JUDGMENT : S.K. Medhi , J. The extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court has been sought to be invoked by filing this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by putting to challenge the opinion rendered vide impugned order dated 24.09.2018 passed by the learned Foreigners’ Tribunal No. 8, Tezpur in F.T. Case No. 1401/2017 corresponding to Police Enquiry No. TZP(B) Case No. 242/04. By the impugned judgment, the petitioner, who was the proceedee before the learned Tribunal, has been declared to be a foreigner post 25.03.1971. 2. The facts of the case may be put in a nutshell as follows: (i) The reference was made by the Superintendent of Police (B), Sonitpur District, against the petitioner giving rise to the aforesaid Case No. 1401/2017. (ii) As per requirement u/s 9 of the Foreigner’s Act, 1946 to prove that the proceedee is not a foreigner, the petitioner had filed the written statement dated 16.05.2018 along with certain documents and had claimed to be an Indian Citizen. He had adduced evidence as DW1. (iii) The learned Tribunal, after considering the facts and circumstances and taking into account of the provisions of Section 9 of the Foreigners’ Act, 1946 had come to a finding that the petitioner, as opposite party had failed to discharge the burden cast upon him and accordingly, the opinion was rendered declaring the petitioner to be a foreign national post 25.03.1971. 3. We have heard Shri I. Hussain, learned counsel for the petitioner. We have also heard Shri J. Payeng, learned Standing Counsel, Home Department & NRC, Assam; Shri A.I. Ali, learned Standing Counsel, Election Commission of India; Shri H.K. Hazarika, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, Assam and Shri CKS Baruah, learned CGC. 4. Shri Hussain, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner could prove his case with cogent evidence and in view of the fact that there was no rebuttal evidence, the learned Tribunal should have accepted the said proof and accordingly held the petitioner to be a citizen of India. In this regard, he has referred to the evidence on affidavit by the petitioner as DW and also the following documentary evidence- i. Voter List, 1965 (Exbt -A) ii. Gift Deed, 1969 (Exbt – B) iii. Voter List, 1970 (Exbt – C) iv. Sale Deed, 1982 (Exbt – D) v. Electoral Roll, 1997 (Exbt – E) vi. In this regard, he has referred to the evidence on affidavit by the petitioner as DW and also the following documentary evidence- i. Voter List, 1965 (Exbt -A) ii. Gift Deed, 1969 (Exbt – B) iii. Voter List, 1970 (Exbt – C) iv. Sale Deed, 1982 (Exbt – D) v. Electoral Roll, 1997 (Exbt – E) vi. Voter list, 2010 (Exbt – F) 5. Shri Hussain, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner was born in the year 1946. He has relied upon a voter list of 1965 containing the name of his projected father Amiruddin Kha. He has also relied upon a voter list of 1970 containing his name as son of Amir. Reliance has been placed on a Gift Deed of land dated 22.05.1969 by his father to himself and a Sale Deed executed by him in the year 1982. He has also relied upon a voter list of 1997 which contains his name along with his wife. He has submitted that though there is some variance of address, the aspect of migration has been stated in the written statement and cannot be a factor against the petitioner. He has submitted that minor inconsistencies in the documents so far as names and age are concerned, are to be ignored. In this regard, he has cited the case of Abdul Khalique Vs. UoI & Ors. reported in 2013 (1) GLT 941 . He has further submitted that the standard of proof in such a case is preponderance of probabilities and in this regard, has relied upon the case of Haidar Ali Vs. UoI & Ors. reported in 2021 (3) GLT 85 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner accordingly submits that the impugned opinion is unsustainable in law and liable to be interfered with. 7. Per contra, Shri J. Payeng, learned Standing Counsel, Home Department & NRC has categorically refuted the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner. He submits that a proceeding under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 relates to determination as to whether the proceedee is a foreigner or not. Therefore, the relevant facts are especially within the knowledge of the proceedee and accordingly, the burden of proving citizenship rests absolutely upon the proceedee, notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act, 1872 and this is mandated under Section 9 of the aforesaid Act, 1946. Therefore, the relevant facts are especially within the knowledge of the proceedee and accordingly, the burden of proving citizenship rests absolutely upon the proceedee, notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act, 1872 and this is mandated under Section 9 of the aforesaid Act, 1946. However, in the instant case, the petitioner utterly failed to discharge the burden. It is also submitted that rebuttal evidence is not mandatory in every case and would be given only if necessary. He further submits that the evidence of a proceedee has to be cogent, relevant, which inspire confidence and acceptable and only thereafter, the question of adducing rebuttal evidence may come in. 8. The learned Standing Counsel further submits that so far as the document relied upon by the petitioner is concerned, a part of the same cannot be relied upon and the document, as a whole is to be read. He has submitted that after the voter list of 1970, the next voter list relied upon is of 1997 and there is an unexplained period of about 27 years. He has submitted that from the cross- examination of the petitioner made on 05.09.2018, it reveals that the father of the petitioner had expired 3 years back. However, there is not even a single document of the existence of his father after 1965. There is no disclosure in the written statement regarding the mother and other siblings of the petitioner and what has happened to his parents. 9. The learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the documents relied upon are mostly in the names of other parties from which the petitioner would not get any support. Emphasising on the aspect that full disclosure is required to be made in the written statement and the evidence cannot traverse beyond the pleadings in such written statement, the learned Standing Counsel has placed reliance upon the case of Rashminara Begum Vs. UoI & Ors. reported in 2017 (4) GLT 346 and the following observations are pressed into service- “25. Written statement is the basic statement of defence of a proceedee before the Foreigners Tribunal. Keeping in mind the mandate of Section 9 of the Foreigners Act,1946, it is incumbent upon the proceedee to disclose at the first instance itself i.e., in his written statement all relevant facts specially within his knowledge having a material bearing on his claim to citizenship of India. Keeping in mind the mandate of Section 9 of the Foreigners Act,1946, it is incumbent upon the proceedee to disclose at the first instance itself i.e., in his written statement all relevant facts specially within his knowledge having a material bearing on his claim to citizenship of India. Material facts pleaded in the written statement are thereafter required to be proved by adducing cogent and reliable evidence. It is also trite that a party cannot traverse beyond the pleadings made in the written statement.” 10. On the aspect of the burden of proof under Section 9, the learned Standing Counsel has relied upon the case of State of Assam & Ors. Vs. Ohab Ali reported in 2018 (4) GLT 360 in which it has been laid down that the question of rebuttal evidence would come only when the evidence of the proceedee are admissible, relevant and proved in accordance with law. By citing the case of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhanwaroo Khan Vs. UoI & Ors. reported in (2002) 4 SCC 346 , he has submitted that long period of stay in a country and mere enrolment in the voter list will not vest any right towards citizenship. The observations relied upon are as follows: “15. We agree with the High Court that a case for interference with the order of deportation is not made out. Long stay in the country and enrolment in the voters’ list would not confer any right on an alien to continue to stay in the country. We do not find any infirmity either with the reasoning adopted or the conclusion arrived at by the High Court or even by the Government of India in its order dated 21-7-1995 passed under Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955.” 11. The learned Standing counsel has submitted that though the petitioner claims his year of birth to be 1946, there is not even a single document of linkage either to his parents or his siblings for the period 1970 to 1982 and further, that from 1982 to 1997, there is no document to establish the existence of the petitioner on Indian soil. In this regard, he has drawn the attention of this Court to the provisions of Section 6A(2) of the Citizenship Act, which reads as follows: 6A. Special provisions as to citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord- (1) ... In this regard, he has drawn the attention of this Court to the provisions of Section 6A(2) of the Citizenship Act, which reads as follows: 6A. Special provisions as to citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord- (1) ... (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (6) and (7), all persons of Indian origin who came before the 1st day of January, 1966 to Assam from the specified territory (including such of those whose names were included in the electoral rolls used for the purposes of the General Election to the House of the People held in 1967) and who have been ordinarily resident in Assam since the dates of their entry into Assam shall be deemed to be citizens of India as from the 1st day of January, 1966. ...” 12. The learned Standing Counsel has also relied upon the case of Monoduti Nandi Vs. UoI & Ors. reported in (2019) 5 GLR 768 to buttress the submission that without the contents of a document being proved, the same will not have any evidentiary value. 13. Shri Payeng, the learned Standing Counsel has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences and Anr. Vs. Bikartan Das & Ors [Civil Appeal No. 3339 of 2023] to contend that this Court in exercise of its Certiorari jurisdiction does not act as an Appellate Court and it is only the decision making process which can be the subject matter of scrutiny. He submits that there is no procedural impropriety or illegality in the decision making process and therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed. 14. The rival contentions have been duly considered. We have also carefully examined the records of the learned Tribunal which were requisitioned vide an order dated 21.12.2018. 15. Before embarking to adjudicate the issue involved vis-a-vis the submissions and the materials on record, we are reminded that a Writ Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would confine its powers to examine the decision making process only. Further, the present case pertains to a proceeding of a Tribunal which has given its findings based on the facts. It is trite law that findings of facts are not liable to be interfered with by a Writ Court under its certiorari jurisdiction. 16. Further, the present case pertains to a proceeding of a Tribunal which has given its findings based on the facts. It is trite law that findings of facts are not liable to be interfered with by a Writ Court under its certiorari jurisdiction. 16. Law is well settled in this field. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after discussing the previous case laws on the jurisdiction of a Writ Court qua the writ of certiorari, in the case of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences (supra) has laid down as follows: “49. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something important in the aforesaid context: Two cardinal principles of law governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari. 50. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking. 51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not.” 17. The principal ground of challenge is that the documents have not been properly appreciated and without there being any rebuttal evidence, the depositions made on behalf of the petitioner should have been deemed to be accepted. 18. The petitioner has relied upon a voter list of 1965 containing the name of his projected father Amiruddin Kha. The next voter list is of the year 1970 containing the name of the petitioner along with his wife Khatiza Khatun. To show the linkage with the father, the petitioner has also relied upon a Gift Deed of the year 1969 and a subsequent Sale Deed by the petitioner of the year 1982. The next voter list is however after a long period of the year of 1997 containing the name of the petitioner as Moniruddin Kha and his wife as Khatiza Banu. The said voter list is however of another constituency, namely, 71 Dhekiajuli. There is a mention in the written statement regarding shifting to village Baligaon in the year 1982. 19. The settled law in the scheme of the present status is that the burden of proof that a proceedee is an Indian citizen is always on the said proceedee and the said burden never shifts. The said procedure is clearly laid down in Section 9 of the Act of 1946 and there is non-obstante clause that the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act would not be applicable. For ready reference, Section 9 is extracted hereinbelow- “9. The said procedure is clearly laid down in Section 9 of the Act of 1946 and there is non-obstante clause that the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act would not be applicable. For ready reference, Section 9 is extracted hereinbelow- “9. Burden of proof.—If in any case not falling under Section 8 any question arises with reference to this Act or any order made or direction given thereunder, whether any person is or is not a foreigner or is or is not a foreigner of a particular class or description the onus of proving that such person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), lie upon such person.” 20. In this connection, the observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Fateh Mohd. Vs. Delhi Administration reported in AIR 1963 SC 1035 which followed the principles laid down by the Constitutional Bench in the case of Ghaus Mohammad Vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1961 SC 1526 in the context of Foreigners Act, 1946 would be relevant which is extracted hereinbelow- “22. This Act confers wide ranging powers to deal with all foreigners or with respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or description of foreigner for prohibiting, regulating or restricting their or his entry into India or their presence or continued presence including their arrest, detention and confinement. The most important provision is Section 9 which casts the burden of proving that a person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall lie upon such person. Therefore, where an order made under the Foreigners Act is challenged and a question arises whether the person against whom the order has been made is a foreigner or not, the burden of proving that he is not a foreigner is upon such a person. In Union of India v. Ghaus Mohd. the Chief Commissioner of Delhi served an order on Ghaus Mohammad to leave India within three days as he was a Pakistani national. In Union of India v. Ghaus Mohd. the Chief Commissioner of Delhi served an order on Ghaus Mohammad to leave India within three days as he was a Pakistani national. He challenged the order before the High Court which set aside the order by observing that there must be prima facie material on the basis of which the authority can proceed to pass an order under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946. In appeal the Constitution Bench reversed the judgment of the High Court holding that onus of showing that he is not a foreigner was upon the respondent.” 21. It is therefore, required to examine as to whether the burden of proof was duly discharged by the petitioner as a proceedee. The records of the learned Tribunal contains the referral order dated 10.02.2005 and the proceedee has been stated Md. Manuruddin son of Lt. Ameruddin Kha, village - Baligaon, P.S. - Thelamara, District – Sonitpur. Accordingly, the notice was also issued in the said name and address by the learned Tribunal. The documents relied upon by the petitioner is however having a different name both of himself and his projected father. As noted above, the voter list of 1965 contains the name of Amiruddin Kha of village – Katahguri. In the voter list of 1970, there is a name Monir Uddin son of Amir of village – Katahguri. The next voter list produced is of the year 1997 and thereafter of the year 2010. Apart from the lack of explanation regarding absence of voter list in which the name of the petitioner appears for a long period of about 27 years from 1970 to 1997 and thereafter, for a period of about 13 years from 1997 to 2010, it has been found that there is discrepancy in the names of the petitioner, his wife and also the place of residence. There is no explanation worth its name as to the aspect as to why after the year 1965, there is not even a single voter list containing the name of the father of the petitioner in view of the admitted fact that the father had been declared to have passed away 3 years prior to the date of deposition by the petitioner which was on 05.09.2018. 22. As held in the case of Haidar Ali (supra), the standard of proof is preponderance of probabilities. 22. As held in the case of Haidar Ali (supra), the standard of proof is preponderance of probabilities. At the same time, the aspect of proof cannot be accepted in a trivial manner in view of the serious issue of influx of illegal migrants which has grave consequence on the integrity and future of the country. 23. This Court finds force in the contention of the learned Standing Counsel that there was no disclosure of material facts in the written statement which would be a factor against the petitioner. Apart from the case of Rashminara Begum (supra) which is relied upon, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India reported in (2005) 5 SCC 665 has made the following observations : “26. There is good and sound reason for placing the burden of proof upon the person concerned who asserts to be a citizen of a particular country. In order to establish one’s citizenship, normally he may be required to give evidence of (i) his date of birth (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Sometimes the place of birth of his grandparents may also be relevant like under Section 6-A(1) (d) of the Citizenship Act. All these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. After he has given evidence on these points, the State authorities can verify the facts and can then lead evidence in rebuttal, if necessary. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a person and assert that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points. This is in accordance with the underlying policy of Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” As noted above, there was no disclosure of the mother, siblings of the petitioner and the aspect regarding the inordinate gap in the voters list from 1970 to 1997 and thereafter to 2010. We are of the opinion that the documents sought to be relied upon by the petitioner do not clearly match with the particulars of the petitioner as proceedee appearing in the Referral Order as well as the notice issued by the learned Tribunal. 24. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the impugned order dated 24.09.2018 passed by the learned Foreigners’ Tribunal No. 8, Tezpur in F.T. Case No. 1401/2017 corresponding to Police Enquiry No. TZP(B) Case No. 242/04 does not call for any interference. Accordingly, this writ petition being devoid of merits stands dismissed. Interim order passed earlier stands vacated. 25. The actions consequent upon the opinion rendered by the learned Tribunal would follow in accordance with law. 26. The records of the aforesaid F.T. Case No. 1401/2017 corresponding to Police Enquiry No. TZP(B) Case No. 242/04 be returned to the learned Foreigners Tribunal No. 8, Tezpur forthwith along with a copy of this order.