JUDGMENT : MOHAMMED NIAS C.P., J. In W.P.(C) No. 42050 of 2024, the petitioners, comprising a private limited company and its Managing Director, had availed multiple credit facilities from the respondent Bank, including working capital and term loans aggregating over Rs. 10 crores, secured by mortgage of immovable properties. Upon default, the loan account was classified as a Non- Performing Asset (NPA) with effect from 20.10.2020. Recovery proceedings were initiated under the SARFAESI Act , including issuance of notice under Section 13(2), followed by filing of an application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal for recovery of the outstanding dues. Though the petitioners were sanctioned a one-time settlement (OTS), they repeatedly defaulted in making the committed payments, leading to the withdrawal of settlement terms and continuation of enforcement proceedings. 2. After several unsuccessful litigations before this Court and the DRAT, the petitioners have now approached this Court contending that they are a registered Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise (MSME) as per Udyam Registration obtained prior to NPA classification, and are therefore entitled to protection under the revival and rehabilitation framework notified by the Central Government through Ext. P8 notification dated 29.05.2015, and made binding on banks by the Ext. P9 RBI circular dated 17.03.2016. It is their case that the Bank proceeded under SARFAESI without first referring their account to the Committee for stressed MSMEs as mandated in the said framework, and hence the proceedings are legally untenable. They rely on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pro Knits v. Canara Bank , [ (2024) 10 SCC 292 ] , to contend that where MSME status is evident prior to NPA classification, the Bank is obligated to consider corrective steps under the statutory framework before resorting to coercive recovery. 3. The petitioners contend that the defaults were due to unforeseen business losses and the impact of the pandemic, and that they made bona fide efforts to settle the dues through various proposals. The petitioners contend that the MSME Notification dated 29.05.2015, issued under Section 9 of the MSMED Act , has statutory force equivalent to legislation and mandates that recovery against MSMEs shall only proceed after stress identification and resolution through the Committee mechanism under para 5(4)(iii). The Bank’s failure to comply with this precondition, despite the petitioners’ registration as an MSME, renders the recovery proceedings void ab initio. 4. The Bank’s failure to comply with this precondition, despite the petitioners’ registration as an MSME, renders the recovery proceedings void ab initio. 4. The petitioners submit that the MSME Notification dated 29.05.2015 lays down a mandatory three-stage framework for stressed accounts—rectification, restructuring, and only thereafter, recovery— applicable upon classification of the borrower under Special Mention Account (SMA) categories. Clause 3 of the framework mandates the constitution of an expert, impartial Committee with representatives from creditors, the State, and external MSME professionals. This Committee is statutorily tasked with formulating a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) prior to any coercive action. The petitioners contend that in their case, the respondent Bank bypassed both the rectification and restructuring stages and proceeded directly to recovery, thereby acting in violation of its obligations under the notification. 5. They further point to the RBI Circular dated 01.10.2021, which reiterates the mandatory duty of banks to identify incipient stress even before a default occurs and to proactively implement resolution mechanisms for all borrowers, not just MSMEs. Paragraph 2 of the circular reinforces the requirement for constituting a Committee for stressed MSMEs. The petitioners allege that no such Committee was ever formed by the respondent Bank, nor were they informed about its existence or the process under the Corrective Action Plan. They argue that the Bank failed in its duty to provide access to rehabilitation mechanisms and did not respond to multiple representations seeking restructuring. The omission to implement these mandatory frameworks, despite clear eligibility and prior registration as an MSME, further undermines the legality of the recovery proceedings. The petitioners argue that the RBI and Central Government, under the Banking Regulation Act and RBI Act, are statutorily obligated to ensure the lawful conduct of banks and may issue binding directions or take disciplinary action where necessary. 6. The petitioners submit that no previous writ was decided on the merits of their entitlement under the MSMED Act or the 29.05.2015 notification, and hence res judicata or estoppel does not apply. Procedural dismissals or denial of amendments cannot bar substantive rights, especially where liberty to re-agitate was granted. They rely on the RBI Master Circular dated 01.10.2021 (para 9.1), mandating pre-default resolution plans, and contend that failure to implement such plans renders NPA classification and recovery action legally unsustainable. 7. The petitioners submit that Ext. Procedural dismissals or denial of amendments cannot bar substantive rights, especially where liberty to re-agitate was granted. They rely on the RBI Master Circular dated 01.10.2021 (para 9.1), mandating pre-default resolution plans, and contend that failure to implement such plans renders NPA classification and recovery action legally unsustainable. 7. The petitioners submit that Ext. P17 representation was made requesting the constitution of a Committee under the MSME framework and for action against the Bank under Section 36AA of the Banking Regulation Act , but no response was received, necessitating the invocation of writ jurisdiction. They also raise apprehension over potential proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC, contending that it is one-sided, denies borrowers access to counterclaims or damages, and is under constitutional challenge before multiple High Courts. 8. Further, the petitioners allege a fraudulent practice by the respondent Bank in handling ECGC insurance proceeds. Despite receiving insurance payouts meant to compensate export defaults, the Bank credited the amounts to a suspense account instead of adjusting the petitioner’s overdue loan account. This, they argue, is a systemic fraud that unjustly burdens MSME borrowers and enables banks to recover from both the borrower and the insurer, with the RBI remaining passive. 9. The petitioners subsequently filed W.P.(C) No. 4389 of 2025 contending that, despite W.P.(C) No. 42050 of 2024 being part-heard and adjourned for further hearing on 19.12.2024, the Advocate Commissioner, acting under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act and at the instance of senior bank officials, took possession of the petitioners’ residential property on 18.12.2024. It is contended that this action, undertaken during the pendency of the writ petition, amounts to interference with the administration of justice and forms the subject matter of Contempt Case No. 3402 of 2024. The petitioners further allege that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate continued to issue compliance directions under Section 14 despite the Court being in seisin of the matter, and that such proceedings were without jurisdiction, attracting the principle in praesentia majoris cessat potentia minoris. 10. The petitioners also challenge the constitutionality of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act , to the extent it permits ex parte possession orders without notice or hearing. It is argued that such a provision violates natural justice and enables recovery without due process. The affidavit of undertaking to remit Rs. 10. The petitioners also challenge the constitutionality of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act , to the extent it permits ex parte possession orders without notice or hearing. It is argued that such a provision violates natural justice and enables recovery without due process. The affidavit of undertaking to remit Rs. 2 crores is stated to have been given under coercion and cannot constitute a valid waiver of statutory rights, particularly when substantial payments had already been made. 11. The petitioners have also instituted W.P.(C) No. 8287 of 2025, involving the same financial transactions and property dispossession challenged in the earlier proceedings. In addition to reiterating their entitlement to protection under the MSME notification and alleging unlawful recovery proceedings, the petitioners in W.P.(C) No. 8287 of 2025 contend that the first petitioner’s proprietary concern, M/s. Kalpaka Processing Co., is a registered Export Oriented Unit (EOU) under Chapter 6 of the Foreign Trade Policy. As such, it is governed by a special legal framework that confers several statutory benefits, including duty-free procurement of raw materials and capital goods. The EOU is required to be a positive net foreign exchange (NFE) earner, calculated cumulatively over five-year block periods, as prescribed under Paragraph 6.04 and Appendix 6B of the Foreign Trade Policy, read with Paragraph 6.10 of the Handbook of Procedures. The Handbook permits extensions of the NFE period in cases of genuine hardship or adverse market conditions, providing a flexible and welfare-based regime to promote exports. 12. The petitioners further submit that financial stress arose due to mismanagement by an investor group that took control in 2014, leading to diversion of funds and operational failures, including non-renewal of insurance during the 2018–2019 floods. Control was restored to the petitioners through a retransfer agreement in 2020, but before revival efforts could materialise, the bank classified the account as NPA and initiated SARFAESI proceedings, disregarding the underlying causes of stress and the statutory protections available to the petitioners as an MSME and EOU. 13. The petitioners further submit that the SARFAESI action led to the cancellation of SARK’s exporter registration, forcing them to route export orders through Kalpaka Processing Co. Despite this, they secured major domestic and international orders, including a tie-up with Mahatma Gandhi University and confirmed exports to Webb James SRL, Italy. They contend that no security interest exists over the Kalpaka factory, yet the bank wrongfully retains possession, risking asset deterioration. Despite this, they secured major domestic and international orders, including a tie-up with Mahatma Gandhi University and confirmed exports to Webb James SRL, Italy. They contend that no security interest exists over the Kalpaka factory, yet the bank wrongfully retains possession, risking asset deterioration. They further allege that the bank, influenced by estranged investors, is selectively targeting them while sparing equally liable guarantors, and that the steps to auction their residence are arbitrary and retaliatory. 14. The petitioners assert that the SARFAESI proceedings are vitiated by breach of mandatory safeguards under the MSMED Act and RBI Circular, and that action against Kalpaka Processing Co.—a registered EOU —violates the Foreign Trade Policy and Customs law. No security interest exists over the factory premises, making possession unlawful. The petitioners further contend that the recovery process is arbitrary, discriminatory, and constitutionally infirm under Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 300A, especially in light of their ongoing revival efforts and the bank's selective enforcement. 15. In the counter affidavit on behalf of the bank in WPC No. 42050 of 2024, the respondents contended that the writ petition is not maintainable either in law or on facts and amounts to an abuse of judicial process, being a deliberate attempt to mislead the Court by suppressing material facts and past litigation history. It was submitted that an Ext. P15, earlier writ petition, W.P.(C) No. 30885 of 2024, raising the same cause of action including the plea that the petitioners were entitled to MSME protection and that the NPA classification and SARFAESI proceedings were illegal, was dismissed by judgment dated 22.11.2024, and that the said judgment has not been appealed but is sought to be circumvented by filing the present petition under a different guise. This was dismissed vide judgment dated 22.11.2024, and later on 26.11.2024, the present writ petition was filed. 16. The maintainability of the writ petition was further challenged on the ground of the availability of an alternative remedy under the SARFAESI Act . The petitioners had unsuccessfully pursued interim relief before the DRT-2, Ernakulam, followed by an appeal before the DRAT, Chennai, which was also dismissed, and further challenged in W.P.(C) No. 21054 of 2024 before the Madras High Court. The petitioners had simultaneously instituted Civil Suit No. 18837 of 2024 before the City Civil Court, Mumbai, claiming that the jurisdiction of civil courts is not ousted. The petitioners had simultaneously instituted Civil Suit No. 18837 of 2024 before the City Civil Court, Mumbai, claiming that the jurisdiction of civil courts is not ousted. Hence, the respondents submitted that maintaining parallel writ proceedings is inconceivable. The petitioners had availed of multiple banking facilities, including cash credit, overdraft, packing credit, foreign bill purchase, term loans, and a bank guarantee, all secured by mortgage of properties and registered with CERSAI. Upon default, the account was classified as NPA on 24.03.2021 with effect from 20.10.2020. 17. SARFAESI proceedings were initiated by issuing a demand notice under Section 13(2) on 09.06.2021, which was replied to by the petitioners. The authorised officer responded on 25.08.2021. Recovery proceedings were also initiated through OA No. 242 of 2021 before the DRT. The petitioners submitted a One Time Settlement (OTS) proposal for Rs. 10 crores on 22.09.2021, which was accepted by the Bank on 06.12.2021. The petitioners failed to comply with the terms of the OTS, leading to possession notices dated 16.03.2022 and 01.09.2022 with respect to secured assets. 18. The Bank also initiated proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 , against the personal guarantors before the NCLT, Kochi. Thereafter, the petitioner filed WPC No. 30885 of 2024 before this Court, contending that the petitioner is entitled to the benefits of the MSME notification, that the NPA classification is illegal, and the securitisation measures initiated are illegal, etc. The registration of the petitioner as an MSME was obtained only on 01.10.2020, whereas the default and the classification of the accounts as NPA were already imminent and based on prior conduct. Therefore, the petitioners cannot retrospectively invoke benefits under the RBI circulars dated 29.05.2015 or otherwise. 19. The petitioners’ conduct in availing and defaulting multiple OTS schemes, pursuing parallel civil and writ proceedings, and violating solemn undertakings demonstrates a pattern of delay and forum- shopping, with mala fide intent. The respondents emphasised that the RBI circulars relied upon by the petitioners are not mandatory in the manner suggested and that the binding precedent in Kotak Mahindra Bank v. Girnar Corrugators Pvt. Ltd. , (2023) 3 SCC 210 , establishes that SARFAESI prevails over MSMED Act in case of conflict. 20. The petitioners’ reliance on Pro Knits is misplaced, as paragraphs 16 and 17 of that judgment explicitly caution against belated invocation of MSME status to obstruct SARFAESI proceedings. 20. The petitioners’ reliance on Pro Knits is misplaced, as paragraphs 16 and 17 of that judgment explicitly caution against belated invocation of MSME status to obstruct SARFAESI proceedings. The same principles were reaffirmed in W.A. No. 1728 of 2024, where the Court distinguished between waiver, estoppel, and acquiescence. The petitioners’ repeated representations and references to ECGC insurance, alleged fraud, or regulatory collusion were denied in toto. The Bank clarified that the ECGC claim, even if received, does not absolve the borrower’s liability. The respondents submitted that all actions have been taken strictly in accordance with law, after providing repeated opportunities and accommodations to the petitioners, and that the present writ petition is devoid of merit, filed without bona fides, and liable to be dismissed with costs. 21. In W.P.(C) No. 42050 of 2024, a statement has been filed on behalf of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), contending that the primary allegation raised by the petitioner, challenging the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act and alleging inaction by the RBI and Union of India in enforcing compliance with the Corrective Action Plan (CAP) mechanism under Exts. P2 and P3 are factually incorrect and legally unsustainable. The RBI submits that pursuant to discussions with the Ministry of MSME, the framework for revival and rehabilitation of stressed MSMEs with a loan limit up to Rs. 25 crore was revised and reissued via Ext. P3 circular dated 17.03.2016, superseding Ext. P2. The revised framework applies to all Scheduled Commercial Banks (excluding RRBs) and mandates the formation of committees for addressing stress in MSME accounts. 22. To monitor implementation, SCBs are required to file half- yearly regulatory returns with the RBI. Based on data submitted for the half year ending 30.09.2024, a total of 3,41,137 cases were referred to such committees, and 3,14,930 cases were resolved during the half year ending in September 2024, and submits that the allegation that committees were not constituted, or that RBI failed in its supervisory role, is thus explicitly denied. It is further stated that review of stressed MSME units under this framework is regularly taken up as an agenda item in quarterly Empowered Committee meetings for MSMEs conducted by RBI’s Regional Offices. Additionally, aggrieved borrowers have a remedy under the Reserve Bank, Integrated Ombudsman Scheme, 2021, for redressal of grievances relating to deficiencies in banking services. 23. It is further stated that review of stressed MSME units under this framework is regularly taken up as an agenda item in quarterly Empowered Committee meetings for MSMEs conducted by RBI’s Regional Offices. Additionally, aggrieved borrowers have a remedy under the Reserve Bank, Integrated Ombudsman Scheme, 2021, for redressal of grievances relating to deficiencies in banking services. 23. In W.P.(C) No. 8287 of 2025, in the statement filed by the Standing Counsel on behalf of the 3 rd respondent, Development Commissioner, it is submitted that the 3rd respondent had issued a licence to M/s Kalpaka Processing Co. The 3rd respondent exercises regulatory control over the Unit solely to ensure compliance with export performance requirements and achievement of positive Net Foreign Exchange (NFE), and is empowered to impose penalties for violations under the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 . Significantly, it is contended that the 3rd respondent has no role or authority with respect to the financial borrowings or loan liabilities of the Unit, nor does it impose any restriction on the creation of a security interest over the assets of the Unit by financial institutions. The only fiscal liability arising in relation to the 3rd respondent pertains to penalties for non-fulfilment of NFE obligations, which are recovered as arrears of land revenue. 24. The statement further notes that the Unit is presently operational and has shown a cumulative export performance of Rs. 1549.20 lakhs for 2023–24, with a positive NFE of Rs. 1265.19 lakhs over the last five-year block period. It is asserted that none of the contentions raised by the petitioners are sustainable, no relief is sought against the 3rd respondent, and no violation of any fundamental or statutory rights is disclosed. The writ petition is described as devoid of merit and experimental in nature, liable to be dismissed with costs to the 3rd respondent. 25. It is asserted that none of the contentions raised by the petitioners are sustainable, no relief is sought against the 3rd respondent, and no violation of any fundamental or statutory rights is disclosed. The writ petition is described as devoid of merit and experimental in nature, liable to be dismissed with costs to the 3rd respondent. 25. Sri Mathew J. Nedumpara, reiterating the contentions pleaded in the writ petitions, submits the following in support of the prayers sought: (i) The petitioner relied on Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [(1954) 1 SCR 1178] , A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [ (1988) 2 SCC 602 ] , Ridge v. Baldwin [AC 40 (HL)], and Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1997) 5 SCC 536 ] to argue that the SARFAESI action is void ab initio for non-compliance with the mandatory preconditions under Paragraph 5(4)(iii) of the MSME Framework, rendering the proceedings non est in law. (ii) The petitioner submits that a writ of certiorari lies as a matter of right where a statutory authority acts ultra vires or in violation of natural justice, and such a remedy is not barred by the existence of an alternative forum. Reliance is placed on A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India ((1969) 2 SCC 262), A.V. Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani (AIR 1961 SC 1506), A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [ (1988) 2 SCC 602 ] , Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1997) 5 SCC 536 ], Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks ( (1998) 8 SCC 1 ), State of U.P. v. Mohammed Nooh ( AIR 1958 SC 86 ), and Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1962 SC 1621). The respondent’s reliance on Paragraph 17 of Pro Knits v. Canara Bank [2024 LiveLaw (SC) 548] is misconceived, as the observations therein were fact-specific and cannot override the statutory mandate. The principle that judgments must be read as a whole and not in fragments is well established in Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka [ (2003) 6 SCC 697 , para 2]. (iii) The petitioner submits that the MSMED Act , being a welfare statute, must be construed liberally and purposively, applying ut res magis valeat quam pereat and ex visceribus actus. Reliance is placed on Delhi Gymkhana Club v. Employees’ State Insurance Corporation (2015) 1 SCC 142 , National Insurance Co. (iii) The petitioner submits that the MSMED Act , being a welfare statute, must be construed liberally and purposively, applying ut res magis valeat quam pereat and ex visceribus actus. Reliance is placed on Delhi Gymkhana Club v. Employees’ State Insurance Corporation (2015) 1 SCC 142 , National Insurance Co. Ltd v. Swaran Singh (2004) 3 SCC 297 , U.P. Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Co. Ltd. v. Ramanuj Yadav (2003) 8 SCC 334 , and Pathumma & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors. (1978) 2 SCC 1 . (iv) The petitioner submits that judgments cannot override or substitute statutory provisions, and in case of conflict, the statute prevails; reliance is placed on Union of India v. Amrit Lal Manchanda [ (2004) 3 SCC 75 , para 15], Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi [ (1996) 6 SCC 44 , paras 9–10], Arasmeta Captive Power Co. v. Lafarge India [ (2013) 15 SCC 414 , paras 31– 39, 41], and Oriental Insurance v. Raj Kumari [ AIR 2008 SC 403 , paras 12–13]. (v) The petitioner submits that when a judgment conflicts with a statute or settled principles of law, the statute prevails, and courts are not bound to follow judgments rendered per incuriam or sub silentio. As held in A.R. Antulay [ (1988) 2 SCC 602 ] , conflicting decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court must be resolved by following the correct principle of law, not isolated observations or bench strength. The petitioner contends that Pro Knits (supra) affirms the statutory force of the 29.05.2015 MSME notification, and only stray remarks in Para 17 appear inconsistent. Since the petitioner’s loan was availed as an MSME with full disclosure, even Pro Knits—read as a whole—supports the case. Courts must interpret judgments contextually and not treat them as substitutes for statutes. Reliance is placed on Amrit Lal Manchanda (2004) 3 SCC 75 , CIT v. Sun Engineering ( (1992) 4 SCC 363 ), Azadi Bachao Andolan (2004) 10 SCC 1 , Bharat Petroleum Corp. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani (2004) 8 SCC 579 , Sudhansu Sekhar Misra AIR 1968 SC 647 , Goodyear India (1990) 2 SCC 71 , Utility Users’ Welfare Assn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani (2004) 8 SCC 579 , Sudhansu Sekhar Misra AIR 1968 SC 647 , Goodyear India (1990) 2 SCC 71 , Utility Users’ Welfare Assn. (2018) 6 SCC 21 , and LIC v. D.J. Bahadur (1981) 1 SCC 315 (vi) The petitioner hold reliance in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1988) 2 SCC 602 , paras 41–51], in which it is held as, res judicata applies only if the earlier decision was on merits, within jurisdiction, complied with natural justice, and did not violate statutory provisions, to argue that there can be no estoppel against law, and the earlier decisions do not attract res judicata. (vii) The petitioner submits that no party should suffer due to an error committed by the court (actus curiae neminem gravabit), and the court is bound ex debito justitiae to undo such injustice. The judgment in W.P.(C) No. 30885 of 2024 is said to be based on a legal misunderstanding of Pro Knits (supra) and P.K. Krishnakumar (2024 SCC OnLine Ker 6888) , treating judicial observations as overriding the statutory notification dated 29.05.2015. Such an error of law and jurisdiction is rectifiable in direct or collateral proceedings. Reliance is placed on A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [ (1988) 2 SCC 602 , paras 49, 57, 75, 76, 79, 81–83], Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [(1954) 1 SCR 1178] , Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra [ (1990) 1 SCC 193 ], State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar [ (2011) 14 SCC 770 ], Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 550], Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat [ (1974) 2 SCC 121 ], Management of Sonepat Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Ajit Singh [(2005) 3 SCC 232], and Official Liquidator v. Dayanand [ (2008) 10 SCC 1 ]. (viii) The petitioner submits that the dismissal of the SLP against W.P.(C) No. 30885 of 2024 by a non-speaking order does not result in merger or estoppel, as held in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala [ (2000) 6 SCC 359 ], Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Scotch Whisky Assn. [ (2008) 10 SCC 723 ], and Manisha Nimesh Mehta v. ICICI Bank [ (2024) 9 SCC 573 ] . Further, the petitioner’s undertaking to remit Rs. [ (2008) 10 SCC 723 ], and Manisha Nimesh Mehta v. ICICI Bank [ (2024) 9 SCC 573 ] . Further, the petitioner’s undertaking to remit Rs. 2 crore does not bar relief, since an undertaking cannot excuse a public authority from discharging its statutory duty, as held in Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty and Anr. [ (2018) 16 SCC 228 ] . It is also submitted, relying on A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [ (1988) 2 SCC 602 ] , that a prior decision which fails to give effect to a statutory prohibition does not operate as res judicata, as public policy embedded in law prevails over private rights. 26. The learned counsel, Sri. Sunil Shankar, reiterating the contentions in the counter affidavit filed by the bank, argues that the present writ petition is nothing but an abuse of the process of law. The very same contentions were raised in W.P. (C) No.30885/2025, which was dismissed. The Special Leave Petition SLP No. 29301 of 2024 filed against the same was also dismissed on 28.04.2025. It is after the dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court that this writ petition is filed. It is also submitted that the present writ petition is hit by the principles of res judicata, constructive res judicata and the issue is squarely covered against the petitioner by the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pro Knits (supra) and of this Court in P.K. Krishnakumar and M.D. Esthappan v. Reserve Bank of India (2025 SCC OnLine Ker 4193) . It is also pointed out that the series of litigations instituted by the petitioner shows that his attempt is to somehow drag the proceedings. 27. Heard both sides and perused the records. 28. A list of the proceedings instituted by the petitioners against the bank so far is as follows: . N o Sl. Case No. Relief Sought / Subject Disposal / Order Date How Disposed / Status 1 W.P.(C) No. 9509 of 2022 Challenged possession notice dated 16.03.2022; prayed to accept OTS if paid before 31.03.2022 11.07.2022 Disposed; permitted to approach the bank for settlement. N o Sl. Case No. Relief Sought / Subject Disposal / Order Date How Disposed / Status 1 W.P.(C) No. 9509 of 2022 Challenged possession notice dated 16.03.2022; prayed to accept OTS if paid before 31.03.2022 11.07.2022 Disposed; permitted to approach the bank for settlement. 2 W.P.(C) No. 28659 of 2022 Direction to accept OTS amount before 30.09.2022 13.10.2022 Disposed; directed the bank to consider the extension of the OTS 3 S.A. No. 77 of 2023 (DRT-2) Challenge to SARFAESI action 02.03.2023 Stay application dismissed 4 O.P.(DRT) No. 122 of 2023 Challenged rejection of stay by DRT 25.05.2023 Dismissed; relegated to DRAT 5 A.I.R. No. 712 of 2023 (DRAT) Appeal with waiver petition 09.11.2023 Dismissed for non- compliance with the deposit 6 O.P.(DRT) No. 232 of 2023 Direction to DRAT to consider waiver 19.06.2023 Allowed; waiver heard 7 O.P.(DRT) No. 488 of 2023 Restoration of DRAT appeal 05.01.2024 Dismissed 8 W.P.(C) No. 7607 of 2024 Seeking 25 Installment facility for paying outstanding amount. 20.05.2024 Dismissed 9 W.P.(C) No. 10785 of 2024 Direction to consider restructuring proposal 12.06.2024 Dismissed after bank rejection 10 W.P.(C) No. 11138 of 2024 -- 30.05.2024 Dismissed as withdrawn 11 W.P.(C) No. 19103 of 2024 Direction to consider OTS proposal 01.07.2024 Dismissed for breach of undertaking 12 Civil Suit No. 18837 of 2024 Filed before City Civil Court, Mumbai — Pending 13 W.P.(C) No. 30885 of 2024 Claimed MSME protection; challenged SARFAESI 22.11.2024 Dismissed 14 W.P.(C) No. 42050 of 2024 Challenge to SARFAESI, RDB, IBC provisions Pending Admitted on 21.02.2025; notice issued 15 W.P.(C) No. 21054 of 2024 Challenge to DRAT dismissal (Madras HC) — Pending 29. Among the list of cases filed earlier, the petitioner filed W.P.C. 30885/2024, taking the very same ground that the action of the bank is illegal, as the same was done in violation of the MSME notifications and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pro Knits . The relevant portions of the judgment in the said case dated 22.11.2024 are extracted below:- “The petitioner claims to be a Micro-Small Medium Enterprise (“MSME”) registered under the Micro Small Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (“ MSMED Act , 2006”), having Udyam Registration No. UDYAM-KL-01-0000886. Petitioner No. 1, after being incorporated, commenced the business of exporting spices on 13.06.1990. 3. The relevant portions of the judgment in the said case dated 22.11.2024 are extracted below:- “The petitioner claims to be a Micro-Small Medium Enterprise (“MSME”) registered under the Micro Small Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (“ MSMED Act , 2006”), having Udyam Registration No. UDYAM-KL-01-0000886. Petitioner No. 1, after being incorporated, commenced the business of exporting spices on 13.06.1990. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent Bank in violation of the provisions of the notification dated 29.05.2015, issued in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 9 of the MSMED Act 2006 by the Central Government for the purpose of facilitating the promotion and development of MSME as well as in violation of the circular dated 17.03.2016 issued by the RBI, classified the loan accounts of the petitioners as NPA, and therefore, all further proceedings thereafter are nullity and liable to be quashed. 5. It is submitted that in the present case, the respondent Bank did not extend any opportunity for revival and rehabilitation to the petitioners as provided under the said notification and in an illegal and malafide manner initiated the SARFAESI proceedings against the petitioner and classified the loan accounts of the petitioners as NPA since the petitioners have committed serious defaults in repaying the loan amount and has proceeded under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act and rules made thereunder. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent Bank has submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable because suppression of the material facts from this court would constitute fraud and misuse of the judicial process. 11. It is submitted that the petitioners have suppressed the material facts of filing earlier writ petitions to mislead this court. The petitioners have not disclosed the filing W.P(C)Nos. 9509/2022, 28695/2022, OP DRT Nos.122/2023 &. 232/2023, W.P (C) Nos. 7607 of 2024, 10785/2024, 11138 of 2024 & 19103 of 2024. 23. Now, the petitioners have again approached this court with the present writ petition, taking the plea of the petitioners being MSME undertaking and the non-compliance of the Government Order and Circular issued by the Central Government and the RBI on this aspect. 24. Heard Adv. Mathew Nedumpara, the learned counsel for the petitioner assisted by Ms. Maria Nedumpara and Adv. Sunil Shankar, the learned Standing counsel for the respondents. 25. 24. Heard Adv. Mathew Nedumpara, the learned counsel for the petitioner assisted by Ms. Maria Nedumpara and Adv. Sunil Shankar, the learned Standing counsel for the respondents. 25. The Supreme Court, in its judgment in M/s PRO KNITS v. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF CANARA BANK & ORS [ Civil Appeal No. 8332 of 2024 dated 01.08.2024], had held that an MSMEs’ loan account, under the instructions contained in the notification dated 29.052015 r/w the directions issued by the RBI vide the notification dated 17.03.2016 referred to above, the Bank or the creditors are required to identify the incipient stress in the account of the MSMEs, before the loan account turned into NPA. The framework under the aforesaid two notifications enables such an MSME to voluntarily initiate the proceedings under the said framework by filing an application along with the affidavit of an authorised person. Therefore, at the stage of identification of incipient stress in the loan account of MSME, it would be incumbent on the part of the concerned MSME to produce authenticated and verifiable documents/material for substantiating its claim of being MSME, before its account is classified as NPA. If the MSME does not bring it to the notice of the concerned Bank/creditor that it is a Micro, Small or Medium Enterprise under the MSMED Act , and if such an enterprise allows the entire process of enforcement of security interest under the SARFAESI Act to be over, the challenge to such action of the concerned Bank/creditor in the court of law/tribunal having failed, such enterprises cannot be permitted to misuse the process of law for thwarting the actions taken under the SARFAESI Act by raising the plea of being an MSME at a belated stage. Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the said judgment are extracted hereunder:- 16. We may hasten to add that under the “Framework for Revival and Rehabilitation of MSMEs”, the banks or creditors are required to identify the incipient stress in the account of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, before their accounts turn into non-performing assets, by creating three sub categories under the “Special Mention Account” Category, however, while creating such sub-categories, the Banks must have some authenticated and verifiable material with them as produced by the concerned MSME to show that loan account is of a Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise, classified and registered as such under the MSMED Act . The said Framework also enables the Micro, Small or Medium Enterprise to voluntarily initiate the proceedings under the said Framework, by filing an application along with the affidavit of an authorized person. Therefore, the stage of identification of incipient stress in the loan account of MSMEs and categorization under the Special Mention Account category, before the loan account of MSME turns into NPA is a very crucial stage, and therefore it would be incumbent on the part of the concerned MSME also to produce authenticated and verifiable documents/material for substantiating its claim of being MSME, before its account is classified as NPA. If that is not done, and once the account is classified as NPA, the banks i.e. secured creditors would be entitled to take the recourse to Chapter III of the SARFAESI Act for the enforcement of the security interest. 17. It is also pertinent to note that sufficient safeguards have been provided under the said Chapter for safeguarding the interest of the Defaulters-Borrowers for giving them opportunities to discharge their debt. However, if at the stage of classification of the loan account of the borrower as NPA, the borrower does not bring to the notice of the concerned bank/creditor that it is a Micro, Small or Medium Enterprise under the MSMED Act and if such an Enterprise allows the entire process for enforcement of security interest under the SARFAESI Act to be over, or it having challenged such action of the concerned bank/creditor in the court of law/tribunal and having failed, such an Enterprise could not be permitted to misuse the process of law for thwarting the actions taken under the SARFAESI Act by raising the plea of being an MSME at a belated stage. Suffice it to say, when it is mandatory or obligatory on the part of the Banks to follow the Instructions/Directions issued by the Central Government and the Reserve Bank of India with regard to the Framework for Revival and Rehabilitation of MSMEs, it would be equally incumbent on the part of the concerned MSMEs to be vigilant enough to follow the process laid down under the said Framework, and bring to the notice of the concerned Banks, by producing authenticated and verifiable documents/material to show its eligibility to get the benefit of the said Framework.” 26.From the facts stated above, it is evident that the petitioners have filed one after another petition before this court and did not comply with the interim order/final order and their own undertakings. The petitioners never raised the issue of the petitioners being MSME and allowed the process under the SARFAESI Act to take place without taking such a plea in the first instance. The petitioners had not disclosed the filing of the aforesaid writ petitions, and they have suppressed the material facts from this court. This Court exercises equity jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and to invoke the equity jurisdiction, the petitioners are required to approach this court with clean hands. When the petitioners have suppressed the material facts from this Court and have filed one after another petition without any intent to comply with the orders and undertakings, I am of the opinion that the present writ petition is nothing but a gross abuse of the process of the court. Therefore, the present writ petition is dismissed with a cost of Rs.25,000/- to be deposited in the Chief Minister's Distress Relief Fund (CMDRF) within a period of seven days from today, failing which, the District Collector Ernakulam, will make recovery from the petitioners as arrears of land revenue under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act. ” 30. The Special Leave Petition, SLP No. 29301 of 2024, filed against the above judgment was dismissed on 28.04.2025. 31. A comparison of the pleadings and the reliefs/ repetition of reliefs sought in W.P(C) 30885/2024 and W.P(C) 42050/2024 are as follows: Common Reliefs: Sl. ” 30. The Special Leave Petition, SLP No. 29301 of 2024, filed against the above judgment was dismissed on 28.04.2025. 31. A comparison of the pleadings and the reliefs/ repetition of reliefs sought in W.P(C) 30885/2024 and W.P(C) 42050/2024 are as follows: Common Reliefs: Sl. No. Relief Description (20 RELIEF) (a to t) WPC 42050/2024 – Relief No. WPC 30885/2024 – relief number 1 Declaration that Notification dated 29.05.2015 (S.O. 1432(E)) is binding and must be implemented (a), (b) (a), (j) 2 To grant a perpetual mandatory and/or prohibitory injunction directing the Central Government and RBI to enforce the notification dated 29.05.2015 in full and to ensure recall of recovery actions taken against the Petitioners in violation thereof, with restoration of status quo and full compensation. (c), (m) (b) (k) 3 Declaration that SARFAESI/RDB/IBC recovery actions in violation of MSMED Notification are void (d), (e), (f) (c) (d), (e) 4 Declare that in the absence of a special forum under the MSMED Act, the jurisdiction of civil courts is not ousted, and DRTs/NCLTs have no authority to adjudicate disputes arising under the said Act. (g) (f) 5. Declare that the Bank’s recovery under SARFAESI/RDB Act is void, recovery being permissible only through the Corrective Action Plan under Notification dated 29.05.2015. (h) (g) 6 Declare that the Petitioners are entitled to compensation for the Bank’s wrongful acts, and no dues are enforceable against them. (j) (h) 7. Declare that the RBI guidelines permitting banks to designate borrowers as willful defaulters are without authority of law and unenforceable. (k) (i) 8. Declare the entire SARFAESI recovery proceedings, including possession and sale of the Petitioners' properties, as illegal, void ab initio, and vitiated by fraud, and quash the same. (n) (l) 9 Declare that Section 80 of the CPC, to the extent it mandates 60 days’ prior notice before instituting a suit against the Government, is unconstitutional and void as it denies access to justice, especially for the weaker sections of society. (r) (p) 10 Declare that the proviso to Section 113 CPC is unconstitutional as it unjustly curtails the civil court’s jurisdiction to decide constitutional questions. (s) (q) 11 Grant a perpetual injunction restraining respondents from initiating any recovery action under SARFAESI, IBC, or other laws, and from dispossessing the Petitioners of their properties. (r) (p) 10 Declare that the proviso to Section 113 CPC is unconstitutional as it unjustly curtails the civil court’s jurisdiction to decide constitutional questions. (s) (q) 11 Grant a perpetual injunction restraining respondents from initiating any recovery action under SARFAESI, IBC, or other laws, and from dispossessing the Petitioners of their properties. (o) (m) 12 Grant a perpetual mandatory injunction directing the respondent bank to constitute a Committee and resolve the stress in the Petitioners' MSME unit as per the RBI notification dated 29.5.2015. (p) (n) 13. Grant a perpetual mandatory injunction directing respondents to cancel the NPA classification and SARFAESI proceedings, and to revive the Petitioners’ business as per the 29.5.2015 MSME notification. (q) (o) 32. Distinct Reliefs Specific to WPC 42050/2024 Sl. No. Relief Description 1 Declare that the Petitioners are entitled to credit and set-off of ? the 5 crores received by the Bank under the ECGC policy, which was wrongfully kept in a suspense account despite covering the insured default. 2 Declare that the prior writ petitions and proceedings detailed in Exhibit P12 do not constitute cause of action estoppel, res judicata, or issue estoppel, as there was no adjudication on merits and no estoppel against statute. The petitioners, thus knowing that very same reliefs claimed earlier are again being repeated and that this Court by judgment referred to above had dismissed the said writ petitions, has now included a prayer for a declaration that the prior writ petition's proceedings do not constitute a cause of action estoppel, res judicata or issue estoppel as there was no adjudication on merits and there is no estoppel against a statute. 33. As regards the above prayer, the same has to fail for multiple reasons. It is trite that even an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as res judicata between the parties to it. A two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Kalinga Mining Corpn. v. Union of India, ( 2013 5 SCC 252 ), held that there is ample authority for the proposition that even an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as res judicata between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates as a res judicata. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates as a res judicata. It was held that a wrong decision by a court having jurisdiction is as much binding between the parties as a right one and may be superseded only by appeals to higher tribunals or other procedure like review which the law provides for. What is res judicata between the parties is not the reasoning or any principle of law, but the actual decision declaring the rights of the parties. When a matter, whether concerning fact or law, has been directly and substantially at issue between the parties as bearing on their rights, the decision thereon, provided other conditions are satisfied, will operate as res judicata, concluding those rights. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure says nothing particular about points of law or pure points of law or the same or different causes of action. 34. Again, the principles of res judicata were elaborately discussed in Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty ( 2018 16 SCC 228 ), and the conclusions are as follows: “34. Given the conspectus of authorities that have been referred to by us hereinabove, the law on the subject may be stated as follows: 34.1. The general rule is that all issues that arise directly and substantially in a former suit or proceeding between the same parties are res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceeding between the same parties. These would include issues of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, and issues of law. 34.2. To this general proposition of law, there are certain exceptions when it comes to issues of law: 34.2.1. Where an issue of law decided between the same parties in a former suit or proceeding relates to the jurisdiction of the Court, an erroneous decision in the former suit or proceeding is not res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceeding between the same parties, even where the issue raised in the second suit or proceeding is directly and substantially the same as that raised in the former suit or proceeding. This follows from a reading of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure itself, for the Court which decides the suit has to be a Court competent to try such suit. This follows from a reading of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure itself, for the Court which decides the suit has to be a Court competent to try such suit. When read with Explanation (I) to Section 11, it is obvious that both the former as well as the subsequent suit need to be decided in Courts competent to try such suits, for the “former suit” can be a suit instituted after the first suit, but which has been decided prior to the suit which was instituted earlier. An erroneous decision as to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot clothe that Court with jurisdiction where it has none. Obviously, a Civil Court cannot send a person to jail for an offence committed under the Indian Penal Code. If it does so, such a judgment would not bind a Magistrate and/or Sessions Court in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties, where the Magistrate sentences the same person for the same offence under the Penal Code. Equally, a Civil Court cannot decide a suit between a landlord and a tenant arising out of the rights claimed under a Rent Act, where the Rent Act clothes a special Court with jurisdiction to decide such suits. As an example, under Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947, the Small Causes Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide proceedings between a landlord and a tenant in respect of rights which arise out of the Bombay Rent Act, and no other Court has jurisdiction to embark upon the same. In this case, even though the Civil Court, in the absence of the statutory bar created by the Rent Act, would have jurisdiction to decide such suits, it is the statutory bar created by the Rent Act that must be given effect to as a matter of public policy. (See, Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v. Navrang Studios & Anr., (1981) 2 SCR 466 at 482). An erroneous decision clothing the Civil Court with jurisdiction to embark upon a suit filed by a landlord against a tenant, in respect of rights claimed under the Bombay Rent Act, would, therefore, not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit filed before the Small Causes Court between the same parties in respect of the same matter directly and substantially in issue in the former suit. 34.2.2. 34.2.2. An issue of law which arises between the same parties in a subsequent suit or proceeding is not res judicata if, by an erroneous decision given on a statutory prohibition in the former suit or proceeding, the statutory prohibition is not given effect to. This is despite the fact that the matter in issue between the parties may be the same as that directly and substantially in issue in the previous suit or proceeding. This is for the reason that in such cases, the rights of the parties are not the only matter for consideration (as is the case of an erroneous interpretation of a statute inter parties), as the public policy contained in the statutory prohibition cannot be set at naught. This is for the same reason as that contained in matters which pertain to issues of law that raise jurisdictional questions. We have seen how, in Natraj Studios (supra), it is the public policy of the statutory prohibition contained in Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act that has to be given effect to. Likewise, the public policy contained in other statutory prohibitions, which need not necessarily go to jurisdiction of a Court, must equally be given effect to, as otherwise special principles of law are fastened upon parties when special considerations relating to public policy mandate that this cannot be done. 34.3. Another exception to this general rule follows from the matter in issue being an issue of law different from that in the previous suit or proceeding. This can happen when the issue of law in the second suit or proceeding is based on different facts from the matter directly and substantially in issue in the first suit or proceeding. Equally, where the law is altered by a competent authority since the earlier decision, the matter in issue in the subsequent suit or proceeding is not the same as in the previous suit or proceeding, because the law to be interpreted is different.” 35. The present prayer for declaration, not asked for earlier, also has to be declined on the ground of constructive res judicata. In Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. & Anr. The present prayer for declaration, not asked for earlier, also has to be declined on the ground of constructive res judicata. In Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. & Anr. v. The Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara [1963 (Supp.)(1) SCR 172] and later, in Devilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam & Others [ 1965(1) SCR 636 ] it was held that if the doctrine of constructive res judicata was not applied to writ proceedings, it would be open to a party to take one proceeding after another and urge new grounds every time, which was plainly inconsistent with the considerations of public policy. 36. On a careful consideration of the legal propositions noted above, it is clear that the petitioners’ attempt to reopen issues already considered and rejected in earlier proceedings is squarely barred by the principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata. The contention that raising additional legal grounds or slight variations in relief entitles them to maintain fresh writ petitions ignores settled law that even an erroneous decision on a question of law binds the parties unless reversed in appeal or set aside by a competent forum. As stated above, the correctness of a previous judicial decision is irrelevant for the application of res judicata; what matters is whether the issue was directly and substantially in issue and finally decided between the parties. This principle was reiterated in Canara Bank (supra), where the Supreme Court clarified that issues of law, fact, or mixed questions, once decided, operate as res judicata unless they fall within narrow exceptions like lack of jurisdiction or overriding statutory prohibition. 37. None of the exceptions to the application of res judicata, such as jurisdictional errors or subsequent change in law, are attracted here. The legal regime under SARFAESI and the RBI MSME circulars remains the same, and the reliefs sought in the current batch of petitions are substantially the same as those rejected in the earlier rounds. The Court cannot entertain repetitive litigation solely because the party rephrases their challenge or invokes constitutional provisions already addressed. Therefore, the petitions are barred by res judicata, and the doctrine applies with full force in the present context to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and to uphold the finality of judicial determinations. 38. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Celir LLP v. Sumati Prasad Bafna and Ors. Therefore, the petitions are barred by res judicata, and the doctrine applies with full force in the present context to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and to uphold the finality of judicial determinations. 38. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Celir LLP v. Sumati Prasad Bafna and Ors. (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727), which relied on the decisions in State of U.P. v. Nawab Hussain [ (1977) 2 SCC 806 ], Devilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam and Ors [ AIR 1965 SC 1150 ], and the English decision in Greenhalgh v. Mallard [(1947) All ER 255 at p.257], to hold that where the same set of facts give rise to multiple causes of action, a litigant cannot be permitted to agitate one cause in one proceeding and reserve the other for future litigation. Such fragmentation aggravates the burden of litigation and is impermissible in law. The Court reiterated that all claims and grounds of defence or attack which could and ought to have been raised in earlier proceedings are barred from being re-agitated subsequently. This rule stems from the Henderson Principle, which, as a corollary of constructive res judicata embodied in Explanation VII to Section 11 CPC, mandates that a party must bring forward the entirety of its case in one proceeding and not in a piecemeal or selective manner. Courts must examine whether a matter could and should have been raised earlier, taking into account the scope of the earlier proceedings and their nexus to the controversy at hand. 39. If the subject matter or seminal issues in a later proceeding are substantially similar or connected to those already adjudicated, the subsequent proceeding amounts to relitigation. Once a cause of action has been judicially determined, all issues fundamental to that cause are deemed to have been conclusively decided, and attempts to revisit any part of it — even through formal distinctions in forums or pleadings — fall foul of the principle. Moreover, any plea or issue that was raised earlier and then abandoned is deemed waived and cannot be resurrected. The overarching object is to protect the finality of adjudications, discourage strategic or delayed litigation, and uphold judicial propriety and fairness by ensuring that parties do not approbate and reprobate or exploit procedural plurality to unsettle concluded controversies. 40. Moreover, any plea or issue that was raised earlier and then abandoned is deemed waived and cannot be resurrected. The overarching object is to protect the finality of adjudications, discourage strategic or delayed litigation, and uphold judicial propriety and fairness by ensuring that parties do not approbate and reprobate or exploit procedural plurality to unsettle concluded controversies. 40. Even on merits , the contention of the petitioners that their MSME registration, obtained prior to NPA classification, automatically entitles them to protection under the notification dated 29.05.2015 is legally untenable. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pro Knits v. Canara Bank (supra), it is the obligation of the borrower to disclose its MSME status with authenticated and verifiable documents before the loan account is classified as a Non-Performing Asset. Failure to do so disentitles the borrower from invoking the statutory framework at a belated stage to obstruct recovery under the SARFAESI Act . 41. A learned Single Judge in M.D. Esthappan v. Reserve Bank of India ( MANU/KE/0723/2025 ) rejected the very argument that MSME classification, by itself, precludes NPA classification or recovery action, observing that the petitioners had taken no timely steps to activate the revival mechanism. This view was affirmed by the Division Bench in M.D. Esthappan v. Reserve Bank of India (supra), which held that a borrower who fails to notify the bank of its MSME status prior to classification as NPA cannot later seek to invalidate proceedings under SARFAESI on that basis. The Court categorically observed that the law laid down in Pro Knits precludes such delayed assertion, and that borrowers cannot remain passive through the recovery process and seek to revive lapsed remedies at a convenient stage. The delayed claim of MSME status, without informing the bank in time or taking steps to start the corrective action process, cannot be accepted. Thus, the petitioners' contentions cannot be accepted given the judgments suffered by the petitioner, including in WPC number 30885/2024, and based on the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Pro Knits (supra), M.D. Esthappan (supra) and P.K. Krishna Kumar (supra). 42. It is also pertinent to note that the Petitioner had given before this court an undertaking in IA No. 1/2024 in W.P(C) No. 19103/2024 that he will deposit an amount of Rs. 42. It is also pertinent to note that the Petitioner had given before this court an undertaking in IA No. 1/2024 in W.P(C) No. 19103/2024 that he will deposit an amount of Rs. 2 crores within the stipulated time, failing which he shall withdraw all cases and surrender possession of the purported secured asset. The undertaking is as follows: “The Hon’ble High Court of Kerala had taken the said W.P.C No. 19103 of 2024along with W.P.C No. 10785/2024 for admission hearing on 10/06/2024. During the course of hearing, this honourable court had directed me to swear an affidavit stating that I shall remit an amount of Rupees 2 Crore on or before 30/06/2024 in regard to the instant subject matter in W.P.C No. 19103 of 2024 along with W.P.C No. 10785/2024. This affidavit s sworn in to put on record that I shall pay Rupees 2 crore on or before 30/06/2024.” 43. On the question of giving undertakings to the Court, the Apex Court in Dnyandeo Sabaji Naik and Another v. Pradnya Prakash [ (2017) 5 SCC 496 ] held as follows: “10. The filing of such an undertaking does not deprive the litigant of the remedy to question the judgment of the High Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Such a situation must, however, be distinguished from a case (such as the present) where a litigant rests content with seeking time to vacate the premises and the circumstances of the case indicate that the litigant did not intend to pursue any further remedy before this Court to assail the judgment of the High Court. Having furnished an unconditional undertaking to vacate the premises, it would be manifestly an abuse of the process for the petitioners to seek recourse to their remedies on the merits of the issues which arose in the First Appeal. 13. This Court must view with disfavour any attempt by a litigant to abuse the process. The sanctity of the judicial process will be seriously eroded if such attempts are not dealt with firmly. A litigant who takes liberties with the truth or with the procedures of the Court should be left in no doubt about the consequences to follow. Others should not venture along the same path in the hope or on a misplaced expectation of judicial leniency. A litigant who takes liberties with the truth or with the procedures of the Court should be left in no doubt about the consequences to follow. Others should not venture along the same path in the hope or on a misplaced expectation of judicial leniency. Exemplary costs are inevitable, and even necessary, in order to ensure that in litigation, as in the law which is practised in our country, there is no premium on the truth”. 44. A review of the petitioners’ litigation history, as disclosed through the table of previously filed cases, reveals a pattern of piecemeal, repetitive filings seeking substantially similar reliefs in respect of the same loan accounts and SARFAESI proceedings. In Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (supra), the Supreme Court applied the Henderson principle, stating that litigation tactics involving the fragmentation of claims or the reintroduction of issues that could and should have been raised earlier constitute abuse of process. The Court emphasised that even where claims are not strictly barred by res judicata, proceedings are liable to be dismissed if they are vexatious, repetitive, or designed to obstruct the finality of judicial outcomes. The present petitions are a clear example of such abuse, especially when read in the context of the entire sequence of proceedings. Repeatedly approaching the court with slightly altered formulations or new legal tags does not change the fact that the petitioners seek to revive claims that have already been decided or could have been resolved earlier. The conduct adopted here undermines judicial discipline and denies access to justice for genuine litigants. 45. W.P(C) No.4389/2025 was filed contending that during the pendency of W.P(C) No.42050/2024, the Magistrate should not have exercised jurisdiction under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act and, therefore, the passing of orders under Section 14 was bad. That apart, the prayers which are sought for in this writ petition are substantially the same as those which have been sought in W.P(C) 42050/2024. Accordingly, no separate orders are required to be passed in this writ petition. 46. Con. Case (C) No.3402/2024 is filed alleging that when the hearing in W.P(C) No.42050/2024 was going on, the bank took possession of the secured asset, which was a contumacious contempt of the Court. Accordingly, no separate orders are required to be passed in this writ petition. 46. Con. Case (C) No.3402/2024 is filed alleging that when the hearing in W.P(C) No.42050/2024 was going on, the bank took possession of the secured asset, which was a contumacious contempt of the Court. It is relevant to reproduce the order passed by this Court on 19.12.2024 in W.P(C) No.42050/2024, which reads thus:- “Counsel for the petitioners submits that this writ petition was heard yesterday. The case was adjourned to today for further hearing. In the meantime, physical possession of the 2nd petitioner’s residential home has been forcibly taken over by the Bank. In such circumstances, this Court is bound to direct the Bank to restore possession. 2. Advocate Mathew J. Nedumpara submitted that further hearing of the case can be only after the contempt is purged. 3. I find that though oral prayer for interim order was made yesterday, this Court was not inclined to grant an interim order yesterday. I am not inclined to pass interim order or restoration order today either.” Given the above order passed by this Court on 19.12.2024, I am not inclined to proceed further in Cont. Case (C) No.3402/2024 and the same will stand dismissed. 47. As regards the submissions of Sri. Ashwin Gopakumar in W.P(C) No. 8287/2025, it has to be noticed that the essential contention raised therein is that the bank could not have proceeded against the secured assets because of the bar created under Section 31 of the Securitisation Act. This contention, that the actions of the secured creditor are against the provisions of the SARFAESI Act , can be urged in a Securitisation Application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Under such circumstances, I am not inclined to pass any orders in that writ petition. The same will stand dismissed, subject to the liberty granted. 48. It is also to be noticed that the cost imposed on the petitioner in W.P(C) 30885/2024 has not been paid, and the subsequent proceedings have been initiated. Though this case eminently warrants the imposition of exemplary costs, I refrain from doing so, mindful of the fact that the petitioners are already burdened under a mountain of troubles. 49. In view of the above findings, these writ petitions are only to be dismissed. Though this case eminently warrants the imposition of exemplary costs, I refrain from doing so, mindful of the fact that the petitioners are already burdened under a mountain of troubles. 49. In view of the above findings, these writ petitions are only to be dismissed. However, the dismissal of the writ petitions will not preclude the petitioners from pursuing their remedies in the pending Securitisation Application before the Debt Recovery Tribunal concerned. The writ petitions are dismissed.