JUDGMENT : (K.V. JAYAKUMAR, J.) This judgment shall dispose of two OP(CAT)s. 2. Aggrieved by the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, in O.A.No.1123/2014 dated 24.12.2018, as well as in R.A.No.14/2019 dated 10.04.2019, the petitioner and the Union of India preferred two separate OP(CAT)s. The OP(CAT).No.238/2019 was preferred by the applicant and the OP(CAT).No.244/2019 was preferred by the Union of India and its officers. The parties are hereinafter referred to as the applicant and the respondents as per their rank in the OA. 3. The facts necessary for disposal of this OP(CAT)s in brief are as follows: The applicant, V. Prakasan, joined the post of temporary Overseer (Civil) in the pay scale of Rs.330-560 on 06.10.1976 in Andaman Lakshadweep Harbour Works [hereinafter referred to as ‘ALHW’]. Thereafter, the applicant was selected as Direct recruit and joined in the post of Engineering Assistant on 22.11.1979 in the pay scale of 425-700. On completion of 5 years service as Engineering Assistant, the applicant, along with certain other Engineering Assistants, was placed in the pay scale of 1660-2660, with effect from 31.03.1994. Vide Annexure-A5 office order, Engineering Assistant was re-named as Junior Engineers in the pay scale of 1400-2300/-. 4. The applicant was promoted to the post of Inspector of Works in the pay scale of 1600-2660, with effect from 31.03.1994 as per Annexure-A6. On completion of the combined service as Engineering Assistant and Inspector of Works, applicant’s pay scale was upgraded to 2000-3500 with effect from 22.11.1995. 5. As per Annexure-A8, the benefit of time bound placement was made available to the applicant in the scale of 6500-10500. On the recommendation of the 5 th CPC, the post of Overseer in the pre- revised scale of 1200-2040 stood merged with that of Junior Engineer in the pay scale of 1400-2300 and the post of Junior Engineer was placed in the revised pay scale of 5000-8000 with effect from 01.01.1996. In addition to the above merger of Inspector of Works with the Junior Engineer, acceptance was called from the applicant. The applicant gave his consent. As per the conditions attached to the merger, his pay was protected. 6. That as per Annexure-A11, the applicant was promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer in the pay scale of 6500-10500. The 4 th respondent granted first ACP to the applicant with effect from 09.08.1999 in the pay scale of 6500-10500 which, he was already drawing. As per the conditions attached to the merger, his pay was protected. 6. That as per Annexure-A11, the applicant was promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer in the pay scale of 6500-10500. The 4 th respondent granted first ACP to the applicant with effect from 09.08.1999 in the pay scale of 6500-10500 which, he was already drawing. On completion of 24 years of service reckoned from 22.11.1979, the respondents granted 2 nd financial upgradation to the applicant on 22.11.2003. On the implementation of the 6 th CPC, the applicant sought 3 rd MACP on completion of 30 years of service. 7. Prior to his retirement, the applicant submitted a representation dated 21.03.2014, claiming the ACP benefit which was granted to the similarly placed employees. The respondents rejected the said application. In that background, the applicant approached the Tribunal claiming the following relief: “(a) call for the records from the office of respondent No. 2 to 4 and hold that the impugned orders at Annexure A-16, A-19, A-33 and A-37 are illegal and invalid and thus, quash and set aside the same. The respondents rejected the said application. In that background, the applicant approached the Tribunal claiming the following relief: “(a) call for the records from the office of respondent No. 2 to 4 and hold that the impugned orders at Annexure A-16, A-19, A-33 and A-37 are illegal and invalid and thus, quash and set aside the same. (b) declare that the applicant is entitled to the two ACPs as also the 3rd MACP respectively as on 09-08- 1999, 6-10-2000 and 6-10-2006, (c) as a consequence to the above, it may further be declared that recovery of alleged over payment of pay and allowances to the tune of Rs 11 lakhs plus being effected by way of Withholding/ adjustment of pension and insistence of payment of the difference of Rs 1.31 lakhs plus is illegal and quash and set aside orders relating to the same, (d) direct the respondents to restore the grant of first and 2nd ACP, (e) And, since the applicant is also entitled to the grant of 3rd MACP w.e.f. 06-10-2006, respondents be directed to upgrade the grading in respect of the years 2004-05 and 2006-07 as "very good" which is the bench mark for the post held by the applicant for higher promotion and then consider the case of the applicant without taking into account the 'below benchmark grading' and afford the 3rd MACP by way of increasing the Grade Pay of the applicant to Rs.7600 and re-fix the last pay drawn and work out the extent of revised pension and other terminal benefits on the basis of the same and pay the difference thereof (both in respect of pay and allowances as also in respect of pension and attendant terminal benefits) to the applicant within a time frame that may be calendared by this Hon'ble Tribunal. (f) Award interest at a rate that may be prescribed by this Hon'ble Tribunal on the arrears of pay and allowances and pension and other terminal benefits. (g) Award cost as may be felt appropriate. 8. The respondents contended that the applicant gave his consent to the proposal for the contemplated merger of Inspector of Works with Junior Engineer on condition that his earlier pay in the post of Inspector of Works would be protected. (g) Award cost as may be felt appropriate. 8. The respondents contended that the applicant gave his consent to the proposal for the contemplated merger of Inspector of Works with Junior Engineer on condition that his earlier pay in the post of Inspector of Works would be protected. The respondents further contended that, the grant of 1 st and 2 nd ACP to the applicant was not correct as per the observation of Pay and Accounts Officer (ALHW), New Delhi. The Pay and Accounts Officer (ALHW), New Delhi, has recommended a revisal of pay of the applicant before the re-submission of pension papers. The grading of the applicant in the ACR for the years 2004-2005 and 2006-2007 had been reviewed by the reviewing authority and the representation submitted by the applicant in this regard was also rejected. The Tribunal, noticing the rival contentions, had disposed of the OA with a direction to the respondents to constitute a review DPC and consider the case of the applicant on the basis of the previous ACRs. 9. The relevant paragraph of the Tribunals order are extracted hereunder: “6. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the pleadings and records. First the applicant has raised the issue that the department cannot recover money in view of the first ACP. According to the applicant, the ACP was given to him we.f. 25.8.1999 as he had got promotion to the post of Inspector of Works on 31 March, 1994. Thus, after adding 12 years from 1994, he is entitled for first ACP. In this regard, we are in agreement with the stand taken by the respondents that the ACP is given on account of stagnation in a particular grade, which is not the case here. The applicant got promotion to the next higher scale w.e.f. 31 March, 1994. Thus he is not entitled for first ACP w.e.f. 7.8.1999. The 2nd ACP is due and payable to the applicant 12 years thereafter. The department has given the second ACP correctly w.e.f. 12.10.2007 in pay scale of Rs.10000-25200. On this count, we are of the view that nothing is found wrong in the action of the respondents in not granting first ACP and second ACP with effect from 12.10.2007. The 2nd ACP is due and payable to the applicant 12 years thereafter. The department has given the second ACP correctly w.e.f. 12.10.2007 in pay scale of Rs.10000-25200. On this count, we are of the view that nothing is found wrong in the action of the respondents in not granting first ACP and second ACP with effect from 12.10.2007. The applicant was not given MACP on completion of 30 years of service as envisaged by the 6th CPC on condition of 10, 20 and 30 years. In this regard, the department has categorically submitted that the applicant's ACRs were not upto the mark. The Bench mark for the same was "very good", whereas for his ACR for the period 2005-06 and 2006-07, his assessment was "good" only. Thus the department has denied the same. The Senior Advocate has drawn our attention to page No. 102 which is ACR for 2006- 07. The signature of the Accepting Authority is not there in Annexure A34. The Reviewing Officer and the Reporting Officer is one and the same, Mr.Bimal Sinha and it is accepted by the Accepting Authority, Chief Engineer (Administration) as "good". It is a serious anomaly. The Reporting Officer and the Reviewing Officer should have been different. Learned counsel for the applicant further submitted that this was never communicated to the applicant. In this regard,, this Tribunal is of the view that in case the grade awarded to the applicant is below the remarks earlier given, then it is all the more necessary to communicate the same to the concerned officer. Thus on this count, this ACR has to be ignored. As regards ACR for 2006- 07, it was pointed that the Reporting Officer had given "very good" and the Reviewing Authority had reduced it to "good" only. The same has also not been communicated to the applicant. In this regard, Mrs. Sumathi Dandapani has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sukhdev Singh vs. Union of India and Ors ., in Civil Appeal No.5892 of 2006, the relevant portion of which is reproduced hereunder: ......In our opinion, every entry in the ACR of a public servant must be communicated to him within a reasonable period whether it is poor, fair. average, good or very good entry. average, good or very good entry. This is what this Court held in paragraphs 17 & 18 of the report in Dev Dutt (2008) 8 SCC 725 a page 733: In our opinion, every entry in the A.C.R. of a public servant must be communicated to him within a reasonable period, whether it is a poor, fair, average, good or very good entry. This is because non- communication of such an entry may adversely affect the employee in two ways: (1) Had the entry been communicated to him he would know about the assessment of his work and conduct by his superiors, which would enable him to improve his work in future (2) He would have an opportunity of making a representation against the entry if he feels it is unjustified, and pray for its upgradation. Hence non- communication of an entry is arbitrary, and it has been held by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (supra) that arbitrariness violates Article 14 of the Constitution, Thus it is not only when there is a benchmark but in all cases that an entry (whether it is poor, fair, average, good or very good) must be communicated to a public servant, otherwise there is violation of the principle of fairness, which is the soul of natural justice. Even an outstanding entry should be communicated since that would boost the morale of the employee and make him work harder." 7. In view of the aforesaid dictum, this Tribunal is of the view that since these 2 ACRs were never communicated in which grading was reduced, that should not be taken into account and the applicant should be suitably assessed taking into account his previous ACRs. In case he is found fit, he should be considered for grant of 3rd MACP. In view of this, we direct the respondents to constitute a review DPC taking into consideration the directions given herein above, within a period of 90 days. Of the receipt of this order. The OA is disposed of with no order as to costs.” 10. Aggrieved by the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, the applicant preferred OP(CAT) No.238/2019 and Union of India and its officers preferred OP(CAT) No.244/2019. 11. Sri T. C. Krishna, Deputy Solicitor General of India-in- Charge, supported the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal. The OA is disposed of with no order as to costs.” 10. Aggrieved by the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, the applicant preferred OP(CAT) No.238/2019 and Union of India and its officers preferred OP(CAT) No.244/2019. 11. Sri T. C. Krishna, Deputy Solicitor General of India-in- Charge, supported the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal. Sri.T.C Krishna submitted that, the observation of the Tribunal that the grading of the ACR was never communicated to the applicant is incorrect. 12. On the other hand, Adv. Sreeraj, the learned counsel for the applicant submitted that, the action of the respondents in re-fixing his pay from the date of his initial appointment, belatedly, and that too without affording him an opportunity of hearing, is illegal to the core. Such an action of the respondents/Union of India is arbitrary, unjust, unreasonable and irrational. It was further submitted that, the competent authority was dancing to the tune, without applying their mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. The Pay and Accounts Officer is a mere recommendatory authority and has usurped the jurisdiction of the competent authority and dictated the terms. The learned counsel for the applicant placed reliance on the decisions reported in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [ (1978) 1 SCC 248 ], Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner of India [ AIR 1978 SC 851 ], Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [ (1981) 1 SCC 664 ], Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation [ (1985) 3 SCC 545 ] and Scheduled Caste and Weaker Section Welfare Association v. State of Karnataka [ (1991) 2 SCC 604 ], supporting the proposition that the person concerned must be given an opportunity of being heard, before any adverse action is taken against him. 13. The first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the action of the respondents in re-fixing the pay of the petitioner to his detriment, from the date of his initial appointment, without an opportunity of being heard is illegal and unjust. The respondents have no case that, they have issued a notice to the applicant before re-fixing of his pay, that too, just before his retirement. 14. The respondents have no case that, they have issued a notice to the applicant before re-fixing of his pay, that too, just before his retirement. 14. The second submission of Adv.Sreeraj is that, due to the illegal withdrawal of first financial upgradation granted under the ACP Scheme and the illegal postponement of the date of his second financial upgradation under the said Scheme and the illegal rejection of third financial upgradation under the Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme (MACP), an amount of Rs.11,07,332/- was withheld from the pensionary benefits of the applicant contrary to the mandate laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab and others v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) and others [ (2015) 4 SCC 334 ]. The learned counsel for the applicant further submitted that the withholding of retirement benefits of the applicant is illegal and unjust. It is further submitted that, even though he has pointed out the instance of P.C. Vinod, a similarly placed employee, wherein the Tribunal has granted relief in O.A.No.276/2016, the Tribunal was not inclined to extend the same relief to the applicant herein. He further submitted that, Union of India has preferred appeal against the order in OA No.276/2016, wherein P.C. Vinod was the applicant, as OP(CAT).No. 141/2017 before this Court and it was dismissed. 15. Upon hearing the submissions of both sides and on perusal of paper book, we are of the view that the withdrawal of financial upgradation under the ACP Scheme by the department, that too, without affording an opportunity of being heard in violation of the principles of natural justice and the same is illegal, unjust and improper. So also, the respondents have withheld the pensionary benefits to the tune of Rs.11,07,332/- ignoring the dictum laid down in Rafiq Masih ’s case (supra). 16. We have already considered the similar issue in OP(CAT) No.141/2017. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are extracted hereunder: “6. Noticing the rival contentions of the parties, the Central Administrative Tribunal allowed the claim of the applicant in the following manner: “16 The PAO office was in existence when this benefit was extended to the beneficiaries in 2007 and having slept over the matter cannot raise objection at a later date. Noticing the rival contentions of the parties, the Central Administrative Tribunal allowed the claim of the applicant in the following manner: “16 The PAO office was in existence when this benefit was extended to the beneficiaries in 2007 and having slept over the matter cannot raise objection at a later date. At the fag end of their career when applicants are faced with more responsibilities on account of family commitments, health, retirement etc, the PAO awakes from its slumber in January 2016 and orders a recovery on account of overpayment, when the applicant has been enjoying the benefit since 9.8.1999 (1st A.C.P) and 16.3.2007 (2 ACP). The Courts including the Apex Court have on several occasions held that a person who has been sleeping over his rights is not entitled to relief sought. On a similar analogy, the PAO who had been sleeping over the overpayment, cannot now wake up and order recovery after eight years of payment, when the applicant is to retire in October 2016. This is also not a case where the office of PAO was not in existence in 2007 when the benefit was extended. However. PAO authorised to order recovery after eight years in 2016. Applicant also brings to our notice that as per Apex Court order in C.A 11527/2014 State of Punjab & Others v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) reported in 2015 (1) KLT 429 (SC) while summarizing the situations wherein recoveries by employers would be impermissible in law had ordered as follows:- "12 (ii) Recovery from retired employees, or employees who are due to retire within one year of the order of recovery. (iii) Recovery from employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of recovery is issued." Under both 12(ii) and (iii) of the Apex Court orders cited above, the recovery from the applicants is inadmissible. This is also a case which is covered by the dictum cited at para 12(v) that the recovery made from the employee would be iniquitous and harsh and arbitrary to such an extent, as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the respondents' right to recover. The case of applicant falls under three categories delineated by the Apex Court as non-recoverable and hence Annexure A-1 order is quashed to that extent. 17. The original application is allowed. 7. The case of applicant falls under three categories delineated by the Apex Court as non-recoverable and hence Annexure A-1 order is quashed to that extent. 17. The original application is allowed. 7. Before us, the contention of the petitioners is that the payment to the applicant was made conditionally and therefore, the dictum laid down in State of Punjab and others v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) and others [ (2015) 4 SCC 334 ] would not apply to the facts of the instant case. 8. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent/applicant would submit that the ratio decidendi in the decision in Rafiq Masih ’s case (supra) is consequentially applicable to the facts of the instant case. In Rafiq Masih ’s case (supra), the Honourable Apex Court opined that, recovery of an amount paid to an employee in excess without any fault of the recipient is impermissible. It may be useful to refer to the relevant portion of the Rafiq Masih’s case (supra) which reads thus: “ 7. Having examined a number of judgments rendered by this Court, we are of the view, that orders passed by the employer seeking recovery of monetary benefits wrongly extended to the employees, can only be interfered with, in cases where such recovery would result in a hardship of a nature, which would far outweigh, the equitable balance of the employer's right to recover. In other words, Interference would be called for, only in such cases where, it would be iniquitous to recover the payment made. In order to ascertain the parameters of the above consideration, and the test to be applied, reference needs to be made to situations when this Court exempted employees from such recovery, even in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Repeated exercise of such power, "for doing complete justice in any cause" would establish that the recovery being effected was iniquitous, and therefore, arbitrary. And accordingly, the interference at the hands of this Court. 8. As between two parties, if a determination is rendered in favour of the party, which is the weaker of the two, without any serious detriment to the other (which is truly a welfare State), the issue resolved would be in consonance with the concept of justice, which is assured to the citizens of India, even in the Preamble of the Constitution of India. The right to recover being pursued by the employer, will have to be compared, with the effect of the recovery on the employee concerned. If the effect of the recovery from the employee concerned would be, more unfair, more wrongful, more improper, and more unwarranted, than the corresponding right of the employer to recover the amount, then it would be iniquitous and arbitrary, to effect the recovery. In such a situation, the employee's right would outbalance, and therefore eclipse, the right of the employer to recover. 9. The doctrine of equality is a dynamic and evolving concept having many dimensions. The embodiment of the doctrine of equality can be found in Articles 14 to 18 contained in Part III of the Constitution of India, dealing with "fundamental rights". These articles of the Constitution, besides assuring equality before the law and equal protection of the laws, also disallow discrimination with the object of achieving equality, in matters of employment; abolish untouchability, to upgrade the social status of an ostracised section of the society; and extinguish titles, to scale down the status of a section of the society, with such appellations. The embodiment of the doctrine of equality, can also be found in Articles 38, 39, 39-A, 43 and 46 contained in Part IV of the Constitution of India, dealing with the "directive principles of State policy". These articles of the Constitution of India contain a mandate to the State requiring it to assure a social order providing justice-social, economic and political, by inter alia minimising monetary inequalities, and by securing the right to adequate means of livelihood, and by providing for adequate wages so as to ensure, an appropriate standard of life, and by promoting economic interests of the weaker sections. 10. In view of the aforestated constitutional mandate, equity and good conscience in the matter of livelihood of the people of this country has to be the basis of all governmental actions. An action of the State, ordering a recovery from an employee, would be in order, so long as it is not rendered iniquitous to the extent that the action of recovery would be more unfair, more wrongful, more improper, and more unwarranted, than the corresponding right of the employer, to recover the amount. An action of the State, ordering a recovery from an employee, would be in order, so long as it is not rendered iniquitous to the extent that the action of recovery would be more unfair, more wrongful, more improper, and more unwarranted, than the corresponding right of the employer, to recover the amount. Or in other words, till such time as the recovery would have a harsh and arbitrary effect on the employee, it would be permissible in law. Orders passed in given situations repeatedly, even in exercise of the power vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, will disclose the parameters of the realm of an action of recovery (of an excess amount paid to an employee) which would breach the obligations of the State, to citizens of this country, and render the action arbitrary, and therefore, violative of the mandate contained in Article 14 of the Constitution of India.” 17. Now coming back to the instant case, on perusal of the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, it could be seen that the Tribunal has only considered the issue with regard to the third MACP alone, but left out two other important issues relating to the withdrawal of financial upgradation under the ACP Scheme and the recovery of benefits already conferred on the applicant. We are unable to fathom why the Tribunal has missed out the vital part of the claim. 18. On a careful evaluation of the materials on record, we are of the view that, the impugned order of the Tribunal is legally unsustainable. We, therefore, hold that, Annexures-A16, A19, A33 and A37 of the respondents are illegal and invalid and liable to be set aside. Unilateral withdrawal of the benefits under the ACP Scheme and consequential withholding of pensionary benefits are illegal and unsustainable. We are of the view that the denial of the MACP to the applicant is also not justifiable. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned order of the Central Administrative Tribunal is liable to be set aside. O.A is allowed. Consequently, OP(CAT) No.238/2019 filed by the applicant is allowed. OP(CAT) No.244/2019 filed by the Union of India is dismissed. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned order of the Central Administrative Tribunal is liable to be set aside. O.A is allowed. Consequently, OP(CAT) No.238/2019 filed by the applicant is allowed. OP(CAT) No.244/2019 filed by the Union of India is dismissed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the applicant is entitled to interest @7% per annum for the amount of Rs.11,07,332/-, the retiral benefits withheld by the respondents. The respondents/Union of India shall comply this direction as expeditiously as possible, but not later than two months, from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.