on the issuance of L.O.I. can it be said to be an accrued right in favour of the petitioner so as to prevail even upon the statutory restrictions as has been stipulated in JMMC Rule 2004. 33. Before answering the said issue, it would to apt to discuss herein the definition of vested/accrued right along with settled legal proposition. 34. Rights are ‘vested’ when right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become property of some particular person or persons as present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits, or contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute vested rights. 35. In Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary (International Edition) at page1397, the word ‘vested’ is defined as a tenure subject to no contingency; complete; established by law as a permanent right, vested interest. 36. The word ‘vested’ is normally used where an immediate fixed right in present or future enjoyment in respect of a property is created. With the long usage the said word ‘vest’ has also acquired a meaning as “an absolute or indefeasible right”. It had a ‘legitimate’ or “settled expectation” to obtain right to enjoy the property etc. Such “settled expectation” can be rendered impossible of fulfilment due to change in law by the legislature. With the long usage the said word ‘vest’ has also acquired a meaning as “an absolute or indefeasible right”. It had a ‘legitimate’ or “settled expectation” to obtain right to enjoy the property etc. Such “settled expectation” can be rendered impossible of fulfilment due to change in law by the legislature. Besides this, such a “settled expectation” or the so called “vested right” cannot be countenanced against public interest and convenience which are sought to be served by amendment of the law. 37. Thus, “vested right” is a right independent of any contingency. Such a right can arise from a contract, statute or by operation of law. A vested right can be taken away only if the law specifically or by necessary implication provide for such a course. 38. In the light of the definition of the “vested right”, it is evident that right accrues to person or persons attached to an institution or building or anything whatsoever, meaning thereby, if an incumbent is claiming a vested right, he is to substantiate before the court of law that the right has been created in his favour by an order passed by the competent authority in accordance with law. 39. It is evident from the definition of the vested right that right would be said to be vested right, permanent and continuous in nature and if that be so, the question of prejudice or following of principles of natural justice will arise. 40. The settled position of law is that once the right has been accrued, the subsequent rule framed carving out the eligibility criteria will not be considered to be a reason to recall the benefit already granted due to the reason that a vested right has been created. Here, it is relevant to refer the definition of vested right as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in MGB Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh , [ (2014) 13 SCC 583 ] at paragraphs11, 12 and 13, which read hereunder as:— “11. The word “vested” is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edn.) at p. 1563, as: “Vested.—fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete. Having the character or given in the rights of absolute ownership; not contingent; not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent. The word “vested” is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edn.) at p. 1563, as: “Vested.—fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete. Having the character or given in the rights of absolute ownership; not contingent; not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent. Rights are ‘vested' when right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become property of some particular person or persons as present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits, or contingent interest inproperty founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute ‘vested rights’.” 12. In Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary (International Edition) at p. 1397, “vested” is defined as law held by a tenure subject to no contingency; complete; established by law as a permanent right;vested interest. 13. Thus, vested right is a right independent of any contingency and it cannot be taken away without consent of the person concerned. Vested right can arise from contract, statute or by operation of law. Unless an accrued or vested right has been derived by a party, the policy decision/scheme could be changed.” 41. Further, so far as the question of taking away the vested right is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the proposition in the case of Chairman, Railway Board v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah , (1997) 6 SCC 623 at paragraph 24 which reads hereunder as: “24. In many of these decisions the expressions “vested rights” or “accrued rights” have been used while striking down the impugned provisions which had been given retrospective operation so as to have an adverse effect in the matter of promotion, seniority, substantive appointment, etc., of the employees. The said expressions have been used in the context of a right flowing under the relevant rule which was sought to be altered with effect from an anterior date and thereby taking away the benefits available under the rule in force at that time. It has been held that such an amendment having retrospective operation which has the effect of taking away a benefit already available to the employee under the existing rule is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. We are unable to hold that these decisions are not in consonance with the decisions in Roshan Lal Tandon [ AIR 1967 SC 1889 ], B.S. Vedera [AIR 1969 SC118] and Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni [ (1983) 2 SCC 33 ].” 42. We are unable to hold that these decisions are not in consonance with the decisions in Roshan Lal Tandon [ AIR 1967 SC 1889 ], B.S. Vedera [AIR 1969 SC118] and Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni [ (1983) 2 SCC 33 ].” 42. Thus, from the definition of the vested right it is evident that right would be said to be vested right, permanent and continuous in nature and if that be so, the question of prejudice or following of principles of natural justice will arise. 43. At this juncture it would be apt to refer herein the relevant provision of Rule 9(1) ¼d½] ¼?k½] 9 ¼?k½] 9 ¼³½] Rule 9 ¼p½ , Rule 9 ¼N½ and Rule 9(12) of the JMMC Rules 2004 for the purpose of consideration of the lis. 44. It is evident from the provision of Rule 9 ¼p½ that in any case, ever after renewal of the lease, initially, the same is not to be extended beyond the period of 31.03.2020 by virtue of amendment incorporated w.e.f. 2018, the period has been extended upto the period of 31.03.2022. The specific stipulation has been made that even if the license has been renewed beyond the period of 31.03.2020, the force of the lease will be upto 31.03.2022. 45. It is evident from the provision as contained under Rule 9 ¼N½ as referred above that the license if renewed or extended the validity of which is after 31.03.2022, then, the validity of license will remain there upto the period of lease but there cannot be any extension, thereafter, since as per the mandate of the provision of Rule 9, the lease is to be granted by way of auction. 46. It is evident from perusal of Rule 9 ¼³½ , of Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, wherein, it has been stipulated that within 180 days from the issuance of notification, the Environmental Clearance has to be mandatorily produced and if the same is not produced, the letter of intent/application would be deemed to have been rejected. 47. 46. It is evident from perusal of Rule 9 ¼³½ , of Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, wherein, it has been stipulated that within 180 days from the issuance of notification, the Environmental Clearance has to be mandatorily produced and if the same is not produced, the letter of intent/application would be deemed to have been rejected. 47. Further, there is a provision of Rule 9 ¼³½ which was added by way of amendment dated 28.09.2020 and as per the said provision, in case where due to delay in granting Environmental Clearance beyond 180 days, which is not attributable to a lessee, and the lease agreement was not approved, in those cases the Revisional Authority was given power to decide the matter on merits. 48. It is further evident from the provision of Rule 9 (12) as quoted and referred hereinabove that the mandate of Rule 9(1) ¼³½ , will be applicable even if the area of land is less than 5 hectares. 49. In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual aspect and settled proposition of law this Court is now adverting to the appreciation of the issue no.(i). 50. The learned counsel for the petitioner has emphatically contended that since LOI has been issued by the authority concerned as such the mining lease must be executed in the favour of the petitioner. 51. In the aforesaid context it needs to refer herein the definition of Letter of Intent as provided in Rule 2 ¼³½ (29) of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004 which reads as under: — 52. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan Cooperative Dairy Federation Ltd. v. Maha Laxmi Mingrate Marketing Service Pvt. Ltd. , (1996) 10 SCC 405 at paragraph 7 thereof has held that Letter of Intent merely expressed an intention to enter into a contract. If the conditions stipulated in the Letter of Intent were not fulfilled by Respondent 1, and if the conduct of Respondent 1 was otherwise not such as would generate confidence, the appellant was entitled to withdraw the Letter of Intent, for ready reference, the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under: “7. … The Letter of Intent merely expressed an intention to enter into a contract. … The Letter of Intent merely expressed an intention to enter into a contract. If the conditions stipulated in the Letter of Intent were not fulfilled by Respondent 1, and if the conduct of Respondent 1 was otherwise not such as would generate confidence, the appellant was entitled to withdraw the Letter of Intent. There was no binding legal relationship between the appellant and Respondent 1 at this stage and the appellant was entitled to look at the totality of circumstances in deciding whether to enter into a binding contract with Respondent 1 or not.” 53. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of ‘ Dresser Rand S.A. v. Bindal Agro Chem Ltd. ’ (2006) 1 SCC 751 has observed that a letter of intent merely indicates a party's intention to enter into contract with other party in future. A letter of intent is not intended to bind either party ultimately to enter into a contract. 54. The view taken in Dresser Rand's case (supra) was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of “ Rishi Khan Logistics Private Ltd. v. Board of Trustees of Kandla Port Trust ”, (2015) 13 SCC 233. 55. The nature of the right created under L.O.I issued and the consequences of non-fulfillment of the conditions contained therein for undue long time is considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “ Bhushan Power and Steel Limited v. S.L. Seal ”, (2017) 2 SCC 125 wherein it has been held which reads as under: “40. It is no doubt true that a letter of intent may be construed as a letter of acceptance if such intention is evident from its terms. It is not uncommon in contracts involving detailed procedure, in order to save time, to issue a letter of intent communicating the acceptance of the offer and asking the contractor to start the work with a stipulation that the detailed contract would be drawn up later. If such a letter is issued to the contractor, though it may be termed as a letter of intent, it may amount to acceptance of the offer resulting in a concluded contract between the parties. If such a letter is issued to the contractor, though it may be termed as a letter of intent, it may amount to acceptance of the offer resulting in a concluded contract between the parties. But the question whether the letter of intent is merely an expression of an intention to place an order in future or whether it is a final acceptance of the offer thereby leading to a contract, is a matter that has to be decided with reference to the terms of the letter. When the LoI is itself hedged with the condition that the final allotment would be made later after obtaining CRZ and other clearances, it may depict an intention to enter into contract at a later stage. Thus, we find that on the facts of this case it appears that a letter with intention to enter into a contract which could take place after all other formalities are completed. However, when the completion of these formalities had taken undue long time and the prices of land, in the interregnum, shot up sharply, the Respondent had a right to cancel the process which had not resulted in a concluded contract.” 56. This Court based upon the aforesaid discussion as also after going through the factual aspect involved in the case of “Bhushan Steel Limited” (supra) is of the view that in both the judgments the issue as provided under section 10A(2)(b) and 10A(2)(c) of the MMDR Act, 1957 was involved wherein the issue of eligibility wherein the exception has been carved out to consider the issue of eligibility of one or other applicant as provided under section 10A(2)(b) which provision is not available under the JMMC Rules, 2004 amended in 2017. However, the different provisions have been provided as under Rule 9 ¼³½ and Rule 9 ¼p½ which provides that even after issuance of L.O.I. certain conditions are to be fulfilled, but herein after issuance of L.O.I the condition as stipulated under Rule 9 ¼³½ and Rule 9 ¼p½ has not been fulfilled. However, the different provisions have been provided as under Rule 9 ¼³½ and Rule 9 ¼p½ which provides that even after issuance of L.O.I. certain conditions are to be fulfilled, but herein after issuance of L.O.I the condition as stipulated under Rule 9 ¼³½ and Rule 9 ¼p½ has not been fulfilled. The reason for relying upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Bhushan Steel Ltd.” (supra) is to consider the issue of L.O.I as a vested right, but issuance of L.O.I which will create a vested right in favour of one or the other party so far as it relates to the condition stipulated under section 10A(2)(b) Of the MMDR Act, 1957 and since the different parameters are therein the JMMC Rules, 2004, hence, no aid is to be given to the petitioner based upon the consideration made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Bhushan Steel Limited” (supra). 57. Thus, as per the settled position of law the issuance of Letter of Intent (L.O.I) itself would not give a right to the petitioner of entering into a lease agreement for mining of minor minerals on the site in question without following all conditions as stipulated in the JMMC Rules, 2004 and particularly Rule 9 ¼³½ of the Rule, 2004. 58. It requires to refer herein that the learned counsel for the petitioner in order to fortify his grievances has placed his reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of “ Kohinoor Steels Pvt. Ltd ” (Supra). 59. 58. It requires to refer herein that the learned counsel for the petitioner in order to fortify his grievances has placed his reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of “ Kohinoor Steels Pvt. Ltd ” (Supra). 59. We have gone through the judgment passed in the aforesaid case and found that was the case pertaining to the major minerals wherein the provision of the MMDR Act, 1957 is applicable and, as such, the said provision has been taken into consideration, particularly the eligibility clause as provided under section 10A(2)(c) thereof, for ready reference the same is being quoted hereunder as: “ 10A(2)(c): “(c) where the Central Government has communicated previous approval as required under sub-section (1) of section 5 for grant of a mining lease, or if a letter of intent (by whatever name called) has been issued by the State Government to grant a mining lease, before the commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, the mining lease shall be granted subject to fulfilment of the conditions of the previous approval or of the letter of intent within a period of two years from the date of commencement of the said Act: Provided that in respect of any mineral specified in the First Schedule, no prospecting licence or mining lease shall be granted under clause (b) of this subsection except with the previous approval of the Central Government.” 60. The ground has been taken based upon the aforesaid statutory provision wherein one of the clauses being the issuance of L.O.I or approval of the State Government and if that situation would be there, then the application of such applicant is not be rejected holding such applicant to be eligible. 61. This Court, while dealing with the issue wherein the provision of section 10A(2)(c) has been taken as a ground, has dealt with the said issue which is evident from the following paragraphs: “ 69. Section 10A(2)(c) specifically prescribes that the mining lease shall be granted subject to fulfilment of the conditions of the previous approval or of the letter of intent within a period of two years from the date of commencement of the said Act. In the proviso, it has been mentioned that no prospecting licence or mining lease shall be granted under clause (b) of this sub-section except with the previous approval of the Central Government. In the proviso, it has been mentioned that no prospecting licence or mining lease shall be granted under clause (b) of this sub-section except with the previous approval of the Central Government. Therefore, the time limit has been prescribed for two years from the date of commencement of the Amendment Act, 2015 and that too with prior approval of the Central Government. 71. However, Section 10A(2)(b) & 10A(2)(c) of the Amendment Act, 2015 temporarily saved some pending applications from before the 2015 Amendment. These exceptions were applicable to the cases where an applicant for mining lease had prospected the area, or in respect of whom a recommendation was made by the State Government and grant of approval by the Central Government was pending. 72. It is further clarified that for the applications saved under Section 10 -A(2)(b) & l0-A(2)(c) of the Act, Central Government’s approval was necessary before the grant of Mining Lease. For pending applications under Section 10 A(2)(b) of the Act, proviso to Section 10 A(2)(c) of the Act mandated the prior approval of the Central Government before a Mining Lease was granted. Similarly, for pending applications under Section 10 A(2)(c) of the Act, the Mining Lease shall be granted within two years of fulfillment of the conditions mentioned in the Letter of Intent (“LOI” for short), only where prior Central Government’s approval has been communicated. Therefore, in both the cases, i.e. Section 10 A(2)(b) and Section 10 A(2)(c), previous approval of the Central Government is necessary in view of the proviso to Section 10 A(2)(c). 77. It is apt to mention that many of the applications covered under Section 10A(2)(b) of the Act, which were pending for decision, in the absence of a sun-set clause in the Pre-Amended Act, became an anachronism in the auction-based regime. Therefore, in order to bring these pending cases to a closure and to enable auction of these mineral blocks in national interest, it was proposed to amend Section 10A(2)(b) of the Act. 78. This Court in view of the aforesaid provisions, as referred hereinabove, is of the view that the MMDR Act, 1957, before amendment of the year 2015 the lapsing period was not there, i.e, as has been inserted by amendment carved out in the year 2015 by insertion of section 10A (1) of the MMDR Act, 1957 as has been referred hereinabove. 79. 79. It is evident from section 10A(2)(c) that the effect of 10A(1) will not be there subject to fulfillment of the condition as provided under section 10A(2)(b) r/w section 10A(2)(c) wherein and whereunder it has been provided that if the Central Government has granted approval as required under sub-section 1 to section 5 of the MMDR Act, 1957 or the letter of intent has been issued by the State Government and if the condition so incorporated in the letter of intent has been undertaken to be fulfilled within a period of two years either from the date of approval by the Central Government or from the date of issuance of letter of intent, then the mining lease can be issued. 90. Section 10A(2)(b) is the condition of eligibility while section 10A(2)(c) is the criteria to be fulfilled by one or the other for the purpose of getting the mining lease which is first approval of the central Government is required as referred under sub-section 1 of section 5 of the MMDR Act, 1957 and second the letter of intent, if issued by the State Government, and the concerned party has given an undertaking to fulfil the conditions as stipulated in the letter of intent. 91. The aforesaid conditions therefore specify that subject to fulfillment of two conditions, i.e., the prior approval of the Central Government or the letter of intent if issued by the State Government or if the conditions stipulated in the letter of Intent is being undertaken to be complied with within a period of two years then the mining lease irrespective of the embargo as provided under section 10A(1) is to be issued. 92. It is evident that by issuance of the approval by the Central Government or the letter of intent the issue has been taken in to consideration that if the right has been accrued in favour of one of the other by virtue of issuance of approval by the Central Government or the letter of intent, if issued by the State Government, then, there will be no adverse affect by the amendment incorporated in the statutory provision of the Act of 1957. 62. 62. However, in the aforesaid case the L.O.I was not issued and as such this Court has come to a conclusion that the applicant, namely Kohinoor Steel Private Limited (supra) was not eligible even in view of the provision of 10 A (2) (c) for ready reference the operative part of the said judgment is being referred hereunder as: 100. In the instant case the learned counsel for the petitioner-Firm has tried to impress upon the Court that the recommendation letter is to be construed as the letter of intent. 101. But this Court is not in agreement with such submission because the recommendation cannot be said to be the accrual of right and moreover, the letter of intent which is to be extended in favour of the petitioner-Firm as required under the Act has not been issued in favour of the party concerned. 102. Admittedly herein, the petitioner-Firm has harped upon to accept the said recommendation to be the letter of intent so that a right is being said to be accrued in favour of the petitioner-Firm and thereby the amendment incorporated in the statute be not adversely affect the interest of the party concerned. 103. But the recommendation cannot be said to be an accrual of right rather the interpretation of the word “recommendation” cannot be said to be the binding upon the other, rather the same is to be accepted and not to be accepted, as such, when the two options are there, i.e., to be accepted or not to be accepted then such decision cannot be said to bind the authority who has to take decision 104. Further, the said recommendation as would be evident from the content of the said letter dated 13.08.2010 is not showing any willingness by the State rather the same is by making a request to the Central Government to grant the approval as required to be granted MMDR Act, 1957. 105. The letter of intent while on the other hand, if issued, then, it will be said to the accrual of right and once the letter of intent has been issued, then the substantial right is said to be created, however, subject to fulfillment of the conditions as per the requirement under section 10A(2)(c) within a period of two years, then the mining lease will be issued. 106. 106. The contention of the petitioner-Firm is also not fit to be accepted to treat the recommendation letter to be binding in view of the specific insertion under section 10A(2)(c) wherein in addition to the two conditions, i.e., the prior approval of the Central Government or the letter of intent to be issued by the State Government, the condition stipulated in the letter of intent is to be fulfilled within a period of two years. 107. Admittedly, and it cannot be that in the recommendation letter dated.13.08.2010. there is no condition stipulated and as such the said recommendation letter in terms of the provision of section 10A(2)(c) cannot be construed to be letter of intent. 108. Further, the letter of intent is to be issued by the State, then the question arises why the State has made a recommendation only and letter of intent has not been issued even though the issuance of letter of intent was within the domain of the State. 109. Apart from the above, it has to be observed that mere making of the application for grant of mineral concessions by the petitioner, does not create any right, much less a vested right, and the petitioner cannot claim that it had pre-existing right to such licence or lease. Its right is only to make an application, which was given by the policy then existing, and if the policy is changed, may be by way of an amendment to the Act, one cannot be stated to have any right on the basis of the earlier policy, which now does not hold good or find any place in the Statute. 110. Further, merely because the applications were kept pending for long period by the concerned authorities would not create any right or an applicant cannot be stated to have a vested right for seeking mining lease on the basis of the provision which has been substituted by the Amendment Act. Conclusion 117. The recommendation of the State Government for grant of previous approval of the Central Government for granting mining lease is the statutory requirement for grant of mining lease by the State Government, which is mandatory. The proviso to Section 10A(2)(c) expressly states that a prospecting license under Section 10A(2)(b) shall not be granted without prior approval of the Central Government. The recommendation of the State Government for grant of previous approval of the Central Government for granting mining lease is the statutory requirement for grant of mining lease by the State Government, which is mandatory. The proviso to Section 10A(2)(c) expressly states that a prospecting license under Section 10A(2)(b) shall not be granted without prior approval of the Central Government. Therefore, construed contextually, an application is to be treated as ‘pending’ until Central Government has considered the application and granted it’s approval and the petitioner's application is to be construed as a ‘pending case’ as the Central Government's approval was awaited. Therefore, the first proviso cannot be read to vest any right before Central Government’s approval is granted. 120. As such on the basis of the aforesaid discussion, the argument advanced by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that pendency of the application for grant of mining lease pursuant to recommendation made by the State Government, a right has been accrued in favour of the petitioner for consideration, is not fit to be accepted. 122. This Court, in view of the above, is of the view that merely because the recommendation has been made by the State the same cannot be construed to be letter of intent creating any vested or accrued right in favour of the petitioner-Firm, as such, in absence of any accrued right the amended provision will automatically adversely impact the interest of the petitioner-Firm and whatever decision is to be taken on the basis of the amended provision which has come into being said to be prospectively affected. 63. So far as the fact of the present case is concerned, there is no provision as contained in JMMC Rules, 2004 holding the applicant to be eligible due to fulfilment of certain conditions, rather, the conditions have been provided, i.e., in Section 9 ¼³½ which has been discussed and referred hereinabove wherein the requirement has been made that even after issuance of L.O.I, certain formalities is to be completed. 64. It needs to refer herein that after issuance of LOI, the application of the petitioner was deemed rejected in terms of Rule 9(1) ¼³½ of JMMC Rules 2004 which was duly informed to the petitioner vide Mem? No. 610 dated 19.03.2018. 64. It needs to refer herein that after issuance of LOI, the application of the petitioner was deemed rejected in terms of Rule 9(1) ¼³½ of JMMC Rules 2004 which was duly informed to the petitioner vide Mem? No. 610 dated 19.03.2018. Consequently, the petitioner made application before the Deputy Commissioner on 28.01.2019 along with E.C for grant of lease but after consideration the application dated 28.01.2019 was rejected by Deputy Commissioner vide order dated 11.02.2019 which was duly communicated by DMO Vide Memo No. 349 dated 25.02.2019. 65. Thereafter, petitioner moved in Revision Case No. 22/2019 before the Mines Commissioner and the Mines Commissioner vide order dated 08.02.2022 condoned the delay and further remanded the matter for fresh consideration as per the rules 2004. After receipt of the order passed by Mines Commissioner, thereafter, the rules 2004 have been amended by JMMC (Amended Rules) 2019 and it has been brought that no fresh lease can be granted on government land and since the nature of land is Government land in terms of Rule 9 (1) ka of Amended rules 2019 as such the fresh lease to the petitioner has not been granted. 66. It requires to refer herein that since the Rule 9 (1) ¼d½ of Amended Rules, 2019 has not been challenged and as such the respondents are bound by the said rules at the time of consideration of application as no right has accrued in favour of petitioner prior to the date of consideration of the application. Moreover, the issuance of L.O.I is mere correspondence for obtaining the requisite clearances for grant of lease and it does not create any right to the petitioner. 67. Thus, herein , there is no such provision that merely L.O.I has been issued then the applicant will be considered to be eligible, rather, even after issuance of L.O.I certain conditions are to be fulfilled as provided under the provision of section 9 ¼?k½ and ¼³½ as referred hereinabove. 68. Therefore , merely because the L.O.I has been issued no right will be said to be created in favour of the petitioner said to be vested one. 69. 68. Therefore , merely because the L.O.I has been issued no right will be said to be created in favour of the petitioner said to be vested one. 69. The fact of the present case since is different of the fact of the case of “Kohinoor Steel Private Limited” (Supra) even the statutory provision is not applicable herein, hence, the judgment rendered in the case of “Kohinoor Steel Private Limited” (Supra) is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 70. So far as the argument advanced that the Deputy Commissioner has made correspondence to the Mine Commissioner seeking guideline is concerned, but no such guideline has been given, hence, the writ petitioner is coming out with a plea that no such fault lies with him. 71. This Court has considered the aforesaid submission and found that said guideline has been sought for on 23.03.2022 and, thereafter, the petitioner sat idle and came to this Court only after more than three years, i.e., on 08.07.2025. 72. This Court, in the entirety of the facts and circumstances and as per the discussions made hereinabove, is of the view that no relief can be granted to the writ petitioner and, accordingly, the present writ petition fails and dismissed as such. W.P.(C) No.3525 of 2025 73. The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the following reliefs: (i) For issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/order (s) /direction(s), particularly a writ of Certiorari for quashing/setting aside the order dated 13.08.2024 as contained in memo no. 1724 dated 05.09.2024 (Annexure-19) passed in Revision Case No. 11/2024 by the Mines Commissioner, Ranchi whereby and where under the revision application filed by the petitioner against the order contained in memo no. 416/M dated 15.03.2024 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Palamau has been dismissed. And (ii) For issuance of an appropriate Writ(s)/Order (s) /Direction(s), particularly a writ of Certiorari for quashing and setting aside the order contained in memo no. 416/M dated 15.03.2024 (Annexure- 18) passed by Deputy Commissioner, Palamau whereby and where under the letter no. 2375/?. dated 29.12.2016 issued by District Mining Officer, Palamau, Medininagar for grant of mining lease in favour of petitioner has been cancelled under Rule 9(1)(Gha) of Jharkhand Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 2004 treating the mining application dated 22.12.2016 as invalid. 416/M dated 15.03.2024 (Annexure- 18) passed by Deputy Commissioner, Palamau whereby and where under the letter no. 2375/?. dated 29.12.2016 issued by District Mining Officer, Palamau, Medininagar for grant of mining lease in favour of petitioner has been cancelled under Rule 9(1)(Gha) of Jharkhand Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 2004 treating the mining application dated 22.12.2016 as invalid. And (iii) Upon quashing of the aforesaid orders dated 15.03.2024 and 05.09.2024, for issuance of appropriate writ/s, order/s or direction/s particularly writ of mandamus commanding upon the respondents to forthwith grant mining lease of stone for the period of 10 years in favour of the petitioner in terms of letter no. 2375/M. dated 29.12.2016 Issued by the District Mining Officer, Palamau, Medininagar for stone mining in Mauza Chando, Thana No. 179, Plot No. 2129 (P), Khata No. 347 admeasuring 9 acres of land. Factual Matrix 74. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ petition needs to refer herein which reads as under: (i) The petitioner is a proprietorship firm and its proprietor is a citizen of India and is thereby entitled by enforcement of fundamental rights as guaranteed under the Constitution of India. (ii) The petitioner had filed an application dated 22.05.2014 for grant of Mining Lease of stone in District Palamu over an area of 9.00 acres in Mouza Chando, pertaining to Thana Chainpur, Thana No. 179, Plot No.2129 (Part) of Khata No. 347 (hereinafter referred as "land in question"). (iii) The Assistant Mining Officer, Palamau, Medininagar vide letter no. 215 dated 22.05.2014 requested the Circle Officer, Chainpur to Inform about the details/ status of the land in question for grant of mining lease. (iv) It is pleaded that the Circle Officer vide letter no. 287 dated 07.08.2014 submitted the enquiry of Circle Officer before the Assistant Mining Officer, Palamau and informed that the land in question is recorded as Tongra in Survey Khatian. (v) Thereafter, the Assistant Mining Officer, Palamau, Medininagar vide memo no. 597 dated 19.08.2014 issued certificate that the petitioner has applied for grant of mining over land in question under Rule 9 Jharkhand Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 2004 which is pending for grant of environmental clearance and there is no mining lease adjoining to the leasehold area of petitioner. (vi) The Deputy Director, Drilling-cum-Drawing and Disbursing Officer, Office of Additional Director Laboratory, Hazaribag vide letter no. (vi) The Deputy Director, Drilling-cum-Drawing and Disbursing Officer, Office of Additional Director Laboratory, Hazaribag vide letter no. 77 dated 07.10.2014 granted Approval of Mining Plan along with progressive Mine Closure Plan in relation to land in question. (vii) Consequently, the Divisional Forest Officer, Medininagar vide letter no. 325 dated 04.02.2015 informed the Assistant Mining Officer, Palamau that the mining lease may be granted in favour of petitioner as the land in question is outside the forest boundary and there is no- National Park/ Sanctuary within the radius of 3.5 KM. Further, it was informed that as per the application submitted by Circle Officer, the land in question is "Gair Majurua Tongra". (viii) The State Level Environment Impact Assessment Authority, Jharkhand vide letter No. EC/SEIAA/2015-16/839/2015/1524 dated 25.08.2015 granted Environmental Clearance in favour of the petitioner. (ix) Further, the District Mining Officer, Palamau, Medininagar vide letter no. 2375 dated 29.12.2016 informed the petitioner that vide order dated 27.12.2016 passed by Deputy Commissioner, Palamau Mining Lease for stone has been granted in favour of the petitioner in Mouza-Chando, pertaining to Plot No. 2129 (Part) of Khata No. 347, under Chainpur P.S. of Palamau District for a period of 10 (ten) years from the date of Execution of Mining Lease. (x) In the aforesaid letter it was directed to the petitioner following to deposit/submit the amount for execution of the Mining Lease deed within 90 days under Rule 28 (1) of J.M.M.C. Rules, 2004: A Security Money 2,25,000/- B Preliminary Expenses 1,000/- C Advance Deed Rent 1,12,500/- D Income Tax 4,500/- E Mining Lease Deed in Two copies N/A F Map of the granted area in two copies N/A G Financial assurance 1,00,000/- (xi) It is stated that the petitioner was ready to deposit the above-said amounts and documents for get it executed within the statutory period, but in the meantime the petitioner fell ill seriously and was bed-ridden from 10.01.2017 to 20.06.2017 due to Ascites and tuberculosis and was under continuous medical treatment and after recovering from the said illness, the petitioner managed the above-said amount for deposit, but in the meantime the period of 90 days lapsed as prescribed in Rule 28 (1) of J.M.M.C. Rules, 2004. (xii) Thereafter, in this regard that the petitioner had preferred Revision Case No. 104/2017 before the Mines Commissioner, Ranchi on 29.06.2017 wherein vide order dated 29.12.2017 as contained in Memo No.04 dated 17.01.2018 the deemed revocation was set-aside and the Deputy Commissioner was directed to examine the matter afresh on merit and to pass a speaking order as per Rules within 30 days from the date of receipt of this order. (xiii) It is pleaded that pursuant to the aforesaid order, the petitioner requested the Deputy Commissioner, Palamau vide letter dated 20.01.2018 to decide afresh. (xiv) Consequent to aforesaid the petitioner received a letter No. 164/M dated 02.02.2018 issued by Deputy Commissioner, Palamau wherein the petitioner was directed to submit all the documents as required vide letter No. 2375/M dated 29.12.2017 of the District Mining Officer, Palamau within one week, so that the execution of the granted Mining Lease Deed could be executed within 30 days (i.e., up to 16.02.2018). (xv) Thereafter, in terms of the directions issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Palamu, the petitioner vide letter dated 08.02.2018 deposited security money, Preliminary Expenses, Advance Dead Rent, Income Tax, in the Government Heads and also pledged the financial assurance and submitted the Mining Lease Deed typed on required Stamp Papers along with Plan of the sanctioned area before the District Mining Officer, Palamau which was duly acknowledged by the Office of the District Mining Officer, Palamau. (xvi) Thereafter the petitioner received an explanation vide letter No.231/M dated 13.03.2018 of the Deputy Commissioner, Palamau to explain within a week that why not the sanctioned order of the Mining Lease may be revoked, as the required papers and documents has been submitted belatedly by the petitioner and as such the execution of Mining Lease could not be granted by the undersigned within 30 days’ time as allowed by Hon'ble Court of Mines Commissioner. (xvii) Subsequent thereof the petitioner submitted his reply vide letter dated 18.03.2018 stating therein that as per order dated 29.12.2017 of the Mines Commissioner, it was directed to the Deputy Commissioner, Palamau "to examine the matter afresh on merit and to pass speaking order as per Rule within 30 days from the date of receipt of this order" and in the light of the above order, the matter was examined afresh on merit by the Deputy Commissioner, Palamau and was pleased to pass a Speaking order within 30 days from the receipt (i.e. 18.01.2018) of the order of Mines Commissioner, which was communicated to petitioner vide his the Letter No. 164/M dated 02.02.2018 directing the petitioner to submit the relevant papers for execution as such it is quite clear that the Deputy Commissioner, Palamu had passed his Speaking Order within stipulated period of 30 days. Thereafter in compliance of the letter No. 104/M dated 02.02.2018 of D.C., Palamau the petitioner has already been submitted the required papers within one week vide his letter 08.02.2018 (which was under 30 days also). (xviii)The petitioner further prayed to execute the Mining Lease Deed as early as possible, so that the petitioner may be able to start the mining works with payments of the Government Revenue as per prescribed Rules and Regulations. (xix) In spite of the submission of all the documents and payment of requisite amount, no information was provided to the petitioner regarding the execution of mining lease. Thereupon, the petitioner sought information under RTI Act, 2005. (xx) The District Mining Officer, Palamau vide letter No.1327 dated 08.09.2018 informed the petitioner that the mining lease in favour of petitioner could not be granted as the mining lease was not executed within 30 days i.e. till 16.02.2018 from the date of receipt of the order passed by the Mines Commissioner, Ranchi. (xxi) Being aggrieved by the letter dated 08.09.2018 filed Revision case being Revision Case No. 104 of 2017 before the Mines Commissioner, Ranchi on 26.09.2018. (xxii) The District Mining Officer, Palamau, vide letter no. 1437 dated 23.06.2023 submitted Statement of Facts prepared in Revision Case No. 104/2017 before the Additional Secretary, Department of Mines and Geology, Jharkhand. (xxiii)Thereafter, Mines Commissioner, Ranchi vide order dated 19.01.2024 contained in memo no. (xxii) The District Mining Officer, Palamau, vide letter no. 1437 dated 23.06.2023 submitted Statement of Facts prepared in Revision Case No. 104/2017 before the Additional Secretary, Department of Mines and Geology, Jharkhand. (xxiii)Thereafter, Mines Commissioner, Ranchi vide order dated 19.01.2024 contained in memo no. 426 dated 23.02.2024 passed in Revision Case No. 104/2017 allowed the application and remanded the matter to the Deputy Commissioner, Palamau to examine the matter afresh on merit and pass speaking order after being satisfied with compliance of all other provision of JMMS Rules, 2004 within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order. (xxiv) Consequent to the aforesaid the Deputy Commissioner, Palamau vide order contained in memo no. 416/M dated 15.03.2024 cancelled the letter no. 2375/M. dated 29.12.2016 issued by District Mining Officer, Palamau, Medininagar for grant of mining lease in favour of petitioner treating the mining application dated 22.12.2016 as invalid on the ground that the provision contained in Rule 9(1) ¼?k½ of JMMC Amendment Rules, 2017 prohibits grant of mining lease of stone on government land by Deputy Commissioner and further no LOI has been issued under Rule 11(ka) of JMMC Amendment Rules, 2017. (xxv) Being aggrieved by the order dated 15.03.2024, the petitioner preferred Revision Case No. 11/2024 before the Mines Commissioner, Ranchi. (xxvi)The Mines Commissioner, Ranchi vide order dated 13.08.2024 as contained in memo no. 1724 dated 05.09.2024 dismissed the Revision Case No. 11/2024 filed by the petitioner on the ground that the lease area of petitioner is government land which can be given on lease only through electronic auction. 75. Being aggrieved, the petitioner-company has approached this Court for redressal of its grievance by filing the present writ petition. Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner 76. The grant of Mining Lease vide order dated 27.12.2016 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Palamau creates enforceable right in favour of the petitioner. 77. The right of petitioner for execution of mining lease deed which accrued on the date of grant of mining lease in favour of the petitioner cannot be abridged by the subsequent amendment of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2017. 78. 77. The right of petitioner for execution of mining lease deed which accrued on the date of grant of mining lease in favour of the petitioner cannot be abridged by the subsequent amendment of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2017. 78. The provision contained in Rule 9(1) ¼?k½ of JMMC Amendment Rules, 2017 cannot be given retrospective application against the petitioner in defiance of the right created in favour of the petitioner by grant of mining lease vide order dated 27.12.2016 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Palamau. 79. Rule 9 (1) ¼?k½ of the JMMC Amendment Rules, 2017 as contained in notification dated 22.02.2017 invalidates the mining application in relation government land received prior to date of notification. It is submitted that the Rule 9 (1) ¼?k½ of the JMMC Amendment Rules, 2017 will not affect the validity of order passed by the competent authority for grant of mining lease. 80. The learned counsel based upon the aforesaid ground has submitted that the impugned orders therefore, needs interference by this Court. Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent-State: 81. It has been contended on behalf of the respondent-State that from perusal of the order dated 15.03.2024 by which lease granted vide order dated 29.12.2016 has been cancelled, it would be evident that Deputy Commissioner while passing the order dated 15.03.2024 has taken the following grounds: (i) The petitioner failed to produce any medical certificate documentary proof of serious illness preventing submission of documents within the stipulated 90 days; (ii) The mining lease application dated 22.12.2016 had become invalid under the JMMC Amendment Rules, 2017, which bar grant of mining leases by the Deputy Commissioner over Government land; and (iii) No mandatory Letter of Intent under Rule 11 ¼d½ of the JMMC Amendment Rules, 2017, had been issued in this case. 82. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is evident that authority concerned had passed the well-reasoned order based upon the factual aspect as well as taken into consideration the statutory restriction which has been inserted by the virtue of amendment of year 2017 as inserted in the rule 11 ¼d½ of Rules 2004 and as such since the requirement has not been fulfilled by the petitioner the lease has been cancelled, therefore there is no error in the order impugned. 83. 83. It has been contended that the petitioner, thereafter, preferred Revision Application No. 11/2024 before the Mines Commissioner, Jharkhand, Ranchi, challenging the aforesaid order dated 15.03.2024 and the Mines Commissioner, Charkhand, Ranchi, vide final order dated 13.08.2024 contained in Memo No. 1724 dated 05.09.2024, has dismissed the said revision on the ground of amendment in Rule 2004 by virtue of JMMC Amendment Rules, 2017, which bars grant of mining leases by the Deputy Commissioner over Government land. The learned counsel thereof has submitted that in the light of the statutory restriction and since the respondent is bound to follow the said statutory restriction it is not possible to redress the grievances of the petitioner. 84. The petitioner has failed to justify the delay in submission of documents within the prescribed 90 days and no mandatory Letter of Intent was issued as required under the JMMC Amendment rules 2017 which also prohibit grant of mining lease over the government land by the Deputy Commissioner. 85. The learned AAG-III appearing for the State of Jharkhand, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that it is case where the petitioner is not entitled for any relief in view of the statutory restrictions as provided under the provision of JMMC Rules, 2004 as amended time to time. Analysis 86. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and appreciated the arguments advanced on their behalf as also go through the material available on record. 87. The issue of grant will be said to be vested/accrual of right is the issue involved in the present case. 88. It requires to refer herein that this Court has already expressed its view on the ambit of vested/accrued right in the preceding paragraph of as such it is not required herein to reiterated the same. 89. It requires to refer herein that the amended provision as amended in the JMMC Rules, 2004 does not speak with respect to eventuality in a case of grant, rather a specific provision has been provided with respect to issuance of L.O.I subject to fulfillment of conditions as provided under section 9 ¼?k½ and ¼³½ . 90. 89. It requires to refer herein that the amended provision as amended in the JMMC Rules, 2004 does not speak with respect to eventuality in a case of grant, rather a specific provision has been provided with respect to issuance of L.O.I subject to fulfillment of conditions as provided under section 9 ¼?k½ and ¼³½ . 90. Further, the Grant being not referred in the Statute and, as such, according to considered view of this Court no right will be said to be accrued in favour of the writ petitioner merely on the basis of grant so as to prevail upon the statutory provision as has been inserted after the amendment in the JMMC Rules, 2004 amended in 2017. 91. Admittedly, the JMMC Rule 2004 has been amended in the year 2017 by insertion of the provision of Rule 9 ¼³½ , Rule 9 ¼p½ , and other allied provisions of JMMC Rules, 2004 wherein the statutory restriction has been imposed for grant of lease to carry out the mining lease. Further, there has been an amendment in the Rules and by virtue of said amendment, under the provisions of Rule 9 ¼d½ under the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004, lease for mining purpose is to be granted on holding a proper auction. 92. Further as mentioned in the preceding paragraph as per Rule 9 ¼³½ , of Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules wherein it has been stipulated that within 180 days from the issuance of notification, the Environmental Clearance has to be mandatorily produced and if the same is not produced, the letter of intent/application would be deemed to have been rejected. Further, there is a proviso under Rule 9 ¼³½ which was added by the amendment dated 28.09.2020 and as per the said proviso, in case where due to delay in granting Environmental Clearance beyond 180 days, which is not attributable to a lessee, and the lease agreement was not approved, in those cases the Revisional Authority was given power to decide the matter on merits. 93. Now adverting to the factual aspects of the instant case, it is evident that herein the mining lease application dated 22.12.2016 rendered invalid in view of the JMMC Amendments Rule 2017 which categorically prohibits the grant of mining lease by the Deputy Commissioner in respect of Government land. 93. Now adverting to the factual aspects of the instant case, it is evident that herein the mining lease application dated 22.12.2016 rendered invalid in view of the JMMC Amendments Rule 2017 which categorically prohibits the grant of mining lease by the Deputy Commissioner in respect of Government land. Furthermore, no L.O.I as mandated under rule 11 ¼d½ JMMC Amendments Rule 2017 has been issued in the present matter which is the one of the requirements for grant of the mining lease. 94. This Court, in backdrop of the aforesaid, is of the view that in view of the statutory restriction imposed by virtue of amendments in the provision of JMMC Rules, 2004, no relief can be granted to the writ petitioner. 95. Accordingly, the instant writ petition stands dismissed. 96. In the result, W.P(C) No.3475 of 2025 and W.P(C) No. 3525 of 2025 stand dismissed and, as such, disposed of. 97. Pending I.As, if any, stands disposed of. Arun Kumar Rai, J.-I Agree.