JUDGMENT : (T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO, J.) 1. This Second Appeal has been filed by the Appellant/Respondent/ Defendant against the Decree and Judgment dated 25.11.2002, in A.S.No.50 of 2000 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Gooty (for short, ‘the First Appellate Court’) reversing the decree and Judgment dated 02.11.2000, in O.S.No.40 of 1999 on the file of Junior Civil Judge, Guntakal (for short, ‘the Trial Court’). 2. The Respondent/Appellant is the Plaintiff, who filed the suit in O.S.No.40 of 1999 seeking recovery of Rs.33,690/-, the principal and interest, from the Defendant based on the promissory note dated 25.04.1996. 3. Referring to the parties as they are initially arrayed in the suit is expedient to mitigate confusion and better comprehend the case. 4. The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the contentious issues between the parties inter se, may be delineated as follows: On 25.04.1996, Defendant borrowed Rs.20,000/- in cash from Plaintiff for personal necessity and executed a promissory note in favour of Plaintiff on the same day, agreeing to repay the amount with interest at 24% per annum. Despite several demands for repayment and a registered notice issued to the Defendant, the Defendant has failed to repay any amount due under the promissory note. 5. In the written statement, the Defendant denied borrowing any money, let alone the sum of Rs.20,000/- from the Plaintiff. Defendant asserts no prior relationship with Plaintiff, who was unknown to him until he received the summons and learned she is the daughter of the late J. Subbaiah Setty, a money lender. The Defendant claims that J. Subbaiah Setty and his sons lent money at exorbitant interest rates, particularly to Railway employees. The Plaintiff's brother, who continued this business after J. Subbaiah Setty's death, allegedly held a grudge against the Defendant due to his role as a Railway Union leader advocating for the welfare of employees. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff fabricated the suit promissory note, with forged signatures, in collaboration with the attestors and scribe, to bid for wrongful gain. Therefore, the Defendant seeks the dismissal of the suit, asserting the signature on the promissory note is a forgery. 6. Based on the above pleadings, the Trial Court has framed the following issues: i. Whether the suit pronote is true, valid and binding on the Defendant? Ii. Whether the suit pronote is forged one? iii. To what relief? 7. Therefore, the Defendant seeks the dismissal of the suit, asserting the signature on the promissory note is a forgery. 6. Based on the above pleadings, the Trial Court has framed the following issues: i. Whether the suit pronote is true, valid and binding on the Defendant? Ii. Whether the suit pronote is forged one? iii. To what relief? 7. During the trial, P.W.1 was examined and marked Exs.A.1 to A.3 on behalf of the Plaintiff. Conversely, on behalf of the Defendant, DW.1 was examined, and no documents were marked. 8. After completing the trial and hearing the arguments of both sides, the Trial Court dismissed the suit without costs. 9. Aggrieved by the same, the Plaintiff filed an Appeal in A.S.No.50 of 2000 on file of the First Appellate Court. The First Appellate Court, being the final fact-finding Court, framed the following points for consideration: 1. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for a decree for the suit amount as prayed for? 2. Whether the suit pronote is forged, thereby the signature found in it is not the signature of the Defendant? 3. Whether the father of the Plaintiff and her brother are money lenders who advance amounts to railway employees at an exorbitant rate of interest at Rs.6/- per hundred per month? 4. Whether the Defendant has not executed and received the consideration? 5. To what relief? 10. The First Appellate Court, after scrutinizing oral and documentary evidence adduced on behalf of both sides, allowed the Appeal by its Judgment and Decree dated 25.11.2002. Assailing the same, the Defendant preferred the present Second Appeal. 11. Heard Sri. O. Manohar Reddy learned Counsel representing the Appellant / Defendant and Sri. N. Ranga Reddy, learned Counsel for the Respondent / Plaintiff. 12. Based on the Appellant’s contentions, the following substantial questions of law are involved in this Second Appeal: i. In the absence of proving the document in one of the modes prescribed under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, whether the First Appellate Court acted legally in decreeing the suit based on its finding on the genuineness of promissory note? ii. In the absence of any evidence concerning the passing of the consideration on the foot of a promissory note, whether the First Appellate Court acted legally in decreeing the suit? 13. ii. In the absence of any evidence concerning the passing of the consideration on the foot of a promissory note, whether the First Appellate Court acted legally in decreeing the suit? 13. Before delving into the matter, since the Appeal is filed under Sec.100 of C.P.C., this Court must see the scope of Section 100 of C.P.C. 14. In H.P.Pyarejan V. Dasappa (dead) by L.Rs.and others , [2006 (3) ALT 41 (SC)] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: Under Section 100 of the Code (as amended in 1976), the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the judgments of the courts below is confined to hearing on substantial questions of law. Interference with the finding of fact by the High Court is not warranted if it involves re-appreciation of evidence (see Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami (1997) 4 SCC 713 ) and Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait (1997) 5 SCC 438 )…… 15. Considerations in Section 100 of C.P.C. arise only when there is a substantial question of law and not mere such questions of law or one based on facts. The learned Counsel for Respondent is right in placing reliance on these rulings. However, it has to be borne in mind that in case of misapplication of law and improper appreciation of evidence on record, particularly the documentary evidence, it is the bounden duty of the High Court sitting in Second Appeal to consider such questions which are substantial in terms of law. 16. In the second Appeal, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the C.P.C., this Court must confine itself to the substantial question of law involved in the Appeal. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of the Courts below, where the Courts below recorded the findings judicially by appreciating both oral and documentary evidence. Further, the existence of a substantial question of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction. This Court cannot substitute its own opinion unless the findings of the Courts below are manifestly perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. 17. Since Defendant has made a plea of forgery and denial of execution of the promissory note, the burden is on Plaintiff to prove the execution of the promissory note (Ex.A.1) and pass on the consideration amount. 18. 17. Since Defendant has made a plea of forgery and denial of execution of the promissory note, the burden is on Plaintiff to prove the execution of the promissory note (Ex.A.1) and pass on the consideration amount. 18. Beyond the pale controversy, it is trite that the burden rests on the Plaintiff's shoulders to prove the claim satisfactorily. Where both parties have chosen to advance their pleadings and adduce evidence, the concept of burden of proof loses its paramount significance. The totality of inputs will have to be reckoned by any prudent mind to decide whether the claim has been established and the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree as prayed for. As seen from the record, both parties have not examined witnesses in support of their case regarding the execution or non-execution of the promissory note (Ex.A.1). As such, the controversy will have to be decided based on oral evidence of PW.1 and DW.1. It would be a travesty of truth, justice and reasonableness to throw overboard the entire evidence and reject the claim lock, stock and barrel for the only reason that still better evidence has not been placed before the Court. Absolute certainty is not the requirement under Section 3 of the Evidence Act. In a civil case, rival contentions and rival evidence must be considered, assessed, evaluated and weighed to conclude whether the burden on the Plaintiff has been discharged. 19. If prudence is the real test, it prescribes differing standards of proof in varying circumstances. Its requirements preclude any Procrustean bed of uniformly rigid rules for each type of case. 20. In M.Narsinga Rao V. State of Andhra Pradesh , [ (2001) 1 SCC 691 ] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 15. The word "proof" needs to be understood in the sense it is defined in the Evidence Act because proof depends upon the admissibility of evidence. A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. This is the definition given for the word "proved" in the Evidence Act. What is required is the production of such materials on which the Court can reasonably act to reach the supposition that a fact exists. This is the definition given for the word "proved" in the Evidence Act. What is required is the production of such materials on which the Court can reasonably act to reach the supposition that a fact exists. Proof of the fact depends upon the degree of probability of its having existed. The standard required for reaching the supposition is that of a prudent man acting in any important matter concerning him. Fletcher Moulton L.J. in Hawkins v. Powells Tillery Steam Coal Company, Ltd., observed this : "Proof does not mean proof to rigid mathematical demonstration, because that is impossible; it must mean such evidence as would induce a reasonable man to come to a particular conclusion." 16. The said observation has stood the test of time and can now be followed as the standard of proof. In reaching a conclusion, the Court can use the process of inferences to be drawn from facts produced or proved. Such inferences are akin to presumptions in law. The law gives absolute discretion to the Court to presume the existence of any fact that it thinks likely to have happened. In that process, the Court may have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public or private business vis-a-vis the facts of the particular case. The discretion is envisaged in Section 114 of the Evidence Act. 21. As PW.1, the Plaintiff testified in support of the suit transaction. PW.1 stated that Defendant borrowed Rs.20,000/- from her on 25.04.1996 and executed Ex.A.1, a promissory note, agreeing to repay the amount with interest. It is undisputed that, before filing the suit, Plaintiff issued a legal notice (Ex.A.2) on 25.10.1998, demanding payment of the amount due under Ex.A.1. The postal acknowledgement (Ex.A.3) confirms the Defendant's receipt of the notice. However, the Defendant disputed the receiving of legal notice. Thus, it is not the Defendant's stand that he provided a reply notice to the Plaintiff. 22. As DW.1, Defendant denies any acquaintance with Plaintiff and claims that he never borrowed money from her. He asserts that the Plaintiff's father and brother were involved in lending money to Railway employees and that, as the Vice Chairman of the Mazdoor Union Station Branch in Guntakal from 1996 to 1999, he had transactions with them. 22. As DW.1, Defendant denies any acquaintance with Plaintiff and claims that he never borrowed money from her. He asserts that the Plaintiff's father and brother were involved in lending money to Railway employees and that, as the Vice Chairman of the Mazdoor Union Station Branch in Guntakal from 1996 to 1999, he had transactions with them. The Defendant contends that the suit promissory note is fabricated and falsely filed against him, further denying his signature on the suit promissory note. 23. The Trial Court dismissed the suit, noting that the Plaintiff should have taken steps to send the Defendant's signature to an expert for comparison. Given the Defendant's claim that he was a stranger to her, however, the testimony provided by PW.1 in cross-examination indicated that the Defendant had been borrowing money from her father for five years. The Trial Court focused solely on the Plaintiff's failure to obtain an expert's opinion on the signature comparison. Despite the availability of the admitted signatures of the Defendant, the Trial Court did not compare them with the disputed ones. Additionally, the Trial Court raised the question of why the Defendant borrowed money from the Plaintiff under the contested promissory note, given that he had previously borrowed amounts from her father. This reasoning lacks logical merit. PW.1 provided a rationale for lending money to the Defendant, explaining that, as her father was unable to do so, she lent him money from her savings, which she had received from her father over time. The mere fact that Defendant had borrowed money from Plaintiff's father does not, in any way, preclude him from borrowing from Plaintiff herself. Apart from these observations, the Trial Court did not provide any other convincing reasons for dismissing the suit. 24. The First Appellate Court considered this testimony when evaluating the Plaintiff's claim. The First Appellate Court also highlighted the discrepancies and improvements in DW.1's version, contradicting his pleadings. Notably, in cross-examination, DW.1 admitted his signature on the postal acknowledgement, suit summons, vakalath, and written statement but denied signing Ex.A.1. Although the Defendant contested the receipt of the legal notice, the First Appellate Court rejected his argument, pointing out that there was no enmity between the Defendant and the postal department, and that the notice had been correctly addressed to him. Although the Defendant contested the receipt of the legal notice, the First Appellate Court rejected his argument, pointing out that there was no enmity between the Defendant and the postal department, and that the notice had been correctly addressed to him. The First Appellate Court invoked the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, which allows for the assumption that a letter, when correctly addressed, is presumed to have been delivered to the addressee, even if the postal acknowledgement is not returned and it also relied on the rulings in G.S. Srikanth V. M/s. Sri Lakshmi Financers , [1998 (2) ALT (Crl) 486 AP] and A.Sudarshan V. Mannen (Shabir) and another , [1997 (1) ALT (Crl) 785 AP] . The First Appellate Court ultimately disbelieved the Defendant's claim of not receiving the registered notice. 25. The First Appellate Court noted that the Defendant did not respond to the legal notice (Ex.A.2) but admitted his signature on the postal acknowledgement (Ex.A.3). The First Appellate Court also referred to the Defendant's testimony, where he claimed to have only seen Ex.A.1 in the Court hall. The First Appellate Court also observed no other dispute or ill feelings between the Defendant and the Plaintiff's brother. The First Appellate Court disbelieved the Defendant's evidence, pointing out that significant improvements had been made during his chief examination, particularly regarding crucial aspects of the case. 26. It is pertinent to note that Ex.A.1, the suit promissory note, lacks attestors. According to the Plaintiff, the promissory note was scribed by the Defendant. The Trial Court overlooked the possibility that Plaintiff need not have forged Defendant's signature as scribe; at most, Plaintiff may have used someone known to her to scribe the promissory note. Additionally, the Trial Court failed to acknowledge that Defendant did not respond to the legal notice sent by Plaintiff, nor did he explain his failure to do so. 27. The First Appellate Court noted that in the space designated for the scribe on Ex.A.1, the word "Me" was written, followed by the Defendant's signature and date. Upon comparison, the First Appellate Court found that the signatures across the revenue stamp and the one below the scribe appeared to be identical. Additionally, the capital letters in English on the suit promissory note and those below the Defendant's signature on the revenue stamp were also found to match. Upon comparison, the First Appellate Court found that the signatures across the revenue stamp and the one below the scribe appeared to be identical. Additionally, the capital letters in English on the suit promissory note and those below the Defendant's signature on the revenue stamp were also found to match. The First Appellate Court further compared the Defendant's signature in the written statement, the suit promissory note, and the postal acknowledgement, concluding that all these signatures appeared to be the same. The First Appellate Court's Judgment also compared the disputed signature with the signature in the Defendant's deposition. 28. The First Appellate Court noted that while there were no attestors to Ex.A.1, the Defendant's claim that a scribe fabricated the promissory note and attestors was incorrect, as the Defendant himself was the scribe. The Trial Court had suggested that the Plaintiff should have ensured the presence of attestoRs.Still, the First Appellate Court observed that attestation was not a mandatory requirement for a promissory note. The absence of attestors did not render the Plaintiff's case unbelievable. The First Appellate Court rightly observed that, given the relatively small amount involved, the Trial Court is within its rights to exercise its powers under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act. After comparing the Defendant’s signature on the promissory note, vakalath, written statement, and other documents with the disputed signature, the First Appellate Court found sufficient reasons to set aside the Trial Court's Judgment and decree. 29. Under the law, it is always open for the Court to compare the signature on the disputed document with the admitted signatures of the Defendant and witnesses (attestors). The rule of prudence and caution requires that, in the first place, expert opinion should be obtained for assistance. If such an opinion is unavailable, the Court has to compare the disputed writings and conclude. 30. Section 73 of the Evidence Act allows the Court to compare the disputed writings with admitted or proved writings to ascertain whether the writing is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written. If such an opinion is unavailable, the Court has to compare the disputed writings and conclude. 30. Section 73 of the Evidence Act allows the Court to compare the disputed writings with admitted or proved writings to ascertain whether the writing is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written. Neither party has opted for a comparison of the signatures by the handwriting expert, this Court views that when the party who relies on the disputed document expresses an apprehension that the document of recent origin or the farthest document shall not be suitable for making the comparison, the admitted or proved contemporary signatures alone should be used for such comparison. Thus, it is clear that if the person who relied on the disputed signature believes that the admitted signature is not disguised, it is good enough for comparison. The Trial Court has not taken pains to compare the signatures. There is no express provision in the Code of Civil Procedure which takes away from an Appellate Court, in cases in which that Code provides for an Appeal from an original decree, the power to review and evaluate the evidence of the witnesses independently of the conclusion reached by the Trial Court regarding the credibility of their evidence. 31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Murarilal V. State of M.P. , [ AIR 1980 SC 531 ] , observed that the duty of the Court to compare the writings and to come to its conclusion cannot be avoided by recourse to the statement that the Court is not an Expert. It is thus clear from the above observation of the Apex Court that under section 73 of the Evidence Act, the Court can compare the disputed and admitted handwriting or signature to conclude. However, provisions of Section 73 of the Evidence Act have been interpreted by various Courts as to how the signatures or handwritings are to be compared when there is no assistance from the Expert. 32. The Defendant, who received legal notice before filing the suit, did not even choose to send a reply denying the borrowing and the execution of the promissory note. The Defendant has not explained the reason for not responding to the legal notice. 32. The Defendant, who received legal notice before filing the suit, did not even choose to send a reply denying the borrowing and the execution of the promissory note. The Defendant has not explained the reason for not responding to the legal notice. This circumstance goes a long way in showing that the suit debt is true and that the Defendant had chosen to come up with a belated and false theory both about the borrowing of the amount and the execution of the promissory note. 33. Defendant is unable to show any reason or circumstance to disbelieve PW.1's evidence regarding the execution of the promissory note by Defendant and passing of consideration. The PW.1's evidence is consistent regarding the execution of the promissory note by Defendant. Though PW.1 was subjected to lengthy cross-examination, nothing was elicited to discredit her evidence. The Plaintiff has no reason to fabricate the suit promissory note. It is not the Defendant's case that he has enmity with the Plaintiff to create the suit promissory note. Furthermore, Defendant executed the execution promissory, he scribed the contents of the promissory note, and he failed to establish the circumstances under which he executed Ex.A.1 without receipt of the consideration amount. However, even the rebuttal could be given by direct evidence or by proving the preponderance of probabilities on record. In the present case, the Defendant has not rebutted the presumption, even by the preponderance of probabilities. Ex.A.1 promissory note shows that Plaintiff has lent the amount to Defendant even without securing the presence of the witnesses. 34. The Defendant failed to prove the contentions regarding non-payment of consideration by leading cogent evidence. He was not successful in showing the improbability of the consideration. The defence taken by the Defendant is not substantiated. 35. After careful consideration, the First Appellate Court had adequately appreciated the evidence. There is no reason for this Court to arrive at a different conclusion than the one arrived at by the First Appellate Court. This Court views that the findings arrived at by the First Appellate Court are correct, and the appellant/defendant has shown no justifiable reasons for arriving at different conclusions. 36. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court discerns no infirmity, much less perversity or illegality, in the Judgment rendered by the First Appellate Court. The findings and reasoning provided by the First Appellate Court are consistent with established legal principles. 36. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court discerns no infirmity, much less perversity or illegality, in the Judgment rendered by the First Appellate Court. The findings and reasoning provided by the First Appellate Court are consistent with established legal principles. The First Appellate Court meticulously reviewed all the evidence on record, omitting nothing pertinent, nor did it consider any extraneous material. As rightly observed by the First Appellate Court, the findings and conclusions recorded by the Trial Court are not based on the appreciation of evidence on record. The Trial Court's Judgment is erroneous and cannot be sustained. The First Appellate Court, after proper appreciation of the evidence on record, has appropriately set aside the Judgment of the Trial Court. Consequently, the findings of the First Appellate Court do not call for interference by this Court. The Second Appeal lacks merit in its entirety. 37. In these circumstances, finding no such questions that require consideration in the Second Appeal, which is a much less substantial question of law as pointed out for the Appellants, this Second Appeal has to be dismissed. 38. As a consequence, this Second Appeal is dismissed without costs. The Judgment dated 25.11.2002 of learned Senior Civil Judge Gooty, in A.S.No.50 of 2000, stands confirmed. Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.