JUDGMENT : Rajesh Shankar, J. 1. The present appeal has been preferred against the order dated 30.11.2023 passed in W.P. (S) No. 664 of 2014, whereby the said writ petition filed by the petitioner/respondent has been allowed by quashing and setting aside the order as contained in memo No. 274 dated 06.07.2013 passed by the appellant no.5- Commandant, JAP-7, Hazaribagh as well as the order as contained in memo No.1789 dated 12.11.2013 passed by the appellant no.4-Deputy Inspector General of Police, JAP, Doranda,Ranchi 2. The factual background of the case is that while the respondent was posted at Kolkole Police Picket, he went on compensatory leave for six days from 23.03.2013 (afternoon) to 29.03.2013, however he failed to join the duty on 30.03.2013 after completion of the leave period. The respondent sent his application to the appellant no.5 through fax as well as registered post for extension of leave by granting him earned leave for 45 days, which was rejected by the said authority vide letter as contained in memo no.1011 dated 22.04.2013 and he was asked to resume the duty instantly failing which, disciplinary proceeding would be initiated against him. 3. The respondent joined the duty on 03.05.2013 and thereafter a departmental proceeding was initiated against him under rule 828(C) of the JHARKHAND POLICE MANUAL and a memo of charge was served upon the respondent vide memo No.1146 dated 11.05.2013, alleging that he was unauthorizedly absent from duty for a period of 34 days. 4. The Commander, C-Company, JAP-7, Hazaribagh was appointed as Conducting Officer in the matter who submitted the enquiry report by exonerating the respondent from the charges levelled against him. However, the Commandant, JAP-7, Hazaribagh (appellant no.5) disagreed with the finding given by the Conducting Officer and imposed punishment against the respondent vide order as contained in memo No. 274 dated 06.07.2013, withholding one increment for six months, equivalent to one black mark. It was further ordered that the said unauthorized absence of the respondent for a period of 34 days would be adjusted against extraordinary leave by withholding his salary for the said period. 5. The respondent preferred appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, JAP, Ranchi, which was also dismissed vide order as contained in memo No.1789 dated 12.11.2013. It was further ordered that the said unauthorized absence of the respondent for a period of 34 days would be adjusted against extraordinary leave by withholding his salary for the said period. 5. The respondent preferred appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, JAP, Ranchi, which was also dismissed vide order as contained in memo No.1789 dated 12.11.2013. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent filed writ petition being W.P.(S) No.664 of 2014, which was allowed vide order dated 30.11.2023 and the orders passed by the disciplinary as well as the appellate authorities were quashed and set aside 6. The learned counsel for the appellants submits that the disciplinary authority had specifically recorded the reason for differing with the finding of the Conducting Officer by clearly stating that there was no evidence on record to show that the respondent was continuously visiting the doctor during the period of his unauthorized absence with respect to treatment of his brother, who got injured in a so-called accident. 7. It is further submitted that the punishment awarded to the respondent was proportionate to the charge levelled against him. It is contended that the impugned order of punishment passed against the respondent was in due compliance of the principles of natural justice. 8. It is also submitted that the learned Single Judge ought to have at least remanded the matter back to the disciplinary authority for deciding it afresh if at all there was any violation of procedural law during the disciplinary proceeding. 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that though the departmental proceeding was initiated against the respondent under rule 828 (C) of the JHARKHAND POLICE MANUAL which was a summary proceeding, he was awarded major punishment without due compliance of the principles of natural justice. 10. It is further submitted that the enquiry officer had submitted the report exonerating the respondent from the alleged charges, however, the disciplinary authority differed with the said finding and imposed major punishment upon him without serving second show cause notice. Such action of the disciplinary authority was, therefore, against the settled legal principle. 11. It is also submitted that the learned Single Judge rightly quashed and set aside the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the order of the appellate authority which needs no interference of this court. 12. Such action of the disciplinary authority was, therefore, against the settled legal principle. 11. It is also submitted that the learned Single Judge rightly quashed and set aside the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the order of the appellate authority which needs no interference of this court. 12. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 13. A departmental proceeding was initiated against the respondent under rule 828 (C) of the JHARKHAND POLICE MANUAL for unauthorized absence from duty for a period of 34 days and in the said proceeding though the enquiry officer exonerated the respondent from the charges levelled against him, the disciplinary authority while disagreeing with the view of the enquiry officer, imposed major punishment against the respondent without serving second show cause notice to him. 14. We have perused the judgment of three judges’ Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Punjab National Bank & Others Vs. Kunj Behari Misra, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84. In the said case, their Lordships have specifically held that whenever a disciplinary authority disagrees with the view taken by the enquiry officer, it must record its tentative reason for such disagreement and afford an opportunity to the delinquent officer to represent against the disagreement before recording its own findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings has to be conveyed so that the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favorable conclusion of the enquiry officer. Their Lordships have further held that the principles of natural justice require the disciplinary authority empowered to take a final decision and to impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before recording its findings on the charges framed against the officer. After submission of the enquiry report, the disciplinary authority has an option either to agree with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer or to disagree with those findings. If it does not agree with the findings of the enquiry officer, it may record its own findings based on record. 15. Moreover, there might be three situations before the disciplinary authority. First is that, where the enquiry officer finds the delinquent officer guilty of the charges framed against him and the disciplinary authority agrees with those findings. If it does not agree with the findings of the enquiry officer, it may record its own findings based on record. 15. Moreover, there might be three situations before the disciplinary authority. First is that, where the enquiry officer finds the delinquent officer guilty of the charges framed against him and the disciplinary authority agrees with those findings. The second is that, if the enquiry officer holds the charges proved, but the disciplinary authority disagrees and records its own finding that the charges are not established. The third is that, if the enquiry officer gives a positive finding that the charges are not established and the delinquent officer is recommended to be exonerated, however the disciplinary authority disagrees with those finding and records its own finding that the charges levelled against the delinquent officer are established for which he/she is liable to be punished. In the first two situations, there would have no difficulty with the disciplinary authority, however in the third situation, even if the rules are silent in this regard, the disciplinary authority is duty bound to afford an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer before recording its own finding different to that of the enquiry officer. 16. It would be contrary to the principles of natural justice if a delinquent officer who has already been held “not guilty” by the enquiry officer is found “guilty” by the disciplinary authority on the basis of the same evidence and material on which a finding of “not guilty” has already been recorded that too without affording an opportunity of hearing to the concerned delinquent officer. 17. The purpose of giving the second show cause notice by the disciplinary authority while disagreeing with the finding of the enquiry officer is to give specific reason to the delinquent on the basis of which the disciplinary authority wants to disagree with the finding of the enquiry officer so as to enable the delinquent to give response in support of the finding of the enquiry officer, otherwise it would be difficult for the delinquent to satisfactorily persuade the disciplinary authority for accepting the conclusions reached by the enquiry officer. 18. The learned counsel for the appellants has tried to convince this Court that sufficient reason has been assigned by the disciplinary authority in its order of punishment for differing with the finding recorded by the enquiry officer. 18. The learned counsel for the appellants has tried to convince this Court that sufficient reason has been assigned by the disciplinary authority in its order of punishment for differing with the finding recorded by the enquiry officer. However, as per our considered view, mere fact that in the final order of punishment, certain reasons have been assigned by the disciplinary authority in disagreeing with the conclusions reached by the enquiry officer, the same cannot cure the defect. The disciplinary authority was duty bound to serve second show cause notice to the respondent explaining the reason for its disagreement with the finding of the enquiry officer, however, he had failed to adhere to such established legal principle. 19. Another argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is that while quashing and setting aside the orders passed by the disciplinary as well as the appellate authorities, the learned Single Judge ought to have at least remitted the matter to the disciplinary authority for deciding it afresh, if a procedural error was found in the disciplinary proceeding. We are not convinced with the said argument of the learned counsel for the appellants in view of the fact that more than 12 years have already been elapsed from the date of passing of the order of punishment and it will not be in the interest of justice to remand the matter at this belated stage to the disciplinary authority. 20. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order dated 30.11.2023 passed in W.P.(S) No. 664 of 2014. 21. The present appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.