JUDGMENT : G.S. Sandhawalia, CJ. 1. The present Letters Patent Appeal seeks consideration of the order passed by the learned Single Judge in CWP No. 2335 of 2009, decided on 23.08.2018 whereby the said writ petition was dismissed. In effect, dismissal of the writ petition led to the orders passed by the Statutory Authorities while exercising their powers under Section 118 of the HP Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) as amended from time time, being upheld whereby the Collector, Solan District Solan, vide order dated 07.05.2006 (Annexure P-6) held that the land measuring 03 bighas on khasra No. 744/238/2 in Mauja Barog Tehsil and District Solan, H.P. had been confiscated to the State of HP along with building constructed thereon free from all encumbrances. 2. The said order had also been upheld in appeal by the Divisional Commissioner, Shimla on 06.09.2008 (Annexure P-8) and the appeal was also unsuccessful before the Financial Commissioner (Appeals) on 02.06.2009 (Annexure P-10) which had led to the filing of the writ petition. 3. The reasoning given by the learned Single Judge to uphold the said order was that there was an agreement as such on record dated 17.09.1998 (Ext. RW1/A), on the basis of which possession had been transferred without valid permission being granted, though there was evidence to show that the possession was still being retained by the writ petitioner in favour of non-agriculturist-respondent No.3. It was accordingly held that water and electricity connection did not show the same in favour of respondent No. 3. However, son of the said respondent was monitoring the construction work and therefore, it was deemed fit to conclude that presumption of truth was assignable to the entries borne in the relevant revenue record and that Roshan Lal was owner in possession of the property. As such there was violation of statutory provisions under Section 118 of the Act and therefore, it could not be said not to be justified for quashing the action of the said authorities. 4. Learned Counsel for the appellant has argued that the findings as such recorded by the learned Single Judge are not justified and are against the record. The learned Single Judge exceeded the jurisdiction as such to come to the said conclusion even though the authorities had not held so. 4. Learned Counsel for the appellant has argued that the findings as such recorded by the learned Single Judge are not justified and are against the record. The learned Single Judge exceeded the jurisdiction as such to come to the said conclusion even though the authorities had not held so. It was further argued that on an earlier occasion there was a civil suit decreed in favour of the present appellant on 24.08.1999 (Annexure P-1) wherein it had been held that the notice issued to the land owner as such under the said provision was not justified and decree had been passed in favour of the plaintiff restraining the defendants from causing any interference and further from ejecting or dispossessing the plaintiff in pursuance of the notices issued. The State had been unsuccessful in appeal on 05.09.2000 (Annexure P-2) and therefore, during the pendency of the appeal, further notice dated 19.05.2000 (Annexure P-4) was not justified. It was further argued that the construction even if raised was on the smaller portion of the land and therefore, confiscation and vesting of three bighas of the land was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. 5. Learned State counsel, on the other hand, submits that the orders passed by the authorities are justified and liable to be upheld and it would be loathe to interfere in appeal the well reasoned order passed by the learned Single Judge. 6. A perusal of the writ paper book would indicate that apparently an agreement was made on 17.07.1998 (Annexure P-3) between writ petitioner Roshan Lal and Pritpal Singh whereby respondent No. 3 now deceased had agreed that the said respondent would purchase three biswas of land situated in village Barog falling in khasra No. 238 for a consideration of rupees four lacs. The necessary sale consideration was rupees four lacs, out of which only two lacs had been paid as earnest money and agreement was subject to grant of permission in favour of the purchaser by the Government of Himachal Pradesh under Section 118 of the Act. A specific clause was in the said covenant that the possession of vacant built up portion was to be delivered to the purchaser by the seller at the time of execution and registration of the sale deed. Similarly, it was mentioned that the land to be sold was to be free from all encumbrances. A specific clause was in the said covenant that the possession of vacant built up portion was to be delivered to the purchaser by the seller at the time of execution and registration of the sale deed. Similarly, it was mentioned that the land to be sold was to be free from all encumbrances. Clause-7 of the agreement provides that all amenities like water and electricity, including the price has to be provided by the seller. It is mentioned that in case, the permission was not granted by the State, the seller would refund the earnest money. Apparently, notice dated 19.05.2000 (Annexure P-4) was served regarding the factum of the respondent No. 3 having purchased the land mentioned in khasra No. 744/238 measuring 3 bighas without permission of the State and to have constructed one storyed building leading to the alleged violation of the provisions of Section 118 of the Act. Resultantly, the land along with structure was liable to be vested under Section 118 (b) of the Act to the State Government. 7. In the reply dated 01.10.2000 (Annexure P- 5) to the Notice, filed by the writ petitioner a reference was made to the earlier litigation and also that the matter was pending before the Civil Court until it was decided by the Civil Court, proceedings had to be adjourned sine die and rather it had already been decided in favour of the petitioner by the trial Court. It was mentioned that the agreement was regarding purchase of only 150 yards of land and there was no concern regarding other 250 yards of land. 8. In the proceedings before the Collector, the Patwari PW-1 stated that the construction was going on at the instance of respondent No. 3 and he also prepared the tatima but he admitted that no demarcation was conducted on the spot and the land had not been partitioned and that there was no independent witness called for. He has also admitted that he had not issued any notice to the petitioner or respondent No. 3. Similar was statement of PW3 Surat Ram Premi Naib Tehsildar that petitioner was recorded owner but respondent No. 3 had constructed two storeyed building and construction was going on. In cross examination it came forth that he had not conducted any demarcation and the same had been done after the case was prepared. Similar was statement of PW3 Surat Ram Premi Naib Tehsildar that petitioner was recorded owner but respondent No. 3 had constructed two storeyed building and construction was going on. In cross examination it came forth that he had not conducted any demarcation and the same had been done after the case was prepared. The son of respondent No. 3 had allegedly run away when he saw the inspection party and no statement was recorded and complainant Dhanbir Singh’s statement was not attached on the file. 9. The categorical case as such of respondent No. 3 was that the house was locked and the owner of the house and land was Roshan Lal (the present petitioner) as the electricity connection was in his name. There was no water connection and possession was not taken. Similar was the statement as such of the petitioner that the electricity meter was in his name and water connection was not installed. The factum of selling other portion’s of the land, after necessary permission from the State and the sale deeds as such being executed was admitted, which apparently led to the adverse findings by the authorities below. Earlier civil litigation as such was stated to be not connected with respondent No. 3 and therefore, it was rightly distinguished by the Collector. 10. In appeal, the Divisional Commissioner apparently held that there was no sale deed and agreement to sell is not a complete transaction of sale of the property. 11. Section 118 of the Act talks about the transfer of land and the validity in favour of the non- agricultrist as such and as per Section 118 (1) (b) of the Act, the agreement has to be with the intention to put a non-agricultrist in possession of the land and allow him to deal with the land in the like manner as if he is a real owner of that land. Section 118 (1) (b)reads as under:- “118. Section 118 (1) (b)reads as under:- “118. Transfer of land to non-agricultrists barred: (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, contract, agreement, custom or usage for the time being in force, but save as otherwise provided in this chapter, no transfer of land (including transfer by a decree of a civil court or for recovery of arrears of land revenue) by way of sale, gift, will, exchange, lease, mortgage with possession, creation of a tenancy or in any other manner shall be valid in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist. Explanation - For the purpose of this sub-section, the expression "transfer of land" shall not include (I) transfer by way of inheritance; (ii) transfer by way of gift made or will executed, in favour of any or all legal heirs of the donor or the testator, as the case may be; (iii) transfer by way of lease of land or building in a municipal area;but shall include: (a) a benami transaction in which land is transferred to an agriculturist for a consideration paid or provided by a non-agriculturist; (b) An authorization made by the owner by way of special or general power of attorney or by an agreement with the intention to put a non-agricultrist in possession of the land and allow him to deal with the land in the like manner as if he is a real owner of that land.” 12. It is not disputed that the permission can be sought from the State Government by the non- agricultrist who intends to purchase the land and it is thus the case of the petitioner that necessary permission had been applied for and without the possession being transferred, the findings recorded by the authorities as such were not justified. 13. In such circumstances, we have examined the order passed by the learned Single Judge wherein, on the basis of the presumption, surmises and conjectures, findings have been recorded that there was an entry in the revenue record showing that the possession had been transferred and the learned Single Judge, who went on to hold that the presumption of truth was assignable to the entries borne in the revenue records and that the transfer of possession did not stand firmly rebutted. 14. 14. On the other hand, it has also been held that Roshan Lal was owner in possession of the land and he had acquiesced for the electricity connection being installed inside the property. It it is also noticed that no demarcation as such had been carried out as to whether property was part of khasra No. 744/238 and the principles of natural justice had been violated. 15. Another aspect which is to be noticed is that the petitioner had objected to the vestment of the land to the extent of 3 bighas whereas in his reply he has submitted that only 3 biswas of land measuring 150 yards was the subject matter of the agreement and there is no concern with another 250 yards of land. The agreement as such talks about purchase of 3 biswas of land where as notice served was for a larger chunk of land and even the vesting of the land as such is of 3 bighas which aspect also had to be examined which was not touched upon by the learned Single Judge. 16. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the findings which have been recorded are not based on the evidence on record before the authorities whereby the learned Single Judge had gone on to hold that the possession was parted with which was sine qua non to come to the said conclusion which even the authorities had not done so. The learned Single Judge as such could not make out a better case as such for the State by the impugned order and therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are not justified in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and cannot be maintained. Resultantly, we partly allow the appeal to the extent that the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside and the matter is remanded for fresh decision on the basis of the evidence which has already been led by both the sides. 17. Appeal is partly allowed to the above limited extent. Parties to put in appearance before the learned Single Judge on 7 th April, 2025.