JUDGMENT : (T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO, J.) 1. This Second Appeal has been filed by the Appellants/Defendants against the Decree and Judgment dated 14.02.2005, in A.S.No.183 of 2000 on the file of IV Additional Senior Civil Judge (Fast Track Court) at Vijayawada (for short, ‘the 1 st Appellate Court’) reversing the decree and Judgment dated 06.11.2001, in O.S. No.2001 of 1999 on the file of IV Additional Junior Civil Judge’s Court, Vijayawada (for short, ‘the trial Court’). 2. The Respondent is the Plaintiff, who filed the Suit in O.S.No.2001 of 1999, seeking a declaration that she is entitled to receive the claim from the defendants covered by Policy 673515851 dated 15.12.1997 as the said Policy is valid and binding on the Defendant. Appellants are the Defendants in the said Suit. 3. Referring to the parties as they are initially arrayed in the Suit is expedient to mitigate potential confusion and better comprehend the case. 4. The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the contentious issues between the parties inter se, may be delineated as follows: The Plaintiff's husband passed away suddenly on 15.12.1997. He had an insurance policy (No. 673515851) with the Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as ‘Insurance Corporation’), for which the Plaintiff was the nominee. The Policy was taken for 15 years, and the husband had paid Rs.356/- towards the first premium on 03.12.1997, as confirmed by a receipt from the agent of the 2 nd Defendant. After the husband's sudden death, Plaintiff informed Defendant but received no response for two months. Later, despite correspondence, the Insurance Corporation denied her claim, stating that there was no concluded contract. 5. The 1 st Defendant filed a written statement, and the 2 nd Defendant adopted the same. In their written statement, the Defendants denied the Plaintiff's claims, asserting that the proposer was deceased when the Corporation accepted the Policy or when the acceptance was communicated. There was no concluded contract between the deceased and the Insurance Corporation, and therefore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to any claim. The Policy was accepted during working hours on 15.12.1997 but was issued on 16.12.1997, with the date backdated, without knowledge of the proposer's death. The Defendants further asserted that no acceptance communication was made to the proposer before his death, as the proposal forms were submitted on 15.12.1997 at 10 AM, and he died before the Policy was processed. The Policy was accepted during working hours on 15.12.1997 but was issued on 16.12.1997, with the date backdated, without knowledge of the proposer's death. The Defendants further asserted that no acceptance communication was made to the proposer before his death, as the proposal forms were submitted on 15.12.1997 at 10 AM, and he died before the Policy was processed. Hence, the Defendants claimed no liability. 6. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court has framed the following issues: 1) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to seek a declaration as prayed for? 2) Whether there is concluded contract in between the deceased and Defendants? 3) To what relief? 7. During the trial, P.W.1 was examined and marked Exs.A1 to A20 on behalf of the Plaintiff. Conversely, on behalf of the Defendants, DW.1 was examined and marked Exs.B1 to B5. 8. After completing the trial and hearing both sides' arguments, the trial Court dismissed the Suit without costs. 9. Aggrieved by the same, the Plaintiff filed an Appeal in A.S.No.183 of 2000 on file of the First Appellate Court. The First Appellate Court, being the final fact-finding Court, framed the following points for consideration: 1) Whether there is a concluded contract in between the deceased and the Respondents? 2) Whether the Appellant is entitled for the policy amount of her husband as prayed for? 3) To what relief? 10. The First Appellate Court, after scrutinising oral and documentary evidence adduced on behalf of both sides, allowed the Appeal by its Judgment and Decree dated 14.02.2005. Assailing the same, the Defendants preferred the present Second Appeal. 11. Heard Smt. Y. Malathi learned Counsel representing the Appellants/Defendants, and none represented the Respondent/Plaintiff. 12. The learned Counsel for the Appellants/Defendants asserts that the First Appellate Court erred in reversing the Trial Court's Judgment. The First Appellate Court incorrectly observed that the specific time of acceptance of the deceased's proposal and the commencement of risk were not mentioned in Ex.A2 and Ex.A3. The First Appellate Court also wrongly held that the Insurance Corporation could not benefit from the failure to communicate acceptance to the deceased. The Trial Court should have recognized that by the time the insurance policy was signed, the proposer was deceased, and thus, there were no true parties to the contract. She argues that a concluded contract requires two living parties. 13. The Trial Court should have recognized that by the time the insurance policy was signed, the proposer was deceased, and thus, there were no true parties to the contract. She argues that a concluded contract requires two living parties. 13. Despite being granted several adjournments, no representation has been made on behalf of the Respondent/Plaintiff. Therefore, the matter is deemed to have been heard on behalf of the Respondent/Plaintiff. 14. Based on the Appellants’ contentions, the following substantial questions of law are involved in this Second Appeal: i. Whether an offer will be completed without communication of acceptance to the person who makes an offer? ii. Whether there can be any acceptance of an offer given by a person who died before the offer is accepted? iii. Whether the Courts below failed to consider the Judgment cited by the Appellant herein reported in AIR 1984 SC 1014 (LIC vs. Rajavasireddy Komalavalli Kamba and others)? 15. Before delving into the matter, since the Appeal is filed under Sec.100 of C.P.C., this Court must see the scope of Section 100 of C.P.C. 16. In H.P.Pyarejan V. Dasappa (dead) by L.Rs. and others , [2006 (3) ALT 41 (SC)] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: Under Section 100 of the Code (as amended in 1976), the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the judgments of the courts below is confined to hearing on substantial questions of law. Interference with the finding of fact by the High Court is not warranted if it involves re-appreciation of evidence (see Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami (1997) 4 SCC 713 ) and Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait (1997) 5 SCC 438 )…… 17. Considerations in Section 100 of C.P.C. arise only when there is a substantial question of law and not mere such questions of law or one based on facts. However, it has to be borne in mind that in case of misapplication of law and improper appreciation of evidence on record, particularly the documentary evidence, it is the bounden duty of the High Court sitting in Second Appeal to consider such questions which are substantial in terms of law. 18. In the second Appeal, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the C.P.C., this Court must confine itself to the substantial question of law involved in the Appeal. 18. In the second Appeal, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the C.P.C., this Court must confine itself to the substantial question of law involved in the Appeal. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of the Courts below, where the Courts below recorded the findings judicially by appreciating both oral and documentary evidence. Further, a substantial question of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction. This Court cannot substitute its own opinion unless the findings of the Courts below are manifestly perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. 19. Before addressing the rival contentions, the undeniable facts drawn from the record are outlined as follows: The Plaintiff is the wife of S.T.M. Krishna (hereafter referred to as 'the deceased'), who died on the morning of 15.12.1997 before 10:00 AM. In her cross-examination, PW1 (the Plaintiff) acknowledged that her husband passed away at 03:00 AM on the same day, 15.12.1997. The Plaintiff was named as the nominee on a policy issued in her husband's name, under policy number 673515851 by the Insurance Corporation. The Insurance Corporation, through the agent, received a sum of Rs. 356/- towards a proposal deposit from the Plaintiff’s husband, as evidenced by Exs.A.1 and A.2. 20. The proposal receipt, allegedly issued by the agent of the Insurance Corporation, claims to be the first premium receipt in favour of the deceased. The Defendants argue that when the Policy was accepted by the Insurance Corporation or by the time of communication of the acceptance, the proposer had already passed away. Therefore, they assert no concluded contract between the deceased and the Insurance Corporation. 21. Learned Counsel for the Appellants relied on the decision in LIC v. Raja Vasireddy Komalavalli Kamba , [ (1984) 2 SCC 719 ] , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 15. Though in certain human relationships, silence to a proposal might convey acceptance, in the case of an insurance proposal, silence does not denote consent, and no binding contract arises until the person to whom an offer is made says or does something to signify his acceptance. Mere delay in answering cannot be construed as an acceptance, as, prima facie, acceptance must be communicated to the offerer. Mere delay in answering cannot be construed as an acceptance, as, prima facie, acceptance must be communicated to the offerer. The general rule is that the insurance contract will be concluded only when the party to whom an offer has been made accepts it unconditionally and communicates his acceptance to the person making the offer. Whether the final acceptance is that of the assured or insurers, however, depends simply on the way in which negotiations for insurance have progressed. See this connection statement of law in MacGillivray & Parkington on Insurance Law, Seventh Edn., p. 94, para 215. 22. The Plaintiffs contend that a concluded contract existed between the Insurance Corporation and the deceased and that it is covered under the life insurance policy, marked as Ex.A.3. Ex.A.3 is the life insurance policy bearing No.673515851, dated 15.12.1997, with the Policy's commencement date also shown as 15.12.1997. It is acknowledged that there was correspondence between the deceased's family members and the Insurance Corporation, as evidenced by Exs.A.4 to A.20. However, these documents primarily serve to reiterate the respective stands of the parties and do not substantively address the core issue in dispute. 23. The Trial Court further observed that the proposer, the deceased, offered to insure his life with the Insurance Corporation. For the contract to be valid, the Trial Court held that the Insurance Corporation's acceptance of the proposal should have been communicated to the proposer during his lifetime. The Trial Court concluded that such acceptance was not communicated before the deceased's passing. Ex.B.4, the proposal register indicates that the deceased's proposal was submitted to the Insurance Corporation on 15.12.1997 during working hours. Ex.B.5, the proposal reference book, is cited in this context. 24. The Trial Court noted that the mere issuance of proposal receipts, specifically, the receipt for Rs.356/- issued in favour of S.T.M. Krishna on 03.12.1997 (Ex.A.1), the receipt for Rs.178/- (Ex.A.2), along with the retention of the premium after the applicant's death and the preparation of the policy document, does not constitute acceptance of the contract. The Trial Court observed that the Insurance Corporation's liability arises only when the Corporation formally accepts the Policy. The Trial Court observed that the Insurance Corporation's liability arises only when the Corporation formally accepts the Policy. In this case, the Trial Court noted that the deceased passed away around 03:00 AM on 15.12.1997, whereas the policy document was not prepared until after 10:00 AM on the same day, and even if the date of the proposal is considered, the Trial Court observed that no concluded contract had been established. Consequently, the receipt issued under Ex.A.1 does not establish a concluded contract between the parties. By making these observations, the Trial Court ultimately dismissed the Suit. 25. The First Appellate Court disagreed with the findings of the Trial Court, noting that the deceased had made a payment of Rs.356/- to the agent on 03.12.1997, as evidenced by the receipt marked as Ex.A.1. It is undisputed that the Insurance Corporation had received the amount on that date. On 15.12.1997, the Insurance Corporation accepted the deceased's proposal. Exs.A.2 and A.3 indicate that the Policy commenced on 15.12.1997 and matured on 15.12.2012. The First Appellate Court highlighted that Exs.A.2 and A.3 do not specify that the Policy commenced precisely at 10:00 AM on 15.12.1997, despite the Policy being accepted during working hours that day. 26. The First Appellate Court further observed that the Insurance Corporation could not exploit the situation merely because the deceased had not received the policy certificate; it is an undisputed fact that the Appellants received the policy certificate, thereby establishing a concluded contract; while the agent submitted the policy proposal on 15.12.1997, and it was accepted on 16.12.1997, with effect from 15.12.1997, the Insurance Corporation failed to specify the exact time for the commencement of the Policy; it was presumed that the Policy of the deceased commenced from 00:00 hours on 15.12.1997, rather than at 10:00 AM on that day. 27. 27. I have gone through section 64vb of the Insurance Act 1938, and it reads as under: 64VB: No risk to be assumed unless premium is received in advance (1)No insurer shall assume any risk in India in respect of any insurance business on which premium is not ordinarily payable outside India unless and until the premium payable is received by him or is guaranteed to be paid by such person in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed or unless and until a deposit of such amount as may be prescribed, is made in advance in the prescribed manner. (2)For the purposes of this section, in the case of risks for which premium can be ascertained in advance, the risk may be assumed not earlier than the date on which the premium has been paid in cash or by cheque to the insurer.Explanation.--Where the premium is tendered by postal money order or a cheque sent by post, the risk may be assumed on the date the money order is booked, or the cheque is posted, as the case may be. (3)Any refund of premium which may become due to an insured on account of the cancellation of a policy or alteration in its terms and conditions or otherwise shall be paid by the insurer directly to the insured by a crossed or order cheque or by postal money order and a proper receipt shall be obtained by the insurer from the insured, and such refund shall in no case be credited to the account of the agent. (4)Where an insurance agent collects a premium on a policy of insurance on behalf of an insurer, he shall deposit with, or dispatch by post to, the insurer the premium so collected in full without deduction of his commission within twenty-four hours of the collection excluding bank and postal holidays. (5)The Central Government may, by rules, relax the requirements of sub-section (1) in respect of particular categories in insurance policies. (6)The Authority may, from time to time, specify, by the regulations made by it, the manner of receipt of premium by the insurer. 28. Upon reviewing Section 64VB of the Insurance Act, I am of the opinion that unless the premium amount is paid in advance by the insured to the insurer, the risk associated with an event, such as an accident, will not be covered under the Policy. 28. Upon reviewing Section 64VB of the Insurance Act, I am of the opinion that unless the premium amount is paid in advance by the insured to the insurer, the risk associated with an event, such as an accident, will not be covered under the Policy. As previously noted, the deceased paid the premium on 03.12.1997, and the Insurance Corporation’s agent received this payment. However, the agent did not submit the deceased's proposal to the Corporation until 15.12.1997. According to Section 64VB of the Insurance Act, the agent is required to submit the proposal form, along with the premium, to the Corporation within 24 hours. It is, therefore, the agent's duty to ensure that all premiums are remitted to the Insurance Corporation within this time frame. 29. As the premium was received on 03.12.1997, accepting that payment would place the Corporation at risk from the date of acceptance, which, in this case, would be 15.12.1997. Furthermore, it is admitted that the Insurance Corporation issued the insurance policy covering the risk from 15.12.1997 without specifying a particular time. This Court holds that when a specific time is stated in the insurance policy or cover note, the Policy's effectiveness shall commence from that designated time and date rather than from any earlier point. In the absence of a specified time, the Policy will take effect at midnight on the date of issuance. Furthermore, if an accident occurs on the same date the Policy is taken out, the insurer will be liable to cover the insured's liability in accordance with the terms of the award. 30. As noted by the First Appellate Court, the Policy was considered to commence from 00:00 hours (midnight) on 15.12.1997 rather than from 10:00 AM on that same day. In the absence of a specified time for the commencement of coverage, and after carefully considering the facts and circumstances of the case and applying the relevant legal provisions under Section 64VB of the Act, this Court concurs with the Judgment of the First Appellate Court. It is determined that the Policy is deemed to have commenced at 00:00 hours (midnight) on 15.12.1997, considering that the premium was paid on 03.12.1997. 31. Upon paying the premium, the insured would reasonably have assumed that the coverage became effective immediately, given that the Insurance Corporation had accepted the payment. It is determined that the Policy is deemed to have commenced at 00:00 hours (midnight) on 15.12.1997, considering that the premium was paid on 03.12.1997. 31. Upon paying the premium, the insured would reasonably have assumed that the coverage became effective immediately, given that the Insurance Corporation had accepted the payment. There is no evidence adduced by the Insurance Corporation indicating that its agent informed the insured that the Policy would not come into effect until a specified future date. 32. In Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Vankadaru Koteswaramma , [MANU/AP/1299/2002] , the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that: 17…………… It is also relevant to refer to the Judgment of a Division Bench of Kerala High Court in LIC of India v. L. Kamalamma AIR 1986 Ker 215 , which dealt with the questions of acceptance of the proposals, wherein it was held that acceptance of the first premium by a person, who is authorised, would constitute acceptance. 18. There is another facet of this proposition. A reading of paragraph No. 14 of the Judgment extracted above indicates that the fact whether a policy was accepted or not would depend upon a number of circumstances, such as whether the final acceptance is that of the assured or insurers and the same would depend on how negotiations for insurance have progressed. In this case, the proposal emanated from the insured. The decision to accept is at the end of the Appellant. That brought about a concluded contract before the insured died. Therefore, the first premium issued in this Appeal stands answered in favour of the Respondent. 33. In Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking v. Basanti Devi , [MANU/SC/0621/1999] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the insurer, Life Insurance Corporation, had floated a 'Salary Savings Scheme' in which the employer deducted premiums from its employees' salaries and paid them to LIC on their behalf. The premium for a period of time was not deducted from an employee's salary. On the death of the employee, his legal representatives claimed the insured amount. LIC rejected the claim on the grounds of lapse of the Policy due to non-payment of premium and that the employer's actions did not bind LIC given that it was not an 'agent' of LIC. The Hon’ble Supreme Court turned down the argument and held that: 11. On the death of the employee, his legal representatives claimed the insured amount. LIC rejected the claim on the grounds of lapse of the Policy due to non-payment of premium and that the employer's actions did not bind LIC given that it was not an 'agent' of LIC. The Hon’ble Supreme Court turned down the argument and held that: 11. In the present case, we are not concerned with the insurance agent. It is not the case of LIC that DESU could be permitted as an insurance agent within the meaning of the Insurance Act and the Regulations. DESU is not procuring or soliciting any business for LIC. DESU is certainly not an insurance agent within the meaning of the aforesaid Insurance Act and the Regulations, but DESU is certainly an agent as defined in Section 182 of the Contract Act. The mode of collection of premiums has been indicated in the Scheme itself, and the employer has been assigned the role of collecting premiums and remitting them to LIC. As far as the employee as such is concerned, the employer will be an agent of LIC. It is a matter of common knowledge that insurance companies employ agents. When there is no insurance agent defined in the Regulations and the Insurance Act, the general principles of the law of agency as contained in the Contract Act are to be applied. 12. Agent in Section 182 means a person employed to do any act for another or to represent another in dealings with third persons, and the person for whom such act is done, or who is so represented, is called the Principal. Under Section 185, no consideration is necessary to create an agency. As far as Bhim Singh is concerned, he was not obligated to pay the premium directly to LIC. Under the agreement between LIC and DESU, the premium was payable to DESU, who was to deduct every month from the salary of Bhim Singh and transmit the same to LIC. DESU had, therefore, implied authority to collect premium from Bhim Singh on behalf of LIC. There was, thus, a valid payment of premium by Bhim Singh. The authority of DESU to collect premiums on behalf of LIC is implied. In any case, DESU had ostensible authority to collect premiums from Bhim Singh on behalf of LIC. DESU had, therefore, implied authority to collect premium from Bhim Singh on behalf of LIC. There was, thus, a valid payment of premium by Bhim Singh. The authority of DESU to collect premiums on behalf of LIC is implied. In any case, DESU had ostensible authority to collect premiums from Bhim Singh on behalf of LIC. So far as Bhim Singh is concerned DESU was an agent of LIC to collect premium on its behalf. 34. Therefore, the Insurance Corporation does not contend that the agent's receipt of the policy amount was an unauthorised act. Even otherwise, as outlined in Section 196 of the Indian Contract Act, once the Principal ratifies an unauthorised act, it is deemed to have been performed with authority, and its effects will follow accordingly. In this case, it is not the stand of the Insurance Corporation that the premium received by the agent, who subsequently credited to the company, was rejected. On the contrary, the Insurance Corporation has accepted the premium received and credited by their agent, thereby ratifying the agent's actions. From the foregoing evidence on record, it is clear that the premium amount collected by the Insurance Corporation’s agent was not deposited with the company without assigning any reasons and was retained by the insurance agent from 03.12.1997 to 14.12.1997. 35. Section 226 of the Contract Act provides that contracts entered through an agent may be enforced in the same manner and will have the same legal consequences as if the contracts had been entered into and the acts done by the Principal in person. The Principal is bound by the acts of his agent. As such, the Insurance Corporation cannot wriggle out of its liability by stating that it is the agent who acted negligently in not remitting the premium amount promptly. Whatever contracts the Insurance Corporation has entered into through the agent are enforceable against the Corporation as if it has entered into these contracts. 36. The Insurance Corporation’s agent demonstrated clear negligence by failing to remit the premium despite collecting it from 03.12.1997 until 15.12.1997. As noted, the insurance agent is statutorily obligated under Section 64VB of the Insurance Act to remit the premium within 24 hours of collection. This obligation was not fulfilled, and if the Policy had been processed within the stipulated 24-hour period, it would have been accepted by 05.12.1997. As noted, the insurance agent is statutorily obligated under Section 64VB of the Insurance Act to remit the premium within 24 hours of collection. This obligation was not fulfilled, and if the Policy had been processed within the stipulated 24-hour period, it would have been accepted by 05.12.1997. The record shows that the premium was only remitted on 15.12.1997, and the Policy was issued that same day. Due to the agent's negligence, the family members of the deceased should not be made to suffer. The Insurance Corporation cannot be allowed to exploit the agent's error by relying on technicalities to avoid liability. As per section 64VB of the Act above, the provision is unambiguous that soon after the receipt of the payment of premium by the owner and received by the Insurance Corporation, the contract of insurance begins between them. The issuance of the Policy is consequently affected after receipt of the premium. Merely because the agent remitted the premium amount belatedly, contrary to the provisions of Section 64VB of the Insurance Act, does not absolve the Insurance Corporation from its liability in entirety. 37. This Court concurs with the submission of the Appellant's Counsel, recognising that, in light of the deceased's passing, there is no possibility of communicating the acceptance of the proposal, thus precluding the formation of a binding contract between the parties. As previously discussed, the Insurance Corporation’s agent was bound by the applicable law to transmit the premium or process the application within 24 hours. The delay caused by the agent, therefore, holds the insurer accountable. It is important to note that insurance contracts are grounded in uberrima fides (utmost good faith). 38. This Court views that there is no difference between a contract of insurance and any other contract except that in a contract of insurance, there is a requirement of unberrima fides, i.e., good faith on the part of the assured, and the contract is likely to be construed contra proferentem that is against the company in case of ambiguity or doubt. A contract is formed when there is an unqualified acceptance of the proposal. Acceptance may be expressed in writing or it may even be implied if the insurer accepts the premium and retains it. In the case of the assured, a positive act on his part by which he recognises or seeks to enforce the Policy amounts to an affirmation of it. Acceptance may be expressed in writing or it may even be implied if the insurer accepts the premium and retains it. In the case of the assured, a positive act on his part by which he recognises or seeks to enforce the Policy amounts to an affirmation of it. 39. The primary objective and rationale behind the Life Insurance Corporation Act of 1956 is to provide absolute security to policyholders regarding their life insurance protection. The Corporation must be guided in its dealings with the public with a social sense of justice. No doubt, the statute governs the Corporation, and claims are to be processed as per the rules laid down in the Life Insurance Corporation Act. The Court considers that, since the premium amount was paid to the authorised agent on December 3, 1997, any delay in its remittance should be regarded as a matter of dispute between the agent and the Principal. Consequently, the family members of the insured should not be made to bear the consequences of such delay, and the Insurance Corporation cannot be permitted to evade its liability in its entirety on the ground that there is no concluded contract. Denying the entire claim would be unfair and unjust to the family, who relied on the deceased’s efforts to secure insurance. It would amount to penalising the family for the insurer's lapse, which goes against the equitable and good faith foundations of the Insurance contract. The deceased's family is entitled to the insurance benefits as the delay in communicating acceptance was solely due to the insurance company's negligence, for which it bears vicarious liability. Courts often take an equitable approach in insurance disputes to ensure fairness. The deceased fulfilled his obligation by paying the premium on 03.12.1997, demonstrating his intent to activate the Policy. The insurer's failure to act promptly cannot deprive the family of their rightful claim. 40. In Minimol Lukose v. L.I.C. of India , [2007 SCC OnLine Ker 216] , the learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that once the premium was accepted unconditionally, the beneficiary is entitled to the benefit of the Policy, and the Respondents contended that there is no contract of insurance as the proposer had passed away pending acceptance of the Policy. While answering the said contentions with reference to the Supreme Court decisions, the Kerala High Court observed as follows: 4…………………….. While answering the said contentions with reference to the Supreme Court decisions, the Kerala High Court observed as follows: 4…………………….. however, it is seen that in the first decision of the Supreme Court referred to above, in spite of holding that there is no policy, the Court directed payment of 50% of the policy amount. In this case, it is also seen that LIC prima facie did not reject the claim when they issued Ext. P5 dated 14.8.1999 because the proposal was to consider the claim……Further, LIC has no case that the proposal was defective or unacceptable for any other reason. In other words, but for the immediate death of the insured, there would have been no problem about the Policy……….I feel in order to maintain goodwill, which is required for the LIC, they have to be considerate in situations like this. Therefore, I feel this is a fit case to award ex gratia payment to the petitioners. In the circumstances and view of the provision for grant of ex gratia payment for death, even in cases where policies are not issued, I feel petitioners are entitled to 50% of the policy amount 41. In consideration of the preceding analysis, alongside the observations delineated in the judicial pronouncements cited herein, and bearing in mind that the premium amount was not remitted by the agent within the time frame mandated under Section 64VB of the relevant statute, this Court, in light of the specific circumstances attendant to this case, concludes that it is appropriate to direct the Insurance Corporation to pay 75% of the claim amount according to Policy No. 673515851, dated 15.12.1997 as ex gratia, by setting aside the Judgment of the First Appellate Court, which had ordered the payment of the entire claim amount. Consequently, the Judgment rendered by the First Appellate Court is hereby modified. The substantial questions of law raised in this Second Appeal are adjudicated accordingly. 42. As a result, the Second Appeal is partly allowed without costs by modifying the Judgment and decree dated 14.02.2005 passed by the IV Additional Senior Civil Judge (Fast Track Court), Vijayawada, in A.S. No.183 of 2000. Defendants are hereby directed to pay 75% of the claim amount covered under policy No.673515851, dated 15.12.1997, to Plaintiff as ex gratia within two months from the date of this Judgment. Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, in this Appeal, shall stand closed.