ORDER : M.Dhandapani, J. Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal in and by which the dismissal of the workman was confirmed, but a lumpsum compensation was awarded, while the Management had assailed the order of lumpsum compensation, the workman has assailed the dismissal from service by filing the respective writ petitions. 2. The workman joined the service of the Management on 18.2.2010 and had enrolled himself to be a member of the Union. On and from 20.12.2013, the workers went on strike for nearly four months and the workers resumed work on 23.4.2014 upon intervention of the Labour Department. Thereafter, the persons, who were instrumental in the strike were proceeded with departmentally. Thereafter, by order dated 25.9.2014, the workman was suspended and a charge memo dated 26.9.2014 was issued alleging that on 23.9.2014, when the workman was on duty, he had sabotaged the conveyor belt was damaged due to the act of the workman, which was wantonly done. The workman submitted his explanation dated 9.10.2014 and not being satisfied, domestic enquiry was conducted. After affording opportunity and upon inspection of the work spot, the enquiry officer concluded his enquiry on 21.02.2015 and submitted his report holding the charges proved. The Management, thereafter, issued second show cause notice on the workman by providing a copy of the enquiry report on 27.4.2015 to which the workman submitted his explanation on 1.5.2015. Being not satisfied with the explanation offered, punishment of dismissal from service was proposed vide communication dated 7.5.2015, to which the workman submitted his reply dated 9.5.2015. Being not satisfied, the Management dismissed the workman from service vide order dated 13.5.2015 and filed approval petition before the appropriate authority seeking approval for the dismissal of the workman by submitting a cheque towards one month’s salary. 3. Against the order of dismissal, the workman raised an industrial dispute u/s 2A (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act on 18.11.2016 by claiming the dismissal to be an act of victimization and unfair labour practice and also contending that the domestic enquiry was not properly considered, which was taken up in I.D. No.708/2018. 4. Before the Tribunal, on the side of the workman, the workman examined himself as W.W.1 and marked Exs.W-1 to W-16. On the side of the Management, one witness was examined as M.W.1 and Exs.M-1 to M-50 were marked. 4. Before the Tribunal, on the side of the workman, the workman examined himself as W.W.1 and marked Exs.W-1 to W-16. On the side of the Management, one witness was examined as M.W.1 and Exs.M-1 to M-50 were marked. The Tribunal, on consideration of the oral and documentary evidence while concluded that the misconduct of the workman had been proved, however, held that the dismissal of the workman from service is not proportionate as the cost of the damage could have been recovered from the workman. Holding so, the Tribunal, while confirming the order of dismissal of the workman, directed the payment of a compensation in a sum of Rs.1 Lakh to the workman in lieu of reinstatement and other consequential benefits, in the interests of the workman and the Management. Aggrieved by the said award, the workman and the Management have filed the respective writ petitions. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the Management submitted that when the Tribunal has found that the misconduct of the workman stood proved through oral and documentary evidence and that there was no violation of principles of natural justice in the conduct of the enquiry, the Tribunal ought to have confirmed the dismissal by allowing the approval petition and dismissing the dispute. However, erroneously the Tribunal had ordered compensation to the workman, which is nothing but an encomium showered on the workman to doing an act, which had caused loss to the Management. Therefore, the compensation awarded by the Tribunal deserves to be set aside. 6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the workman submitted that when the Tribunal had come to the unassailable conclusion that the punishment imposed on the petitioner is disproportionate, the Tribunal ought to have reinstated the workman by inflicting some punishment and ought not have paid a compensation. Therefore, he prays for affirmative orders at the hands of this Court. 7. This Court gave its careful consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing on either side and perused the materials available on record. 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in B.C. Chaturvedi – Vs - Union of India ( 1995 (6) SCC 749 ), while dealing with the issue pertaining to the power of the Court relating to judicial review of the order passed by the disciplinary authority, held as under : “12. 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in B.C. Chaturvedi – Vs - Union of India ( 1995 (6) SCC 749 ), while dealing with the issue pertaining to the power of the Court relating to judicial review of the order passed by the disciplinary authority, held as under : “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [ (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 1 LLJ 38 ] this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.” (Emphasis Supplied) 9. The above view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Principal Secy. Govt. of A.P. - Vs - M. Adinarayana, ( 2004 (12) SCC 579 ) , wherein, it has been held as under :- “23. We have read this charge in the light of allegations in support thereof. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the respondent has neither supplied any prior information on the Government nor did he send any prior intimation to the Government. By not doing this, he has contravened the provisions of Rule 9. The Tribunal has also categorically held that the respondent has not applied for prior information before he purchased the items from the competent authority nor he intimated to the competent authority forthwith soon after the purchase of the several items. Therefore, in our view, the charged officer has violated Rule 9 of the Conduct Rules and thus is guilty of misconduct within Rule 2-H (sic) of the Andhra Pradesh Disciplinary Amendment Act, 1993. In view of the abovesaid finding we hold that respondent is guilty of both the charges framed against him within Rule 2 (b) of the Conduct Rules of 1961 framed under the Amendment Act, 1993. * * * * * * * 26. In our opinion, judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness of the charges as it is not an appeal but only a review of the manner in which the decision was made. * * * * * * * 26. In our opinion, judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness of the charges as it is not an appeal but only a review of the manner in which the decision was made. We have, therefore, no hesitation in setting aside the order of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal and the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court for reasons stated (supra). The order passed by the Government removing the respondent from service is in order and, therefore, the appeal filed by the appellant State stands allowed. Further, there will be no order as to costs.” 10. In Director General of Police, RPF & Ors. - Vs – Rajendra Kumar Dubey (C.A. No.3820/2020 dated 25.11.20) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, adverting to the various decisions of the Apex Court relating to the interference by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction with respect to disciplinary proceedings, including the decision in Chaturvedi's case (supra), held as under :- “12.1 ...... It is well settled that the High Court must not act as an appellate authority, and re-appreciate the evidence led before the enquiry officer. We will advert to some of the decisions of this Court with respect to interference by the High Courts with findings in a departmental enquiry against a public servant. In State of Andhra Pradesh v S.Sree Rama Rao , a three judge bench of this Court held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is not the function of the High Court under its writ jurisdiction to review the evidence, and arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. It is not the function of the High Court under its writ jurisdiction to review the evidence, and arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may, however interfere where the departmental authority which has held the proceedings against the delinquent officer are inconsistent with the principles of natural justice, where the findings are based on no evidence, which may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry, or the authorities were actuated by some extraneous considerations and failed to reach a fair decision, or allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations, or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. If however the enquiry is properly held, the departmental authority is the sole judge of facts, and if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a writ petition. These principles were further reiterated in the State of Andhra Pradesh v Chitra Venkata Rao . The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The court exercises the power not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal on the appreciation of evidence, are not re-opened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ court, but not an error of fact, however grave it may be. A writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the finding of fact, the tribunal has erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence. A finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the material evidence adduced before the tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point, and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal. A finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the material evidence adduced before the tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point, and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal. In subsequent decisions of this Court, including Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, Director General RPF v. Ch. Sai Babu, Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v T.T. Murali, Union of India v. Manab Kumar Guha, these principles have been consistently followed. In a recent judgment delivered by this Court in the State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Heem Singh this Court has summed up the law in following words : “33. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters, there are two ends of the spectrum. The first embodies a rule of restraint. The second defines when interference is permissible. The rule of restraint constricts the ambit of judicial review. This is for a valid reason. The determination of whether a misconduct has been committed lies primarily within the domain of the disciplinary authority. The judge does not assume the mantle of the disciplinary authority. Nor does the judge wear the hat of an employer. Deference to a finding of fact by the disciplinary authority is a recognition of the idea that it is the employer who is responsible for the efficient conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of natural justice. But they are not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not the strict standard which governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but a civil standard governed by a preponderance of probabilities. Within the rule of preponderance, there are varying approaches based on context and subject. The first end of the spectrum is founded on deference and autonomy – deference to the position of the disciplinary authority as a fact finding authority and autonomy of the employer in maintaining discipline and efficiency of the service. At the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry are based on no evidence or when they suffer from perversity. At the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry are based on no evidence or when they suffer from perversity. A failure to consider vital evidence is an incident of what the law regards as a perverse determination of fact. Proportionality is an entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. Service jurisprudence has recognized it for long years in allowing for the authority of the court to interfere when the finding or the penalty are disproportionate to the weight of the evidence or misconduct. Judicial craft lies in maintaining a steady sail between the banks of these two shores which have been termed as the two ends of the spectrum. Judges do not rest with a mere recitation of the hands-off mantra when they exercise judicial review. To determine whether the finding in a disciplinary enquiry is based on some evidence an initial or threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. That is to satisfy the conscience of the court that there is some evidence to support the charge of misconduct and to guard against perversity. But this does not allow the court to re-appreciate evidentiary findings in a disciplinary enquiry or to substitute a view which appears to the judge to be more appropriate. To do so would offend the first principle which has been outlined above. The ultimate guide is the exercise of robust common sense without which the judges’ craft is in vain.” In Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran , this Court held that the High Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The ultimate guide is the exercise of robust common sense without which the judges’ craft is in vain.” In Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran , this Court held that the High Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court would determine whether : (a) the enquiry is held by the competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations which are extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. In paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Court held that : “13.Under Articles 226 / 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not : (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in the case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based; (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” (Emphasis Supplied) 11. From the ratio laid down above, it is implicitly clear that the Courts, in exercise of its power of judicial review, cannot extend the examination to the correctness of the act of the disciplinary authority, but only limit itself to the manner in which the decision has been arrived at by the authority and whether the same is in accordance with law. This Court is to test only the correctness of the decision arrived at by the authority on the basis of the evidence before it, which has since been confirmed by the Tribunal and not proceed with the case as if it is an appeal against the order of punishment. 12. It has been further held in the said decisions that so long as the enquiry is not defective the Court has to only see whether there was a prima facie case for dismissal and whether the employer had come to the bona fide conclusion that the employee was guilty of misconduct. What is further to be seen is that the conclusion arrived at by the employer is bona fide as to the guilt of the employee and that there was no unfair labour practice or victimization involved and to satisfy itself with regard to the punishment imposed. However, if the enquiry is found to be defective for any reason, the Labour Court would also have to consider for itself on the evidence adduced before it whether the dismissal was justified. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Rajendra Kumar Dubey's case (supra), following the ratio laid down in Gunasekaran's case has held that the High Court, sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution, while determining its scope of interference in a departmental proceedings is only bound to determine whether (a) the enquiry is held by the competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations which are extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 14. 14. It is to be stressed that the Court in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court. It has been the consistent view of the Courts that the nature of evidence required in a disciplinary proceeding is not on the same level as required in a criminal trial, as in the disciplinary proceedings, the finding is arrived at on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. In such a scenario, it is not the function of the High Court under its writ jurisdiction to review the evidence, and arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. If the enquiry is properly held within the four boundaries of legal necessities, then the departmental authority is the sole judge of facts, and if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a writ petition. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ court, but not an error of fact, however grave it may be. High Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India shall not venture into re- appreciation of the evidence and further the Supreme Court has also codified the circumstances under which re-appreciation of evidence is permissible. 15. The words of eminent jurist V.R.Krishna Iyer, J., resonates loud, where His Lordship (as he then was), had stated that “The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair common-sense way as men of understanding and wordly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny”. 16. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny”. 16. Bearing the first test principles in mind, a careful perusal of the materials available on record, more specifically the contentions on behalf of the workman reveals that there is no element of violation of principles of natural justice. No contention has been advanced on the aspect of violation of principles of natural justice. Though certain grounds have been raised on behalf of the workman, the whole case of the workman is premised on the disproportionate nature of the punishment and, therefore, there arises no necessity for this Court to venture into the aspect of violation of principles of natural justice. 17. While the grievance espoused through the writ petition by the Management is that as a finding of misconduct has been arrived at, attributable to the workman, no necessity arises for payment of lumpsum compensation, which, otherwise would only be deemed to be an encomium given for the act of the workman; whereas the workman contends that the punishment is disproportionate to the charges levelled, as even the Tribunal has held that instead of dismissal, the cost for the sabotage could have been retrieved from the workman and, therefore, the workman is entitled for reinstatement along with all consequential benefits. 18. The finding with regard to the misconduct has been established through oral and documentary evidence and this Court, sitting in judicial review, cannot transpose its views to that of the enquiry officer and the Tribunal so long as there is no perversity with regard to the findings arrived at. Therefore, this Court Court is not entering into the realm of the said findings, as neither perversity nor principles of natural justice have been put to the fore to contend that the findings with regard to the misconduct is wholly flawed. 19. Coming to the question of payment of lumpsum compensation, the manner in which the proportionality of the punishment inflicted on the delinquent has to be dealt with has been considered by the Apex Court in V.S.P. – Vs - Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu ( 2008 (5) SCC 569 ) , and it was held as under :- “12. 19. Coming to the question of payment of lumpsum compensation, the manner in which the proportionality of the punishment inflicted on the delinquent has to be dealt with has been considered by the Apex Court in V.S.P. – Vs - Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu ( 2008 (5) SCC 569 ) , and it was held as under :- “12. While answering the aforesaid question/issue, the decision of this Court in the case of Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu (supra), on the judicial review and the limited jurisdiction of the High Court on the proportionality of the order of departmental authority is required to be referred to. In the said decision, after referring to a catena of judgments of this Court, it is observed and held by this Court that the jurisdiction of the High Court on the proportionality of the order of departmental authority is limited. It is observed that it cannot set aside a well- reasoned order only on grounds of sympathy and sentiments. It is further observed and held that once it is found that all the procedural requirements had been complied with, courts would not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee. It is further observed that the superior courts, only in some cases may invoke the doctrine of proportionality, however if the decision of an employer is found to be within the legal parameters, the doctrine would ordinarily not be invoked when the misconduct stands proved.” 20. The precedents on the issue of interference with the punishment imposed has been oft considered by the Courts and it has been the consistent view of the Courts that it is always within the domain of the disciplinary authority to decide on the punishment to be imposed on the delinquent, which should be proportionate to the act of the delinquent. Only when the punishment is disproportionate and shocking to the conscience, should the courts interfere in the same in exercise of powers under Article 226. In Prem Nath Bali – Vs - High Court of Delhi ( 2015 (16) SCC 415 ) , the Supreme Court held as under :- “20. It is a settled principle of law that once the charges leveled against the delinquent employee are proved then it is for the appointing authority to decide as to what punishment should be imposed on the delinquent employee as per the Rules. It is a settled principle of law that once the charges leveled against the delinquent employee are proved then it is for the appointing authority to decide as to what punishment should be imposed on the delinquent employee as per the Rules. The appointing authority, keeping in view the nature and gravity of the charges, findings of the inquiry officer, entire service record of the delinquent employee and all relevant factors relating to the delinquent, exercised its discretion and then imposed the punishment as provided in the Rules. 21. Once such discretion is exercised by the appointing authority in inflicting the punishment (whether minor or major) then the courts are slow to interfere in the quantum of punishment and only in rare and appropriate case substitutes the punishment. Such power is exercised when the court finds that the delinquent employee is able to prove that the punishment inflicted on him is wholly unreasonable, arbitrary and disproportionate to the gravity of the proved charges thereby shocking the conscience of the court or when it is found to be in contravention of the Rules. The Court may, in such cases, remit the case to the appointing authority for imposing any other punishment as against what was originally awarded to the delinquent employee by the appointing authority as per the Rules or may substitute the punishment by itself instead of remitting to the appointing authority.” (Emphasis Supplied) 21. From the ratio laid down by the Apex Court above, it is crystal clear that the power to interfere with the punishment should be exercised only if the delinquent employee is able to prove that the punishment inflicted on him is wholly unreasonable, arbitrary and disproportionate to the gravity of the proved charges and, thereby, shocking the conscience of the Court or if it is in contravention of the Rules. 22. There could be no quarrel with the fact that the misconduct has been held to be proved and this Court, in exercise of its power of judicial review cannot reappraise the evidence. However, is the misconduct of the workman is of such a proportion that the confirmation of the punishment of dismissal by the Tribunal is sustainable. 22. There could be no quarrel with the fact that the misconduct has been held to be proved and this Court, in exercise of its power of judicial review cannot reappraise the evidence. However, is the misconduct of the workman is of such a proportion that the confirmation of the punishment of dismissal by the Tribunal is sustainable. However, at the same time, it should not also be lost sight of that all is not well between the workman and the management and the tempers between both are boiling high, which, if the workman is continued by ordering reinstatement, will only lead to multiplicity of proceedings at a later point of time. During the period of dismissal from service, pending approval, the workman had completed law degree. 23. A harmonious environment is necessary in which both the employer and employee could function well, which alone would be in the interest of the organisation. The act of the workman had prevailed upon the Management to dismiss him from service, which clearly shows that the Management had no consideration towards the workman, as the running of the industry was affected due to the act of the workman. Equally, the act of the workman in sabotaging the working process, leading to the stoppage of production shows that the workman too has no regard for the management. Therefore, both the workman and the management are at loggerheads and in this backdrop, would the continuance of the workman in the organisation augur well for both sides. 24. A perusal of the materials available on record, more particularly the documentary evidence in the form of Exs.M-1 and M-2 reveal that certain faults were found in the conveyor belt, though at the relevant point of time, the workman was in-charge of handling the conveyor. True it is that there are certain ambiguities in the documentary evidence, but that alone cannot be suffice to overturn the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, which has been upheld by the Tribunal, as in a disciplinary proceedings, the standard of proof is on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. True it is that there are certain ambiguities in the documentary evidence, but that alone cannot be suffice to overturn the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, which has been upheld by the Tribunal, as in a disciplinary proceedings, the standard of proof is on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, when there are evidence, which prima facie, point a finger on the workman and it has been accepted by the enquiry officer and the Tribunal, this Court cannot overturn the said finding in the absence of affirmative evidence in exercise of its power of judicial review. 25. Once this Court has accepted the findings, necessarily punishment to be imposed on the workman has to follow suit. As aforesaid, the cordial relationship between the workman and management is not in subsistence. Further, pending the approval of the order of dismissal, the workman had acquired qualification of law and holding that the workman would have utilised his legal qualifications to earn his bread and butter, the Tribunal, instead of interfering with the punishment, had ordered compensation. 26. Though it is contended on behalf of the management that payment of compensation appears as if it is an encomium for the act of the workman, however, the Management has totally lost sight of the fact that the punishment of dismissal on the evidence available on record would not be sufficient to make out a case for dismissal. Further, keeping in mind the fact that all is not well between the management and the workman, the Tribunal has awarded compensation in lieu of reinstatement by invocation of power u/s 11-A of the ID Act. 27. Section 11-A of the Act clothes the Tribunal with power to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen, which is quoted hereunder :- “ 11A. 27. Section 11-A of the Act clothes the Tribunal with power to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen, which is quoted hereunder :- “ 11A. Powers of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen.- Where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require: Provided that in any proceeding under this section the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take any fresh evidence in relation to the matter.” 28. From the above, it is implicitly evident that where the Tribunal, in the course of adjudication proceedings is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require. 29. In the present case, as discussed above, the relationship between the workman and the management stood strained and the punishment of dismissal or discharge, on the materials available, was found to be excessive, but considering the nature of relationship, that existed between the workman and the management, the Tribunal, exercising its power u/s 11-A of the Act, had, awarded compensation instead of lessening the punishment of dismissal of the workman, which, otherwise, would have borne bitter fruits between the management and the workman till such time the bond of employer-employee continued between the management and the workman. By no stretch, the exercise of power of the Tribunal could be found fault with and the said exercise could not be branded as an encomium given to the workman by the Tribunal, which is flawed reasoning imparted by the Management. Therefore, this Court does not find any infirmity in the order compensation awarded by the Tribunal in lieu of any lesser punishment, which is based on sound logic and reasoning and the same does not warrant interference at the hands of this Court. Equally, for the aforesaid reason, the prayer of reinstatement of the workman cannot be considered and rightly so, the Tribunal has rejected the same and the said order also does not call for any interference. 30. For the reasons aforesaid, there is no infirmity or perversity in the order impugned herein, passed by the Tribunal in I.D. No.708/2018 by the Labour Court, Kancheepuram and, accordingly, the same is confirmed. Accordingly, both the writ petitions fails and the same are dismissed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. There shall be no order as to costs.