ORDER : A. BADHARUDEEN, J. First accused in V.C.No.07/2014 on the files of the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Kozhikode, has filed this Criminal Miscellaneous Case under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, and the prayer herein is as under: To quash Annexure A FIR No.VC 07/2014 KKD before the Enquiry Commissioner And Special Judge, Kozhikode and all further proceedings pursuant thereto, so as to secure the ends of justice. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau. 3. In this matter, crime was registered alleging commission of offences punishable under Section 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the PC Act, 1988’ hereinafter) as well as under Sections 465, 471 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, by the accused. The allegations against the petitioner herein, as per FIR, are as under: The Vigilance enquiry conducted disclosed that Smt.Remadevi had officiated as RDO Kozhikode for the period from 26-06-2009 to 22-02-2011. The officer was entrusted with the authority to proceed against the vehicles transporting river and illegally under the Kerala Protection of River Banks and Regulation of Removal of sand Act 2001 and KPRB and RS ordinance 2010. As per section 23A(2) there is provision in the Act to confiscate the vehicles used for illegal transportation. Uncertain conditions after hearing, the vehicles can be released to the owners temporarily by collecting 30% of the total value of the vehicle in cash and 70% of the value by providing security either by immovable property or by bank guarantee. During the tenure of Smt.Remadevi about 198 cases of seizure of vehicles with illegal sand transportation had been heard and disposed from the district. The enquiry officer checked and verified 47 such case files at random during the Vigilance enquiry. The verification of files and the enquires conducted brought out serious irregularities involving corruption in disposing the vehicles involved in the reported cases of seizure. Most of the cases were book by the local Police from the district on detection of illegal transportation of river sand. In few instances the Revenue squad also seized and referred the matter to the RDO. It is observed that only river sand transported without proper sand passes were seized and referred to the RDO to proceed against the vehicle owners under the act. In few instances the Revenue squad also seized and referred the matter to the RDO. It is observed that only river sand transported without proper sand passes were seized and referred to the RDO to proceed against the vehicle owners under the act. No delay is noticed by seizing officers to file report of seizure. Notices were seen served to RC owners from the office to invoke provisions to confiscate the vehicles involved in such cases. Most of the owners failed to appear with proper documents/sand passes in the first appearance. Sufficient opportunity is seen extended to the vehicle owners to produce various sorts of documents like passes issued by manufacturers of M.Sand, rock sand and ordinary soil for which mining permits were already sanctioned by Mining & Geology Department. Under the cover of such subsequently produced passes, the RDO released vehicles to the owners imposing nominal fines to defeat the very purpose of the Act and causing heavy financial loss to public exchequer. This was materialised by sheer abuse of power with ulterior motives to get pecuniary advantages to the vehicle owners as well as to the officer. The enquiry officer has observed that in a particular case that reported by Koduvally Police station in Cr.No.340/10, the Village officer, Thiruvambady provided a bogus sand pass to the vehicle owner to facilitate the release of the vehicle involved in the case. The Village officer abused his office and provided a bogus sand pass to the vehicle owner for the undue gain of the vehicle owner. In another instance, one Abdul Rafeeq has been released his vehicle from RDO office on production of a sand pass created subsequent to the seizure of the vehicle. Orders are seen passed by the RDO in the above two instances also without verifying the genuineness of the document produced subsequent to the detection of the offences. 4. While seeking quashment of the FIR, the point argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner officiated as the Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO), Kozhikode, for the period from 26.06.2009 till 22.02.2011. While holding the post, she was entrusted with the authority to proceed against vehicles transporting river sand illegally under the Kerala Protection of River Banks and Regulation of Removal of Sand Act, 2001 (for short, ‘the Sand Act, 2001’ hereinafter) and KPRB and RS Ordinance, 2010. While holding the post, she was entrusted with the authority to proceed against vehicles transporting river sand illegally under the Kerala Protection of River Banks and Regulation of Removal of Sand Act, 2001 (for short, ‘the Sand Act, 2001’ hereinafter) and KPRB and RS Ordinance, 2010. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, as per Section 23A(2) of the Ordinance, there was a provision to confiscate the vehicles used for illegal transportation. Further, it is submitted that against the order passed under Section 23A, revision is provided to the District Collector under Section 23B and also an appeal before the District Court under Section 23C. The specific point argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, while exercising the power of confiscation under Section 23A(2) of the Ordinance, the functions performed by the petitioner as the Revenue Divisional Officer, are quasi-judicial in nature, thereby entitling the officer to protection under Sections 2(a) and 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 (for short, 'the Judges (Protection) Act' hereinafter). Annexure C - final order in Crl.M.C.No.1736/2013, dated 10.10.2014, rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court, has been placed by the learned counsel, where the said issue was considered. After referring the provisions and also referring two decisions of the Apex Court in S.P.Goel v. Collector of Stamps, Delhi reported in [ (1996) 1 SCC 573 ] and E.S.Sanjeeva Rao v. Central Bureau of Investigation (C.B.I.) Mumbai and others reported in [2012 Cri.L.J.4053] and also the decision of this Court in Sankara Pillai v. Chandran reported in [1991 (1) KLT 586] , this Court in paragraph No.14 of Annexure C - final order in Crl.M.C.No.1736/2013 held as under: 14. Considering the powers exercised by the petitioner while dealing with matters under the Ordinance, it is indisputable that he was wielding quasi judicial powers. If he committed mistakes knowingly or unknowingly, there are remedies available to the aggrieved persons as per the provisions of the Ordinance itself. Apart from that, Sub-sec. (2) of Sec.3 of the Act of 1985 itself enables the Central Government or State Government or the Supreme Court of India or any High Court as the case may be, to take such action, whether civil, criminal or departmental, against any person, who is or was a Judge. Apart from that, Sub-sec. (2) of Sec.3 of the Act of 1985 itself enables the Central Government or State Government or the Supreme Court of India or any High Court as the case may be, to take such action, whether civil, criminal or departmental, against any person, who is or was a Judge. It is, therefore, very clear that the power of the State Government to take action against the petitioner is not taken away by the Act of 1985 if he was delinquent in the discharge of his official duties. But,that will not enable the prosecution to register a case against the petitioner without obtaining required sanction under Sec.3 (2) of the Act of 1985. Hence, I find that the petition is to be allowed. It is made clear that the State Government is free to take appropriate action under law against the petitioner, if there are legal reasons for doing so. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the petitioner pressed for quashment of the proceedings by applying the ratio laid down in the above decisions. 5. The learned Public Prosecutor placed a constitution of Division Bench of the Apex Court in Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. Meerut v. Lakshmi Chand and Others reported in [1963 KHC 538] , with reference to paragraph Nos.11 and 13 and in paragraph No.13, the Apex Court enlisted the essentials to be satisfied to make a decision or an act judicial. The same as under: 13. To make a decision or an act judicial, the following criteria must be satisfied: 1) it is in substance a determination upon investigations of a question by the application of objective standards to facts found in the light of pre existing legal rules; 2) it declares rights or imposes upon parties obligation affecting their civil rights; and 3) that the investigation, is subject to certain procedural attributes contemplating an opportunity of presenting its case to a party, ascertainment of facts by means of evidence if a dispute be on questions of fact, and if the dispute be on question of law on the presentation of legal argument, and a decision resulting in the disposal of the matter on findings based upon those questions of law and fact. In the said case, the Apex Court considered the order passed by a Conciliation Officer in granting or refusing permission to alter the terms of the employment of workmen, at the instance of the employer and held that the direction of the Conciliation Officer under Clause 29 of the order could not be said to be purely administrative. 6. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, when the essentials set out by the Apex Court as stated above or gone through, it could not be safely concluded that the petitioner exercised the power of quasi- judicial function so as to get protection. The learned Public Prosecutor also placed decision of this Court in Paul P.R. v. State of Kerala and Another reported in [ 2013 (2) KHC 692 ] , where this Court addressed the question as to whether Land Acquisition Officer discharging the functions of the District Collector is entitled to claim protection under the Judges (Protection) Act and held that he is not entitled to get the benefit of Section 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. Similarly, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed decision of this Court in Sunil Kumar P. v. State of Kerala and Another , reported in [2021 KHC 5052] , where this Court held that the Tahsildar, who is exercising the power of a Land Tribunal, is exercising quasi-judicial power. Likewise, in another decision in Santhosh Kumar G. v. State of Kerala reported in [ 2021 KHC 393 ] , this Court appraised the question as to whether protection is available to the Kerala Value Added Tax Assessment Authority and held in the affirmative. 7. In the instant case, what was done by the petitioner is exercise of power of confiscation under Section 23A of the Sand Act, 2001, for which, revision and appeal also provided, as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner under Section 23B and 23C. Going by the allegations in the FIR, the allegations are confined to the erroneous and illegal exercise of power, allegedly benefited undue pecuniary advantage to the vehicle owners in collusion with the officer, as stated by the prosecution. Going by the allegations in the FIR, the allegations are confined to the erroneous and illegal exercise of power, allegedly benefited undue pecuniary advantage to the vehicle owners in collusion with the officer, as stated by the prosecution. While addressing the question of whether the petitioner exercised power under Section 23A of the Sand Act, 2001 as a quasi-judicial authority falling within the purview of Sections 2(a) and 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, the parameters set out by the Apex Court in Jaswant Sugar Mills 's case (supra), as well as the provisions referred to in Annexure C final order, are relevant to be considered. 8. Section 2 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 defines the term 'Judge' as follows: “In this Act, "Judge" means not only every person who is officially designated as a Judge, but also every person- (a) who is empowered by law to give in any legal proceeding a definitive judgment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against, would be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive; or (b) who is one of a body of persons which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment as is referred to in clause (a)." 9. Section 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 further provides as under: “Additional Protection to Judges (1) Notwithstanding, anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and subject to the provision of sub- section (2), no court shall entertain or continue any civil or criminal proceeding against any person who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the course of acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall debar or affect in any manner, the power of the Central Government or the State Government or the Supreme Court of India or any High Court or any other authority under any law for the time being in force to take such action (whether by way of civil, criminal or department proceeding or otherwise) against any person who is or was a Judge." 10. Going by the Apex Court judgment in Jaswant Sugar Mills 's case (supra), in order to find out whether an order passed by the authority of a quasi-judicial nature may not be a nomenclature to the officer to describe him as a Judge or a Judicial Officer and what would require is whether, by the virtue of the said Act, the officer declares rights or imposes obligation upon parties affecting their civil rights and whether the investigation, enquiry or the proceedings are subject to certain procedural articles contemplating an opportunity of presenting its case to a party ascertaining the facts by means of evidence on the fact disputed and if the dispute be on question of law on the presentation of legal arguments and a decision resulting in the disposal of the matter on findings based upon those questions of law and fact. When an authority exercises a statutory power with the above requirements, for which, challenge by way of revision and appeal have been provided by the same statute, the said order should not be relegated as an order either of executive or an administrative nature, such order should be characterized as a quasi-judicial order and the officer, who passed the order, which is the core plank of this crime, thus, entitled to protection under Section 2(a) r/w 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. Holding so, the FIR registered against the petitioner herein who had exercised quasi-judicial functions will not sustain in the eye of law. Accordingly, this petition is allowed. All further proceedings in Annexure A FIR No.VC 07/2014 KKD before the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Kozhikode, against the petitioner herein, stand quashed. However, it is specifically ordered that the State Government is at liberty to proceed against the petitioner under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985.